农民专业合作社中的委托代理关系与治理机制研究
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摘要
2007年7月,正式颁布实施的《中华人民共和国农民专业合作社法》对我国农民经济合作组织的发展和规范运行起到了积极的推动作用。2012年底,国家工商总局统计资料显示,已经注册登记的农民专业合作社总量达到52.2万家,农户加入专业合作社的比重达到16.4%。农民专业合作社是完善我国农村基本经营制度、发展现代农业和促进新农村建设的重要力量。
但是,相对于发达国家而言,我国农户入社的比例比较低,农民专业合作社对于农民的影响和带动作用有限。当前,我国大多数农民专业合作社主要是依靠涉农企业、生产和运销大户、农村基层供销社和基层组织等核心成员牵头组建的,这些农民专业合作社为分散化、小规模经营的单个农户提供生产资料、农产品加工和运销等方面的服务,但普遍存在合作社的规模小、市场竞争力弱、服务能力不强、与农户的利益联结不紧密等问题。由于各地区农业生产条件、社会文化和经济发展水平等各方面的影响,我国农民专业合作社发展的层次和水平差距很大,随着我国工业化和城市化水平的不断提高,城乡差距和地区差距的进一步扩大,以及农村阶层分化的加剧,参与合作社的农户在人力资本、商业资本和社会资本等的异质性将更加突出。在内因和外因的相互作用和相互影响下,合作社成员之间的委托代理关系对我国农民专业合作社的组织结构和发展方向产生越来越重要的影响。
在借鉴已有的研究成果的基础上,本文从以下几个方面进行了创新性探索：
第一,构建了“状态-结构-关系-治理-绩效”的分析范式(SSRGP)。对农民专业合作社的制度安排与治理问题,运用规范分析方法,将合作社成员委托代理关系与治理有机嵌入到产业组织理论的SCP分析范式与制度行为理论的分析SSP范式中。本文在对农民专业合作社的制度安排分析基础上,首次尝试将SSRGP分析范式应用到合作社内部的成员关系选择与合作社治理和绩效研究中,从委托代理视角,揭示同质性和异质性合作社的组织结构、行为、关系、治理与绩效之间的深层逻辑关系,为增强对农民专业合作社的客观性和整体性认识提供科学依据。
第二,首次对农民专业合作社成员合作关系的可能性和稳定性进行了研究。从合作社组织的制度安排结构出发,将合作关系的稳定性引入农民专业合作社组织结构与治理问题的分析中,首次探讨了农民专业合作社不同成员之间合作关系的可能性和稳定性,一定程度上突破了传统的委托代理关系研究视角,完善了已有的委托代理关系相关研究的范围,从理论上对合作社委托代理关系及治理进行了有益的补充。
第三,设计了调查问卷并运用案例对同质性和异质性农民专业合作社的委托代理关系与治理机制进行了研究。根据研究目的和内容,设计了针对农民专业合作社和成员的调查问卷,对同质性和异质性农民专业合作社的委托代理关系与治理机制进行比较研究。学术界对农民专业合作社治理机制与绩效的研究中,绝大部分仅限于定性分析,已有的定量分析中,所选择的变量均是没有权重的一组平行变量,本研究构建了农民合作社治理机制的层次模型,并运用客观赋权法—熵值法对各治理变量进行赋权,探讨了理事会、管理者报酬、股权结构、监督机制、成员退出权和外部监督与竞争各变量对于合作社治理机制的关系,因此,本文的研究可以说农民专业合作社研究方面作出了新的探索。
本文沿着从农民专业合作社委托代理关系的“组织状态、组织结构、委托代理关系与治理”几个层面进行相关问题的研究。
为详细了解我国农民专业合作社的组织状态,本研究从我国农村改革的背景出发,对我国农业合作化时期、人民公社时期以及1978年农村改革开放以来出现的合作社组织状态和影响因素进行了分析,在此基础上,进一步分析了不同的组织状态下的组织结构和委托代理关系特点,阐释了合作社的组织状态对其组织结构、成员关系和治理机制和治理绩效的影响。研究结果表明：从互助组、初级社、人民公社到转型时期的农民专业合作社,委托代理关系存在由弱到强、由简单到发展、由单向到多重的变化趋势,不同类型的委托代理关系的治理机制和治理绩效存在明显差异。其中,20世纪90年代以来农民专业合作社中的“成员-合作社”和“中小成员-核心成员”之间的委托代理关系与治理是我国农民专业合作社面临的主要问题。
为深入解释合作社的组织状态、组织结构、委托代理关系和治理的相互作用机制。本文以委托代理理论为指导,借鉴相关理论,结合案例,应用“状态-结构-关系-治理-绩效”的分析范式,分别对同质性和异质性合作社进行分析和比较。研究结果表明：
第一,成员的同质性取决于成员利益、要素禀赋、提供产品、入社动机和成员角色等方面,同质性合作社中,成员是使用者、惠顾者、所有者和控制者的统一体；第二,同质性决定成员关系是双向委托代理,代理链短,成员之间容易沟通和交流,减少了信息不对称,增强了合作社的稳定性。依据“状态空间模型化方法”和“分布函数的参数化方法”的研究表明,同质性成员与管理者均按照个人效用最大化进行理性博弈,基于合作双赢的关系契约更能够减少管理者的机会主义行为；第三,同质性合作社的资本形成仅限于成员,合作社财产属于全体成员所有,投票权仅限于成员。同质性合作社没有共同资产赎回,合作社盈余扣除公共积累以后主要以价格调整方式返还给成员,价格调整对每一个成员均等；第四,人口统计特征、资源禀赋和角色、风险承担与期望、能力等方面的差异是成员异质性产生的重要条件,成员异质性结构导致合作社在成员与合作社之间产生较为复杂委托代理关系。成员异质性决定了核心成员拥有合作社的控制权、决策权和收益权,中小成员要素禀赋、风险承担以及不能让渡的股份等特征决定了股份化的产权结构不利于合作社的长期稳定。
为了准确阐释对我国农民专业合作社委托代理关系的治理机制和治理绩效,本文沿着SSRGP分析范式,重点研究了异质性农民专业合作社的治理。
首先,在深入分析异质性合作社成员委托代理关系的基础上,借鉴相关理论,研究了我国农民专业合作社成员的合作关系的可能性和稳定性,从合作社内、外部提出了合作社委托代理关系的治理机制。研究结论表明：第一,借鉴Stackelberg竞争模型和Bertrand模型的分析显示,中小成员之间的合作存在子博弈精练纳什均衡,合作创造了价值增值并实现了集体理性；第二,通过古诺模型的分析表明,只要合作的收益率满足一定条件,异质性成员之间能够进行合作。借鉴KMRW声誉模型的分析显示,合作社不同类型的成员n阶段重复博弈存在合作均衡,合作社成员之间的合作关系存在稳定性。
其次,对我国农民专业合作社委托代理关系治理机制的进行实证分析。研究表明：第一,合作社委托代理关系治理机制主要包括：决策机制、激励机制、监督机制的内部治理机制以及外部约束机制,通过合作社委托代理关系治理机制的层次模型并应用熵值法对样本合作社进行了评价表明,治理机制各个变量在合作社治理过程中各自发挥不同的作用；第二,合作社有效的治理水平依赖于其完善的治理结构。当前我国农民专业合作社代理问题治理的重点应体现在合作社内部成员大会、监事会以及加强外部监督和竞争机制等方面；第三,在“社员—合作社”委托代理关系中,成员的偏好决定于理事会私人信息和监事会的监督水平,如果监事会独立程度较高,理事会不会与监事会共享内部私人信息,监事会将会选择一个相对低的监督强度,且不提供咨询或者提供的咨询没有任何价值。合作社内部规范、成员的主人翁意识、相互信任和彼此忠诚等非正式制度治理比较有效；第四,“中小社员—合作社”委托代理关系中,监事会独立程度越高,核心成员侵占中小社员侵占努力程度的边际成本越高,核心成员越不愿意实施侵占中小社员的利益。当监事会独立于核心成员时,核心成员很难通过控制监事会实施对于中小社员权益的侵占,其选择的侵占努力程度较低。通过加强外部力量特别是政府对合作社运行有效的制约与监督,通过外部力量的适度介入,协调中小成员和核心成员利益冲突,消除成员异质性对合作社发展的负面影响。
最后,在以上研究的基础上,通过对发达国家农业合作社委托代理关系治理的主要类型和经验的考察,从改进农户合作方式、提高合作社的经济效益、完善合作社法律制度、规范监督机制和社会资本等方面提出相应的政策建议。
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Farmers' Special Cooperatives, which was formally implemented in July2007, has made great contribution to the development and normal functioning of the farmers' economic cooperative organizations. According to the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, by the end of2012, the number of rural households that have enrolled in farmers' special cooperatives totaled0.552million, accounting for16.4%of all the rural households in our country. Farmers' special cooperatives have been serving as a vital force in perfecting the rural basic management system in China, boosting modern agriculture as well as pushing the building of a new countryside.
But compared to those of developed countries, the ratio of registered farmers in China is still relatively low, thus the benefits brought by farmers' special cooperatives to the farmers are quite limited. For the moment, most farmers' special cooperatives in China were mainly set up under the leadership of those core members from agricultural enterprises, production and marketing majors, rural supply and marketing cooperatives and other grass root organizations. Devoted to providing those decentralized and small individual peasant households with production materials and the processing and marketing services of agricultural products, these cooperatives, however, are generally characterized by a small scale, lack of market competitiveness, undesirable service quality and loose connections with the farmers. Owning to the disparities in agricultural production conditions, social cultures and economic development of different regions, there exists a wide gap in the development between different farmers'special cooperatives. And with the continuous progression of our national industrialization and urbanization, the gap between the urban and the rural as well as between different regions, the intensification of the rural class differentiation, the heterogeneity in labors, commercial and social resources among enrolled rural households will all grow more prominent. Under the interactivity of both internal and external factors, the principal-agent relationship between members of the cooperatives will play a more and more crucial role in shaping the organization structure and the course of farmers'special cooperatives in China.
Based on the existing research results, this paper makes a creative exploration in the following several aspects. First, building an analytical paradigm of "Situation-structure-relation-governance-performance". As for the system arrangement and governance issues of the farmers'specialized cooperatives, it gets the principal-agent relations and governance of cooperative members organically embedded in The SCP analysis paradigm of the industrial organization theory and analysis SSP paradigm of the system behavior theory with the normative analysis method. Based on the analysis of the Institutional arrangements for the farmers' professional co-operatives, this paper make the first attempt to apply SSRGP analysis paradigm to the relationship choice among the cooperative internal members and cooperative governance as well as the performance study, and to reveal the deep logic of relationship between organization structure, behavior, relationships, and governance and performance in homogeneity and heterogeneity cooperatives from the perspective of principal-agent, in order to provide the scientific evidence for the enhancement of the objectivity and integrity of understanding in farmers' professional co-operatives.
Second, the possibility and stability of the cooperative relationship among the farmers' professional co-operatives members were studied for the first time. Starting from the system arrangement structure of cooperative organization, introducing the stability of the cooperation relationships into the analysis of the organization structure and governance issues in farmers' professional cooperatives and discussing the possibility and stability of the cooperative relationship among the farmers' professional co-operatives members for the first time, the study breaks through the traditional principal-agent relationship research perspectives to some extent, and perfects the range in the existing related research of the principal-agent relationship, supplements the cooperative principal-agent relations and governance beneficially in theory.
Third, design a questionnaire and the use of a case study on the principal-agent relationship with the governance mechanisms of the homogeneity and heterogeneity of farmer cooperatives. Designed the questionnaire to professional farmers' cooperatives and members Based on the purpose and content, a comparative study of homogeneity and heterogeneity of farmer cooperative agency relationship with governance mechanisms. Academic governance mechanisms and performance of farmers 'professional cooperatives, mostly limited to qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis of existing, the selected variables are the weights of a set of parallel variables, we constructed a farmers' cooperative governance hierarchical model of the mechanism, and the use of objective weighting method-entropy method of the governance variables empowerment of the Council, Executive Compensation, ownership structure and supervision mechanism, members of the right of withdrawal and external oversight and competition variables for cooperatives relationship of governance mechanisms, therefore, this study can be said that the study of farmers' professional cooperatives made a new exploration.
This article conducts the research in related issues from the four levels named "organization status, organizational structure, the principal-agent relationship and governance" in the farmers' professional co-operatives principal-agent relationship.
For details about organization status of farmer professional cooperatives in our country, this research setting out from the background of the rural reform in China, analyses the cooperative organization status and influencing factors presented since the agricultural cooperation movement period in China, the people's commune period, and reform and opening-up in1978, based on which it gets further analysis on the characteristics of organizational structures and the principal-agent relationship under different organizational status, and illustrates the impact of organizational state of cooperatives on its organizational structure, member relationships, governance mechanisms and governance performance. Results show that:from mutual aid team, elementary agricultural producers' cooperative, people's commune, to the transformation of farmers' professional co-operatives, principal-agent relationship grows from weak to strong, from simple to complex, from single to multiple. Governance mechanisms and performance of different types of principal-agent relationship exists obvious difference. Of which, the principal-agent relationship and governance between the "members-cooperatives" and "small and medium-sized members-core members" since the1990s in the farmers' professional co-operatives are the major problem farmers' professional cooperatives are facing.
To further explain the cooperative organization status, organizational structure, the interaction mechanism of principal-agent relationship and governance, based on principal-agent theory as the guidance and combined with related case, this article applies an analytical paradigm of the "Situation-structure-relation-governance-performance" to do an analysis of the homogeneity and heterogeneity cooperatives respectively and make comparison between them leaning from related theory. The results show that:
First, the homogeneity of members depends on the interests of members, factor endowments, providing the product, motivation of entering the club and member role, etc. In homogeneity cooperatives, members are the unity of the users, patronage, owner and controller. Second, homogeneity decides the membership to be bidirectional principal-agent. Since agent chain is short, communication and exchanges become quite easy among members, the information asymmetry is reduced and the stability of the cooperatives is increased. The study of the "Situation-space formulation" and "parameterized distribution formulation" have shown that, members and managers of homogeneity carry on the rational game in accordance with the individual utility maximization,the relational contract based on win-win cooperation can reduce the managers' opportunism behavior much more; Third, the capital formation of homogeneity cooperatives is restricted to members, the cooperative property belongs to all the members, and the right to vote is limited to the members only. Homogeneity cooperative have no common assets to redeem, cooperative surplus mainly come back to the member in price adjustment way after deducting public accumulation, and the price adjustment is equal to every member. Fourth, the difference in the demographic characteristics, resources endowment and the role, risk taking and expectations, ability etc. is the important condition during the generation of member heterogeneity. The structures of membership heterogeneity lead to a more complicated principal-agent relationship between member and cooperatives. Membership heterogeneity determines the core members has the right to control, make decision and profit, the characteristics of small and medium-sized members such as factor endowments, risk-taking, and the shares cannot be assigned etc determines the demutualized property right structure is not in favour of long-term stability of the cooperative.
In order to interpret the governance mechanisms and performance of farmers' professional co-operatives principal-agent relationship accurately in our country, this paper focuses on the management of heterogeneous farmer cooperatives along the SSRGP analysis paradigm.
First, on the basis of the deep analysis on the principal-agent relationship of the heterogeneous cooperative members, learning relevant theories for reference, this paper studies the possibility and stability of the cooperative relationship among the farmers' professional co-operative members, and proposes the management mechanism for the cooperative principal-agent relationship from the view of both inside and outside the cooperatives. Research results indicate that:in the first place, according to the Stackelberg competition model and Bertrand model, analysis shows that there exists the fining Nash balance in the cooperation among the small and medium-sized members, cooperation can create the increment of value and realize the collective rationality; in the second place, the analysis of Cournot model shows that, heterogeneous members can cooperate as long as the yield of the cooperation meet the certain conditions. The analysis using KMRW reputation model for reference reveal that, cooperative equilibrium exists in the stage repeated game of the different types of the members in the cooperative, there is certain stability in the cooperative relationships among the members.
Second, making empirical analysis to the governance mechanism of farmers' professional co-operatives principal-agent relationship in our country. Research shows that:in the first place, Cooperatives principal-agent relationship governance mechanism mainly includes:decision-making mechanism, incentive mechanism and internal governance and external constraint mechanism of the supervision mechanism, through the hierarchical model of cooperative principal-agent governance mechanism, the evaluation applying the entropy method to the sample cooperative indicates:different variables of the governance mechanism play a different role in the process of cooperative governance respectively.In the second place, the effective cooperative governance relies on the perfect governance structure. In present, the focus of the agency problem governance of the farmers' professional co-operatives in our country should reflect on the membership meetings and board of supervisors inside the cooperative and strengthening of the external supervision and competition mechanism, etc; In the third place, in the principal-agent relationships of "membership-co-operatives", the preference of the members is determined by the private information in board of directors and the supervising level of the board of supervisors. If the board of supervisors is of a high degree of independence, board of directors would not share the internal private information with board of supervisors, board of supervisors will choose a supervision of relatively low strength, and not provide advice or provide advice without any value. The informal institutional governance such as cooperatives internal specification, members of the sense of ownership, trust and loyalty to each other prove out to be more effective; In the last place, in the principal-agent relationship of "small and medium-sized members-co-operatives", the higher the degree of independence of the board of supervisors, the higher the marginal cost for the core members to occupy the efforts of the small and medium-sized members, the core members are more reluctant to take implementation to encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized members. When the board of supervisors is independent of the core members, the core members are difficult to carry out the encroachment of the interests of the small and medium-sized members through the control of the board of supervisors, their choose a relatively low degree effort of occupations. Through strengthening the effective restriction and supervision of external forces, especially the government to the cooperatives, with the reasonable participation by external forces, the interest conflict of the small and medium-sized and core members can be coordinated, and the negative impacts of the membership heterogeneity on the cooperative development will be eliminated.
At last, on the basis of the researches above. By means of the respects to the main types and experience of farmer cooperation's principal-agent relationships in developed countries. And from the point of improving the patterns of the farmer cooperation, increasing the economic efficiency, consummating the legal system of the cooperation, specificating the regulatory mechanism and so on, to raise corresponding policy suggestions.
但是,相对于发达国家而言,我国农户入社的比例比较低,农民专业合作社对于农民的影响和带动作用有限。当前,我国大多数农民专业合作社主要是依靠涉农企业、生产和运销大户、农村基层供销社和基层组织等核心成员牵头组建的,这些农民专业合作社为分散化、小规模经营的单个农户提供生产资料、农产品加工和运销等方面的服务,但普遍存在合作社的规模小、市场竞争力弱、服务能力不强、与农户的利益联结不紧密等问题。由于各地区农业生产条件、社会文化和经济发展水平等各方面的影响,我国农民专业合作社发展的层次和水平差距很大,随着我国工业化和城市化水平的不断提高,城乡差距和地区差距的进一步扩大,以及农村阶层分化的加剧,参与合作社的农户在人力资本、商业资本和社会资本等的异质性将更加突出。在内因和外因的相互作用和相互影响下,合作社成员之间的委托代理关系对我国农民专业合作社的组织结构和发展方向产生越来越重要的影响。
在借鉴已有的研究成果的基础上,本文从以下几个方面进行了创新性探索：
第一,构建了“状态-结构-关系-治理-绩效”的分析范式(SSRGP)。对农民专业合作社的制度安排与治理问题,运用规范分析方法,将合作社成员委托代理关系与治理有机嵌入到产业组织理论的SCP分析范式与制度行为理论的分析SSP范式中。本文在对农民专业合作社的制度安排分析基础上,首次尝试将SSRGP分析范式应用到合作社内部的成员关系选择与合作社治理和绩效研究中,从委托代理视角,揭示同质性和异质性合作社的组织结构、行为、关系、治理与绩效之间的深层逻辑关系,为增强对农民专业合作社的客观性和整体性认识提供科学依据。
第二,首次对农民专业合作社成员合作关系的可能性和稳定性进行了研究。从合作社组织的制度安排结构出发,将合作关系的稳定性引入农民专业合作社组织结构与治理问题的分析中,首次探讨了农民专业合作社不同成员之间合作关系的可能性和稳定性,一定程度上突破了传统的委托代理关系研究视角,完善了已有的委托代理关系相关研究的范围,从理论上对合作社委托代理关系及治理进行了有益的补充。
第三,设计了调查问卷并运用案例对同质性和异质性农民专业合作社的委托代理关系与治理机制进行了研究。根据研究目的和内容,设计了针对农民专业合作社和成员的调查问卷,对同质性和异质性农民专业合作社的委托代理关系与治理机制进行比较研究。学术界对农民专业合作社治理机制与绩效的研究中,绝大部分仅限于定性分析,已有的定量分析中,所选择的变量均是没有权重的一组平行变量,本研究构建了农民合作社治理机制的层次模型,并运用客观赋权法—熵值法对各治理变量进行赋权,探讨了理事会、管理者报酬、股权结构、监督机制、成员退出权和外部监督与竞争各变量对于合作社治理机制的关系,因此,本文的研究可以说农民专业合作社研究方面作出了新的探索。
本文沿着从农民专业合作社委托代理关系的“组织状态、组织结构、委托代理关系与治理”几个层面进行相关问题的研究。
为详细了解我国农民专业合作社的组织状态,本研究从我国农村改革的背景出发,对我国农业合作化时期、人民公社时期以及1978年农村改革开放以来出现的合作社组织状态和影响因素进行了分析,在此基础上,进一步分析了不同的组织状态下的组织结构和委托代理关系特点,阐释了合作社的组织状态对其组织结构、成员关系和治理机制和治理绩效的影响。研究结果表明：从互助组、初级社、人民公社到转型时期的农民专业合作社,委托代理关系存在由弱到强、由简单到发展、由单向到多重的变化趋势,不同类型的委托代理关系的治理机制和治理绩效存在明显差异。其中,20世纪90年代以来农民专业合作社中的“成员-合作社”和“中小成员-核心成员”之间的委托代理关系与治理是我国农民专业合作社面临的主要问题。
为深入解释合作社的组织状态、组织结构、委托代理关系和治理的相互作用机制。本文以委托代理理论为指导,借鉴相关理论,结合案例,应用“状态-结构-关系-治理-绩效”的分析范式,分别对同质性和异质性合作社进行分析和比较。研究结果表明：
第一,成员的同质性取决于成员利益、要素禀赋、提供产品、入社动机和成员角色等方面,同质性合作社中,成员是使用者、惠顾者、所有者和控制者的统一体；第二,同质性决定成员关系是双向委托代理,代理链短,成员之间容易沟通和交流,减少了信息不对称,增强了合作社的稳定性。依据“状态空间模型化方法”和“分布函数的参数化方法”的研究表明,同质性成员与管理者均按照个人效用最大化进行理性博弈,基于合作双赢的关系契约更能够减少管理者的机会主义行为；第三,同质性合作社的资本形成仅限于成员,合作社财产属于全体成员所有,投票权仅限于成员。同质性合作社没有共同资产赎回,合作社盈余扣除公共积累以后主要以价格调整方式返还给成员,价格调整对每一个成员均等；第四,人口统计特征、资源禀赋和角色、风险承担与期望、能力等方面的差异是成员异质性产生的重要条件,成员异质性结构导致合作社在成员与合作社之间产生较为复杂委托代理关系。成员异质性决定了核心成员拥有合作社的控制权、决策权和收益权,中小成员要素禀赋、风险承担以及不能让渡的股份等特征决定了股份化的产权结构不利于合作社的长期稳定。
为了准确阐释对我国农民专业合作社委托代理关系的治理机制和治理绩效,本文沿着SSRGP分析范式,重点研究了异质性农民专业合作社的治理。
首先,在深入分析异质性合作社成员委托代理关系的基础上,借鉴相关理论,研究了我国农民专业合作社成员的合作关系的可能性和稳定性,从合作社内、外部提出了合作社委托代理关系的治理机制。研究结论表明：第一,借鉴Stackelberg竞争模型和Bertrand模型的分析显示,中小成员之间的合作存在子博弈精练纳什均衡,合作创造了价值增值并实现了集体理性；第二,通过古诺模型的分析表明,只要合作的收益率满足一定条件,异质性成员之间能够进行合作。借鉴KMRW声誉模型的分析显示,合作社不同类型的成员n阶段重复博弈存在合作均衡,合作社成员之间的合作关系存在稳定性。
其次,对我国农民专业合作社委托代理关系治理机制的进行实证分析。研究表明：第一,合作社委托代理关系治理机制主要包括：决策机制、激励机制、监督机制的内部治理机制以及外部约束机制,通过合作社委托代理关系治理机制的层次模型并应用熵值法对样本合作社进行了评价表明,治理机制各个变量在合作社治理过程中各自发挥不同的作用；第二,合作社有效的治理水平依赖于其完善的治理结构。当前我国农民专业合作社代理问题治理的重点应体现在合作社内部成员大会、监事会以及加强外部监督和竞争机制等方面；第三,在“社员—合作社”委托代理关系中,成员的偏好决定于理事会私人信息和监事会的监督水平,如果监事会独立程度较高,理事会不会与监事会共享内部私人信息,监事会将会选择一个相对低的监督强度,且不提供咨询或者提供的咨询没有任何价值。合作社内部规范、成员的主人翁意识、相互信任和彼此忠诚等非正式制度治理比较有效；第四,“中小社员—合作社”委托代理关系中,监事会独立程度越高,核心成员侵占中小社员侵占努力程度的边际成本越高,核心成员越不愿意实施侵占中小社员的利益。当监事会独立于核心成员时,核心成员很难通过控制监事会实施对于中小社员权益的侵占,其选择的侵占努力程度较低。通过加强外部力量特别是政府对合作社运行有效的制约与监督,通过外部力量的适度介入,协调中小成员和核心成员利益冲突,消除成员异质性对合作社发展的负面影响。
最后,在以上研究的基础上,通过对发达国家农业合作社委托代理关系治理的主要类型和经验的考察,从改进农户合作方式、提高合作社的经济效益、完善合作社法律制度、规范监督机制和社会资本等方面提出相应的政策建议。
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Farmers' Special Cooperatives, which was formally implemented in July2007, has made great contribution to the development and normal functioning of the farmers' economic cooperative organizations. According to the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, by the end of2012, the number of rural households that have enrolled in farmers' special cooperatives totaled0.552million, accounting for16.4%of all the rural households in our country. Farmers' special cooperatives have been serving as a vital force in perfecting the rural basic management system in China, boosting modern agriculture as well as pushing the building of a new countryside.
But compared to those of developed countries, the ratio of registered farmers in China is still relatively low, thus the benefits brought by farmers' special cooperatives to the farmers are quite limited. For the moment, most farmers' special cooperatives in China were mainly set up under the leadership of those core members from agricultural enterprises, production and marketing majors, rural supply and marketing cooperatives and other grass root organizations. Devoted to providing those decentralized and small individual peasant households with production materials and the processing and marketing services of agricultural products, these cooperatives, however, are generally characterized by a small scale, lack of market competitiveness, undesirable service quality and loose connections with the farmers. Owning to the disparities in agricultural production conditions, social cultures and economic development of different regions, there exists a wide gap in the development between different farmers'special cooperatives. And with the continuous progression of our national industrialization and urbanization, the gap between the urban and the rural as well as between different regions, the intensification of the rural class differentiation, the heterogeneity in labors, commercial and social resources among enrolled rural households will all grow more prominent. Under the interactivity of both internal and external factors, the principal-agent relationship between members of the cooperatives will play a more and more crucial role in shaping the organization structure and the course of farmers'special cooperatives in China.
Based on the existing research results, this paper makes a creative exploration in the following several aspects. First, building an analytical paradigm of "Situation-structure-relation-governance-performance". As for the system arrangement and governance issues of the farmers'specialized cooperatives, it gets the principal-agent relations and governance of cooperative members organically embedded in The SCP analysis paradigm of the industrial organization theory and analysis SSP paradigm of the system behavior theory with the normative analysis method. Based on the analysis of the Institutional arrangements for the farmers' professional co-operatives, this paper make the first attempt to apply SSRGP analysis paradigm to the relationship choice among the cooperative internal members and cooperative governance as well as the performance study, and to reveal the deep logic of relationship between organization structure, behavior, relationships, and governance and performance in homogeneity and heterogeneity cooperatives from the perspective of principal-agent, in order to provide the scientific evidence for the enhancement of the objectivity and integrity of understanding in farmers' professional co-operatives.
Second, the possibility and stability of the cooperative relationship among the farmers' professional co-operatives members were studied for the first time. Starting from the system arrangement structure of cooperative organization, introducing the stability of the cooperation relationships into the analysis of the organization structure and governance issues in farmers' professional cooperatives and discussing the possibility and stability of the cooperative relationship among the farmers' professional co-operatives members for the first time, the study breaks through the traditional principal-agent relationship research perspectives to some extent, and perfects the range in the existing related research of the principal-agent relationship, supplements the cooperative principal-agent relations and governance beneficially in theory.
Third, design a questionnaire and the use of a case study on the principal-agent relationship with the governance mechanisms of the homogeneity and heterogeneity of farmer cooperatives. Designed the questionnaire to professional farmers' cooperatives and members Based on the purpose and content, a comparative study of homogeneity and heterogeneity of farmer cooperative agency relationship with governance mechanisms. Academic governance mechanisms and performance of farmers 'professional cooperatives, mostly limited to qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis of existing, the selected variables are the weights of a set of parallel variables, we constructed a farmers' cooperative governance hierarchical model of the mechanism, and the use of objective weighting method-entropy method of the governance variables empowerment of the Council, Executive Compensation, ownership structure and supervision mechanism, members of the right of withdrawal and external oversight and competition variables for cooperatives relationship of governance mechanisms, therefore, this study can be said that the study of farmers' professional cooperatives made a new exploration.
This article conducts the research in related issues from the four levels named "organization status, organizational structure, the principal-agent relationship and governance" in the farmers' professional co-operatives principal-agent relationship.
For details about organization status of farmer professional cooperatives in our country, this research setting out from the background of the rural reform in China, analyses the cooperative organization status and influencing factors presented since the agricultural cooperation movement period in China, the people's commune period, and reform and opening-up in1978, based on which it gets further analysis on the characteristics of organizational structures and the principal-agent relationship under different organizational status, and illustrates the impact of organizational state of cooperatives on its organizational structure, member relationships, governance mechanisms and governance performance. Results show that:from mutual aid team, elementary agricultural producers' cooperative, people's commune, to the transformation of farmers' professional co-operatives, principal-agent relationship grows from weak to strong, from simple to complex, from single to multiple. Governance mechanisms and performance of different types of principal-agent relationship exists obvious difference. Of which, the principal-agent relationship and governance between the "members-cooperatives" and "small and medium-sized members-core members" since the1990s in the farmers' professional co-operatives are the major problem farmers' professional cooperatives are facing.
To further explain the cooperative organization status, organizational structure, the interaction mechanism of principal-agent relationship and governance, based on principal-agent theory as the guidance and combined with related case, this article applies an analytical paradigm of the "Situation-structure-relation-governance-performance" to do an analysis of the homogeneity and heterogeneity cooperatives respectively and make comparison between them leaning from related theory. The results show that:
First, the homogeneity of members depends on the interests of members, factor endowments, providing the product, motivation of entering the club and member role, etc. In homogeneity cooperatives, members are the unity of the users, patronage, owner and controller. Second, homogeneity decides the membership to be bidirectional principal-agent. Since agent chain is short, communication and exchanges become quite easy among members, the information asymmetry is reduced and the stability of the cooperatives is increased. The study of the "Situation-space formulation" and "parameterized distribution formulation" have shown that, members and managers of homogeneity carry on the rational game in accordance with the individual utility maximization,the relational contract based on win-win cooperation can reduce the managers' opportunism behavior much more; Third, the capital formation of homogeneity cooperatives is restricted to members, the cooperative property belongs to all the members, and the right to vote is limited to the members only. Homogeneity cooperative have no common assets to redeem, cooperative surplus mainly come back to the member in price adjustment way after deducting public accumulation, and the price adjustment is equal to every member. Fourth, the difference in the demographic characteristics, resources endowment and the role, risk taking and expectations, ability etc. is the important condition during the generation of member heterogeneity. The structures of membership heterogeneity lead to a more complicated principal-agent relationship between member and cooperatives. Membership heterogeneity determines the core members has the right to control, make decision and profit, the characteristics of small and medium-sized members such as factor endowments, risk-taking, and the shares cannot be assigned etc determines the demutualized property right structure is not in favour of long-term stability of the cooperative.
In order to interpret the governance mechanisms and performance of farmers' professional co-operatives principal-agent relationship accurately in our country, this paper focuses on the management of heterogeneous farmer cooperatives along the SSRGP analysis paradigm.
First, on the basis of the deep analysis on the principal-agent relationship of the heterogeneous cooperative members, learning relevant theories for reference, this paper studies the possibility and stability of the cooperative relationship among the farmers' professional co-operative members, and proposes the management mechanism for the cooperative principal-agent relationship from the view of both inside and outside the cooperatives. Research results indicate that:in the first place, according to the Stackelberg competition model and Bertrand model, analysis shows that there exists the fining Nash balance in the cooperation among the small and medium-sized members, cooperation can create the increment of value and realize the collective rationality; in the second place, the analysis of Cournot model shows that, heterogeneous members can cooperate as long as the yield of the cooperation meet the certain conditions. The analysis using KMRW reputation model for reference reveal that, cooperative equilibrium exists in the stage repeated game of the different types of the members in the cooperative, there is certain stability in the cooperative relationships among the members.
Second, making empirical analysis to the governance mechanism of farmers' professional co-operatives principal-agent relationship in our country. Research shows that:in the first place, Cooperatives principal-agent relationship governance mechanism mainly includes:decision-making mechanism, incentive mechanism and internal governance and external constraint mechanism of the supervision mechanism, through the hierarchical model of cooperative principal-agent governance mechanism, the evaluation applying the entropy method to the sample cooperative indicates:different variables of the governance mechanism play a different role in the process of cooperative governance respectively.In the second place, the effective cooperative governance relies on the perfect governance structure. In present, the focus of the agency problem governance of the farmers' professional co-operatives in our country should reflect on the membership meetings and board of supervisors inside the cooperative and strengthening of the external supervision and competition mechanism, etc; In the third place, in the principal-agent relationships of "membership-co-operatives", the preference of the members is determined by the private information in board of directors and the supervising level of the board of supervisors. If the board of supervisors is of a high degree of independence, board of directors would not share the internal private information with board of supervisors, board of supervisors will choose a supervision of relatively low strength, and not provide advice or provide advice without any value. The informal institutional governance such as cooperatives internal specification, members of the sense of ownership, trust and loyalty to each other prove out to be more effective; In the last place, in the principal-agent relationship of "small and medium-sized members-co-operatives", the higher the degree of independence of the board of supervisors, the higher the marginal cost for the core members to occupy the efforts of the small and medium-sized members, the core members are more reluctant to take implementation to encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized members. When the board of supervisors is independent of the core members, the core members are difficult to carry out the encroachment of the interests of the small and medium-sized members through the control of the board of supervisors, their choose a relatively low degree effort of occupations. Through strengthening the effective restriction and supervision of external forces, especially the government to the cooperatives, with the reasonable participation by external forces, the interest conflict of the small and medium-sized and core members can be coordinated, and the negative impacts of the membership heterogeneity on the cooperative development will be eliminated.
At last, on the basis of the researches above. By means of the respects to the main types and experience of farmer cooperation's principal-agent relationships in developed countries. And from the point of improving the patterns of the farmer cooperation, increasing the economic efficiency, consummating the legal system of the cooperation, specificating the regulatory mechanism and so on, to raise corresponding policy suggestions.
引文
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