信用保证的制度设计与交易成本研究
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摘要
目前,世界各国普遍采用信用保证制度来解决中小企业融资困境的问题,特别是中小企业融资市场失灵的问题。过去多数的研究从微观角度,针对信用保证机构的营运特性、营运绩效或风险进行分析；宏观的角度则从政府产业或银行信贷政策等探讨,一些跨国的研究则以各国制度功能或特征表现作出说明和比较,虽然大部份的结论也说明政府介入的必要性及信保制度的特定效益,但也常出现正反两面的意见,对于信用保证制度为何或如何解决中小企业融资问题缺乏整体性的理论架构及分析工具。
本文先以制度经济学的交易成本观点,针对中小企业融资问题的市场失灵现象,分别从信息不对称、垄断、外部性及公共财等角度进行完整深入的分析,从中归纳出与交易成本的关联性,并以“交易成本是制度运作的成本”为核心思想,从制度理论中探讨制度的定义及其中的构成要素并和相关的交易成本作为联结,形成一个制度要素与交易成本分析表,作为检视世界各国及美国、中国大陆和台湾等信用保证制度的分析框架。其次,透过制度变迁理论分析各种制度安排的背景因素,以了解其发展的时空背景和影响性。
研究结果发现,在制度安排分析方面,以“法令明定交易对象”和“政府主导”是世界各国信保制度普遍的安排要素,前者有助于参与者降低市场交易成本；后者则有助于降低银行等金融机构的高度垄断性问题,同时也解决“信用保证”公共财供给不足的问题。此外,政府进行政策统合和资源分配将有效降低政治交易成本。至于其它的信保制度设计要素对于解决交易成本问题,因各国环境及政策不同,不易判断其优劣,这也说明了制度的设计需有整体性的思考。
在个案研究中,美国和台湾的信保制度因针对小企业融资市场的交易成本问题有较多的制度安排,因此较能有效降低市场失灵问题,中国大陆的个案则显示制度安排不足。从制度变迁的观点来看,前两者的制度安排与经济危急的环境有关,而最后者则因从功能补足为思考出发点,故仅重视监管的安排。
本文所发展的分析架构工具能协助快速检视现行信保制度的全貌,也可明确掌握该制度的缺失和各因素之间的关联性,以作为制度检讨或修正时综合考虑的依据。而透过制度变迁的分析,可以解释说明诱发各国信保制度的时空背景,以降低不当模拟的偏误。
本文主要包括下列内容：对中小企业的融资问题进行理论及实务上的梳理,并归纳为四个交易成本的因素。针对制度理论的制度定义进行深刻的探讨,并和交易成本理论相结合。对于过去信保制度的诸多研究进行前述理论的分类及说明。发展出检视信保制度的工具框架。针对美国中国大陆及台湾三个信保制度个案进行检视,除详细说明其各自的特性也比较其间的差异。最后给出结论和建议。
The credit guarantee (CG) mechanism is generally used as the important policy and program to solve the financial problems of SMEs around the world. The main purpose is to solve the problems of the SME financing market failure. Past, the majority of research from the microscopic point of credit guarantee agencies are operating characteristics, performance or risk analysis; macropoint of view from government property and bank credit policy. Some multinational studies were designed to examine national institutions function or characteristic performance. Although most conclusions illustrate the need for government intervention and institution specific benefits, but often the pros and cons of opinions were also issued. Why or how that credit guarantee institution solves the financial problems of SMEs lacks integrity theoretical framework and analysis tools.
This article firstly explores the transaction costs associate with SME financing market failure phenomenon, respectively, from the information asymmetry, monopoly, externalities and public goods with a completely and in-depth analysis from institutional economics perspective."transaction cost is the cost of the operation of the institution" is as the core idea to explore the definition of constituent elements of the institution and as links related to transaction costs. An analytical framework of an institutional elements and transaction cost analysis table is developed and used as view the credit guarantee instititions in the world and the United States, China mainland and Taiwan. Secondly, through institutional change theory analysis of the background factors of the various institutional arrangements to understand their background and the impact of the development of space-time.
The results found in the analysis of institutional arrangements, the "act stipulates. the transaction object" and "government-led" are common arrangements in the world CGs, the former helps participants reduce market transaction costs; latter helps to reduce the highly monopoly of banks and other financial institutions, also solve the problem of inadequate supply of public goods of credit guarantee. In addition, the government policy integration and resource allocation will reduce political transaction costs. As for the other institutional elements for solving transaction costs, the difficulty to judge the pros and cons is true since of the different national environment policy.
In the case studies, the CGs in the United States and Taiwan because of the more institutional arrangements, are more effective to reduce market failures, the China mainland shows a lack of institutional arrangements. From the point of view of institutional change, the former two's institutional arrangements were initialed under economic crisis, and the last settled due from a functional complement as the start thinking point, so the only emphasis on regulatory arrangements.
Analytical framework tools assist to view of existing CGs, also clearly grasp the correlation between these elements of the institition. Through the analysis of institutional change, can induce the factors of space-time background to different countries CGs, help reduce improper analogy bias.
This article consists of the following elements:
First, the financing problems of SMEs on the theory and practice of carding, and grouped into four factors of transaction costs.
Second, profound of institution definition for institutional theory and transaction cost theory.
Third, the classification and description of researchs for the past CGs with the foregoing theory.
Fourth, the development of the tools framework examines the CGs.
Fifth, views the cases of the institutional arrangement of CGs in America, China mainland and Taiwan, also compares the differences between them, in addition to the detailed description of their respective characteristics.
Sixth, and finally give conclusions and recommendations.
本文先以制度经济学的交易成本观点,针对中小企业融资问题的市场失灵现象,分别从信息不对称、垄断、外部性及公共财等角度进行完整深入的分析,从中归纳出与交易成本的关联性,并以“交易成本是制度运作的成本”为核心思想,从制度理论中探讨制度的定义及其中的构成要素并和相关的交易成本作为联结,形成一个制度要素与交易成本分析表,作为检视世界各国及美国、中国大陆和台湾等信用保证制度的分析框架。其次,透过制度变迁理论分析各种制度安排的背景因素,以了解其发展的时空背景和影响性。
研究结果发现,在制度安排分析方面,以“法令明定交易对象”和“政府主导”是世界各国信保制度普遍的安排要素,前者有助于参与者降低市场交易成本；后者则有助于降低银行等金融机构的高度垄断性问题,同时也解决“信用保证”公共财供给不足的问题。此外,政府进行政策统合和资源分配将有效降低政治交易成本。至于其它的信保制度设计要素对于解决交易成本问题,因各国环境及政策不同,不易判断其优劣,这也说明了制度的设计需有整体性的思考。
在个案研究中,美国和台湾的信保制度因针对小企业融资市场的交易成本问题有较多的制度安排,因此较能有效降低市场失灵问题,中国大陆的个案则显示制度安排不足。从制度变迁的观点来看,前两者的制度安排与经济危急的环境有关,而最后者则因从功能补足为思考出发点,故仅重视监管的安排。
本文所发展的分析架构工具能协助快速检视现行信保制度的全貌,也可明确掌握该制度的缺失和各因素之间的关联性,以作为制度检讨或修正时综合考虑的依据。而透过制度变迁的分析,可以解释说明诱发各国信保制度的时空背景,以降低不当模拟的偏误。
本文主要包括下列内容：对中小企业的融资问题进行理论及实务上的梳理,并归纳为四个交易成本的因素。针对制度理论的制度定义进行深刻的探讨,并和交易成本理论相结合。对于过去信保制度的诸多研究进行前述理论的分类及说明。发展出检视信保制度的工具框架。针对美国中国大陆及台湾三个信保制度个案进行检视,除详细说明其各自的特性也比较其间的差异。最后给出结论和建议。
The credit guarantee (CG) mechanism is generally used as the important policy and program to solve the financial problems of SMEs around the world. The main purpose is to solve the problems of the SME financing market failure. Past, the majority of research from the microscopic point of credit guarantee agencies are operating characteristics, performance or risk analysis; macropoint of view from government property and bank credit policy. Some multinational studies were designed to examine national institutions function or characteristic performance. Although most conclusions illustrate the need for government intervention and institution specific benefits, but often the pros and cons of opinions were also issued. Why or how that credit guarantee institution solves the financial problems of SMEs lacks integrity theoretical framework and analysis tools.
This article firstly explores the transaction costs associate with SME financing market failure phenomenon, respectively, from the information asymmetry, monopoly, externalities and public goods with a completely and in-depth analysis from institutional economics perspective."transaction cost is the cost of the operation of the institution" is as the core idea to explore the definition of constituent elements of the institution and as links related to transaction costs. An analytical framework of an institutional elements and transaction cost analysis table is developed and used as view the credit guarantee instititions in the world and the United States, China mainland and Taiwan. Secondly, through institutional change theory analysis of the background factors of the various institutional arrangements to understand their background and the impact of the development of space-time.
The results found in the analysis of institutional arrangements, the "act stipulates. the transaction object" and "government-led" are common arrangements in the world CGs, the former helps participants reduce market transaction costs; latter helps to reduce the highly monopoly of banks and other financial institutions, also solve the problem of inadequate supply of public goods of credit guarantee. In addition, the government policy integration and resource allocation will reduce political transaction costs. As for the other institutional elements for solving transaction costs, the difficulty to judge the pros and cons is true since of the different national environment policy.
In the case studies, the CGs in the United States and Taiwan because of the more institutional arrangements, are more effective to reduce market failures, the China mainland shows a lack of institutional arrangements. From the point of view of institutional change, the former two's institutional arrangements were initialed under economic crisis, and the last settled due from a functional complement as the start thinking point, so the only emphasis on regulatory arrangements.
Analytical framework tools assist to view of existing CGs, also clearly grasp the correlation between these elements of the institition. Through the analysis of institutional change, can induce the factors of space-time background to different countries CGs, help reduce improper analogy bias.
This article consists of the following elements:
First, the financing problems of SMEs on the theory and practice of carding, and grouped into four factors of transaction costs.
Second, profound of institution definition for institutional theory and transaction cost theory.
Third, the classification and description of researchs for the past CGs with the foregoing theory.
Fourth, the development of the tools framework examines the CGs.
Fifth, views the cases of the institutional arrangement of CGs in America, China mainland and Taiwan, also compares the differences between them, in addition to the detailed description of their respective characteristics.
Sixth, and finally give conclusions and recommendations.
引文
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