政治联系对民营企业资本配置的影响研究
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摘要
改革开放三十多年来，民营经济借助改革浪潮得到迅速发展，已经成为推动国民经济增长的一支重要力量，民营企业家在社会政治领域的影响也明显增大，企业家积极参政议政已屡见不鲜，而且许多民营企业乐于聘请政府官员担任企业要职，通过这些方式许多民营企业与政府之间构建了紧密的政治联系。
政治联系作为公司治理的一种因素，把企业的利益与政府及其官员的利益联系在一起，双方各有自身的利益诉求；企业为了获得更多的经济资源配置以及政府庇护，往往主动与政府及其官员构建紧密联系，通过借用政府权力来实现企业的利益诉求；而政府及其官员深知其手中掌握权力的价值，权力寻租难以避免，在为民营企业提供各种帮助之时，他们也有自己的利益诉求，需要与之关联的企业做出一定的“贡献”。因此，民营企业在构建政治联系的同时，实际上也在一定程度上不由自主地将自己置于政府干预之下，既可能获得政府“扶持之手”的帮助，也可能遭受政府“掠夺之手”的侵害。
为了厘清政治联系对民营企业的利弊影响，论文以企业资本配置问题为切入视角，从现实经济问题与客观现象出发，结合中国经济制度背景特征，采用从逻辑推理分析到实证检验、再到策略建议的研究思路，深入系统地探究了政治联系对民营企业资本配置及其相关治理问题的影响。
论文主要内容以及研究结论：
（1）以我国2005～2010年间民营上市公司为样本，以“固定资产投资的价值效应”作为度量投资效率的依据，考察了政治联系以及地区市场化差异对民营企业固定资产投资规模和效率的影响，研究结果表明：有政治联系的民企相对于没有政治联系的民企会进行更多的固定资产投资；但是，地区市场化程度越高，由于政府对企业经营的干预越少，政治联系对民营企业投资规模的正向影响作用越弱。在市场化程度较高的地区，企业主要基于经济分析做出投资决策，受到政府直接干预的程度较弱，投资效率没有显著受到企业政治联系的影响；但是，在市场化程度较低的地区，有政治联系民营企业的固定资产投资在很大程度上受到政府“掠夺之手”的侵害，从而导致有政治联系的民营企业表现出较低的投资效率。拓展性研究表明，当终极控制人通过金字塔结构式的复杂产权控制链间接控制着上市公司，发生现金流权与控制权相分离的情况时，对于有政治联系的企业，大股东有条件和动机通过投资扩张攫取私有利益，表现出较低的固定资产投资价值效应，这一现象在市场化程度较低地区更为明显；在这种情形下，外部中小投资者无法平等分享政治联系为企业带来的利益，反而会因为大股东和政府追求各自的利益目标而遭受投资损失。
（2）以2007～2010年间深沪A股市场上的民营上市公司为样本，实证考察了作为企业内部超额资源的组织冗余以及作为获取外部资源重要途径的政治联系能否促进民营企业R&D投资，并深入探讨了组织冗余和政治联系对企业R&D投资影响作用如何随着地区市场化程度的改变而改变，研究结果表明：不同类型的冗余资源对企业R&D投资的影响是有差异的；企业储备直接可利用冗余和潜在冗余能够促进R&D投资，但储备可恢复冗余会对企业R&D投资产生挤占。地区市场化程度越高，通过市场交易获得R&D所需资源的成本越低，此时民营企业不必储备大量的冗余资源；因此，市场化程度越高，直接可利用冗余和潜在冗余对R&D投资的积极影响作用越弱。作为获取外部资源重要渠道的政治联系并非必然促进企业R&D投资，在市场化程度较低地区政治联系不利于企业的R&D投资；但在市场化程度较高地区，政治联系对R&D投资有微弱的促进作用。仅在市场化程度较高地区发现政治联系能够显著促进企业将直接可利用冗余投向R&D，即形成资源互补效应；但没发现其他冗余资源与政治联系存在显著的资源互补效应。拓展性研究发现，在市场化程度较低的地区，由于政府对企业经营的干预较多，会造成固定资产投资对R&D投资的“挤占”，政治联系的存在不利于民营企业通过创新研发谋求长期可持续发展；但在市场化程度较高地区，并未发现这一不利影响。
（3）以我国2005～2010年间民营上市公司为样本，考察政治联系以及制度环境差异对民营企业获取银行贷款的影响，并进一步分析银行贷款的治理效应及其对企业价值的影响。研究结果表明：民营企业的政治联系影响了银行的放贷决策，与政府建立政治联系的民营企业可以获取更多的银行贷款，并且对于获取风险较高的长期银行贷款方面亦发挥出显著作用。制度环境越差，即政府侵害产权的程度越深、私有产权的法律保护环境越弱以及金融业的市场化水平越低，“政治联系的银行贷款效应”越强，构建政治联系是民营企业克服市场制度缺陷的一种非正式替代机制；其中“政治联系的银行贷款效应”在获取更多的长期贷款方面表现显著。建立政治联系的民营企业，其背负的银行债务能够发挥一定的治理效应，促进了企业价值的提升，政治联系为企业带来的银行资金是有效率的资源配置。本研究为加深理解政治联系对公司价值和社会资源配置的影响提供了一个有意义的视角。
Reform and opening up more than30years, the private economy developedrapidly with the reform tide, which has become an important force in promotingnational economic growth. The impact of private entrepreneurs in the social andpolitical field has increased significantly; entrepreneurs participating in politics activelyare very common; many private enterprises are willing to hire government officials as acorporate senior; by these ways many private enterprises build close politicalconnections with government.
Political connection as a factor of corporate governance bring the interests ofenterprises and government (including its officials) together, both sides have their owninterest demands. In order to obtain more economic resources allocation as well aspolitical asylum, many enterprises take initiative to build close ties with governmentand its officials, through the authority of government to achieve firm interest demands.The government and its officials realize the value of the authority in their hands, sopower rent-seeking is hard to avoid. While providing assistance to private enterprises,they have their own interest demands, and need these enterprises make certain“contributions”. Thus it can be seen, while building political connections withgovernment, private enterprises involuntarily place themselves under the governmentintervention at the same time; they not only possible to obtain help from government’s“helping hand”, also may be subject to misappropriation by government’s “grappinghand”.
To better understand the pros and cons impact of political connections on privateenterprises, starting from the real economic issues and market phenomena, adopting theresearch ideas of “institutional background analysis, logical reasoning, empirical testingand policy recommendations”, this paper studied the impact of political connections onprivate enterprises’ capital allocation and its related governance issues deeply andsystematically.
The main contents and conclusion:
(1) Choosing Chinese private listed firms during2005~2010as samples, this paperstudies the impact of political connections and degree of regional marketization on scaleand efficiency of capital investment of private firms. The results show that: Firms withpolitical connections have more capital investment than those without political connections; but higher the marketization degree is, weaker the positive impact ofpolitical connections on capital investment scale is. In the region of higher degree ofmarketization, political connections have no influence on the value effect of capitalinvestment; but in the region of lower degree of marketization, firms with politicalconnections have lower value effect of capital investment than those without politicalconnections. Finally, we have the conclusion: From the perspective of capitalinvestment, building political connections in the region of lower degree ofmarketization is “harm” than “profit” for private firms; through the ties of politicalconnections, government intervention on private firms will lead capital investment to be“political contributions”, so harm the firm value.
(2) Based on the theory of R&D investment derived from internal and externalresources, choosing private listed enterprise in China A share market during2007~2010as samples, this paper studies the impact of organizational slack and political connectionon private firms’ R&D investment in different market circumstance, the empiricalresults show that: Available slack and potential slack can increase private firms’ R&Dinvestment, but save recoverable slack will crowd out R&D investment; With theimprovement of the degree of regional marketization, the positive effect of availableslack and potential slack on R&D investment will become weaker. The politicalconnection as an important channel of access to external resources does not necessarilypromote firms’ R&D investment; in the region of lower degree of marketization,political connection has negative effect on R&D investment; but in the region of higherdegree of marketization, political connection has slightly positive effect on R&Dinvestment. Only in the region of higher degree of marketization, political connectioncan promote the available slack change into R&D investment significantly; but haven’tfound significant complementarities between other slack and political connection. Atlast, we provide some policy suggestions for government departments to designincentive mechanism for private firms’ R&D investment.
(3) Choosing Chinese private listed enterprises during2005~2010as samples, thispaper studies the impact of political connections of private enterprises and differencesof institutional environments on acquiring bank loans, and analyzes the governanceeffect of bank-debt and its impact on firm value. The results show that: Politicalconnections have influenced bank's lending policy; the private enterprises who havepolitical connections could acquire more loans from bank. Poorer the institutionalenvironments are, stronger the effect of political connections in helping private enterprises to acquire more bank loans is; building political connections is an informalsubstitute mechanism for private enterprises to overcome the drawbacks of marketinstitutions. The bank loans have governance effect in private enterprises with politicalconnections and can increase firm value; the allocation of bank loans through politicalconnections is efficient. This study provides a meaningful perspective for deepeningunderstand the impact of political connections on firm value and allocation of socialresources.
政治联系作为公司治理的一种因素，把企业的利益与政府及其官员的利益联系在一起，双方各有自身的利益诉求；企业为了获得更多的经济资源配置以及政府庇护，往往主动与政府及其官员构建紧密联系，通过借用政府权力来实现企业的利益诉求；而政府及其官员深知其手中掌握权力的价值，权力寻租难以避免，在为民营企业提供各种帮助之时，他们也有自己的利益诉求，需要与之关联的企业做出一定的“贡献”。因此，民营企业在构建政治联系的同时，实际上也在一定程度上不由自主地将自己置于政府干预之下，既可能获得政府“扶持之手”的帮助，也可能遭受政府“掠夺之手”的侵害。
为了厘清政治联系对民营企业的利弊影响，论文以企业资本配置问题为切入视角，从现实经济问题与客观现象出发，结合中国经济制度背景特征，采用从逻辑推理分析到实证检验、再到策略建议的研究思路，深入系统地探究了政治联系对民营企业资本配置及其相关治理问题的影响。
论文主要内容以及研究结论：
（1）以我国2005～2010年间民营上市公司为样本，以“固定资产投资的价值效应”作为度量投资效率的依据，考察了政治联系以及地区市场化差异对民营企业固定资产投资规模和效率的影响，研究结果表明：有政治联系的民企相对于没有政治联系的民企会进行更多的固定资产投资；但是，地区市场化程度越高，由于政府对企业经营的干预越少，政治联系对民营企业投资规模的正向影响作用越弱。在市场化程度较高的地区，企业主要基于经济分析做出投资决策，受到政府直接干预的程度较弱，投资效率没有显著受到企业政治联系的影响；但是，在市场化程度较低的地区，有政治联系民营企业的固定资产投资在很大程度上受到政府“掠夺之手”的侵害，从而导致有政治联系的民营企业表现出较低的投资效率。拓展性研究表明，当终极控制人通过金字塔结构式的复杂产权控制链间接控制着上市公司，发生现金流权与控制权相分离的情况时，对于有政治联系的企业，大股东有条件和动机通过投资扩张攫取私有利益，表现出较低的固定资产投资价值效应，这一现象在市场化程度较低地区更为明显；在这种情形下，外部中小投资者无法平等分享政治联系为企业带来的利益，反而会因为大股东和政府追求各自的利益目标而遭受投资损失。
（2）以2007～2010年间深沪A股市场上的民营上市公司为样本，实证考察了作为企业内部超额资源的组织冗余以及作为获取外部资源重要途径的政治联系能否促进民营企业R&D投资，并深入探讨了组织冗余和政治联系对企业R&D投资影响作用如何随着地区市场化程度的改变而改变，研究结果表明：不同类型的冗余资源对企业R&D投资的影响是有差异的；企业储备直接可利用冗余和潜在冗余能够促进R&D投资，但储备可恢复冗余会对企业R&D投资产生挤占。地区市场化程度越高，通过市场交易获得R&D所需资源的成本越低，此时民营企业不必储备大量的冗余资源；因此，市场化程度越高，直接可利用冗余和潜在冗余对R&D投资的积极影响作用越弱。作为获取外部资源重要渠道的政治联系并非必然促进企业R&D投资，在市场化程度较低地区政治联系不利于企业的R&D投资；但在市场化程度较高地区，政治联系对R&D投资有微弱的促进作用。仅在市场化程度较高地区发现政治联系能够显著促进企业将直接可利用冗余投向R&D，即形成资源互补效应；但没发现其他冗余资源与政治联系存在显著的资源互补效应。拓展性研究发现，在市场化程度较低的地区，由于政府对企业经营的干预较多，会造成固定资产投资对R&D投资的“挤占”，政治联系的存在不利于民营企业通过创新研发谋求长期可持续发展；但在市场化程度较高地区，并未发现这一不利影响。
（3）以我国2005～2010年间民营上市公司为样本，考察政治联系以及制度环境差异对民营企业获取银行贷款的影响，并进一步分析银行贷款的治理效应及其对企业价值的影响。研究结果表明：民营企业的政治联系影响了银行的放贷决策，与政府建立政治联系的民营企业可以获取更多的银行贷款，并且对于获取风险较高的长期银行贷款方面亦发挥出显著作用。制度环境越差，即政府侵害产权的程度越深、私有产权的法律保护环境越弱以及金融业的市场化水平越低，“政治联系的银行贷款效应”越强，构建政治联系是民营企业克服市场制度缺陷的一种非正式替代机制；其中“政治联系的银行贷款效应”在获取更多的长期贷款方面表现显著。建立政治联系的民营企业，其背负的银行债务能够发挥一定的治理效应，促进了企业价值的提升，政治联系为企业带来的银行资金是有效率的资源配置。本研究为加深理解政治联系对公司价值和社会资源配置的影响提供了一个有意义的视角。
Reform and opening up more than30years, the private economy developedrapidly with the reform tide, which has become an important force in promotingnational economic growth. The impact of private entrepreneurs in the social andpolitical field has increased significantly; entrepreneurs participating in politics activelyare very common; many private enterprises are willing to hire government officials as acorporate senior; by these ways many private enterprises build close politicalconnections with government.
Political connection as a factor of corporate governance bring the interests ofenterprises and government (including its officials) together, both sides have their owninterest demands. In order to obtain more economic resources allocation as well aspolitical asylum, many enterprises take initiative to build close ties with governmentand its officials, through the authority of government to achieve firm interest demands.The government and its officials realize the value of the authority in their hands, sopower rent-seeking is hard to avoid. While providing assistance to private enterprises,they have their own interest demands, and need these enterprises make certain“contributions”. Thus it can be seen, while building political connections withgovernment, private enterprises involuntarily place themselves under the governmentintervention at the same time; they not only possible to obtain help from government’s“helping hand”, also may be subject to misappropriation by government’s “grappinghand”.
To better understand the pros and cons impact of political connections on privateenterprises, starting from the real economic issues and market phenomena, adopting theresearch ideas of “institutional background analysis, logical reasoning, empirical testingand policy recommendations”, this paper studied the impact of political connections onprivate enterprises’ capital allocation and its related governance issues deeply andsystematically.
The main contents and conclusion:
(1) Choosing Chinese private listed firms during2005~2010as samples, this paperstudies the impact of political connections and degree of regional marketization on scaleand efficiency of capital investment of private firms. The results show that: Firms withpolitical connections have more capital investment than those without political connections; but higher the marketization degree is, weaker the positive impact ofpolitical connections on capital investment scale is. In the region of higher degree ofmarketization, political connections have no influence on the value effect of capitalinvestment; but in the region of lower degree of marketization, firms with politicalconnections have lower value effect of capital investment than those without politicalconnections. Finally, we have the conclusion: From the perspective of capitalinvestment, building political connections in the region of lower degree ofmarketization is “harm” than “profit” for private firms; through the ties of politicalconnections, government intervention on private firms will lead capital investment to be“political contributions”, so harm the firm value.
(2) Based on the theory of R&D investment derived from internal and externalresources, choosing private listed enterprise in China A share market during2007~2010as samples, this paper studies the impact of organizational slack and political connectionon private firms’ R&D investment in different market circumstance, the empiricalresults show that: Available slack and potential slack can increase private firms’ R&Dinvestment, but save recoverable slack will crowd out R&D investment; With theimprovement of the degree of regional marketization, the positive effect of availableslack and potential slack on R&D investment will become weaker. The politicalconnection as an important channel of access to external resources does not necessarilypromote firms’ R&D investment; in the region of lower degree of marketization,political connection has negative effect on R&D investment; but in the region of higherdegree of marketization, political connection has slightly positive effect on R&Dinvestment. Only in the region of higher degree of marketization, political connectioncan promote the available slack change into R&D investment significantly; but haven’tfound significant complementarities between other slack and political connection. Atlast, we provide some policy suggestions for government departments to designincentive mechanism for private firms’ R&D investment.
(3) Choosing Chinese private listed enterprises during2005~2010as samples, thispaper studies the impact of political connections of private enterprises and differencesof institutional environments on acquiring bank loans, and analyzes the governanceeffect of bank-debt and its impact on firm value. The results show that: Politicalconnections have influenced bank's lending policy; the private enterprises who havepolitical connections could acquire more loans from bank. Poorer the institutionalenvironments are, stronger the effect of political connections in helping private enterprises to acquire more bank loans is; building political connections is an informalsubstitute mechanism for private enterprises to overcome the drawbacks of marketinstitutions. The bank loans have governance effect in private enterprises with politicalconnections and can increase firm value; the allocation of bank loans through politicalconnections is efficient. This study provides a meaningful perspective for deepeningunderstand the impact of political connections on firm value and allocation of socialresources.
引文
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