行为视角下中国上市公司股利决策研究
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摘要
长期以来，“中国式股利之谜”一直是公司金融理论界研究的一个重要问题，中国证监会十数年来一直致力于提高上市公司的分红意愿和水平。主流学者对股利决策的研究大多从税差、信息不对称、代理冲突等角度出发，将中国上市公司股利决策不同于西方的根源归结为中国特殊的制度安排，较少触及理性人假设，忽视人的行为偏差对股利决策的影响。行为学派对股利决策的研究初步形成一个理论框架，并没有进一步的丰富和完善。基于此背景，本文在已有相关研究基础上，结合中国的制度背景，从投资者异质信念和管理者过度自信两个角度来研究中国上市公司股利支付意愿不足和股利支付率低的现象。
首先，在股利迎合理论的分析框架中引入投资者异质信念和管理者过度自信，对上市公司股利支付活动机理进行理论分析，论证了投资者异质信念和管理者过度自信心理偏差对公司股利决策的影响。研究发现，每股股利与投资者异质信念负相关。投资者异质信念来自于：关于公司清算成本的信息比例，持股份额，风险溢价、税收溢价、投资溢价等，股利支付与这些因素之间存在负向关系。股利支付活动取决于股利溢价。文章论证了股利溢价与管理者过度自信负相关，当管理者对经济形势比较乐观时，股利支付倾向随着管理者的过度自信程度上升而下降；而当管理者者对经济形势比较悲观时，股利支付倾向随着管理者过度自信程度的上升而上升。
其次，实证检验了投资者异质信念对上市公司股利支付意愿的影响。本文利用多元probit模型对影响中国上市公司股利支付意愿的因素进行了实证研究，分别采用分析师预测分歧、经调整换手率和超额收益波动率刻画投资者异质信念，结果发现：在控制住公司规模、盈利能力、成长性、负债比率、股权集中度和流通股比例等因素后，投资者异质信念越大，公司股利支付的概率越低。研究结果证实了行为假说，控制变量的符号支持信号假说和管理者迎合假说，但是不能确定是否支持自由现金流假说和代理假说。同时，利用生存分析方法和Cox比例风险模型对上市公司支付意愿进行了实证研究。结果发现：沪深两家交易所上市公司的分红发生率很接近，但是分红特征有显著差别。公司成立时间年限越长，发生分红的可能性越高。公司上市地点会显著影响公司分红意愿，在沪市上市的公司发生分红可能性更高。主营业务收入，速动比率，法人股比例，行业股利支付水平，净资产收益率，每股净资产都显著地提高了股利支付的风险比率。而财务杠杆、股东权益比倒数、每股收益，市盈率会降低分红的风险比率会降低股利支付的风险比率，但是回归系数不显著，没有显著地净效应。
此外，实证检验了管理者过度自信对上市公司股利支付意愿和支付水平的影响。本文利用Logic模型对上市公司股利支付意愿进行实证研究，通过结合期权价内程度和管理者是否行权来判断其管理者过度自信特征，研究发现，上市公司的股利支付意愿与管理者过度自信之间存在着负相关关系，在管理者过度自信情况下，现金流量越小，成长机会较差的公司，股利支付可能性越小。上市公司独立董事人数的增加会增加股利支付的可能性，但是独立董事人数和现金流量的联合作用不明显。
最后，本文利用Tobit模型对上市公司股利支付水平进行了实证研究，采用管理者盈余预测作为过度自信的代理变量，结果发现，管理者过度自信与上市公司股利支付水平存在负相关的关系。结合管理者相机决策理论设立交叉项，从四个方面探讨并检验了可能或弱化和强化管理者过度自信与股利支付水平之间关系的五个因素。管理者身兼二职和现金流充裕程度会显著强化该关系，而具有控制权的第一大股东的公有制属性和行政任命会弱化该关系，市场成长水平的影响不显著。
总之，本文的实证研究发现，投资者异质信念和管理者过度自信会降低我国上市公司股利支付意愿和支付水平。这表明，除了传统的税收因素、信息因素、代理问题等，行为因素也是股利决策的重要影响因素，通过行为的视角有助于解释我国上市公司股利支付意愿和支付水平长期低下的现象。
“Chinese style dividend puzzle” is always a debatable topic in the world ofacademic and practice,China Securities Regulatory Commission devotes to invokelisted company's willingness of dividend payment and raise the level of dividendpayment for decades. Main strain researchers who study dividend policy focus on taxdifference, information asymmetry, principle-agency conflict,attribute the differencebetween Chinese listed company's dividend policy behavior and their westerncounterpart to Chinese special institutional arrangement. They seldom think of thehypothesis of rational man,ignoring the influence of man's behavioral bias ondividend policy. Behavioral school who study the dividend policy has develop anpreliminary research framework, but they haven't enrich and consummate it. Basedon this background, this dissertation use the methodology and viewpoint ofreliterature concerned for reference, considering the Chinese institutionalbackground,study on the Chinese listed company's low propensity and level to paydividend through investor's heterogeneous belief and managerial over-confidence.
Firstly, incorporating investor's heterogeneous belief and managerialoverconfidence to divend catering theory,their influence mechanism on listedcompany's dividend policy decision is studied. A model is constructed to demonstratethe negative relationship between dividend per share and investor's heterogeneousbelief.The later comes from the ratio of information about company clear cost, shareholding, risk, tax, investment premium.Dividend payment is negatively associatedwith them. Dividend payment propensity depends on dividend premium which hasnegatively related to managerial overconfidence.This dissertation explores therelationship between dividend payment propensity and managerial overconfidence asmanager has optimistic and pessimistic with economic situation.
Secondly,this dissertation empirically study investor's heterogeneous belief'sinfluence on listed company's dividend policy.Using multivariable probit model,analyst forcast disagreement,adjusted turnover ratio,excess return ratio as the proxy variable for investor's heterogeneous belief,it is found that controlling for companysize,earning ability,growth,leverage,share concerntration and tradable share ratio,thelarger the investor's heterogeneous belief;the lower probability of company'sdividend payment.this result supports for behavioral hypothesis,those controllingvariable's symbolic supports information hypothesis and managerial cateringhypothesis,but is not sure of supporting agent hypothesis.
Thirdly, the dividend payment propensity is empirical studied using survivalanalysis and Cox proportional hazard model, although the incidence ratio of Shanghaiand Shenzhen listed company is near, their payment character is difference,company's age and listed address can explain the dividend payment willingness. mainbusiness income, quick ratio, institutional share ratio, industrial dividend level, returnon equity, equity per share obviously raise the hazard ratio of dividend payment.financial leverage,Shareholders' equity ratio reciprocal,earning per share,price earningratio reduce the hazard ratio of dividend payment,but that is not obvious, they don'thave net effect.
Thirdly, managerial overconfidence's influence on listed company's dividendpayment willingness and level is studied,Using manager's option exercise situation tojudge managerial overconfidence, the influence effect is explored in logic model, it isfound that listed company dividend payment willingness is negatively related tomanagerial overconfidence.Under such circumstance,listed company with low cashflow and growth opportunity has lower probability to pay, the increasing independentdirector number can raise the probability to pay, but it's combination effect withcashflow is not obvious.
Fourthly, listed company dividend payment level is studied in a Tobit model.Using managerial earning forcast as proxy variable for managerial overconfidence, itis found that managerial overconfidence is negatively related to dividend paymentlevel. Based on managerial discretion theory,this dissertation studies five factor thatmay have impact on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and listedcompany dividend payment. managerial duality and cashflow will strengthen it,stateownership and political appointment will weaken it.
In conclusion, this dissertation try to demonstrate that: investor's heterogeneousbelief and managerial overconfidence can explain Chinese listed company'slong-term low dividend payment willingness and level. That is to say, exceptstraditional factor, behavioral factor is also important, through this view canunderstand Chinese company's long-term low dividend payment willingness andlevel.
首先，在股利迎合理论的分析框架中引入投资者异质信念和管理者过度自信，对上市公司股利支付活动机理进行理论分析，论证了投资者异质信念和管理者过度自信心理偏差对公司股利决策的影响。研究发现，每股股利与投资者异质信念负相关。投资者异质信念来自于：关于公司清算成本的信息比例，持股份额，风险溢价、税收溢价、投资溢价等，股利支付与这些因素之间存在负向关系。股利支付活动取决于股利溢价。文章论证了股利溢价与管理者过度自信负相关，当管理者对经济形势比较乐观时，股利支付倾向随着管理者的过度自信程度上升而下降；而当管理者者对经济形势比较悲观时，股利支付倾向随着管理者过度自信程度的上升而上升。
其次，实证检验了投资者异质信念对上市公司股利支付意愿的影响。本文利用多元probit模型对影响中国上市公司股利支付意愿的因素进行了实证研究，分别采用分析师预测分歧、经调整换手率和超额收益波动率刻画投资者异质信念，结果发现：在控制住公司规模、盈利能力、成长性、负债比率、股权集中度和流通股比例等因素后，投资者异质信念越大，公司股利支付的概率越低。研究结果证实了行为假说，控制变量的符号支持信号假说和管理者迎合假说，但是不能确定是否支持自由现金流假说和代理假说。同时，利用生存分析方法和Cox比例风险模型对上市公司支付意愿进行了实证研究。结果发现：沪深两家交易所上市公司的分红发生率很接近，但是分红特征有显著差别。公司成立时间年限越长，发生分红的可能性越高。公司上市地点会显著影响公司分红意愿，在沪市上市的公司发生分红可能性更高。主营业务收入，速动比率，法人股比例，行业股利支付水平，净资产收益率，每股净资产都显著地提高了股利支付的风险比率。而财务杠杆、股东权益比倒数、每股收益，市盈率会降低分红的风险比率会降低股利支付的风险比率，但是回归系数不显著，没有显著地净效应。
此外，实证检验了管理者过度自信对上市公司股利支付意愿和支付水平的影响。本文利用Logic模型对上市公司股利支付意愿进行实证研究，通过结合期权价内程度和管理者是否行权来判断其管理者过度自信特征，研究发现，上市公司的股利支付意愿与管理者过度自信之间存在着负相关关系，在管理者过度自信情况下，现金流量越小，成长机会较差的公司，股利支付可能性越小。上市公司独立董事人数的增加会增加股利支付的可能性，但是独立董事人数和现金流量的联合作用不明显。
最后，本文利用Tobit模型对上市公司股利支付水平进行了实证研究，采用管理者盈余预测作为过度自信的代理变量，结果发现，管理者过度自信与上市公司股利支付水平存在负相关的关系。结合管理者相机决策理论设立交叉项，从四个方面探讨并检验了可能或弱化和强化管理者过度自信与股利支付水平之间关系的五个因素。管理者身兼二职和现金流充裕程度会显著强化该关系，而具有控制权的第一大股东的公有制属性和行政任命会弱化该关系，市场成长水平的影响不显著。
总之，本文的实证研究发现，投资者异质信念和管理者过度自信会降低我国上市公司股利支付意愿和支付水平。这表明，除了传统的税收因素、信息因素、代理问题等，行为因素也是股利决策的重要影响因素，通过行为的视角有助于解释我国上市公司股利支付意愿和支付水平长期低下的现象。
“Chinese style dividend puzzle” is always a debatable topic in the world ofacademic and practice,China Securities Regulatory Commission devotes to invokelisted company's willingness of dividend payment and raise the level of dividendpayment for decades. Main strain researchers who study dividend policy focus on taxdifference, information asymmetry, principle-agency conflict,attribute the differencebetween Chinese listed company's dividend policy behavior and their westerncounterpart to Chinese special institutional arrangement. They seldom think of thehypothesis of rational man,ignoring the influence of man's behavioral bias ondividend policy. Behavioral school who study the dividend policy has develop anpreliminary research framework, but they haven't enrich and consummate it. Basedon this background, this dissertation use the methodology and viewpoint ofreliterature concerned for reference, considering the Chinese institutionalbackground,study on the Chinese listed company's low propensity and level to paydividend through investor's heterogeneous belief and managerial over-confidence.
Firstly, incorporating investor's heterogeneous belief and managerialoverconfidence to divend catering theory,their influence mechanism on listedcompany's dividend policy decision is studied. A model is constructed to demonstratethe negative relationship between dividend per share and investor's heterogeneousbelief.The later comes from the ratio of information about company clear cost, shareholding, risk, tax, investment premium.Dividend payment is negatively associatedwith them. Dividend payment propensity depends on dividend premium which hasnegatively related to managerial overconfidence.This dissertation explores therelationship between dividend payment propensity and managerial overconfidence asmanager has optimistic and pessimistic with economic situation.
Secondly,this dissertation empirically study investor's heterogeneous belief'sinfluence on listed company's dividend policy.Using multivariable probit model,analyst forcast disagreement,adjusted turnover ratio,excess return ratio as the proxy variable for investor's heterogeneous belief,it is found that controlling for companysize,earning ability,growth,leverage,share concerntration and tradable share ratio,thelarger the investor's heterogeneous belief;the lower probability of company'sdividend payment.this result supports for behavioral hypothesis,those controllingvariable's symbolic supports information hypothesis and managerial cateringhypothesis,but is not sure of supporting agent hypothesis.
Thirdly, the dividend payment propensity is empirical studied using survivalanalysis and Cox proportional hazard model, although the incidence ratio of Shanghaiand Shenzhen listed company is near, their payment character is difference,company's age and listed address can explain the dividend payment willingness. mainbusiness income, quick ratio, institutional share ratio, industrial dividend level, returnon equity, equity per share obviously raise the hazard ratio of dividend payment.financial leverage,Shareholders' equity ratio reciprocal,earning per share,price earningratio reduce the hazard ratio of dividend payment,but that is not obvious, they don'thave net effect.
Thirdly, managerial overconfidence's influence on listed company's dividendpayment willingness and level is studied,Using manager's option exercise situation tojudge managerial overconfidence, the influence effect is explored in logic model, it isfound that listed company dividend payment willingness is negatively related tomanagerial overconfidence.Under such circumstance,listed company with low cashflow and growth opportunity has lower probability to pay, the increasing independentdirector number can raise the probability to pay, but it's combination effect withcashflow is not obvious.
Fourthly, listed company dividend payment level is studied in a Tobit model.Using managerial earning forcast as proxy variable for managerial overconfidence, itis found that managerial overconfidence is negatively related to dividend paymentlevel. Based on managerial discretion theory,this dissertation studies five factor thatmay have impact on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and listedcompany dividend payment. managerial duality and cashflow will strengthen it,stateownership and political appointment will weaken it.
In conclusion, this dissertation try to demonstrate that: investor's heterogeneousbelief and managerial overconfidence can explain Chinese listed company'slong-term low dividend payment willingness and level. That is to say, exceptstraditional factor, behavioral factor is also important, through this view canunderstand Chinese company's long-term low dividend payment willingness andlevel.
引文
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