论股票期权的法律制度构建
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摘要
本文是关于股票期权制度构建的专题研究，全文近四万字。论文立足于国内外股票期权的实践，同时借鉴了管理学、经济学、社会学等方面的研究成果，来阐发自己的看法。
本文共分五部分：
第一部分为股票期权的基本内涵。本部分着重分析了股票期权的含义、特点、法律性质、价值取向等基本范畴内的问题。本文认为，股票期权是指在公司治理中对经营者进行长期激励的一种薪酬制度，其价值在于降低代理成本、吸引优秀人才、减少企业现金支出和克服企业人员的短期行为。
第二部分为股票期权的理论基础。较为详细地阐明了委托代理理论与人力资本理论是股票期权实施的两个至为重要的理论前提。本文认为，现代公司中代理成本主要由经理的短期行为、偷懒行为、控制行为、以及股东的搭便车行为所致。而人力资本作为企业中最具能动性的生产要素，决定着企业的兴衰存亡，且具有绝对私有性而难易被抢占，并难以从质和量上准确定价。
第三部分为股票期权在我国的实践。主要涉及股票期权的模式和特点两个问题。本文认为，就股票期权在我国的现行模式而言，大体有上海模式、北京模式和武汉模式三种。但所有这些模式又有一定的共性：其适用范围不仅限于上市公司；股票期权不再是一种选择权；非国有中小股东利益在制度设计中未受到重视；具有惩罚性；在股票来源上不采用预留方式。
第四部分为股票期权的适用条件及我们必须直面的问题。本文认为，成熟的股票市场、宽松的公司资本制、国家宏观经济形势及企业所处行业发展空间看好、完善的职业经理人市场、优惠的税收制度则是股票期权制度不可或缺的适用条件。而股票期权的授予主体和对象不明确；法律法规没有明确规定推行股票期权所需的股票来源；缺乏股票期权行权受益兑现机制；无相应的税收优惠政策和会计法则；国有企业产权结构单一、法人治理结构不完善；证券市场发育不完善等是我们在构建股票期权制度必须解决或直面的问题。
第五部分为实施股票期权制度的法律设计，是本文的核心部分。在这一部分，本文首先论述了构建股票期权制度需修订的公司法、证券法、税法及会计法则等相关法令法规，以清除法律障碍。最后就股票期权设计中的授予主体、激励对象、行权价、行权期、授予数量、行权方式、业绩考核指标等法律要素进行了探讨。
In this thesis containing nearly 40,000 Chinese words in all, based on the practice of ESO in China and in some foreign countries, the construction of the Executive Stock Option (ESO) system has been studied, using mainly the knowledge of administration, economics and sociology for reference.
This thesis consists of five parts:
The first part is on the basal connotations of ESO. It talks about its signification, characteristics, legal quality, and value as well. As a long-term stimulating salary system to enterprise proprietors, the merits of ESO are that it can help corporations to lower agency cost, attract the talent, reduce cash expenditure and eliminate short-term behavior of employees.
The second part is about the theoretical bases of ESO. It introduces amply the two important theoretical prerequisites of this system, Agency Cost Theory and Human Capital Theory. Agency cost in modern corporations leads mainly from the short-term behavior, the shiftless behavior and the manipulative behavior of executives, and from the hitchhiking behavior of shareholders. At the same time, as the most motile essential factors of production, human capital determines enterprises' rise and fall. In addition, because human capital is absolutely private, it is difficult to control it and to price it precisely on quality and quantity.
The third part tells about the practice of ESO in China, dealing mainly with its present modes and the respective peculiarities of each mode. As far as the current modes of ESO in China are concerned, they are mainly Shanghai Mode, Beijing Mode and Wuhan Mode. Each mode has its own peculiarities, at the same time they have certain shared ones: ESO is applied not only to listed companies; ESO is no longer a kind of selective right; the benefit of non-state junior shareholders hasn't been attached importance in the system design; ESO is punitive; as to the sources of the stock, keeping stock in advance isn't adopted.
The fourth part introduces applying conditions of ESO and puts forward some problems that must be solved or faced in the construction of the system. A mature stock
market, an easy business capital system, fine condition of national economy, broad prospects of the industry, a perfect market for the vocational executives, favorable tax systems are exactly essential to the smooth running of ESO. Problems existing in the system are as follows: the awarding principal part and the awarded one of ESO are not specific; the laws and regulations have not defined the sources of the stock; the honoring mechanisms of ESO are scarce; there is not favorable tax policy and accountant regulations; the simplistic property right structure and unperfect corporation system in state enterprises; the securities business is immature, etc.
The fifth part is about the legal system construction of ESO, and it is the most important part of this thesis. First, in order to overcome legal obstacles to the construction of ESO, revising Chinese Corporation Law, Securities Law, Tax Law and correlative accountant regulations has been proposed. Then, at the end, this part discusses the legal factors of ESO construction, including the awarding principal part, the stimulated objects, the price, the term, the quantity, the mode, the assessing indexes to achievements, and so on.
本文共分五部分：
第一部分为股票期权的基本内涵。本部分着重分析了股票期权的含义、特点、法律性质、价值取向等基本范畴内的问题。本文认为，股票期权是指在公司治理中对经营者进行长期激励的一种薪酬制度，其价值在于降低代理成本、吸引优秀人才、减少企业现金支出和克服企业人员的短期行为。
第二部分为股票期权的理论基础。较为详细地阐明了委托代理理论与人力资本理论是股票期权实施的两个至为重要的理论前提。本文认为，现代公司中代理成本主要由经理的短期行为、偷懒行为、控制行为、以及股东的搭便车行为所致。而人力资本作为企业中最具能动性的生产要素，决定着企业的兴衰存亡，且具有绝对私有性而难易被抢占，并难以从质和量上准确定价。
第三部分为股票期权在我国的实践。主要涉及股票期权的模式和特点两个问题。本文认为，就股票期权在我国的现行模式而言，大体有上海模式、北京模式和武汉模式三种。但所有这些模式又有一定的共性：其适用范围不仅限于上市公司；股票期权不再是一种选择权；非国有中小股东利益在制度设计中未受到重视；具有惩罚性；在股票来源上不采用预留方式。
第四部分为股票期权的适用条件及我们必须直面的问题。本文认为，成熟的股票市场、宽松的公司资本制、国家宏观经济形势及企业所处行业发展空间看好、完善的职业经理人市场、优惠的税收制度则是股票期权制度不可或缺的适用条件。而股票期权的授予主体和对象不明确；法律法规没有明确规定推行股票期权所需的股票来源；缺乏股票期权行权受益兑现机制；无相应的税收优惠政策和会计法则；国有企业产权结构单一、法人治理结构不完善；证券市场发育不完善等是我们在构建股票期权制度必须解决或直面的问题。
第五部分为实施股票期权制度的法律设计，是本文的核心部分。在这一部分，本文首先论述了构建股票期权制度需修订的公司法、证券法、税法及会计法则等相关法令法规，以清除法律障碍。最后就股票期权设计中的授予主体、激励对象、行权价、行权期、授予数量、行权方式、业绩考核指标等法律要素进行了探讨。
In this thesis containing nearly 40,000 Chinese words in all, based on the practice of ESO in China and in some foreign countries, the construction of the Executive Stock Option (ESO) system has been studied, using mainly the knowledge of administration, economics and sociology for reference.
This thesis consists of five parts:
The first part is on the basal connotations of ESO. It talks about its signification, characteristics, legal quality, and value as well. As a long-term stimulating salary system to enterprise proprietors, the merits of ESO are that it can help corporations to lower agency cost, attract the talent, reduce cash expenditure and eliminate short-term behavior of employees.
The second part is about the theoretical bases of ESO. It introduces amply the two important theoretical prerequisites of this system, Agency Cost Theory and Human Capital Theory. Agency cost in modern corporations leads mainly from the short-term behavior, the shiftless behavior and the manipulative behavior of executives, and from the hitchhiking behavior of shareholders. At the same time, as the most motile essential factors of production, human capital determines enterprises' rise and fall. In addition, because human capital is absolutely private, it is difficult to control it and to price it precisely on quality and quantity.
The third part tells about the practice of ESO in China, dealing mainly with its present modes and the respective peculiarities of each mode. As far as the current modes of ESO in China are concerned, they are mainly Shanghai Mode, Beijing Mode and Wuhan Mode. Each mode has its own peculiarities, at the same time they have certain shared ones: ESO is applied not only to listed companies; ESO is no longer a kind of selective right; the benefit of non-state junior shareholders hasn't been attached importance in the system design; ESO is punitive; as to the sources of the stock, keeping stock in advance isn't adopted.
The fourth part introduces applying conditions of ESO and puts forward some problems that must be solved or faced in the construction of the system. A mature stock
market, an easy business capital system, fine condition of national economy, broad prospects of the industry, a perfect market for the vocational executives, favorable tax systems are exactly essential to the smooth running of ESO. Problems existing in the system are as follows: the awarding principal part and the awarded one of ESO are not specific; the laws and regulations have not defined the sources of the stock; the honoring mechanisms of ESO are scarce; there is not favorable tax policy and accountant regulations; the simplistic property right structure and unperfect corporation system in state enterprises; the securities business is immature, etc.
The fifth part is about the legal system construction of ESO, and it is the most important part of this thesis. First, in order to overcome legal obstacles to the construction of ESO, revising Chinese Corporation Law, Securities Law, Tax Law and correlative accountant regulations has been proposed. Then, at the end, this part discusses the legal factors of ESO construction, including the awarding principal part, the stimulated objects, the price, the term, the quantity, the mode, the assessing indexes to achievements, and so on.
引文
[1] Statutory Stock Options. http://www.neco.org
[2] Non-qualified Stock Options. http://www.neco.org
[3] Stock Options in Privately Held Companies. http://www.neco.org
[4] Stock Option Plans Spur Growth Companies to Greater Heights. http://www.neco.org
[5] Understanding Stock Options. http://www.neco.org
[6] Financial Returns of Public ESOP Companies: Investor Effects vs. Manager.
[7] Effects. Financial Analysts Journal, 8/9.
[8] McClelland, D.C. (1976). Power is the Great Motivators. Harvard Business Review, 34.
[9] Matures, C., P. Regibeau, K.Rockett. Compensation Schemes and Labor Market Competition.
[10] Piece Rate versus Wage Rate. Journal of Economies & Management Strategy, 1994-3: 325-353.
[11] Scott S. Rodrick. Incentive Compensation and Employee Ownership. http://www.amazon.com
[12] Robert R. Pastore. An Authoritative Guide to Incentive and Nonqualified Stock Option. http://www.amazon.com
[13] Shane A. Johnson, Yisong S. Tian. The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock Option Plans. Journal of Financial Economics 57(2000).
[14] [台]史尚宽．民法总论．中国政法大学出版社2000年版．
[15] [加]布莱恩 R·柴芬斯．公司法：理论、结构和运作．法律出版社2001年版．
[16] 梁彗星．民商法论丛(总第17卷)．金桥文化出版(香港)有限公司2000年版．
[17] 胡果威．美国公司法，法律出版社1999年版．
[18] 梅慎实．现代公司机关权力构造论．中国政法大学出版社2000年版．
[19] 卞耀武．当代外国公司法，法律出版社1995年版．
[20] [台]武忆舟．公司法论．三民书局1995年新版．
[21] 郭锋，王坚．公司法修改纵横谈．法律出版社2001年版．
[22] 范健，蒋大兴．公司法论．南京大学出版社1997年版．
[23] 蒋大兴．公司法的展开与评判．法律出版社2001年版．
[24] 程合江等．国有股权研究，中国政法大学出版社2000年版．
[25] 张士元等．企业法．法律出版社1997年版．
[26] 张维迎．企业的企业家——契约理论．上海三联书店，上海人民出版社1995年版．
[27] 刘灿．现代公司制的产权关系和治理结构研究．西南财经大学出版社1996年第一版．
[28] 杨瑞龙．企业共同治理的经济学分析．经济科学出版社2001年3月第一版．
[29] 严诚忠．企业人力资源管理——理论与实务．立信会计出版社1999年5月第一版．
[30] 程恩富，李新，B·梁赞诺夫，J·I·希罗科拉德．中俄经济学家论中俄经济改革．经济科学出版社2000年11月第一版．
[31] 洪银兴．发展经济学与中国经济发展．高等教育出版社2001年7月第一版．
[32] 祝二军．证券犯罪的认定与处理．人民法院出版社2000年第一版．
[33] 王亦平，马强，王轶．公司法理与并购运做．人民法院出版社1999年第一版．
[34] 杨瑞龙．国有企业治理结构创新的经济学分析．中国人民大学出版社2001年12月第一版．
[35] 黄运成，张育军．中国证券市场发展与创新．中国财政经济出版社2001年版．
[36] 陈清泰，吴敬琏．股票期权激励制度法规政策研究报告．中国财政经济出版社2001年版．
[37] 黄钟苏，高晓博．经理激励与股票期权．中华工商联合出版社2001年版．
[38] 张志强．期权理论与公司理财．华夏出版社2000年版．
[39] 高如星，王敏祥．美国证券法．法律出版社2001年版．
[40] [美]罗伯特W汉密尔顿．公司法概要．李存捧译．中国社会科学出版社1999年版．
[41] 胡俞越．经理层革命．中国财政经济出版社2000年版．
[42] 高程德主编．现代公司理论[M]．北京大学出版社，2000：94．
[2] Non-qualified Stock Options. http://www.neco.org
[3] Stock Options in Privately Held Companies. http://www.neco.org
[4] Stock Option Plans Spur Growth Companies to Greater Heights. http://www.neco.org
[5] Understanding Stock Options. http://www.neco.org
[6] Financial Returns of Public ESOP Companies: Investor Effects vs. Manager.
[7] Effects. Financial Analysts Journal, 8/9.
[8] McClelland, D.C. (1976). Power is the Great Motivators. Harvard Business Review, 34.
[9] Matures, C., P. Regibeau, K.Rockett. Compensation Schemes and Labor Market Competition.
[10] Piece Rate versus Wage Rate. Journal of Economies & Management Strategy, 1994-3: 325-353.
[11] Scott S. Rodrick. Incentive Compensation and Employee Ownership. http://www.amazon.com
[12] Robert R. Pastore. An Authoritative Guide to Incentive and Nonqualified Stock Option. http://www.amazon.com
[13] Shane A. Johnson, Yisong S. Tian. The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock Option Plans. Journal of Financial Economics 57(2000).
[14] [台]史尚宽．民法总论．中国政法大学出版社2000年版．
[15] [加]布莱恩 R·柴芬斯．公司法：理论、结构和运作．法律出版社2001年版．
[16] 梁彗星．民商法论丛(总第17卷)．金桥文化出版(香港)有限公司2000年版．
[17] 胡果威．美国公司法，法律出版社1999年版．
[18] 梅慎实．现代公司机关权力构造论．中国政法大学出版社2000年版．
[19] 卞耀武．当代外国公司法，法律出版社1995年版．
[20] [台]武忆舟．公司法论．三民书局1995年新版．
[21] 郭锋，王坚．公司法修改纵横谈．法律出版社2001年版．
[22] 范健，蒋大兴．公司法论．南京大学出版社1997年版．
[23] 蒋大兴．公司法的展开与评判．法律出版社2001年版．
[24] 程合江等．国有股权研究，中国政法大学出版社2000年版．
[25] 张士元等．企业法．法律出版社1997年版．
[26] 张维迎．企业的企业家——契约理论．上海三联书店，上海人民出版社1995年版．
[27] 刘灿．现代公司制的产权关系和治理结构研究．西南财经大学出版社1996年第一版．
[28] 杨瑞龙．企业共同治理的经济学分析．经济科学出版社2001年3月第一版．
[29] 严诚忠．企业人力资源管理——理论与实务．立信会计出版社1999年5月第一版．
[30] 程恩富，李新，B·梁赞诺夫，J·I·希罗科拉德．中俄经济学家论中俄经济改革．经济科学出版社2000年11月第一版．
[31] 洪银兴．发展经济学与中国经济发展．高等教育出版社2001年7月第一版．
[32] 祝二军．证券犯罪的认定与处理．人民法院出版社2000年第一版．
[33] 王亦平，马强，王轶．公司法理与并购运做．人民法院出版社1999年第一版．
[34] 杨瑞龙．国有企业治理结构创新的经济学分析．中国人民大学出版社2001年12月第一版．
[35] 黄运成，张育军．中国证券市场发展与创新．中国财政经济出版社2001年版．
[36] 陈清泰，吴敬琏．股票期权激励制度法规政策研究报告．中国财政经济出版社2001年版．
[37] 黄钟苏，高晓博．经理激励与股票期权．中华工商联合出版社2001年版．
[38] 张志强．期权理论与公司理财．华夏出版社2000年版．
[39] 高如星，王敏祥．美国证券法．法律出版社2001年版．
[40] [美]罗伯特W汉密尔顿．公司法概要．李存捧译．中国社会科学出版社1999年版．
[41] 胡俞越．经理层革命．中国财政经济出版社2000年版．
[42] 高程德主编．现代公司理论[M]．北京大学出版社，2000：94．
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