交易扩展中的信用——一个制度与组织的视角
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摘要
人类的交易是基于信用的交易，信用的范围也就制约了人类交易的范围。人类的理性会在博弈中形成一系列旨在扩大人类的信用范围的制度和组织，并进而扩展交易范围。因此，人类交易扩展的过程是一个信用扩展的过程。但是，长期以来信用问题一直未进入主流经济学的研究。随着信息经济学、博弈论、新制度经济学和演化经济学等领域的兴起，关于不对称信息条件下交易者相互诚实合作机制的形成问题开始得到经济学家的广泛关注，并取得可观成果。本文正是运用这些成果，从制度与组织的视角讨论交易扩展过程中的信用形成机制。
本文将信用理解成交易主体共同合作的预期及合作策略均衡。而保证交易信用的制度和组织正是博弈策略均衡的体现。人类所有的交易可最为基本的区分为四个扩展层次，交易前提、代际交易、熟人社会交易、匿名社会交易。
财产权利是所有交易的前提。财产权利的相互认可和尊重是信用的结果，其信用均衡成立的条件包括占有成为共同知识、有足够比例的针对失信者的惩罚策略个体以及对信用秩序享受的搭便车行为必须控制在足够低的水平。
代际交易是维系人类繁衍重要保证，它的信用依赖于家庭这一制度安排。家庭尤其是核心家庭的主要功能之一是形成了有效的代际学习机制，使得隔代约束成为可能，并因此确保了在自利条件下，代际投资信用均衡的形成。
熟人社会或者传统社会交易的信用主要依赖于双边机制和多边机制约束。双边机制约束下，可识别的商号形成是其重要的条件。而行会和商团出现则形成了有效运作的多边机制，并因而保证了行会和商团内部交易的信用。
匿名交易中的信用依赖于第三方权威机构，其信用程度则依赖于这个权威机构的使用成本。而在充分的可选择性条件下，权威机构的信用是可以得到保证的。在保证权威机构信用的条件中，专制型权威机构的信用保障条件最苛刻，民主型权威次之，开放型权威机构的信用保障条件最为简单。
The human's transactions are based on trust. The extension of trust bounds the extension of transaction. Fortunately, human's rationality will evolve series of institutions and organizations to extend the bound of trust, and then of transaction. Therefore, the process of extending in transaction is the same process of extending in trust. But the mainstream economics haven't studied trust for long time. Until rising of Information Economics, Game Theory, New Institutional Economics and Evolution Economics, the problem of how the agents play honest under asymmetric information came into seizing most economists' attentions, And mounts of papers and works emergence. Using those researches, this dissertation argues the mechanism of how the trust forms in the process of transaction extending ground on the viewpoint of institutions and organizations.
We define trust as the co-expectation of cooperation and equilibriums of cooperation strategy, while the institutions and organizations, which ensure the transaction trust, are just embodiment of the equilibriums. All of the transactions can
be classified in fore essential ranks--precondition of transaction, intergeneration
transaction, transaction in acquaintance society and transaction in anonymous society. Property right is the foundation of all transaction. It's the outcome of trust the people recognize and respect property rights each other. The conditions involve the occupancy becoming the common knowledge, sufficient proportion people punishing distrust, and the "free riders" of trust order restraining in low enough.
Intergeneration transactions are preconditions of human's reproducing, and it's trust rely on the family which as an institution. Family, especially nuclear family takes a basic function that provides an efficient intergeneration learning, which makes "grandson's restrain" possible. Hence, even an ego would trust in intergeneration.
In acquaintance society, the transaction trust mainly ground on bilateral mechanism and multilateral mechanism. Under bilateral mechanism, distinguishable firms are the important conditions of trust. And guilds and coalition support the efficient multilateral mechanism, which ensure the trust of interior transaction.
Trust in anonymous society depends upon the authority and its costs. The trust of authority itself can be insuring under sufficient selectivity. Among the condition of insuring authorities' trust, it's most rigors for autocratic authority, then democratic authority, and it's most easy for opening authority.
本文将信用理解成交易主体共同合作的预期及合作策略均衡。而保证交易信用的制度和组织正是博弈策略均衡的体现。人类所有的交易可最为基本的区分为四个扩展层次，交易前提、代际交易、熟人社会交易、匿名社会交易。
财产权利是所有交易的前提。财产权利的相互认可和尊重是信用的结果，其信用均衡成立的条件包括占有成为共同知识、有足够比例的针对失信者的惩罚策略个体以及对信用秩序享受的搭便车行为必须控制在足够低的水平。
代际交易是维系人类繁衍重要保证，它的信用依赖于家庭这一制度安排。家庭尤其是核心家庭的主要功能之一是形成了有效的代际学习机制，使得隔代约束成为可能，并因此确保了在自利条件下，代际投资信用均衡的形成。
熟人社会或者传统社会交易的信用主要依赖于双边机制和多边机制约束。双边机制约束下，可识别的商号形成是其重要的条件。而行会和商团出现则形成了有效运作的多边机制，并因而保证了行会和商团内部交易的信用。
匿名交易中的信用依赖于第三方权威机构，其信用程度则依赖于这个权威机构的使用成本。而在充分的可选择性条件下，权威机构的信用是可以得到保证的。在保证权威机构信用的条件中，专制型权威机构的信用保障条件最苛刻，民主型权威次之，开放型权威机构的信用保障条件最为简单。
The human's transactions are based on trust. The extension of trust bounds the extension of transaction. Fortunately, human's rationality will evolve series of institutions and organizations to extend the bound of trust, and then of transaction. Therefore, the process of extending in transaction is the same process of extending in trust. But the mainstream economics haven't studied trust for long time. Until rising of Information Economics, Game Theory, New Institutional Economics and Evolution Economics, the problem of how the agents play honest under asymmetric information came into seizing most economists' attentions, And mounts of papers and works emergence. Using those researches, this dissertation argues the mechanism of how the trust forms in the process of transaction extending ground on the viewpoint of institutions and organizations.
We define trust as the co-expectation of cooperation and equilibriums of cooperation strategy, while the institutions and organizations, which ensure the transaction trust, are just embodiment of the equilibriums. All of the transactions can
be classified in fore essential ranks--precondition of transaction, intergeneration
transaction, transaction in acquaintance society and transaction in anonymous society. Property right is the foundation of all transaction. It's the outcome of trust the people recognize and respect property rights each other. The conditions involve the occupancy becoming the common knowledge, sufficient proportion people punishing distrust, and the "free riders" of trust order restraining in low enough.
Intergeneration transactions are preconditions of human's reproducing, and it's trust rely on the family which as an institution. Family, especially nuclear family takes a basic function that provides an efficient intergeneration learning, which makes "grandson's restrain" possible. Hence, even an ego would trust in intergeneration.
In acquaintance society, the transaction trust mainly ground on bilateral mechanism and multilateral mechanism. Under bilateral mechanism, distinguishable firms are the important conditions of trust. And guilds and coalition support the efficient multilateral mechanism, which ensure the trust of interior transaction.
Trust in anonymous society depends upon the authority and its costs. The trust of authority itself can be insuring under sufficient selectivity. Among the condition of insuring authorities' trust, it's most rigors for autocratic authority, then democratic authority, and it's most easy for opening authority.
引文
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