电信业混合营销渠道冲突协调研究
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摘要
随着我国经济的快速增长,我国电信产业不断发展,电信市场的竞争越发激烈,从网络覆盖规模、业务种类及运营模式、用户规模、品牌竞争逐渐到现在的渠道资源竞争,渠道已成为了电信业发展中的一个不可或缺的重要资源与竞争手段。随着Internet的迅猛发展,电信网、广电网和互联网的进一步融合,电子商务应用日益普遍,为用户提供电子化服务已成为不可逆转的潮流,在这种背景下,国内外大部分主流电信运营商都在现有渠道系统的基础上引入了电子直销渠道,构建混合营销渠道系统。这种混合营销渠道结构是电信业渠道系统的重大变革,是极具应用前景的渠道模式。然而这种渠道模式的实施在给电信业带来机遇的同时也面临诸多挑战,由于社会渠道的存在,电子直销渠道的引入必定造成竞争和冲突,这种混合渠道环境下的渠道冲突问题显得越发突出,给运营商带来跨渠道的冲突与运营方面的难题,成为关注的焦点。在这种情况下,电信运营商面临的不仅是是否开通电子直销渠道的问题,为了解决混合营销渠道冲突的矛盾,电信运营商不得不探索混合营销渠道新的运作模式与冲突协调机制,达成营销渠道上下游协调和不同渠道利益之间的平衡,这已经成为电信运营商无法回避的重要课题。
混合渠道表面看是一个浅显的现象,但如何用科学的理论对其进行解释和分析乃是一大挑战。本论文主要以数理模型为主,定性分析为辅,以博弈论、委托代理理论、双边激励理论等为基础,从研究传统社会渠道与运营商电子直销渠道之间的冲突入手,全面、客观地认识电信业混合营销渠道冲突与协调的过程及其影响因素,采用多种分析手段寻求有效解决渠道冲突的方法,探讨可能的协调机制,为电信运营商进行混合营销渠道的实际管理和学界进行混合营销渠道冲突协调的研究提供可资借鉴的视野和方法。
全文的研究将分为七章展开：
在第一章的绪论中,介绍了本文的研究背景,引出研究的问题；明确了本文的研究对象和研究方法；提出了论文的基本结构与技术路线；并阐述本文的创新之处。
在第二章的理论综述中,对营销渠道及渠道冲突的相关理论进行总结,梳理国内电信运营商的营销渠道现状,对国内电信业渠道结构体系进行系统回顾,阐述其发展历程,并从中寻求有益的制度设计及发展路线。
论文的第三章,运用非合作博弈理论,基于消费者渠道偏好、两渠道的横向价格竞争等要素,建立博弈模型分析运营商电子直销渠道与社会渠道之间的同层竞争和电信运营商与社会渠道商之间上下游的竞争,通过比较由于渠道系统结构变化而导致的渠道双方均衡利润变化情况,研究混合营销渠道下电子直销渠道和传统社会渠道的相互作用关系以及渠道系统的发展演变趋势,混合营销渠道结构存在的必要条件以及渠道成员对于混合渠道组合运营模式的选择策略。
论文的第四章,分析电信业混合营销渠道冲突产生的根源。将电信业混合营销渠道环境下的渠道冲突细分为垂直渠道冲突、水平渠道冲突和多渠道冲突,以某行为是否妨碍渠道成员实现其利润最大化为判断渠道冲突的标准,综合应用定性研究和定量研究相结合的方法,定性分析混合营销渠道中的水平冲突产生的根源；建立不完全信息动态博弈模型定量分析混合营销渠道中垂直冲突产生的根源；建立完全信息动态博弈模型定量分析混合营销渠道中交叉冲突产生的根源。研究表明,渠道商之间追求自身利益最大化的个体理性和集体理性之间的矛盾是导致电信业混合营销渠道中水平渠道冲突的根源；信息不对称是导致电信业混合营销渠道垂直渠道冲突的根源,而多层次的营销渠道结构中信息不对称问题将更为严重,爆发冲突的可能性更大；电子直销渠道和社会渠道之间的价格竞争以及消费者固有的渠道偏好是导致电信业混合营销渠道交叉渠道冲突的根源。
论文的第五章,针对电信产品自身的特点,考虑了电信产品(服务)的二次消费特征,改进现有模型,构建了适用于电信业领域的混合营销渠道中运营商电子直销渠道和社会渠道之间竞争的Stackelberg动态博弈模型,以垂直一体化渠道结构作为基准,分析比较分散控制下和垂直一体化结构下的渠道系统的最优利润,设计了一种促使混合渠道达成协调状态的收益分享合同,通过转移电信二次消费的部分收益给渠道商,解决混合渠道的交叉渠道冲突和收入分成问题,并详细探讨了运营商和渠道商之间的合作利润分配,电信运营商可以通过灵活的定价机制安排诱使渠道商合作达成渠道协调,从而实现渠道整体利润的最大化,带来增量收益,保证电信运营商和渠道商的双赢。
论文的第六章,构建运营商电子直销渠道和社会渠道之间竞争的Stackelberg动态博弈模型,将渠道商的销售努力成本系数作为私有信息,通过比较渠道存在信息共享情形和不存在信息共享情形下运营商和渠道商的均衡定价策略和均衡收益,分析渠道商信息共享对于整个混合渠道绩效以及渠道成员收益的影响,研究渠道商信息共享对于整个混合营销渠道的价值。围绕混合渠道的信息共享协调激励机制问题,运用委托代理理论,分别设计了用来激励渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的单边激励监督机制和同时激励运营商和渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的双边激励机制,得出了渠道双方最优的收益分享系数以及双方最优的努力水平,并讨论了保证机制有效的参数条件。
第七章作为论文最后一章,对本论文的主要研究成果进行了归纳总结,并指出了本论文研究的主要创新点、不足以及未来的研究方向。
本文的主要创新之处为：
1)本文建立了电信业混合渠道中运营商电子直销渠道与传统社会渠道的竞争博弈模型,分析了三种渠道系统和三种渠道权力结构下电信运营商与社会渠道商的定价、利润等因素的对比变化,明确了两个渠道的相互作用关系,渠道成员对于混合渠道组合运营模式的选择策略,得到了电信业混合渠道稳定存在的条件。
2)本文将电信产品的二次消费特征考虑在内,建立了电信业混合营销渠道协调的动态博弈模型,设计了一个促使混合渠道达成协调状态的收益分享合同,通过灵活的定价机制安排和合同参数设计,使整个渠道的收益最大化,同时保证电信运营商和渠道商的双赢,从而协调混合渠道的渠道冲突,并探讨了渠道双方的合作利润分配。
3)本文建立博弈模型分析了在电信业混合渠道中信息共享的价值,并分别设计了激励渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的单边激励机制和同时激励运营商和渠道商的双边激励机制,协调混合渠道中由于信息不对称导致的渠道冲突,解决单边和双边道德风险问题,还探讨了保证机制有效的参数条件。
With the rapid development of Chinese economy, the competition in telecommunication market become dractical, the telecom operators face great challenge. The competition between telecom operators have changed from the scope of network, the diversity of services, the subscriber number and the brand to the marketing channel management. Marketing channels have become the most essential component in core competitiveness for telecom operators. With the development of domestic communication electronics technology, and telecommunications networks, wide power grid and the further integration of the Internet to provide users with e-services has become an irreversible trend in Telecommunication Industry. The advent of e-commerce has prompted many telecom operators to redesign their traditional channel structures by complementing their existing social channels with an e-channel channel and construct a hybrid channel system. The hybrid channel system is the major change in Telecommunication Industry, and is a promising channel mode. However the hybrid channel system brings both opportunities and challenges to the Telecommunication Industry. Due to the existence of social channels, the introduction of the e-channel channel may always be detrimental to the channel distributor, and usually lead to channel conflict. The channel conflict in hybrid channel system become acute, and has been a core focus of the channel management in Telecommunication Industry. In this case, the problem that telecom operators must face is not only whether to introduce an e-channel channel, but how to explore a new operating model and a new conflict coordination mechanism to balance the profit between different channel members, it is a very important and urgent problem for telecom operators.
The hybrid channel structure looks like a facial phenomenon, but its scientific explanation and analysis remains a big challenge. This dissertation uses normative theoretical analysis and adopts integrated qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Therefore, by adopting theories and methods of Game Theory, principal-agent theory and double incentive theory, this dissertation based on the channels harmony and the profit maximization, focuses on the conflict between the social channel and the e-channel, explores the possible optimization and coordination mechanism, so as to provide scientific references for people to understand the prevailing channel structure in nowadays'business world, as well as to provide a new perspective for researchers and telecom operator managers.
The dissertation consists of following seven chapters:
Fisrt, chapter one is the introduction, including the research background, the research object, the main structure, innovative points, and so on.
Second, in chapter two, a summary of basic theories of marketing channel and channel conflict is presented.The dissertation firstly combines some characteristics of Telecommunication Industry to expatiate the marketing channels theories, then thoroughly analyzes the china telecom industry and its marketing channels development evolution course as well as the present marketing channels situation of the three main telecom operators.
Third, the dissertation considers a hybrid channel system involving one telecom operator and one independent channel distributor, the hybrid channel consists of a traditional social channel and an e-channel. Customers are assumed to be heterogeneous and are able to purchase telecom products either through the social channel or through the telecom operator's e-channel. Optimization theory, non-cooperative game theory are utilized to construct an complete information dynamic game model to study on the conflicts between social channel and e-channel, between telecom operator and channel distributor. Both the horizontal price competition and acceptance level of customers in each channel are considered in the model. Decision frameworks related are established also. The dissertation studies three noncooperative games of different power structures, including Static Nash game, Telecom operator Stackelberg game and channel distributor Stackelberg game. A comparison of prices, sales and profits of channel members under different channel structure is presented, the purpose is to investigate the influence of acceptance level of customers and horizontal price competition on the choice strategies of dual channel. It reveals the mechanism of action between the social channel and e-channel channel in the hybrid channel system, the necessary condition for the existence of the hybrid channel system.
Fourth, the dissertation divides the channel conflict of hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry into three types:the level channel conflict, the vertical channel conflict and the multi-channel conflict and takes it as a standard that whether an action would prevent channel members from maximize their respective profits. The dissertation analyzes the causes of the level channel conflict using qualitative methodology, it constructs an incomplete information dynamic game model to study on the causes of the vertical channel conflict, an complete information dynamic game model to study on the causes of the multi-channel conflict.
Fifth, according to the characteristics of telecom products, a stackelberg game model for coordination of hybrid channels with the character of twice-consuming is established. By comparing and analyzing equilibrium profits and pricing strategies between the integrated and the decentralized in the hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry, we found that the profit in the hybrid channel under the decentralized is less than the integrated. Based on stackelberg game models, this dissertation builds up a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the multi-channel conflict in hybrid channel and solve the problem of profit-sharing between the telecom operator and the channel distributor. It draws a conclusion that the telecom operator can induce the channel distributor to coordinate through flexible pricing method, and both of them can share cooperative profits based on negotiation mechanisms, the revenue-sharing contract can maximize the total channel profit, make the channel members to reach a "win-win" situation and finally coordinate the multi-channel conflict. The telecom operator can provide infinite such contract for coordination of hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry.
Sixth, the dissertation firstly analyzes the value of information sharing in the hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry using of the fix quantify ways and the related factors affecting, the main study is the value of sharing cost information of the channel distributor about sales effortAccording to the channel distributor whether to share its marginal cost information to the telecom operator, the model can be divided into complete information dynamic game and incomplete information dynamic game. We analyze the equilibrium pricing policies and the equilibrium profits of telecom operator and channel distributor under both the full information sharing case and no information sharing case based on the stackelberg game theory, and compute the value of information sharing. After analyzing the value of information sharing to the hybrid channel, aimed at the information sharing problems in the hybrid channel, based on principal-agent theory and double incentive theory, an incentive and supervisory mechanism is designed to boost the channel distributor's effort level. Then, to better display generality, we expand the basic principal-agent model and establish another incentive and supervisory mechanism to boost the effort level of both telecom operator and channel distributor. The optimized incentive intensity and the influencing factors which the telecom operator gives the channel distributor are established. The mechanism's characters and the parameters'terms to ensure the validity are discussed also. Seventh, as the last chapter, the seventh chapter concludes the whole dissertation, and
points out the main innovation, the limits and the future research fields. The major innovations of the dissertation include the following:
1) This dissertation constructs an complete information dynamic game model between the telecom operator and the channel distributor in the hybrid channel in telecommunication industry and studies three noncooperative games of different power structures. A comparison of prices, sales and profits of channel members under different channel structure is presented. It reveals the mechanism of action between the social channel and e-channel in the hybrid channel system, the choice strategies of dual channel and the necessary condition for the existence of the hybrid channel system.
2) This dissertation constructs a stackelberg game model for coordination of hybrid channels with the character of twice-consuming in telecommunication industry and builds up a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the multi-channel conflict in hybrid channel. It draws a conclusion that the revenue-sharing contract can maximize the total channel profit, make the channel members to reach a "win-win" situation through flexible pricing method and parameter design, finally coordinate the multi-channel conflict. The issue of cooperative profits distribution is discussed also.
3) The game theory is employed in this dissertation to study the value of information sharing in the hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry using of the fix quantify ways and the related factors affecting. Aimed at the information sharing problems in the hybrid channel, based on principal-agent theory and double incentive theory, an incentive and supervisory mechanism is designed to boost the channel distributor's effort level. Then, to better display generality, we expand the basic principal-agent model and establish another incentive and supervisory mechanism to boost the effort level of both telecom operator and channel distributor. The mechanism's characters and the parameters'terms to ensure the validity are discussed also.
混合渠道表面看是一个浅显的现象,但如何用科学的理论对其进行解释和分析乃是一大挑战。本论文主要以数理模型为主,定性分析为辅,以博弈论、委托代理理论、双边激励理论等为基础,从研究传统社会渠道与运营商电子直销渠道之间的冲突入手,全面、客观地认识电信业混合营销渠道冲突与协调的过程及其影响因素,采用多种分析手段寻求有效解决渠道冲突的方法,探讨可能的协调机制,为电信运营商进行混合营销渠道的实际管理和学界进行混合营销渠道冲突协调的研究提供可资借鉴的视野和方法。
全文的研究将分为七章展开：
在第一章的绪论中,介绍了本文的研究背景,引出研究的问题；明确了本文的研究对象和研究方法；提出了论文的基本结构与技术路线；并阐述本文的创新之处。
在第二章的理论综述中,对营销渠道及渠道冲突的相关理论进行总结,梳理国内电信运营商的营销渠道现状,对国内电信业渠道结构体系进行系统回顾,阐述其发展历程,并从中寻求有益的制度设计及发展路线。
论文的第三章,运用非合作博弈理论,基于消费者渠道偏好、两渠道的横向价格竞争等要素,建立博弈模型分析运营商电子直销渠道与社会渠道之间的同层竞争和电信运营商与社会渠道商之间上下游的竞争,通过比较由于渠道系统结构变化而导致的渠道双方均衡利润变化情况,研究混合营销渠道下电子直销渠道和传统社会渠道的相互作用关系以及渠道系统的发展演变趋势,混合营销渠道结构存在的必要条件以及渠道成员对于混合渠道组合运营模式的选择策略。
论文的第四章,分析电信业混合营销渠道冲突产生的根源。将电信业混合营销渠道环境下的渠道冲突细分为垂直渠道冲突、水平渠道冲突和多渠道冲突,以某行为是否妨碍渠道成员实现其利润最大化为判断渠道冲突的标准,综合应用定性研究和定量研究相结合的方法,定性分析混合营销渠道中的水平冲突产生的根源；建立不完全信息动态博弈模型定量分析混合营销渠道中垂直冲突产生的根源；建立完全信息动态博弈模型定量分析混合营销渠道中交叉冲突产生的根源。研究表明,渠道商之间追求自身利益最大化的个体理性和集体理性之间的矛盾是导致电信业混合营销渠道中水平渠道冲突的根源；信息不对称是导致电信业混合营销渠道垂直渠道冲突的根源,而多层次的营销渠道结构中信息不对称问题将更为严重,爆发冲突的可能性更大；电子直销渠道和社会渠道之间的价格竞争以及消费者固有的渠道偏好是导致电信业混合营销渠道交叉渠道冲突的根源。
论文的第五章,针对电信产品自身的特点,考虑了电信产品(服务)的二次消费特征,改进现有模型,构建了适用于电信业领域的混合营销渠道中运营商电子直销渠道和社会渠道之间竞争的Stackelberg动态博弈模型,以垂直一体化渠道结构作为基准,分析比较分散控制下和垂直一体化结构下的渠道系统的最优利润,设计了一种促使混合渠道达成协调状态的收益分享合同,通过转移电信二次消费的部分收益给渠道商,解决混合渠道的交叉渠道冲突和收入分成问题,并详细探讨了运营商和渠道商之间的合作利润分配,电信运营商可以通过灵活的定价机制安排诱使渠道商合作达成渠道协调,从而实现渠道整体利润的最大化,带来增量收益,保证电信运营商和渠道商的双赢。
论文的第六章,构建运营商电子直销渠道和社会渠道之间竞争的Stackelberg动态博弈模型,将渠道商的销售努力成本系数作为私有信息,通过比较渠道存在信息共享情形和不存在信息共享情形下运营商和渠道商的均衡定价策略和均衡收益,分析渠道商信息共享对于整个混合渠道绩效以及渠道成员收益的影响,研究渠道商信息共享对于整个混合营销渠道的价值。围绕混合渠道的信息共享协调激励机制问题,运用委托代理理论,分别设计了用来激励渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的单边激励监督机制和同时激励运营商和渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的双边激励机制,得出了渠道双方最优的收益分享系数以及双方最优的努力水平,并讨论了保证机制有效的参数条件。
第七章作为论文最后一章,对本论文的主要研究成果进行了归纳总结,并指出了本论文研究的主要创新点、不足以及未来的研究方向。
本文的主要创新之处为：
1)本文建立了电信业混合渠道中运营商电子直销渠道与传统社会渠道的竞争博弈模型,分析了三种渠道系统和三种渠道权力结构下电信运营商与社会渠道商的定价、利润等因素的对比变化,明确了两个渠道的相互作用关系,渠道成员对于混合渠道组合运营模式的选择策略,得到了电信业混合渠道稳定存在的条件。
2)本文将电信产品的二次消费特征考虑在内,建立了电信业混合营销渠道协调的动态博弈模型,设计了一个促使混合渠道达成协调状态的收益分享合同,通过灵活的定价机制安排和合同参数设计,使整个渠道的收益最大化,同时保证电信运营商和渠道商的双赢,从而协调混合渠道的渠道冲突,并探讨了渠道双方的合作利润分配。
3)本文建立博弈模型分析了在电信业混合渠道中信息共享的价值,并分别设计了激励渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的单边激励机制和同时激励运营商和渠道商的双边激励机制,协调混合渠道中由于信息不对称导致的渠道冲突,解决单边和双边道德风险问题,还探讨了保证机制有效的参数条件。
With the rapid development of Chinese economy, the competition in telecommunication market become dractical, the telecom operators face great challenge. The competition between telecom operators have changed from the scope of network, the diversity of services, the subscriber number and the brand to the marketing channel management. Marketing channels have become the most essential component in core competitiveness for telecom operators. With the development of domestic communication electronics technology, and telecommunications networks, wide power grid and the further integration of the Internet to provide users with e-services has become an irreversible trend in Telecommunication Industry. The advent of e-commerce has prompted many telecom operators to redesign their traditional channel structures by complementing their existing social channels with an e-channel channel and construct a hybrid channel system. The hybrid channel system is the major change in Telecommunication Industry, and is a promising channel mode. However the hybrid channel system brings both opportunities and challenges to the Telecommunication Industry. Due to the existence of social channels, the introduction of the e-channel channel may always be detrimental to the channel distributor, and usually lead to channel conflict. The channel conflict in hybrid channel system become acute, and has been a core focus of the channel management in Telecommunication Industry. In this case, the problem that telecom operators must face is not only whether to introduce an e-channel channel, but how to explore a new operating model and a new conflict coordination mechanism to balance the profit between different channel members, it is a very important and urgent problem for telecom operators.
The hybrid channel structure looks like a facial phenomenon, but its scientific explanation and analysis remains a big challenge. This dissertation uses normative theoretical analysis and adopts integrated qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Therefore, by adopting theories and methods of Game Theory, principal-agent theory and double incentive theory, this dissertation based on the channels harmony and the profit maximization, focuses on the conflict between the social channel and the e-channel, explores the possible optimization and coordination mechanism, so as to provide scientific references for people to understand the prevailing channel structure in nowadays'business world, as well as to provide a new perspective for researchers and telecom operator managers.
The dissertation consists of following seven chapters:
Fisrt, chapter one is the introduction, including the research background, the research object, the main structure, innovative points, and so on.
Second, in chapter two, a summary of basic theories of marketing channel and channel conflict is presented.The dissertation firstly combines some characteristics of Telecommunication Industry to expatiate the marketing channels theories, then thoroughly analyzes the china telecom industry and its marketing channels development evolution course as well as the present marketing channels situation of the three main telecom operators.
Third, the dissertation considers a hybrid channel system involving one telecom operator and one independent channel distributor, the hybrid channel consists of a traditional social channel and an e-channel. Customers are assumed to be heterogeneous and are able to purchase telecom products either through the social channel or through the telecom operator's e-channel. Optimization theory, non-cooperative game theory are utilized to construct an complete information dynamic game model to study on the conflicts between social channel and e-channel, between telecom operator and channel distributor. Both the horizontal price competition and acceptance level of customers in each channel are considered in the model. Decision frameworks related are established also. The dissertation studies three noncooperative games of different power structures, including Static Nash game, Telecom operator Stackelberg game and channel distributor Stackelberg game. A comparison of prices, sales and profits of channel members under different channel structure is presented, the purpose is to investigate the influence of acceptance level of customers and horizontal price competition on the choice strategies of dual channel. It reveals the mechanism of action between the social channel and e-channel channel in the hybrid channel system, the necessary condition for the existence of the hybrid channel system.
Fourth, the dissertation divides the channel conflict of hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry into three types:the level channel conflict, the vertical channel conflict and the multi-channel conflict and takes it as a standard that whether an action would prevent channel members from maximize their respective profits. The dissertation analyzes the causes of the level channel conflict using qualitative methodology, it constructs an incomplete information dynamic game model to study on the causes of the vertical channel conflict, an complete information dynamic game model to study on the causes of the multi-channel conflict.
Fifth, according to the characteristics of telecom products, a stackelberg game model for coordination of hybrid channels with the character of twice-consuming is established. By comparing and analyzing equilibrium profits and pricing strategies between the integrated and the decentralized in the hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry, we found that the profit in the hybrid channel under the decentralized is less than the integrated. Based on stackelberg game models, this dissertation builds up a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the multi-channel conflict in hybrid channel and solve the problem of profit-sharing between the telecom operator and the channel distributor. It draws a conclusion that the telecom operator can induce the channel distributor to coordinate through flexible pricing method, and both of them can share cooperative profits based on negotiation mechanisms, the revenue-sharing contract can maximize the total channel profit, make the channel members to reach a "win-win" situation and finally coordinate the multi-channel conflict. The telecom operator can provide infinite such contract for coordination of hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry.
Sixth, the dissertation firstly analyzes the value of information sharing in the hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry using of the fix quantify ways and the related factors affecting, the main study is the value of sharing cost information of the channel distributor about sales effortAccording to the channel distributor whether to share its marginal cost information to the telecom operator, the model can be divided into complete information dynamic game and incomplete information dynamic game. We analyze the equilibrium pricing policies and the equilibrium profits of telecom operator and channel distributor under both the full information sharing case and no information sharing case based on the stackelberg game theory, and compute the value of information sharing. After analyzing the value of information sharing to the hybrid channel, aimed at the information sharing problems in the hybrid channel, based on principal-agent theory and double incentive theory, an incentive and supervisory mechanism is designed to boost the channel distributor's effort level. Then, to better display generality, we expand the basic principal-agent model and establish another incentive and supervisory mechanism to boost the effort level of both telecom operator and channel distributor. The optimized incentive intensity and the influencing factors which the telecom operator gives the channel distributor are established. The mechanism's characters and the parameters'terms to ensure the validity are discussed also. Seventh, as the last chapter, the seventh chapter concludes the whole dissertation, and
points out the main innovation, the limits and the future research fields. The major innovations of the dissertation include the following:
1) This dissertation constructs an complete information dynamic game model between the telecom operator and the channel distributor in the hybrid channel in telecommunication industry and studies three noncooperative games of different power structures. A comparison of prices, sales and profits of channel members under different channel structure is presented. It reveals the mechanism of action between the social channel and e-channel in the hybrid channel system, the choice strategies of dual channel and the necessary condition for the existence of the hybrid channel system.
2) This dissertation constructs a stackelberg game model for coordination of hybrid channels with the character of twice-consuming in telecommunication industry and builds up a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the multi-channel conflict in hybrid channel. It draws a conclusion that the revenue-sharing contract can maximize the total channel profit, make the channel members to reach a "win-win" situation through flexible pricing method and parameter design, finally coordinate the multi-channel conflict. The issue of cooperative profits distribution is discussed also.
3) The game theory is employed in this dissertation to study the value of information sharing in the hybrid channel in Telecommunication Industry using of the fix quantify ways and the related factors affecting. Aimed at the information sharing problems in the hybrid channel, based on principal-agent theory and double incentive theory, an incentive and supervisory mechanism is designed to boost the channel distributor's effort level. Then, to better display generality, we expand the basic principal-agent model and establish another incentive and supervisory mechanism to boost the effort level of both telecom operator and channel distributor. The mechanism's characters and the parameters'terms to ensure the validity are discussed also.
引文
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