美韩核关系（1956年-2006年）：对同盟矛盾性的个案考察
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摘要
论文的主要脉络是从案例到理论。从案例研究总结国际关系实践中的一些规律,再提升为理论。案例是美韩核关系,理论是同盟矛盾性。美韩核关系是美韩同盟关系中的一部分,而且是其中表现较为剧烈、特征较为明显的一部分,所以本文希望从美韩核关系的特征中抽取出同盟矛盾性的一些特质。
对美韩核关系实践的研究,包括美韩核关系的内容和影响。美韩核关系的内容表明,美国对韩国既保护又约束。美韩核关系的内容表现出同盟功能的对立统一性。一方面,同盟的功能是对立和冲突的。另一方面,同盟的功能也是统一的,美国希望通过这样的同盟结构实现朝鲜半岛的地区安全。
美韩核关系的影响则表明,美国对韩国的核保护是导致朝鲜核发展的重要因素。上世纪70年代中期之后,在平衡撤军的影响、应对感知到的朝鲜进攻态势,以及消减韩国的核动机等因素的共同作用下,驻韩美军强化了核威胁的态势,而这一态势对朝鲜核项目的启动有重要的推动作用。冷战后至今,美国向韩国提供的延伸核威慑也是推动朝鲜继续核发展的影响因素之一。为了确保韩国不发展核武器,美国会确认向韩国提供的核保护,这是阻止韩国未来核发展的重要因素,也是阻止朝鲜未来弃核的重要因素。美韩核关系的影响同样表现出同盟影响的复杂性和矛盾性。使盟友获得更多安全的努力,会导致对手更多的不安全,互动之后又导致了结盟方新的不安全。
美韩核关系的实践研究为同盟矛盾性的理论研究提供了重要启示。美韩核关系的内容可以总结为同盟功能的矛盾性。本文认为,在1945年之前,同盟功能的矛盾性是不明显的,同盟基本上都是针对外部威胁的军事集团。而在1945年之后,同盟功能的矛盾性开始明显表现出来,同盟的对内约束功能开始上升为同盟的另一个重要功能。本文认为,国际权力结构的变化、同盟控制成本的变化和相互依存程度的加强是同盟矛盾性变化的主要影响因素。同盟功能矛盾性的理论可以对冷战后北约的存续和发展、美日同盟功能的强化以及同盟的防扩散约束等现象做出解释。
美韩核关系的影响则可以总结为同盟影响的矛盾性。本文在总结美韩核关系和美韩同盟影响的基础上,提出同盟复杂影响的两种运行路径:一是“同盟安全—对手不安全—同盟不安全”路径,二是“对手安全—同盟不安全—对手不安全”路径。冷战后北约东扩和美日同盟强化所导致的安全困境问题,可以使用第一种路径来解释。上世纪70年代美苏缓和后又转向对抗的案例,则可以使用第二种路径做出解释。同样,在对美韩—朝鲜安全互动中的矛盾循环分析之后,本文抽象出同盟影响的矛盾循环模型。冷战时期美欧同盟与苏联的安全互动和冷战后北约东扩与俄罗斯互动的事实,则可以使用同盟影响的矛盾循环模型来做出解释。
本文还提出同盟稳定状态的概念和影响因素来评估同盟矛盾的程度。同盟稳定状态可以划分为同盟契合、同盟摇摆和同盟危机三个层级。同盟的共同利益和相互依赖是同盟稳定状态的根本决定因素。同盟间的制度安排在一定程度上制约同盟状态之间的转换。盟国近期的行为因素则是直接反映同盟稳定状态的重要指标。本文使用同盟稳定状态的衡量指标对美韩、美英、美法、美德、美日同盟的矛盾程度进行了评估。
同盟矛盾性理论对朝核问题的解决有重要启示。美国需要认识到,它使韩国感到安全的行为,却让朝鲜感到强烈的不安全。只有认识到自己的历史责任,美国才会真心诚意地推动朝核问题的解决。朝鲜需要认识到,美国的行为有时并不一定是针对自己,而是为了安抚韩国。对这一点的深刻理解会增加朝鲜的安全信心。韩国则需要认识到,当美国试图通过美朝缓和来解决安全问题时,韩国需要克服被美国抛弃的担心。
同盟矛盾性理论对我国未来同盟战略的运用也有一定启示。中国在未来成长过程中将可能会逐渐使用同盟战略来处理中国的周边事务。采取公开的结盟战略会引致所针对国家的不满。采取模糊的、非正式同盟的战略,同时强调同盟的对内管理功能,会减弱一些潜在对手国家的猜忌和怀疑。当然,过多强调同盟的对内功能则容易导致同盟的凝聚力下降和盟友的离心。因此,使用同盟战略需要很高的外交技巧,来平衡同盟的对外和对内功能。这样才可能使同盟战略为我国今后的和平发展贡献积极的作用。
The basic research path of this article is from case analysis to theoretical summarization. The case is U.S.-ROK nuclear relations. The theory is alliance contradiction. U.S.-ROK nuclear relations is a dramatic and distinct part of U.S.-ROK alliance relations, so this article hopes to distill some characteristics of alliance contradiction from the features of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations.
The researches on U.S.-ROK nuclear relations include its contents and influences. Its contents show that America protected and restrained South Korea, which manifests contradiction and congruence of alliance functions. On one hand, the functions of alliance are contradictory and inconsistent. On the other hand, the functions of alliance are coherent, which means America wants to achieve regional security of Korean peninsula through this alliance structure.
The influences of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations show that American nuclear protection on South Korea is an important factor of North Korea's nuclear development. After the mid-1970s, due to balance the negative impact of USFK's Withdrawal, respond to the perceived North Korea's aggressiveness, and eliminate South Korea's nuclear motivation, American forces in South Korea strengthened the posture of nuclear threat, which had an important stimulating impact on the start-up of the North Korea nuclear programs. After cold war, America's extended nuclear deterrence in South Korea is also one of the factors of driving North Korea's nuclear development. To make sure that South Korea will not develop nuclear weapons, America will provide nuclear protection clearly. This is the important factor of stopping South Korea's future nuclear development, and is also the important factor of stopping North Korea's future nuclear abandonment. The influences of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations show the complexity and contradiction of alliance influences. The effort that give ally more security leads to adversary's more insecurity, and in the end it circularly leads to ally's new insecurity.
The researches on U.S.-ROK nuclear relations provide some important enlightenment for theoretical researches on alliance contradiction. The contents of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations can be summarized as the contradiction of alliance functions. The author holds that, before 1945, the contradiction of alliance function is not obvious, and alliances basically are military groups against external threats. After 1945, the contradiction of alliance function is clear, and the restrictive function begins to become an important function. The author holds that the changes of international power structure, the changes of controlling costs, and the enhancement of interdependence are the reasons that lead to the changes of alliance contradiction. The theory of alliance function contradiction can help us understand some phenomena, such as the existence and development of NATO, the strengthening of U.S.-Japan alliance function, and alliance's efforts on nonproliferation.
The influences of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations can be summarized as the contradiction of alliance influence. Based on studies of the influences of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations and U.S.-ROK alliance, this article puts forward two moving paths of alliance complex influences: one is "alliance security-adversary insecurity-alliance insecurity" path; the other is "adversary security-alliance insecurity-adversary insecurity" path. The security dilemmas that have been caused by NATO's enlargement and U.S.-Japan alliance strengthening can be explained by the first path. The fact that U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente couldn't last in 1970s' can be explained by the second path. Moreover, based on U.S.-ROK-DPRK security interaction, this article brings forward the contradiction circulation model of alliance influence. U.S.-Europe security interaction with Soviet Union in cold war and NATO's enlargement and Russia's reactions after cold war, can be explained by this contradiction circulation model.
This article also puts forward the concept and the acting factors of alliance stable state to evaluate the extent of alliance contradiction. Alliance stable state can be divided as alliance harmony, alliance fluctuation and alliance crisis. Common interests and interdependence are the decisive factors of alliance stable state. Institutional arrangements in alliance restrict transition between different states. Ally's recent behaviors are an important index of weighing alliance stable state. This article uses the weighing indexes of alliance stable state to evaluate the contradiction extent of U.S.-ROK, U.S.-Britain, U.S.-France, U.S.-Germany and U.S.-Japan alliance.
Alliance contradiction theory has some important illumination on the solving of North Korea's nuclear issue. America should recognize that, its behaviors that made South Korea feel secure made North Korea feel insecure strongly. Only recognizing its historical responsibility could America sincerely promote the solving of North Korea' nuclear issue. North Korea should understand that America's behaviors weren't necessarily against it sometimes, but appeased South Korea. This understanding can help North Korea enhance its security confidence. South Korea should recognize that, when America tries to solve security problems though U.S.-DPRK reconciliation, it has to overcome the fear of abandonment.
Alliance contradiction theory has some enlightenment on China's future alliance strategy. In the future, China may gradually use alliance strategy to deal with peripheral issues. Open alliance strategy may induce target countries' dissatisfaction. Obscure and informal alliance strategy that strengthens internal management function may weaken some potential adversary countries' suspicions and worries. Of course, more emphasis on internal function easily leads to the decline of alliance cohesion. Therefore, using alliance strategy needs high diplomatic skills to balance alliance's external and internal functions. In this way can alliance strategy contribute a lot for China's peaceful development.
对美韩核关系实践的研究,包括美韩核关系的内容和影响。美韩核关系的内容表明,美国对韩国既保护又约束。美韩核关系的内容表现出同盟功能的对立统一性。一方面,同盟的功能是对立和冲突的。另一方面,同盟的功能也是统一的,美国希望通过这样的同盟结构实现朝鲜半岛的地区安全。
美韩核关系的影响则表明,美国对韩国的核保护是导致朝鲜核发展的重要因素。上世纪70年代中期之后,在平衡撤军的影响、应对感知到的朝鲜进攻态势,以及消减韩国的核动机等因素的共同作用下,驻韩美军强化了核威胁的态势,而这一态势对朝鲜核项目的启动有重要的推动作用。冷战后至今,美国向韩国提供的延伸核威慑也是推动朝鲜继续核发展的影响因素之一。为了确保韩国不发展核武器,美国会确认向韩国提供的核保护,这是阻止韩国未来核发展的重要因素,也是阻止朝鲜未来弃核的重要因素。美韩核关系的影响同样表现出同盟影响的复杂性和矛盾性。使盟友获得更多安全的努力,会导致对手更多的不安全,互动之后又导致了结盟方新的不安全。
美韩核关系的实践研究为同盟矛盾性的理论研究提供了重要启示。美韩核关系的内容可以总结为同盟功能的矛盾性。本文认为,在1945年之前,同盟功能的矛盾性是不明显的,同盟基本上都是针对外部威胁的军事集团。而在1945年之后,同盟功能的矛盾性开始明显表现出来,同盟的对内约束功能开始上升为同盟的另一个重要功能。本文认为,国际权力结构的变化、同盟控制成本的变化和相互依存程度的加强是同盟矛盾性变化的主要影响因素。同盟功能矛盾性的理论可以对冷战后北约的存续和发展、美日同盟功能的强化以及同盟的防扩散约束等现象做出解释。
美韩核关系的影响则可以总结为同盟影响的矛盾性。本文在总结美韩核关系和美韩同盟影响的基础上,提出同盟复杂影响的两种运行路径:一是“同盟安全—对手不安全—同盟不安全”路径,二是“对手安全—同盟不安全—对手不安全”路径。冷战后北约东扩和美日同盟强化所导致的安全困境问题,可以使用第一种路径来解释。上世纪70年代美苏缓和后又转向对抗的案例,则可以使用第二种路径做出解释。同样,在对美韩—朝鲜安全互动中的矛盾循环分析之后,本文抽象出同盟影响的矛盾循环模型。冷战时期美欧同盟与苏联的安全互动和冷战后北约东扩与俄罗斯互动的事实,则可以使用同盟影响的矛盾循环模型来做出解释。
本文还提出同盟稳定状态的概念和影响因素来评估同盟矛盾的程度。同盟稳定状态可以划分为同盟契合、同盟摇摆和同盟危机三个层级。同盟的共同利益和相互依赖是同盟稳定状态的根本决定因素。同盟间的制度安排在一定程度上制约同盟状态之间的转换。盟国近期的行为因素则是直接反映同盟稳定状态的重要指标。本文使用同盟稳定状态的衡量指标对美韩、美英、美法、美德、美日同盟的矛盾程度进行了评估。
同盟矛盾性理论对朝核问题的解决有重要启示。美国需要认识到,它使韩国感到安全的行为,却让朝鲜感到强烈的不安全。只有认识到自己的历史责任,美国才会真心诚意地推动朝核问题的解决。朝鲜需要认识到,美国的行为有时并不一定是针对自己,而是为了安抚韩国。对这一点的深刻理解会增加朝鲜的安全信心。韩国则需要认识到,当美国试图通过美朝缓和来解决安全问题时,韩国需要克服被美国抛弃的担心。
同盟矛盾性理论对我国未来同盟战略的运用也有一定启示。中国在未来成长过程中将可能会逐渐使用同盟战略来处理中国的周边事务。采取公开的结盟战略会引致所针对国家的不满。采取模糊的、非正式同盟的战略,同时强调同盟的对内管理功能,会减弱一些潜在对手国家的猜忌和怀疑。当然,过多强调同盟的对内功能则容易导致同盟的凝聚力下降和盟友的离心。因此,使用同盟战略需要很高的外交技巧,来平衡同盟的对外和对内功能。这样才可能使同盟战略为我国今后的和平发展贡献积极的作用。
The basic research path of this article is from case analysis to theoretical summarization. The case is U.S.-ROK nuclear relations. The theory is alliance contradiction. U.S.-ROK nuclear relations is a dramatic and distinct part of U.S.-ROK alliance relations, so this article hopes to distill some characteristics of alliance contradiction from the features of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations.
The researches on U.S.-ROK nuclear relations include its contents and influences. Its contents show that America protected and restrained South Korea, which manifests contradiction and congruence of alliance functions. On one hand, the functions of alliance are contradictory and inconsistent. On the other hand, the functions of alliance are coherent, which means America wants to achieve regional security of Korean peninsula through this alliance structure.
The influences of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations show that American nuclear protection on South Korea is an important factor of North Korea's nuclear development. After the mid-1970s, due to balance the negative impact of USFK's Withdrawal, respond to the perceived North Korea's aggressiveness, and eliminate South Korea's nuclear motivation, American forces in South Korea strengthened the posture of nuclear threat, which had an important stimulating impact on the start-up of the North Korea nuclear programs. After cold war, America's extended nuclear deterrence in South Korea is also one of the factors of driving North Korea's nuclear development. To make sure that South Korea will not develop nuclear weapons, America will provide nuclear protection clearly. This is the important factor of stopping South Korea's future nuclear development, and is also the important factor of stopping North Korea's future nuclear abandonment. The influences of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations show the complexity and contradiction of alliance influences. The effort that give ally more security leads to adversary's more insecurity, and in the end it circularly leads to ally's new insecurity.
The researches on U.S.-ROK nuclear relations provide some important enlightenment for theoretical researches on alliance contradiction. The contents of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations can be summarized as the contradiction of alliance functions. The author holds that, before 1945, the contradiction of alliance function is not obvious, and alliances basically are military groups against external threats. After 1945, the contradiction of alliance function is clear, and the restrictive function begins to become an important function. The author holds that the changes of international power structure, the changes of controlling costs, and the enhancement of interdependence are the reasons that lead to the changes of alliance contradiction. The theory of alliance function contradiction can help us understand some phenomena, such as the existence and development of NATO, the strengthening of U.S.-Japan alliance function, and alliance's efforts on nonproliferation.
The influences of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations can be summarized as the contradiction of alliance influence. Based on studies of the influences of U.S.-ROK nuclear relations and U.S.-ROK alliance, this article puts forward two moving paths of alliance complex influences: one is "alliance security-adversary insecurity-alliance insecurity" path; the other is "adversary security-alliance insecurity-adversary insecurity" path. The security dilemmas that have been caused by NATO's enlargement and U.S.-Japan alliance strengthening can be explained by the first path. The fact that U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente couldn't last in 1970s' can be explained by the second path. Moreover, based on U.S.-ROK-DPRK security interaction, this article brings forward the contradiction circulation model of alliance influence. U.S.-Europe security interaction with Soviet Union in cold war and NATO's enlargement and Russia's reactions after cold war, can be explained by this contradiction circulation model.
This article also puts forward the concept and the acting factors of alliance stable state to evaluate the extent of alliance contradiction. Alliance stable state can be divided as alliance harmony, alliance fluctuation and alliance crisis. Common interests and interdependence are the decisive factors of alliance stable state. Institutional arrangements in alliance restrict transition between different states. Ally's recent behaviors are an important index of weighing alliance stable state. This article uses the weighing indexes of alliance stable state to evaluate the contradiction extent of U.S.-ROK, U.S.-Britain, U.S.-France, U.S.-Germany and U.S.-Japan alliance.
Alliance contradiction theory has some important illumination on the solving of North Korea's nuclear issue. America should recognize that, its behaviors that made South Korea feel secure made North Korea feel insecure strongly. Only recognizing its historical responsibility could America sincerely promote the solving of North Korea' nuclear issue. North Korea should understand that America's behaviors weren't necessarily against it sometimes, but appeased South Korea. This understanding can help North Korea enhance its security confidence. South Korea should recognize that, when America tries to solve security problems though U.S.-DPRK reconciliation, it has to overcome the fear of abandonment.
Alliance contradiction theory has some enlightenment on China's future alliance strategy. In the future, China may gradually use alliance strategy to deal with peripheral issues. Open alliance strategy may induce target countries' dissatisfaction. Obscure and informal alliance strategy that strengthens internal management function may weaken some potential adversary countries' suspicions and worries. Of course, more emphasis on internal function easily leads to the decline of alliance cohesion. Therefore, using alliance strategy needs high diplomatic skills to balance alliance's external and internal functions. In this way can alliance strategy contribute a lot for China's peaceful development.
引文
1 倪世雄等著:《当代西方国际关系理论》,复旦大学出版社,2001年版,第11页。
2 上引书,第10页。
3 在朝鲜战争中美国的几次核恐吓和核外交,美国学者已经根据解密材料进行了详细和充分的分析。See Roger Dingman,"Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,"International Security,Vol.13,No.3,Winter 1988/1989,pp.50-91;Edward Friedman,"Nuclear Blackmail and the End of the Korean War,"Modern China,Vol.1,No.1,Jan.,1975,pp.75-91;Rosemary J.Foot,"Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,"International Security,Vol.13,No.3,Winter 1988-1989,pp.92-112;Roger M.Anders,"The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War:Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control,"Military Affairs,Vol.52,No.1,January 1988,pp.1-6.
4 Natural Resources Defense Council,Nuclear Program,available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/default.asp
5 The Federation of American Scientists,The Nuclear Information Project,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/
6 The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/index.html
7 The Brookings Institution,Foreign Policy Studies,The U.S.Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project,available at http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/weapons.htm
8 美国乔治·华盛顿大学的国家安全档案项目在2000年赢得美国乔治·伯克(George Polk)新闻奖,被誉为“世界上最大的关于解密文件的非政府图书馆”(《洛杉矶时报》,2001年1月16日)。The National Security Archive,Nuclear History,available at http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nuchis.html
9 Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,and Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅰ:U.S.Nuclear Forces and Capabilities,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Publishing Company,1984;Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Robert S.Norris,and Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅱ:U.S.Nuclear Warhead Production,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Publishing Company,1987;Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Milton M.Hoenig,and Robert S.Norris,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅲ:U.S.Nuclear Warhead Facility Profiles,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Press,1987;Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Robert S.Norris,and Jeffrey I.Sands,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅳ:Soviet Nuclear Weapons,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Press,1989;Robert S.Norris,Andrew Burrows,Richard Fieldhouse,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Vol.5,British,French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons,Ballinger,1994.
10 NRDC,Thomas B.Cochran,available at http://www.nrdc.org/reference/profiles/prococh.asp
11 威廉·阿金,目前是《华盛顿邮报》的网络专栏作家,同时也是哈佛大学卡尔人权政策中心的研究人员。1985年到2002年,他负责《原子核科学家公报》的“定论栏目”(Last Word),也是NRDC核笔记本栏目的主笔之一,他还曾参与1984-2002年的《SIPRI年鉴》中“核武器”部分的编写工作。同时,他还是《核武器手册》主要作者之一和1985年《核战场》(Nuclear Battlefields)一书的合著者之一。Wikipedia,William Arkin,available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Arkin
12 罗伯特·诺里斯,美国自然资源保护委员会(NRDC)的核项目的高级研究人员。他为《原子核科学家公报》中的NRDC核笔记本栏目贡献了100多篇文章。他也是《核武器手册》的作者之一。NRDC,Bibliography of Works by Robert S.Norris,available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/norris/norrispubs.asp
13 汉斯·克里斯汀生,美国科学家联盟的核信息项目的负责人。在1998-2002年,他负责鹦鹉螺研究所的核战略项目,2002-2005年,他成为自然保护委员会的核项目顾问。Federation of American Scientist,Hans M.Kristensen,available at http://www.fas.org/static/staffbios.jsp
14 William M.Arkin and Richard W.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefields:Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,MA:Ballinger,1985.
15 斯蒂芬·舒瓦兹,著名的《不扩散评论》(The Nonproliferation Review)的编辑。曾为《原子核科学家公报》的执行主任,并曾任布鲁斯金学会的外交政策研究项目的项目主任。CNS Staff:Stephen I.Schwartz,available at http://cns.miis.edu/cns/staff/sschwartz.htm
16 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998.
17 威廉·布尔,乔治·华盛顿大学的国家安全档案项目的高级分析员,负责国家安全档案的核历史部分。The National Security Archive,Dr.William Burr,available at http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/nsa/arc_staff.html
18 该中心是美国在防扩散领域研究的最大非政府组织之一。该中心在2007年更名为詹姆士·马丁不扩散研究中心。该中心出版著名的《不扩散评论》(The Nonproliferation Review)杂志。The Center for Nonproliferation Studies,available at http://cns.miis.edu/
19 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,nonproliferation,available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/
20 该中心由之前的国际安全与军备控制中心(Center for International Security and Arms Control,CISAC)更名而来。The Center for International Security and Cooperation,available at http://cisac.stanford.edu/
21 美国军控协会是美国的政府研究机构。出版著名的《今日军控》(Arms Control Today,ACT)刊物。Arms Control Association,available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
22 The Institute for Science and International Security,available at http://www.isis-online.org/
23 该中心主办有著名的《华盛顿季刊》(Washington Quarterly)。Center for Strategic&International Studies,International Security Program Proiect on Nuclear Issues,available at http://www.csis.org/
24 Henry L.Stimson Centre,The Cooperative Nonproliferation Program,available at http://www.stimson.org/cnp/programhome.cfm
25 该中心出版刊物《防务监控》(The Defense Monitor)。World Security Institute,The Center for Defense Information.available at http://www.cdi.org/about/index.cfm
26 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,The Nonproliferation,Homeland and International Security,available at http://www.llnl.gov/llnl/organization/nai.jsp
27 Sandia National Labortary,Nonproliferation program,available at http://www.sandia.gov/mission/nonprolif/index.html
28 斯科特·赛根,斯坦福大学政治学教授,国际安全与军备控制中心(CISAC)的共同主任。其他主要著作包括Moving Targets:Nuclear Strategy and National Security(Princeton University Press,1989);The Limits of Safety:Organizations,Accidents,and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press,1993)。CISAC,Scott D.Sagan,available at http://cisac.stanford.edu/people/2223/
29 Scott D.Sagan,and Kenneth N.Waltz,The Spread of Nuclear Weapons:A Debate Renewed,W.W.Norton,2002.
30 乔治·奎斯特,马里兰大学的政府和政治系主任,在核军控和核不扩散方面著述颇丰,其他著作包括Nuclear Diplomacy:The First Twenty-five Years(New York:Dunellen,1970);Nuclear Monopoly(New Brunswick,New Jersey:Transaction Books:2000).The Source for Strategic and Security Research,George H.Quester,available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?q=372
31 George H.Quester,The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press,1973;George H.Quester,The Future of Nuclear Deterrence,Lexington,Mass.:D.C.Heath,1986.
32 理查德·贝茨,哥伦比亚大学教授,曾为布鲁金斯学会高级研究人员。Columbia University ISERP,Richard Betts,available at http://www.iserp.columbia.edu/people/betts.html
33 Richard Betts,Nuclear Blackmail andNuclear Balance,Washington:The Brookings Institution,1987.
34 刘易斯·邓恩(Lewis Dunn),美国智库科学应用国际公司副总裁(Science Applications International Corporation,SAIC),曾任美国军控与裁军署助理署长,在武器扩散、国家安全和军控政策方面有很多著述。Council on Foreign Relations,Lewis Dunn,available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/2771/after_the_tests.html
35 Lewis Dunn,Controlling the Bomb." Nonproliferation in the 1980s,New Haven:Yale University Press,1982.
36 格雷厄姆·艾利森,哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的贝尔弗科学与国际事务中心主任,曾任里根时期的国防部长特别顾问和克林顿时期负责政策和计划的助理国防部长。另著有Nuclear Terrorism:The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe(Times Books,2004).Wikipedia,Graham T.Allison,available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_T._Allison
37 Graham Allison,Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy:Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material,Cambridge,Mass.:The MIT Press,1996.
38 兰德尔·卡罗琳·福斯博格,美国智库防务与裁军研究所(the Institute for Defense&Disarmament Studies,IDDS) 执行所攻。 Cambridge Forum Speakers 1970-1990,Randall Forsberg,available at http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/cfs/randall_caroline_forsberg.php
39 Randall Caroline Forsberg,Nonproliferation Primer:Preventing the Spread of Nuclear,Chemical and Biological Weapons,Cambridge,Mass.:The MIT Press,1995.
40 戴维·奥尔布莱特(David Albright),科学与国际安全研究所(ISIS)的创立者和主席,物理学家。从上世纪80年代开始评估世界范围内的钚和高浓缩铀的存量,以详细和科学的裂变材料的技术分析闻名。ISIS,Biography of David Albright,available at http://www.isis-online.org/about/staff/dalbright.html
41 David Albright,Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996:World Inventories,Capabilities and Policies,Sweden:SIPRI,1997
42 里昂那德·斯拜克特(Leonard S.Spector),蒙特雷国际问题研究所的不扩散研究中心副主任。他曾任美国能源部国家核安全局(National Nuclear Security Administration)负责军控和不扩散的助理副局长(Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation),也曾任卡耐基国际和平基金会的核不扩散项目的主任。其他著作为Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1995:A Guide in Maps and Charts(with Mark McDonough and Evan Medeiros,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,1995);The Undeclared Bomb:The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,1987-1988(Harper Business,1990).See CNS Staff:Leonard S.Spector,available at http://cns.miis.edu/cns/staff/lspect.htm
43 Leonard S.Spector and Jacqueline Smith,Nuclear Ambitions:The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,1989-1990,Boulder(CO):Westview,1990.
44 米切尔·赖斯(Mitchell Reiss),威廉-玛丽学院副院长,曾任美国国务院政策计划办公室主任(2003-2005)。Wikipedia,Mitchell Reiss,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitchell_Reiss
45 Mitchell Reiss,Bridled Ambition:Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, Washington,D.C.:Woodrow Wilson Center Press,1995.
46 IISS,Proliferation and Nonproliferation,available at http://www.iiss.org/programmes/proliferation-and-non-proliferation
47 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,Non-proliferation and Export Control Project,available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/
48 该中心出版有刊物《裁军外交》(Disarmament Diplomacy )。The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy,available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/
49 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004.
50 五卷本中前两卷被翻译为中文。托马斯·B·科克伦等著,柯情山等译,《核武器手册(第一卷):美国的核力量和能力》,解放军出版社,1985年版;托马斯·B·科克伦等著,王连奎等译,《核武器手册(第二卷):美国的核弹头生产》,国防工业出版社,1990年版。
51 约翰·纽豪斯:《核时代的战争与和平》,军事科学出版社,1989年版。
52 麦乔治·邦迪著,褚广友等译:《美国核战略》,世界知识出版社,1991年版。
53 劳伦斯·弗里德曼:《核战略的演变》,黄钟青译,中国社会科学出版社,1990年版。
54 徐光裕著:《核战略纵横》,国防大学出版社,1987年版。
55 祁学远:《世界有核国家的核力量与核政策》,军事科学出版社,1991年版。
56 王仲春等编译:《美国五角大楼核作战计划揭密》,山西人民出版社,1992年版。
57 王仲春,夏立平:《美国核力量与核战略》,国防大学出版社,1995年版。
58 陈崇北等著:《威慑战略》,军事科学出版社,1989年版。
59 美国军备控制协会著:《军备控制概论》,中国军事科学院外国军事研究部译,军事科学出版社,1993年版。
60 王羊:《美苏军备竞赛与控制研究》,军事科学院出版社,1993年版。
61 朱明权:《核扩散:危险与防止》,上海科学技术文献出版社,1995年版。
62 潘振强主编:《国际裁军与军备控制》,国防大学出版社,1996年版。
63 杜祥琬:《核军备控制的科学技术基础》,国防工业出版社,1996年版。
64 朱锋:《弹道导弹防御计划与国际安全》,上海人民出版社,2001年版。
65 吴莼思:《威慑理论与导弹防御》,长征出版社,2001年版。
66 朱强国:《美国战略导弹防御计划的动因》,世界知识出版社,2004年版。
67 夏立平:《亚太地区军备控制与安全》,上海人民出版社,2002年版。
68 朱明权、吴莼思、苏长和:《威慑与稳定--中美核关系》,时事出版社.,2005年版。
69 吴大辉:《防范与合作--苏联解体后的俄美核安全关系(1991-2005)》,人民出版社,2005年版。
70 The Center for Nonproliferation Studies,The East Asia Nonproliferation Program,available at http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/index.htm
71 The Nautilus Institute,The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network,available at http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html
72 The International Institute For Strategic Studies,Korean Security Project,available at http://www.iiss.org/programmes/north-east-asia/korean-security-project
73 Harvard University,Korea Institute,available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/～korea/
74 University of California,Berkeley,Center for Korean Studies,available at http://ieas.berkeley.edu/cks/
75 Comubia University,The Center for Korean Research,available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ckr/
76 University of California,Los Angeles,Center for Korean Studies,available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/korea/
77 University of Hawaii,The Center for Korean Studies,available at http://www.hawaii.edu/korea/
78 Cornell University Department of Asian Studies,available at http://lrc.cornell.edu/asian
79 Georgetown University,Asian Studies Program,available at http://asianstudies.georgetown.edu/
80 The George Washington University,The Sigur Center for Asian Studies,available at http://www.gwu.edu/～sigur/
81 University of Oxford,Faculty of Oriental Studies,Korean Studies,available at http://www.orinst.ox.ac.uk/ea/korean/
82 The University of British Columbia,The Centre for Korean Research,available at http://www.iar.ubc.ca/centres/ckr/
83 赛利格·哈里森,伍德罗·威尔逊国际学者中心(the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars)高级研究员。1972年,他代表《华盛顿邮报》和另一名《纽约时报》记者访问朝鲜,并会见金日成,是朝鲜战争后首次访问朝鲜的美国人。1989年,哈里森主持卡耐基基金会资助的国际会议,首次使朝鲜的新闻发言人和美国官员同场讨论。1992年,哈里森组团访问朝鲜,首次基本证实朝鲜后处理钚的事实。See Institute for Corean-American Studies,Selig S.Harrision,available at http://www.icasinc.org/bios/harrison.html
84 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002.
85 约瑟夫·贝鲁兹,《简式情报评论》(Jane's Intelligence Review)顾问,最著名的朝鲜防务和情报问题专家。在朝鲜问题上的专著还有:North Korean Special Forces(Jane's Information Group,1988);Terrorism:The North Korean Connection(Taylor&Francis,1990)。See Amacon,Joseph Bermudez,available at http://www.coasttocoastam.com/guests/631.html
86 Joseph S.Bermudez Jr.,The Armed Forces of North Korea,New York:I.B.Tauris Publishers,2001.
87 唐·奥博多佛,霍普金斯大学尼采国际问题高等研究院(Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,SAIS)教授,著名记者。38年记者生涯,其中25年在《华盛顿邮报》。Wikipedia,Don Oberdorfer,available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Don_Oberdorfer
85 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997.
89 布鲁斯·卡明斯,芝加哥大学历史系教授,当代朝鲜半岛史专家。在朝鲜半岛问题上的其它著作为The Origins of The Korean War(Princeton University Press,1981);Parallax Visions:Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations(Duke University Press,1999)。See The UniversitV of Chicage,Department of History,available at http://history.uchicago.edu/faculty/cumings.html
90 Bruce Cumings,Korea's Place in the Sun:A Modern History,New York:W.W.Norton,1997:Bruce Cumings.North Korea:Another Country,New York:W.W.Norton,2003.
91 利昂·西格尔,纽约社会科学研究委员会的东北亚合作安全项目主任,1979-1981年曾为美国国务院政治军事办公室主任特别助理,1989-2005年为《纽约时报》编委会成员。See Center for American Progress,Leon V.Sigal,available at http://www.americanprogress.org/aboutus/scholars/SigalLeon.html
92 Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea,NJ:Princeton University Press.1998.
93 彼得·海斯,鹦鹉螺安全和可持续发展研究所(the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development)的执行主任。另著有American Lake:Nuclear Peril in the Pacific (Co-author with Lyubza Zarsky,Penguin,1987)。The Nautilus Institute,Peter Hayes,available at http://www.nautilus.org/admin/staff/peter.html
94 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lexington:Lexington Books,1991.
95 安德鲁·麦克,英国哥伦比亚大学人类安全中心(the Human Security Center)主任。See Liu Institute for Global Issues,Andrew Mack,available at http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/about/index.cfm?fuseaction=bio&peopleID= 10
96 Andrew Mack,ed.,Asian Flashpoint:Security and the Korean Peninsula,Canberra:Allen &Unwin,1993.
97 尼古拉斯·艾伯斯塔特,美国企业研究所(the American Enterprise Institute)新美国世纪项目(the Project for the New American Century)研究员。在朝鲜半岛问题上的专著还有Korea Approaches Reunification(M.E.Sharpe,1995).Rightweb,Nicholas Eberstadt,available at http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1141
98 Nicholas Eberstadt,The End of North Korea,Washington:American Enterprise Institute Press,1999.
99 塞缪尔·金,美国哥伦比亚大学怀泽海东亚研究所(Weatherhead East Asian Institute)高级研究员,曾任哥伦比亚韩国研究中心副主任(1995-2006)。他在朝鲜半岛问题上的编著包括:North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era(ed.,Oxford University Press,1998);Korea's Globalization(ed.,Cambridge University Press,2000);North Korea and Northeast Asia(ed.,Rowman & Littlefield,2002);Korea's Democratization(ed.,Cambridge University Press,2003 ).Weatherhead East Asian Institute,Professor Samuel S.Kim,available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/weai/scholars/kim.html
100 Samuel S.Kim,The Two Koreas and the Great Powers,New York:Cambridge University Press,2006.
101 徐大肃,美国夏威夷大学政治学教授和韩国研究所所长。Columbia University Press,Dae-Sook Suh,available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cup/catalog/data/978023106/9780231065733.HTM
102 Dae-Sook Suh,Kim Il-Sung:North Korean Leader,New York:Columbia University Press,1995.
103 爱德华·奥尔森,美国海军研究生学院教授,亚洲事务专家。在朝鲜半岛问题上的著作有:Korea,The Divided Nation(Praeger Security International,2005) 。 Naval Postgraduate School,Edward A.Olsen,available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/people/olsen.asp
104 Edward A.Olsen,Toward Normalizing U.S.--Korea Relations:In Due Course? Boulder,CO:L.Rienner Publishers,2002.
105 斯科特·施奈德,美国亚洲基金会的高级研究员,朝韩外交政策以及美国朝鲜半岛政策问题专家。The Asia Foundation,Scott Snyder,available at http://www.asiafoundation.org/Guide/snyder.html
106 Scott Snyder,Negotiating on the Edge:North Korean Negotiating Behavior,Washington:United States Institute of Peace Press,1999.
107 道格拉斯·潘道,美国智库Cato研究所高级研究人员。他曾担任里根的特别助理和里根在1980总统选举时的高级政策分析师。CATO Institute,Doug Bandow,available at http://www.cato.org/people/bandow.html
108 Douglas Bandow,Tripwire:Korea and U.S.Foreign Policy in a Changed World,Washington,D.C.:The Cato Institute,1996.
109 维克多·车,乔治敦大学副教授,曾在小布什政府的国家安全委员会中担任亚洲事务顾问,主要著作为 Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford University Press,1999).Georgetown University,Victor D.Cha,available at http://www8.georgetown.edu/departments/government/faeulty/chav/
110 戴维·姜,达特茅斯学院(Dartmouth College)副教授,朝鲜半岛问题专家。
111 Victor D.Cha,and David C.Kang,Nuclear North Korea:A Debate on Engagement Strategies, New York:Columbia University Press,2003.
112 米切尔·梅扎,美国国家战争学院(The U.S.National War College)教授,曾为战略和国际研究中心(the Center for Strategic and International Studies,CSIS)的新千年项目主任(the New Miilennium Project)和华盛顿季刊(the Washington Quarterly)的编辑。
113 Michael J.Mazarr,North Korea and the Bomb:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,New York,NY:St.Martin's Press,1995.
114 Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security,available at http://www.ifans.go.kr/ie/index.jsp
115 Korea Institute for National Unification,available at http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/
116 Korea National Defense University,Research Institute on National Security Affairs,available at http://www.kndu.ac.kr/eng/
117 Korea Institute for Defense Analysis,available at http://www.kida.re.kr/english2005/
118 The Sejong Institute,available at http://www.sejong.org/
119 Kyungnam University,The Institute for Far Eastern Studies,available at http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/
120 Yonsei University,The Institute for Korean Unification Studies,available at http://suny.yonsei.ac.kr/～ikus/main_eng.html
121 Korea University,The Ilmin International Relations Institute,available at http://www.korea.ac.kr/～ilmin/
122 Keimyung University,the International Research Institute for Korean Studies,available at http://eng.actakoreana.org/
123 East Asia Institute,available at http://www.eai.or.kr/english/
124 河英善,韩国首尔国立大学教授。
125 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983.
126 韩昇洲,现任韩国总理,韩国高丽大学国际关系研究所前所长。他曾担任韩国外交部长(1993-1994)。在担任韩国外交部长期间,他协调协调美韩对朝政策的努力受到广泛赞誉。他另著有Changing values in Asia:their impact on governance and development(Tokyo:Japan Center for International Exchange,1999)。Korea Unniverstiy,HAN Sung-Joo,available at http://www.korea.ac.kr/～ilmin/staff-bio-hsj.htm
127 Han Sung-Joo and Gerald Curtis,ed.,The U.S.-South Korean Alliance:Evolving Patterns in Security Relations,Lexington,MA:Heath,1983.
128 文正仁,现为韩国外交通商部国际安全事务大使,韩国延世大学(Yonsei University)政治学教授。Pacific Council,Dr.Chung-In Moon,available at http://www.pacificcouncil.org/interior.aspx?pageID=About&subID=31&itemID=10518
129 Chung-In Moon,ed.,Arms control on the Korean Peninsula,Yonsei University Press Seoul,1996.
130 千祥勋,韩国统一研究院高级研究人员。另著有U.S.National Missile Defense and South Korea's National Security(Seoul:KINU,2001);Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:A Comprehensive Approach(Albuquerque,NM:Cooperative Monitoring Center,SNL,1999)。See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Seongwhun Cheon,available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1290
131 Cheon Seongwhun,Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea,Korea Institute for National Unification,2006;Cheon Seongwhun,Non-Nuclear Policy of the Unified Korea:Looking Beyond and Being in the Process of Unification,Seoul:Korea Institute for National Unification,2002.
132 Kim Jung-Ik,The Future of the US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship,ST.Martin's Press,1996.
133 于美华:“‘朝鲜核问题'的来龙去脉”,《国际资料信息》,1994年第5期,第6-9页。
134 程玉洁:“朝鲜核问题的来龙去脉”,《现代国际关系》,1994年第9期,第43-47页。
135 于美华:“朝鲜半岛形势及中国政策分析”,《现代国际关系》,1996年第10期,第34-38页。
136 韩镇涉:“关于东北亚未来安全问题的几点看法”,《当代亚太》,1995年第5期,第49-54页。
137 虞少华:“朝鲜半岛形势的发展与前景”,《国际问题研究》,1997年第4期,第11-18页。
138 朴键一:“朝鲜核问题及其未来走向”,《当代亚太》,2003年第3期,第23-26页;
朴键一:“北京六方会谈与朝鲜核问题的前景”,《当代亚太》,2003年第10期,第42-46页。
139 李敦球:“朝鲜为何打核牌”,《世界知识》,2005年第7期,第26-28页。
140 时永明:“朝鲜核问题与东北亚安全”,《国际问题研究》,2003年第5期,第52-54页。
141 沈丁立:“朝鲜和伊朗的核问题”,载《美国问题研究》,第四缉,时事出版社,倪世雄,刘永涛主编,2005年,第332-341页。
142 于迎丽:“朝核问题与东北亚安全合作”,《国际观察》,2004年第6期,第34-39页。
143 刘鸣:“朝鲜半岛新一轮核风波解读”,《社会观察》,2003年第1期,第21-22页。
144 杨红梅:“朝鲜核危机的症结及走向”,《现代国际关系》,2003年第5期,第21-26页。
145 崔志鹰:“‘核危机'与朝美关系前景”,《东北亚论坛》,2003年第4期,第12-15页。
146 石源华:“‘六方会谈'机制化:东北亚安全合作的努力方向”,《国际观察》,2005年第2期。
147 任晓:“六方会谈与东北亚多边安全机制的可能性”,《国际问题研究》,2005年第1期,第38-41。
148 王少普:“朝鲜半岛缓和进程与东北亚局势”,《国际观察》,2001年第2期,第45-48页。
149 杨红梅:“朝鲜缔结朝美‘和平协定'的构想与努力”,《世界经济研究》,2003年第3期,第53-57页。
150 李敦球:“韩国也出核问题”,《世界知识》,2004年第19期,第32-34页。
151 程玉洁:“韩国核风波的来龙去脉”,《国际资料信息》,2004年第11期,第16-19页。
152 朱锋:“导弹试射、六方会谈与多边谈判中的‘安全困境'”,《现代国际关系》,2006年第8期,第25-31页。
153 石源华:“朝鲜核试爆与重开六方会谈”,《东北亚论坛》,2007年第1期,第53-57页。
154 姜宅九:“中国参与六方会谈:斡旋角色与前景”,《当代亚太》,2007年第2期,第30-35页。
155 李开盛:“中国对朝核问题影响的定量分析”,《世界经济与政治》,2007年第4期,第48-53页。
156 刘阿明,姚晓玫:“朝鲜核问题与中美利益博弈”,《国际观察》,2007年第2期,第73-79页。
157 沈丁立:“朝鲜核试验和中朝关系及中国的选择”,《青年参考》,2006年9月16日。
158 崔立如:“朝鲜半岛安全问题:中国的作用”,《现代国际关系》,2006年第9期,第42-47页。
159 张琏瑰:“朝鲜核试验后的局势和中国的选择”,《新远见》,2007年第2期,第20-40页。
160 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991.
161 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley, 1997,pp.255-259.
162 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,pp.197-200.
163 尽管该文件仍为部分解密,但解密的部分对1945年到1977年的美国海外核部署的时间、地点以及背景已经有较为详细的描述。这个文件的附录B名为《1951-1977年在各国的部署年表》(Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977),是所述时期美国在各国核部署的情况略表,包括部署武器的名称、部署时间和撤出时间。这份解密材料可以为冷战时期核历史的研究者提供重要参考。
164 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983.
165 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003.
166 姜政敏(Jungmin Kang),美国斯坦福大学的国际安全与军备控制中心(CISAC)的科研人员。姜的研究特点是把核能领域的技术分析引入核政策研究。CISAC,Jungmin Kang,available at http://cisac.stanford.edu/people/jungminkang/
167 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1,January/February 2005,pp.40-49.
168 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,pp.53-80.
169 Peter Hayes,"The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue," in Andrew Mack ed.,Asian Flashpoint:Security and the Korean Peninsula,Allen & Unwin,1993,pp.51-83.
170 王连成:“对韩国核能力的初步分析”,载中国军控与裁军协会:《2005:国际军备控制与裁军报告》,世界知识出版社,2005年1月,第81-93页。
171 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004.
172 David Albright and Kevin O'Neill,eds.,Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle,Washington,D.C.:Institute For Science And International Security,2000.
173 亚历山大·曼苏洛夫(Alexandre Y.Mansourov),美国亚太安全研究中心(Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies)副教授,主编有Bytes and Bullets:Information Technology Revolution and National Security on the Korean Peninsula(APCSS:Honolulu,HI,2005);A Turning Point:Democratic Consolidation in the ROK and Strategic Readjustment in the US-ROK Alliance(APCSS:Honolulu,HI,2005);The North Korean Nuclear Program:Security,Strategy,and New Perspectives from Russia(together with Dr.Clay J.Moltz,Routledge Press:New York,2000)。Institute for Corean-American Studies,Alexandre Y.Mansourov,available at http://www.icasinc.org/bios/mansouro.html
174 Alexandre Y.Mansourov,"The Origins,Evolution,and Current Politics ofthe North Korean Nuclear Program,"The Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1995,pp.25-38.
175 Robert Alvarez,"North Korea:No Bygones at Yongbyon,"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,July/August 2003,pp.39-45.
176 李彬:《朝鲜的军备发展》,载《军备控制研究与进展》,第2卷,2004年,第1期,第7-12页。
177 Michael J.Mazarr,"Going Just a Little Nuclear:Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea,"International Security,Vol.20,No.2(Fall 1995),pp.92-122.
178 Peter Hayes,"What North Korea Wants,"The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,December 1993,pp.8-10.
179 Andrew Mack,"A Nuclear North Korea:The Choices Are Narrowing," World Policy Journal summer 1994,p.27-35.
180 Nicholas Eberstadt,"Noah Korea's Weaons Quest," The National Interest,Summer 2005,pp.49-52.
181 Jonathan D.Pollack,"North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015:Three Scenarios,"Asia Policy,Number 3,January 2007,pp.105-123.
182 沈丁立:“朝鲜弃核和拥核,哪个更安全?”《东方早报》,2006年12月21日。
183 Peter Hayes,"The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue," in Andrew Mack ed.,Asian Flashpoint:Security and the Korean Peninsula,Allen & Unwin,1993,pp.78-79.
184 Brad Roberts,"East Asia's Nuclear Future:A Long-Term View of Threat Reduction," Institute For Defense Analyses,IDA Document P-3641,p.6,pp.16-21.
185 International Crisis Group,"North Korea's Nuclear Test:The Fallout," Policy Briefing,No.56,Seoul/Brussels,13 November 2006,p.9.
186 Robyn Lim,"Australia and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence," The Center for Independent Studies,Issue Analysis,No.81,1 March 2007,pp.4-5.
187 Alliance一词在中文翻译时,有时被译为“同盟”,有时被译为“联盟”,但意思基本都是一样的。本文在这里统一为“同盟”。
188 George Liska,Nations in Alliance:the Limits of Interdependence,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press,1968,p.4.
189 Arnold Wolfers,"Alliances," in David L.Sills(ed.),International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,New York:Macmillan,1968,pp.268-269.
190 Warren F.Kimball,"Alliances,Coalitions,and Ententes",in Alexander DeConde(eds.),Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy,New York:Charles Scribner's Sons,1978,pp.1-2.
191 Glenn H.Snyder,Alliance Politics,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1987,p.4.
192 Glenn H.Snyder,"Alliance Theory:A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs,Vol.44,No.1,Spring 1990,p.104.
193 Robert Osgood,Alliances and American Foreign Policy,Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins Press,1968,p.18.
194 Stephen M.Walt,The Origins of Alliances,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1987,p.12.
195 参见孙德刚,“联而不盟:国际安全合作中的准联盟理论”,《外交评论》,2007年第12期,第64页。
196 参见于铁军:“国际政治中的同盟理论:进展与争论”,《欧洲》,1999年第5期,第16页。
197 参见孙德刚,“国际安全之联盟理论探析”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第4期,第41页。
198 Hans J.Morgenthau,"Alliances in Theory and Practice",in Arnold Wolfers ed.,Alliance Policy in the Cold War,Baltimore,MD:The Johns Hopkins Press,1959,pp.184-212.
199 George F.Liska,Nations in Alliance:The Limits of Interdependence,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press,1962,p.1.
200 William H.Riker,The Theory of Political Coalitions,New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,1962,p.174.
201 Pierre M.Gallois,"U.S.Strategy and the Defense of Europe,"Obis,Summer 1963,Vol.Ⅶ.No.2,pp-226-249;Henry A.Kissinger,The Troubled Partnership,Westport,CT:Greenwood Press,1982,pp.11-13.
202 参见于铁军:“国际政治中的同盟理论:进展与争论”,《欧洲》,1999年第5期,第18页。
203 Stephen M.Walt,The Origins of Alliances,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1987,p.7.
204 Ibid.,p.275.
205 Stephen Walt,"Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security,Spring 1985,p.10.
206 Randall L.Schweller,"Neorealisms Status-Quo Bias:What Security Dilemma?",in Benjamin Frankel ed.,Realism:Restatements and Renewal,London:Frank Cass,1996,pp.90-121.
207 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,July 1984,Vol.34,No.3,pp.461-495.
208 Thomas J.Christensen and Jack Snyder,"Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks:Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization,Spring 1990,Vol.44,No.2,pp.144-147.
209 参见于铁军:“国际政治中的同盟理论:进展与争论”,《欧洲》,1999年第5期,第22页。
210 Robert O.Keohane,"Alliance,Threats and the Uses of Neorealism,"International Security,Summer 1988,Vol.13,No.1,pp.174-175.
211 Stephen M.Walt,"Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival,Spring.1997,Vol.39,No.1,pp.166-167.
212 参见于铁军:“国际政治中的同盟理论:进展与争论”,《欧洲》,1999年第5期,第24页。
213 Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney,ed.,US Allies in A Changing World,London:FRANKCASS,2001,pp.29-48.
214 Stephen M.Walt,"Why Alliances Endure or Collapse",Survival,Spring 1997,Vol.39,No.1,pp.169-170.
215 Michael C.Desch,"Culture Clash:Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies",International Security,Summer 1998,Vol.23,No.1,p.165.
216 参见孙德刚,“国际安全之联盟理论探析”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第4期,第52页。
217 Hans J.Morgenthau,"Alliances in Theory and Practice",in Arnold Wolfers ed.,Alliance Policy in the Cold War,Baltimore,MD:The Johns Hopkins Press,1959,pp.188-191.
218 Robert L.Rothestein,Alliances and Small Powers,New York:Columbia University Press,1968,p.11.
219 Victor D.Cha,Alignment despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle,Stanford:Stanford University Press,1999.
220 Hans J.Morgenthau,"Alliances in Theory and Practice",in Arnold Wolfers ed.,Alliance Policy in the Cold War,Baltimore,MD:The Johns Hopkins Press,1959,pp.184-212;Robert E.Osgood,Alliance and American Foreign Policy,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press,1968.
221 Stephen M.Walt,The Origins of Alliances,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1987,p.149.
222 Randall L.Schweller,"Bandwagoning for Profit:Bring the Revisionist State Back in,"International Security,Vol.19,No.1,Summer 1994,pp.80- 81.
223 Robert O.Keohane,"Alliance,Threats and the Uses of Neorealism,"International Security,Summer 1988,Vol.13,No.1,pp.174-175.
224 Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney,ed.,US Allies in A Changing World,London:FRANKCASS,2001,pp.29-48.
225 Richard E.Neustadt,Alliance Politics,New York:Columbia University Press,1970.
226 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,pp.466-468.
227 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser,"An Economic Theory of Alliance," Review of Economics and Statistics,August 1966,pp.266-279.
228 William H.Riker,The Theory of Political Coalitions,New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,1962,p.174.
229 Charles W.Kegley,Jr.and Gregory A.Raymond,When Trust Breaks Down:Alliance Norms and World Politics,South Carolina:University of South Carolina Press,1990,p.107.
230 王帆:“联盟管理理论与联盟管理困境”,《欧洲研究》,2006年第4期,第112页。
231 曼瑟尔·奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,陈郁等译,上海三联书店,1996年版,译者前言第5页。
232 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,pp.468-471.
233 王帆:“联盟管理理论与联盟管理困境”,《欧洲研究》,2006年第4期,第111-125页。
234 赵怀普、王前:“单极与多极:北约还是铁板一块吗?”,《当代世界》,2004年第4期,第19-21页。
235 丁菲娅:“美欧分歧对北约发展的影响”,《国际问题研究》,2004年第1期,第48-52页。
236 王学军:“冷战后欧美联盟的动力与趋势”,《教学与研究》,2007年第7期,第67-72页。
237 张景全:“从同盟机制角度看美国对日本历史问题的态度”,《当代亚太》,2006年第9期,第26-30页。
238 何英莺:《论战后日美军事同盟中的摩擦关系》,复旦大学博士论文,指导教师:朱明权教授,2003年4月。
239 Hans J.Morgenthau,"Alliances in Theory and Practice",in Arnold Wolfers ed.,Alliance Policy in the Cold War,Baltimore,MD:The Johns Hopkins Press,1959,pp.184-212.
240[美]斯蒂芬·沃尔特:《联盟的起源》,周丕启译,北京大学出版社,2007年版,第149-153页。
241 Randall L.Schweller,"Neorealisms Status-Quo Bias:What Security Dilemma?",in Benjamin Frankel ed.,Realism:Restatements and Renewal,London:Frank Cass,1996,pp.90-121.
242 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,p.466-367.
243 这是美国第八军自己编撰的历史档案,每年一本。档案很详细地描述了第八军的作战战略、编制部署、人员和财务等。该档案涉及核武器部署的部分仍然保密,但从档案中仍可以发现一些关于核部署的有价值的信息。这些档案由鹦鹉螺研究院申请解密,可以从鹦鹉螺研究院的网页中获得。The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,"Military Histories,"available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
244 这是美国太平洋司令部的历史档案,与第八军的历史档案情况基本相似。The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,"Military Histories," available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
1 Bruce Cumings,"Nuclear Imbalance of Terror:The American Surveillance Regime and North Korea's Nuclear Programme," in Raju G.C.Thomas,ed.,The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime:Prospects for the 21st Century,Basingstoke:Macmillan,1998,p.214.
2 Donald Stone Macdonald,US-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance,The Twenty-Year Record:An Interpretive Summary of Archives of the US Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965,Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1992,p.23.
3 1956年,这一机构基本上已经不发挥作用了。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg."American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.34.
4 Donald Stone Macdonald,US-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance,The Twenty-Year Record." An Interpretive Summary of Archives of the US Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965,Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1992,pp.78-79.
5 Ibid.,pp.23-24.
6 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp.4-5,available at http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/news/19991020/index.html
7 1950年6月,杜鲁门批准在英国部署89个原子弹的非核部分,以支持战略空军司令部在英国部署的轰炸机。到1950年7月,这些非核部分在英国完成部署。这一时期,原子弹的钚或者铀芯(又称为核胶囊,nuclear capsule)与非核的外壳是分开放置的。美国原子能委员会对核部件进行保管,只有通过总统的授权,才可以交给军方。在战争的情况下,这些核部件被快速地运到部署有非核部分的基地,组成完整的核武器使用。部署非核部分的考虑是,前沿部署这些庞大而且赘重的非核部分,要比在危机时候运送完整的一个原子弹更快和更容易。See Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,“Where they were,''The Bulletin D7r the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.27。关于核武器发展早期的非核部分和核部件的权力监管,《核武器手册》中有详细描述。See Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Robea S.Norris,Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅱ:U.S.Nuclear Warhe.ad Production,Ballinger Pub.Co.,Cambridge,England,1987,p.2;托马斯·B·科克伦等著,王连奎等译,《核武器手册(第二卷):美国的核弹头生产》,国防工业出版社,1990年版,第2页。
8 当时,一些美国官员认为,朝鲜战争是苏联为入侵西欧而转移美国注意力的阴谋。See Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,“Where they were,''The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.27.
9 杜鲁门任命空军参谋总长豪伊特·坎登博格(Hoyt S Candenberg)作为参联会的执行人员,来保管这些核胶囊。See Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,“Where they were,''The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.29;Roger Dingman,”Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,''International Security,Vol.13,No.3,Winter 1988/1989,p.72.
10 曾任美国国家安全顾问的麦乔治·邦迪对这一政策及其核意义有详细的描述。参见麦乔治·邦迪著,褚广友等译:《美国核战略》,世界知识出版社,1991年版,第339页。
11 法国仅部署过非核部分。See Office ofthe Secretary of Defense,“History ofthe Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,“Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977,"p.6.
12 Ibid.,pp.4-5.
13 “斗牛士”导弹的射程为1000千米。美国在韩国部署的可以携带核航弹的飞机有F-100、F-105、F-4和F-16。其中F-100作战半径为885千米,F-105为1191,F-4作战半径为1060千米,但对地面目标攻击距离为1610千米。F-16作战半径为925千米。以韩国的乌山空军基地为中心的1000千米范围,可以攻击到苏联的海参崴和中国的东北、山东等东部地区。这些武器系统的射程和作战半径的数据来自:Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,”Martin SSM-A-1/B-61/TM-61/MGM-1 Matador",http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-1.html;Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,and Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅰ:U.S.Nuclear Forces and Capabilities,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Publishing Company,1984,p.216,p.221,226.
14 杜鲁门在1948年将军费上限限定为144亿美元,但参联会强烈反对,认为这样的预算会丢掉欧洲。这样的预算争执在杜鲁门时期一直存在。See Kevin O'Neill,“Building the Bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.13.艾森豪威尔在其执政时期同样认为,联邦预算过于庞大,最可能节约的部门就是国防部。参见麦乔治·邦迪著,褚广友等译:《美国核战略》,世界知识出版社,1991年版,第339页。
15 20世纪50年代,一吨TNT炸药需要1700美元,而使用裂变物质产生同样当量的爆炸力只需23美元。参见约翰·纽豪斯:《核时代的战争与和平》,军事科学出版社,1989年版,第164页。1951年,联合原子能委员会主席布赖恩·麦克马洪提出参议院第46号决议案, 在此决议案辩论时,他讲到,“通过核武器这种和平力量的真正支柱,美国能打击任何地方的敌人,……,这会挽救国家的经济崩溃。一个装备有原子弹的陆军、海军和空军,意味着花在许多传统武器上的上百亿美元的费用将减少。”See Kevin O'Neill,“Building the Bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.19-20。
16 这一句话出自艾森豪威尔1953年12月在联合国大会的一次演讲中,他在演讲中宣布:“在我们的部队里,原子武器实际上已经取得了常规武器的地位,……,陆军、海军、空军和海军陆战队有能力将这种武器用于军事目的。”这个宣布在当时可能还有点夸大其辞,但几年后,核武器已经被大范围地引入美国的作战部队中。在不到十年的时间里,这些部队的任何一支小分队里已经很难发现没有核武器的存在。See Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,“Deploying the bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.152-153。
17 对五群制师编制调整最详细的描述是,约翰·米德雷的《致命的虚幻:陆军在核战场中的政策》的第二章“原子陆军:五群制的发展”。See“Chapter Ⅱ,The Atomic Army:Development of the Pentomic Division,''in John J.Midgley,Jr.,Deadly Illusions:Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield,Boulder and London:Westview Press,1986,pp.31-85.
18 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.35.
19 See Richard G.Stilwell,and Donald Zagoria,Arguments against US Troop Reductions in Korea,in Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report,1977",p.348.;George McGovern,"The US Risk in Korea," in Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report,1977",p.333,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
20 Ibid.,p.346.
21 Bruce Cumings,"Nuclear Imbalance of Terror:The American Surveillance Regime and North Korea's Nuclear Programme," in Raju G.C.Thomas,ed.,The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime:Prospects for the 21st Century,Basingstoke:Macmillan,1998,p.215.
22 Operations Research Office,Johns Hopkins University,Semi-Annual Report 9:2,July 1-Dec.31,1956,contents page.
23 Thomas B.Allen,War Games:The Secret World of the Creators,Players,and Policy Makers Rehearsing World War Ⅲ Today,New York:McGraw-Hill,1987,1919.51-55.
24 1953年停战协定谈判时,李承晚就表示反对。停战协定签订后,李又多次宣称要重新进入战争。See Donald Stone Macdonald,US-Korean Relationsfrom Liberation to Self-Reliance,The Twenty-Year Record:An Interpretive Summary of Archives of the US Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965,Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1992,pp.18-20.
25 Bruce Cumings,“Nuclear Imbalance of Terror:The American Surveillance Regime and North Korea's Nuclear Programme,''in Raju G.C.Thomas,ed.,The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime:Prospects for the 21st Century,Basingstoke:Macmillan,1998,p.216.
26 参见本章的第三节。
27 Hans Kristensen,”Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella,"Section 3,”The Battle over Okinawa,''http://www.nautilus.org/archives//library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-3.html
28 这一信息是美国学者彼得·海斯在与驻韩美军的退役军官访谈中得到的。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.35.
29 Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Quarterly Historical Summary:Historical Report,April-June 1966," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,G3,declassified,p.15.
30 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.50.
31 Thomas B.Allen,War Games." The Secret World of the Creators,Players,and Policy Makers Rehearsing Worm War Ⅲ Today,New York:McGraw-Hill,1987,pp.51-55.
32 60年代末期,是一个美国经济和政治实力都相对下降的时期。尼克松决心恢复美国在世界事务中的中心地位。1969年,尼克松宣布美国不再保卫那些微不足道的利益,希望可以从各个地区的安全承诺中解脱出来。在尼克松-基辛格的世界大棋局中,朝鲜半岛是相对不重要的。尼克松试图构建以一个离岸海军为主导的东亚战略。这一战略要求减少对韩国的军事承诺,以避免对地区冲突的再度卷入。See F.Schurmann,The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon:The Grand Design,Berkeley,1987,p.2.
33 这一次撤出了驻韩美军总数6万人中的2万人。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.13.
34 1971年,国防部长梅尔文·莱尔德(Melvin Laird)签署了一个决策备忘录,内容是,到1974年底,剩下的第二步兵师要减少一个旅。但第二年,这个截至日期延长到1975年。1974年,继任的施莱辛格在国会建议,驻韩美军应完全逐渐撤离,由驻扎在夏威夷的陆军和关岛的海军组成的流动后备力量来接替。以强硬著称的施莱辛格之所以支持撤军,是因为他认为这样可以更有效地与苏联竞争。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.55;“Mobile Force Eyed for GIs in Korea,''Korea Herald,March 3,1974,p.1.
35 1974年12月,在对汉城的一次简短访问中,福特明确对朴正熙说:“我们没有从韩国撤军的意图。”针对韩国对美国进一步撤出的忧虑,国防部长施莱辛格在1975年8月访问汉城,私下对朴正熙说,他“预见(美国对韩政策)在今后五年内不会有太大变化”。See Thomas J.Barnes,“Secretary Schlesinger's Discussion in Seoul,''Nmional Security Council Memorandum,Nov.29,1975,declassified 1995,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.430.
36 See Thomas J.Barnes."Secretary Schlesinger's Discussion in Seoul,''Nmional Security Council Memorandum,Nov.29,1975,declassified 1995.
37 卡特的竞选团队希望卡特与福特总统有所区别。而在孤立主义情绪盛行的后越战时代,从韩国撤军是个很好的议题。同时,通过宣扬撤军,卡特可以得到金融保守派和国际自由派的支持。金融保守派希望盟国分享更多的防务支出,而国际自由派则担心与朝鲜的冲突自动升级为核战争。也有人认为,推崇人权的卡特看到关于朴正熙政府对其民众暴行的第一手记录,对韩国政府心生厌恶而决定撤军。See Cyrus Vance,Hard Choice:Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy,New York:Simon and Schuster,1983,p.449.
38 譬如,驻韩美军总参谋长约翰·辛拉伯(John Singlaub)对《华盛顿邮报》记者说,“假如美国如期撤出地面部队的话,那将导致战争。”辛拉伯之后受到卡特的批评,并被调出韩国。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.90.
39 国务卿万斯、国防部长哈罗德·布朗、负责东亚事务的助理国务卿理查德·豪尔布鲁克(Richard Holbrooke)此时都开始阻挠撤军计划的进行。就连布热津斯基在1978年都开始表示,撤军计划可能是错误的。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.89-93.
40 1978年4月,参议院武装部队委员会第一次对卡特的撤军政策进行批评。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.79.
41 卡特最初计划第一批撤出6000人,之后调整为撤出800人的战斗营和2600名非战斗人员。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.93-94
42 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.103-104;Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,pp.70-84.
43 Global Security,Camp Page,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-page.htm
44 卡特在竞选时宣布:“我们有700枚核武器在韩国,我认为任何一个都没有存在的理由。”See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.89.
45 参见《华盛顿邮报》记者奥博多佛1995年对哈罗德·布朗的访谈。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.89.
46 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato,U.S.Policy toward Japan and Korea:A Changing Influence Relationship,New York:Praeger,1982,pp.111-112.
47 National Security Study Memorandum 226,"Review of U.S.Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," May 2.7,1977,declassified 1994,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans.:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.433.
48 V.Guldry,"U.S.Nuclear Weapons to Leave South Korea When Troops Depart," Washington Star,June 14,1977.
49 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.84.
50 1977年,美国在韩核武器数量为660-700件。 到1981年卡特政府结束时,减少为250件左右。参见第二节第五部分“在韩国核武器的数量”中的分析。
51 就“诚实的约翰”而言,陆军在1976年卡特当选之前就准备让它们全部退役。See U.S.Senate,Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,“Military Construction Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980," Hearings,U.S.Government Printing Office,Washington,D.C.,1979,p.181.
52 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato,U.S.Policy toward Japan and Korea:A Changing Influence Relationship,New York:Praeger,1982,p.114.
53 Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.Vol.55.No.6.November/December 1999,pp.30-31.
54 当时国会批评核武器信息极度保密,“美国驻一些国家的大使都不知道是否美国在其所驻国家部署了核武器。”See Hans Kristensen,“Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella,''Section 3,“The Battle over Okinawa,''http://www.nautilus.org/archives//library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-3.html
55 Ibid.
56 Command in Chief,U.S.Pacific Command,"CINCPAC Command History 1974," Volume Ⅰ,September 25,1975,p.262,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
57 Ibid.,p.263.
58 1977年太平洋司令部档案记载了以下内容:同样出于对核武器存储安全的考虑,太平洋司令部于1977年6月6日到10日对韩国的存储基地进行了检查。其中提及的存储基地为阿姆斯基地、群山空军基地和乌山空军基地。这份档案还记载,在乌山空军基地的核武器存储设施在这年的晚些时候停止使用。See Commander in Chief,U.S.Pacific Command(CINCPAC).“CINCPAC Command History for 1977,''Volume Ⅱ,September 1,1978,pp.431-432,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Proiect,available at hap://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
59 "Schlesinger Wams N.Korea U.S.May Use Nuclear Arms," St.Louis Post-Dispatch,June 22,1975.
60 William Burr,"Looking Back:The Limit of Limited Nuclear War," Arms Control Today,January/February 2006 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-Lookingback.asp
61 U.S.Forces Korea/Eighth U.S.Army,"1976 Annual Historical Report," p.ⅲ,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
62 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.93.
63 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.75-76.
64 危机是由联合安全区的一颗大树引起的。由于是夏季,这颗树非常茂密。美国士兵认为这颗树遮挡了他们观察朝鲜那边情况的视线,因此美国士兵就到联合安全区去修剪这颗树。随即赶来的朝鲜士兵不让美军对树进行修剪,因为他们认为联合安全区的任何东西都不能被破坏。在争执中冲突发生,美国两名军官被杀死。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.74.
65 在讨论之前,美国对危机已经迅速做出第一反应:将驻韩美军和韩国的警戒状态升级到最高的战争准备状态;从冲绳和爱达荷州各调遣一个空军中队的F-4战斗机和F-111战斗轰炸机至韩国;从关岛起飞的重型轰炸机B-52开始在接近朝鲜的上空做模拟轰炸的飞行演习;美国航母中途号从日本开往韩国领海。See Conrad Delateur,“Murder at Panmunjom:The Role of Theatre Commander in Crisis Resolution,''The Senior Seminar Of Foreign Service Institute,United States Department of State,Twenty-Nimh Session,March,1987,p.12,Declassified,http://www.nautilus.org/foia/panmunjom.html
66 用一些高级官员的话说,“朝鲜人是野人”,意即他们是不理智的。他们担心,即便是小规模的军事打击也会引发朝鲜的剧烈军事反应。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.78-79.
67 保罗·班扬是美国传说中的伐木巨人。Conrad Delateur,"Murder at Panmunjom:The Role of Theatre Commander in Crisis Resolution,"The Senior Seminar of Foreign Service Institute.United States Department of State,Twenty-Ninth Session,March,1987,pp.19-20.,Declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Projeet,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/panmunjom.html
68 Ibid.,pp.20-21.
69 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.81.
70 Ibid.,p.82.
71 在1969年危机中,朝鲜在第二年才释放了扣留人员,而且朝鲜一直扣留着美国的情报船。同时,朝鲜并不认为自己的行为有错误,也没有向美国表示歉意。
72 Science Applications,Inc.,Vulnerability of North Korean Forces:Evaluation of Vulnerability of North Korean Divisions to Tactical Nuclear Weapons,Report to U.S.Defense Nuclear Agency,DNA 4570F-1,Malean,Va.,March 1978,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/NKVulnerability.html.
73 Ibid.,p.2-18,p.4-2,p.4-3,p.5-1,p.5-2.
74 Ibid.,p.1-6.
75 Ibid.,p.3,p.4-2.
76 美国学者在讨论朝鲜战争爆发的历史时经常强调:1949年到1950年初,美国参联会不认为朝鲜半岛对于美国安全是重要的,甚至麦克阿瑟开始时也如此认为,以至于1950年1月,国务卿艾奇逊告诉国家新闻社,“遏制共产主义的边界已经划定,朝鲜半岛被排除在自由世界防线之外”。这一讲话被认为向金日成传递了美国默许他攻击南方的信号。George McGovern.“The US Risk in Korea,''in Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,“Annual Historical Report,1977",p.330,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
77 Korea Herald,"Mobile Force Eyed for GIs in Korea," March 3,1974,p.1;"Schlesinger Warns N.Korea U.S.May Use Nuclear Arms," St.Louis Post-Dispatch,June 22,1975.
78 这一问题主要在第三章中进行讨论。
79 基辛格在给美国驻韩大使的电报中清晰地表达了这一观点。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.70.
80 地道和前沿部署是应对核威胁较为实用和有效的方式。参见乔登江,朱焕金编著:《人类的灾难--核武器与核爆炸》,清华大学出版社和暨南大学出版社,2000年12月出版,第108-127页。
81 Richard G.Stilwell,and Donald Zagoria,Arguments against US Troop Reductions in Korea,in Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report,1977",p.347,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
82 Ibid.,pp.346-347.
83 在里根的反苏政策中,美国给予亚洲足够的关注。里根的亚洲政策有三部分组成:加强与中国的军事合作、巩固与日本的结盟联系和加强在韩国的军事能力。
84 它产生的背景是里根政府1.7万亿美元的五年巨额防务开支计划和国防部长卡斯巴·温伯杰(Caspar Weinberger)的《1984-1988年防务指针》(1984-88 Defense Guidance)的公布。See Martha Wenger,"AirLand Battle Doctrine,"MERIP Reports,No.111,Rapid Deployment and Nuclear War,January 1983,p.12.
85 Ibid.
86 Robert S.Dudney,"The New Army with New Punch," US News & World Report,September 20,1982,pp.59-60.
87 Martha Wenger,"AirLand Battle Doctrine," MERIP Reports,No.111,Rapid Deployment and Nuclear War,January 1983,p.13.
88 Ibid.,p.13.
89 Colonel William G.Hanne,"The Integrated Battlefield," Military Review,June 1982,p.40.
90 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.93.
91 W.Livsey,"U.S.and ROK Readiness," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum,10:1,Summer 1985,p.44.
92 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.91.
93 R.Halloran,"Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy for Fighting a Long Nuclear War," New York Times,May 30,1982.
94 1983年的“协作精神”演习,美韩共191700人参加。其中,美国有73700人参与(41500人来自朝鲜半岛以外),韩国有118000人参与。到1984年,“协作精神”演习总人数超过20万人。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.93.
95 G.Jochum,"Team Sprit 84:Amphibious Exercises Provide Readiness," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum,Vol.9,No.2,Fall 1984,p.5;W.Livsey,"U.S.and ROK Readiness," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum,Vol.10,No.1,Summer 1985,p.43.
96 参见利昂·斯格尔(Leon V.Sigal)在1996年对格雷格的访谈。See Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea.Princeton University Press.New Jersey.p.28.
97 Colin Powell,My American Journey,New York:Random House,1995,p.540.
98 "Issues and Opportunities in U.S.-Korean Relations," A Report of the Committee on U.S.-R.O.K.Relations,cosponsored by the East-West Center and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs,February 11,1991.
99 William J.Crowe and Alan D.Romberg,"Rethinking Security in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs,Spring 1991,p.134.
100 See Eli Corin,"Presidential Nuclear Initiatives:An Alternative Paradigm for Arms Control,"Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Monterey Institute of International Studies,March 2004,http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_41a.html
101 尽管此次美国并没有完全撤回所有海外部署的核武器,根据NRDC和美国其它研究机构的报告,美国至今仍在欧洲6个国家保留了核航弹。See Hans M.Kristensen,“U.S.Nuclear Weapons in Europe:A review of post-Cold War policy,force levels,and war planning,''Natural Resources Defense Council,February 2005,http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp
102 Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,pp.29-30.
103 James Ki.m,"Rob Declares South Korea is Free of Nuclear Weapons," United Press International,December 18,1991;Kelly Smith Tunney,"President:South Korea is Nuclear-Free,"The Associated Press,18 December 1991.
104 Mitchell Reiss,Bridled Ambition:Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities,Washington:Woodrow Wilson Center Press,1995,p.238.
105 Hans M.Kristensen,"The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea," The Nuclear Information Project,Nuclear Brief September 28,2005,http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/withdrawal.htm
106 Commander in Chief US Pacific Command,"Command History1991," Volume Ⅰ,p.90-91.declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
107 Ibid.,p.91.
108 Ibid.,p.92.
109 Hans M.Kristensen,"The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea," Nuclear Brief September 28,2005.
110 当核炮弹开始从群山空军基地撤出的时候,《华盛顿邮报》在1991年10月12日发表文章说,美国已经决定将暂时保留对B61核航弹的撤出。结合美国仍在欧洲部署核航弹的情况来看,美国最初不撤出核航弹的决定是合乎逻辑的。See Hans M.Kristensen,“The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea,''Nuclear Brief September 28.2005.
111 Ibid.
112 对美国的核撤出计划,朝鲜开始反应冷淡,并称朝鲜仍然受到美国远程核武器攻击的威胁。因此,朝鲜开始坚持的立场是:只要韩国仍在美国核保护伞之下,视查其核设施便是不允许的。但一个较大的政策转向出现在11月26日,朝鲜宣布:只要美国允许对其基地进行检查来确认所有的核武器已经撤走,朝鲜就可以接受对其核设施的核查。同时,朝鲜表示欢迎布什总统9月27日的倡议,并称,“当美国开始从韩国撤出核武器时,朝鲜会签署核安全保障协议”。See Hans M.Kristensen,“The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea".
113 11月28日,韩国的联合通讯社报道,韩国和美国已经同意在年底完成核撤出,并计划在1992年1月初宣布韩国的无核地位。See Hans M.Kristensen,“The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea".
114 William J.Crowe and Alan D.Romberg,"Rethinking Security in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs,Spring 1991,p.134.
115 对核禁忌(nuclear taboo)最详细的分析参见尼娜·泰勒沃德(Nina Tannenwald)的文章。See Nina Tannenwald,“Stigmatizing the Bomb:Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,''International Security,Vol 29,No.4(Spring 2005,),pp.5-49.
116 Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,p.29.
117 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp.2-7,available at http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/news/19991020/index.html
118 例如,美国在韩国部署的核武器种类较多,而美国在全球核部署中种类较多的国家和地区仅为德国、意大利、关岛、冲绳、夏威夷和韩国等有限的几个;1958年美国在韩国部署“诚实的约翰”导弹和280毫米原子炮是学术界较为确认的信息,可以明显地帮助区分:到1977年时美国在很多国家和地区的核部署已经完全撤出,而在韩国的核部署是在1991年完全撤出的。通过撤出时间的信息也可以确认韩国的核部署情况。
119 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp 4-5.
120 彼得·海斯的依据来自国防部的解密材料。See J.Cary,“U.S.Military Bases Overseas:An Exploratory Investigation,''report from Institute for Defense Analyses,International and Social Studies Division to Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense,International Security Affairs,U.S.Defense Department,Research Paper P-397,Arlington,Va.,June 1967,p.43;Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.35.
121 Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.30.
122 附录B记载了美国在其它地方部署“斗牛士”导弹的情况:在德国的部署时间是1955年4月,撤出时间是1962年9月;在冲绳的部署时间是1957年9月到12月,撤出时间是1960年12月;在中国台湾部署的时间是1958年1月,撤出时间是1962年1月。Office ofthe Secretary of Defense,“History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945through Seplember 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,“Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977,''pp.4-7.
123 1976年太平洋司令部档案描述了当时“长矛”导弹在韩国部署时各司令部之间的意见纷争。陆军建议在韩国部署“长矛”导弹,因为“韩国是最可能使用地面(发射的)核武器的地区”。太平洋司令部同意这一点,但是建议在“长矛”导弹部署之后,把这一时期已经老化的“诚实的约翰”导弹和“奈基-大力神”导弹撤出。驻韩美军司令部(USFK)考虑到奈基独特的防空能力,而不同意撤出奈基。这时,参联会考虑到,在韩国部署“长矛”导弹的问题上,总统会与各部门讨论很长时间,所以就先行把打算在韩国部署的“长矛”导弹的核弹头运到关岛。1976年太平洋司令部档案记载,在1976年12月,为韩国的“长矛”导弹配置的核弹头已经运到关岛的海军基地。Command in Chief,U.S.Pacific Command,”CINCPAC Command History 1976,'' Volume Ⅰ,pp.159-160,p.197,available a1http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/CINCPAC76.pdf
124 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,p.252.
125 J.Anderson,"Neutron Bombs Could Be Used in South Korea," Washington Post,May 4,1983,p.Col3.
126 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.103.
127 Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,"Deploying the bomb," in Stephen Ⅰ.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.154.
128 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Martin SSM-A-12/M4/MGM-18 Lacrosse," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-18.html
129 Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,"Deploying the bomb," in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,13rookings Institution Press,1998,p.156.
130 “斗牛士”导弹在全球服役最晚至1961年。See Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak.and Stephen I.Schwartz,“Deploying the bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.149.
131 “中士”导弹在全球最晚服役至1977年。See Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,“Deploying the bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.148.
132 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit." The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91.
133 Hans M.Kristensen,"The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea," The Nuclear Information Project,Nuclear Brief September 28,2005,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/withdrawal.htm
134 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Douglas M31/M50/MGR-1 Honest John," http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/r-1.html
135 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit." The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
136 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Martin SSM-A-1/B-61/TM-61/MGM-1 Matador," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-1.html
137 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit." The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
138 因为在发射该导弹之前,需要一个前沿的侦查小队先接近打击目标,然后在前方发射信号,经雷达捕捉到信号后,再给导弹发射命令。因此,在黑夜和天气不好时,或者雷达系统出现拥堵或遭受反措施时,该导弹很容易误击目标。
139 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Martin SSM-A-12/M4/MGM-18 Lacrosse," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-18.html
140 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
141 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Western Electric SAM-A-25/M6/MIM-14 Nike Hercules," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-14.html
142 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
143 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"JPL/Sperry SSM-A-27/M15/MGM-29 Sergeant," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-29.html
144 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
145 Ibid.
146 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"LTV MGM-52Lance," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-52.html
147 The Nuclear Weapon Archive,"Complete List of All U.S.Nuclear Weapons," 14 October 2006,available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html
148 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp.4-7.
149 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.192.
150 钱聚瑛:《世界火炮手册》,兵器工业出版社,1992年版,第93-94页。
151 上引书,第97-100页。
152 The Nuclear Weapon Archive,"Complete List of All U.S.Nuclear Weapons," 14 October 2006,available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html
153 钱聚瑛:《世界火炮手册》,兵器工业出版社,1992年版,第69-70页。
154 其中M109、M109A1和M109A2/A3分别于1963、1973和1980年服役。上引书,第78-82页。
155 使用火箭增程弹的射程可达30千米。上引书,第71-73页。
156 The Nuclear Weapon Archive,"Complete List of All U.S.Nuclear Weapons," 14 October 2006,available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html
157 Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,"Deploying the bomb," in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit." The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.192.
158 早期核弹的主要运载工具是飞机,因此,早期核弹多数都是核航弹。美国开发出的核航弹的型号包括MK-Ⅰ、MK-Ⅲ、MK-4、MK-5、MK-6、MK-7、MK-8、MK-11、MK-12、TX/MK-14、MK-15、TX-16、EC-17、MK-17、MK-18、B21、EC-24、B24、B27、B28、B36、B39、B41、B43、B53、B57、B61、B83。See The Nuclear Weapon Archive.“Complete List Of All U.S.Nuclear Weapons,"14 October 2006,available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html
159 乌山和群山是二战后至今美国驻韩空军的两大重要基地。美国在这里部署着驻韩空军的主要战斗部队。这里作战飞机部署的基本情况是:朝鲜战争期间是F-86、1950年代末部署F-100、1962-1963年部署F-105、在1968-1969年部署F-106、在1971年开始部署F-4、在里根总统执政后(1983年)开始部署A-10和F-16。这些飞机中可以携带核武器的飞机为F-100、F-105、F-4和F-16。See Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅰ:U.S.Nuclear Forces and Capabilities,Ballinger Pub.Co.,Cambridge,England,1984,p.216,p.221,226.
160 F-100可以运载MK-7、B-28、B-43、B-57、B-61。F-105和F-4可以携带B-28、B-43、B-57、B-61。F-16则仅能携带B-61。Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak and Stephen I.Schwartz,“Deploying the bomb,”in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.191;Andteas Parsch,Designation-Systems.Net,“Designations Of U.S.Nuclear Weapons,''available at http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/nuke.html
161 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91.
162 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.95.
163 W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231
164 第六军需品营归负责整个驻韩美军后勤的第19支援司令部管辖。See Peter Hayes.Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,pp.249-250.
165 之后,乌山空军基地不再存储核武器。而群山空军基地之后成为核武器存储的主要地点。
166 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,p.250.
167 第4导弹司令部总部在春川附近的佩奇基地(Page)。第4导弹司令部在1978年撤销。参见Global Security,"Camp Page,"available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-page.htm
168 80年代,第二步兵师的师部炮兵总部设在斯坦利基地(Stanley),由两个155毫米榴弹炮炮兵营和一个全般支持的炮兵营组成。两个155毫米榴弹炮炮兵营总部也在斯坦利基地,它们为第二步兵师的第一和第二旅直接提供火力支持。每个155毫米炮兵营由三个连组成,每连6个榴弹炮。全般支持的炮兵营总部设在议政府附近的爱沙俑基地(Essayons),由两个203毫米自行榴弹炮连(每连6个炮)和一个由9个发射车的多功能导弹发射系统组成。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,pp.252-253.
169 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,pp.250-251.
170 如在70年代前期,乌山空军基地的核打击任务由部署在那里的第51战术战斗机联队完成。主战飞机是F-4E。See W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231.
171 到70年代后期,核作战任务主要由在群山基地的第8战术战斗机联队完成。F-16在1981年取代F-4成为主战飞机。See W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231.
172 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.49.
173 群山军事基地离非军事区约有250公里。光州离非军事区约330公里。
174 美国第八军档案中记载,1966年5月20日,第八军举行会议,确定了一个范围广泛的核武器存储和运输的支持网络。乌山空军基地被确定为核武器运输和协调的中心,直升机运输被确立为核武器运输的主要方式。同时,美国驻韩陆军和空军之间就核武器的运输和接受程序方面达成了一些机制和协议。部署的核武器基本上都是陆军的,而运输要通过空军,因此,需要相互协调的机制。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.48.
175 乌山军事基地离非军事区约有70公里。
176 1974年,出于安全的考虑,太平洋司令部对太平洋地区的核武器存储基地地进行了视察。该档案描述了这一过程,并在其中提到了韩国的存储地址。Command in Chief U.S.Pacific Command,“CINCPAC Command History 1974,''Volume I,September 25,1975,p.100,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
177 Stephen I.Schwartz,"Bombs in the Backyard:Bases and Facilities with Significant Current or Historical U.S.Nuclear Weapons or Naval Nuclear Propulsion Missions," U.S.Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project,August 2002,available at http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/basesize.htm
178 Commander in Chief,U.S.Pacific Command(CINCPAC),"CINCPAC Command History for 1977," Volume Ⅱ,September 1,1978,p.431-432,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
179 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,p.250.
180 See Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.30.
181 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91.
182 Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.30.
183 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp.4-5,available at http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/news/19991020/index.html
184 Hans Kristensen,"Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella," Section 3,"The Battle over Okinawa," http://www.nautilus.org/archives//library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-3.html
185 美国在1972年撤出在冲绳的核部署,在1974年撤出在菲律宾和中国台湾的核部署。See Office of the Secretary of Defense.“History ofthe Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977,"pp.2-7.
186 "South Korea Summary," DMS Market Intelligence Report,1978,pp.7-8.
187 R.Halloran,"Report to Congress Provides Figures for Nuclear Arsenal," New York Times,November 15,1983.
188 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.85.
189 参见第一节第二部分中“卡特撤军中核武器的地位”的分析。
190 W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231.
191 1988年核地雷全部撤出部署,而在此之前,美国在韩部署的核地雷的数量约为20枚。See Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.86-91;W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231.
192 U.S.Forces Korea/Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report," Seoul 1978,p.6,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
193 Ibid.
194 W.Scott and T.Y.Lee,"ROK-US Combined Forces Command," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum,Fall 1982,p.29.
195 T.Carrington,"Koreans Harbor Resentment of the U.S.Over Their Subordinate Role in Defense," Wall Street Journal,July 28,1987,p.28.
196 与美国缔结有核合作双边协定的北约国家有比利时、加拿大、希腊、意大利、荷兰、土耳其、英国和西德。See Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅰ:U.s.Nuclear Forces and Capabilities,Ballinger Pub.Co.,Cambridge,England,1984,p.94.
197 Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.30.
198 Ibid.
199 Paul Buteux,The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO,1965-1980,New York:Cambridge University Press,1983,p.87.
200 Ibid.,p.212.
201 Ibid.,p.50,69.
202 Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Quarterly Historical Summary Historical Report,April-June 1966," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,Seoul,1966,p.16,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html.
203 Ibid.,p.9.
204 Ibid.
205 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,pp.109-110.
206 Headquarters,Eighth U.S.Army,Organization and Functions,Regulation 10-1,May 22,1984,pp.5-21,27,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
207 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.111.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.,p.112.
210 Nineteenth Support Command,"Annual Historical Review CY 1985," p.17,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
211 Ninth Air Force Air Combat Command,"History of 4th Fighter Wing:January-June 1998,"Vol.1,December 1998,declassified,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/4fw98.pdf;Hans M.Kristensen,"U.S.Nuclear Strike Planning Against North Korea," The Nuclear Information Project,Nuclear Brief,September 28,2005,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/koreaplanning.htm
212 Hans M.Kristensen,"Preemptive Posturing;What happened to deterrence?" Bulletin of Atomic Scientist,September/October 2002,pp.55-56.
213 Office of the Inspector General,DoD,"Year 2000 Compliance of the Trident Submarine Command and Control System," Report No.99-167,May 24,1999,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/IG99-167.pdf
214 Hans M.Kristensen,"U.S.Nuclear Strike Planning Against North Korea," The Nuclear Information Project,Nuclear Brief,September 28,2005,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/koreaplanning.htm
215 American Nukes in South Korea,available at http://www.kimsoft.com/2003/us-nukes-sk.htm
216 Ibid
217 朱锋:“‘核态势评估报告'与小布什政府新核战略”,《世界经济与政治》,2002年第6期,第22页。
218 上引文,第23-24页。
219 "Nuclear Posture Review:Excerpts," pp.16-17,available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm
220 吴大辉:《防范与合作:苏联解体后的俄美核安全关系(1991-2005)》,人民出版社,2005年版,第1页。
221 Hans M.Kristensen,"Preemptive Posturing:What Happened to Deterrence?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 2002,p.58.
222 Jonas Siegel,"In Harm's Way," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,May/June 2005,p.34.
223 Sohn Suk-joo,"S.Korea divided over redeployment of U.S.tactical nuclear weapons," Yonhap News Agency,October 19,2006.
224[韩]朴民赫:“前总统金泳三采访录”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月12日。
225[韩]尹相虎:“韩美决定制定‘核保护伞'具体方案”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月20日。
226[韩]尹相虎:“韩美签署《核伞保护具体保障》声明”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月21日;[韩]尹相虎:“韩美就作战指挥权收回时间达成协议“,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月23日。
1 See Arnold Kramish,The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy,New York:Harper & Row,1963,pp.3-9;Peter R.Lavoy,"The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace," Arms Control Today,December 2003,available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Lavoy.asp
2 John A.Hall,"Atoms for Peace,or War," Foreign Affairs,July 1965,p.505.
3 到1958年,在海外接受培训的韩国科学家达到89人。See Young-Sun Ha,Nuc&ar Proliferation,World Order andKorea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.83.
4 Nuclear Threat Initiative,South Korea Profile,Nuclear Chronology,available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3046.html
5 Eighth United States Army,Staff Historian's Office,"Chronology:1 January 1968-30 June 1968," p.17,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
6 Nuclear Threat Initiative,South Korea Profile,Nuclear Chronology,available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3046.html
7 Ibid.
8 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,pp.83-84.
9 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003.p55.
10 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.88.
11 Ibid.
12 Jungmin Kang & H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shitting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,p.71.
13 Ibid.
14 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.102.
15 古里反应堆在1978年开始工作。
16 Nuclear Threat Iniative,South Korea Profile,Nuclear Chronology,available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3046.html
17 See Mark Hibbs,"Legacy of Secret Nuclear Program Led U.S.to Blunt R.O.K.Cooperation,"Nucleonics Week,January 7,1999,p.10.
18 Yong-sun Ha,"Nucleadzation of Small States and World Order:The Case of Korea,",Asian Survey,Vol.18,No.11,November 1978,p.1137.
19 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.58.
20 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order andKorea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.127.
21 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.59.
22[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第228页。
23 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.247.
24[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第220-255页。
25 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.69.
26 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.65.
27 从韩国政府的官僚体制上看,国防发展局和防务工业署归国防部,工业发展研究所归商业部,韩国科技所归科技部。See Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.70.
28[韩]吴源哲:《全斗焕和美国阻止了韩国的导弹开发》,《新东亚》,1996年1月,第423-447页。
29 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.72.
30[韩]具祥会:《开发武器系统的30年》,《国防与技术》,1998年,第86-91页。
31 Janne E.Nolan,Trappings of Power:Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,Washington:Brookings Institution,1991,p.49-50.
32 Peter Hayes,"The Two Koreas and the International Missile Trade," in W.C.Potter and H.W.Jencks,ed.,The International Missile Bazaar,Bouler:Westview Press,1993,p.136-138.
33 Peter Hayes,"Early Indicators:ROK Long-Range Missile Capabilities," NAPSNET,published by the Nautilus Institute,Berkeley,California,November 17,1999,p.2.
34 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.62.
35 朝鲜“自主防卫的四点方针”的内容是:一、武装全部人口,建立一支装备精良的民兵和一支准备作战的预备役部队;二、强化重要的工业、运输和信息中心的防御工事,和增加军事设施的防御能力;三、训练一支精英的军官队伍;四、实现军事装备和军事作战理念的现代化。See Kim Jung-Ik,The Future of the US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship,New York:St.Martin's Press,1996,p.20.
36 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),The Military Balance 1970/71,London:IISS,1970,pp.45-46.
37 Kim Jung-Ik,The Future of the US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship,New York:St.Martin's Press,1996,p.38.
38 Ibid.,pp.38-40.
39 1968年1月18日,朝鲜突击队31人从非军事区的南界潜入韩国境内。据韩国描述,朝鲜突击队的任务是攻入韩国总统府青瓦台刺杀朴正熙。1月21日,突击队已经行进到离总统府800米的地方,但遭遇韩国的警察,之后,突击队分散为小组,分开行动。这些突击队员仅有一人被抓获,其余被韩国武装力量杀死,或自杀。See Chuck Downs,Over the Line:North Korea's Negotiating Strategy,Washington D.C.:The AEI Press,Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute,p.121.
40 美国认为,美国的情报船在靠近朝鲜海域的公海上游弋,但被朝鲜非法扣留。而朝鲜认为,美国的间谍船进入朝鲜海域,侵犯朝鲜主权,所以朝鲜扣留该船。一年之后,朝鲜释放了船员,但未归还美国的船只。See Chuck Downs,Over the Line:North Korea's Negotiating Strategy,Washington D.C.,The AEI Press,Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute,1999,PP.122-123.
41 1969年4月,朝鲜击落了一架美国海军的EC-121侦察机,飞机上的31名美国海军人员遇难。平壤电台广播认为,朝鲜击落了一架入侵朝鲜领空的飞机。而美国坚持说,像之前的几百架飞机一样,EC-121正在执行一个例行的侦查任务,平行于朝鲜飞过日本海。See Chuck Downs,Over the Line:North Korea's Negotiating Strategy,Washington D.C.:The AEI Press,Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute,1999,p.146.
42 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.55.
43 参见[韩]吴源哲:《韩国式的经济建设》,汉城:起亚经济研究所出版,第28页。
44 当1970年3月美国表示要撤军时,韩国领导人就表现出强烈的不满。然而,美国并没有与韩国商谈撤军事宜。1970年8月,美国副总统斯皮罗·阿格纽(Spiro T.Agnew)访问汉城,朴正熙以一种很不客气的口吻向阿格纽阐述了撤军带来的问题。原先计划为一个小时的会议进行了六个小时。但是,在离开汉城前的新闻发布会上,阿格纽仍然强调,所有的美国军队在5年内将被完全撤离,这无疑更加剧了韩国的忧虑。See Seung-Young Kim,“Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82,"Diplomacy&Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.55.
45 Ibid.
46 韩国在1964年向南越派出了2218名医护人员和工程部队,在1965年派出一个步兵师 18904人,在1966年又派出另外一个步兵师23865人,在1967年派出海军部队2963人。到1967年时,韩国在南越驻军总数达5万人。至于韩国向南越派兵的原因,朴正熙的说法是,“这是我们增强自由世界前线的道德责任的一部分,同时也是向帮助过韩国的人们表达谢意的一种方式”。实际上,更加现实的原因是,韩国希望以这种方式稳住美国在韩国的军事存在。因为之前有报道,美国打算撤出在韩国的驻军来增加在南越的常规力量。See Kim Jung-Ik,The Future of US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship,ST.Martin's Press,INC.,1996,p.36.
47 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.127.
48 See U.S.House Committee on International Relations,Subcommittee of International Organization,Report,Investigation of Korea-American Relations,October 31,1978,Washington,D.C.:U.S.Government Printing Office,1978,p.80;William Gleysteen Jr.,Massive Entanglement,Marginal Influence:Carter and Korea in Crisis,Washington,DC.:Brookings 1999,p.23.
49[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第226页,第237页。
50 Ibid.
51 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.127.
52 Embassy Intelligence and Washington Instructions,DOS cable "ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,"March 4,1975,declassified 1997,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.70.
53 Yong-sun Ha,"Nuclearization of Small States and World Order:The Case of Korea," Asian Survey,Vol.18,No.11,November 1978,p.1137.
54 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.64.
55[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第234页。
56 假如韩国拥有后处理能力的话,从古里堆中取出的乏燃料一年可以生产出20-28个当量为2万吨TNT的核武器。See Yong-sun Ha,"Nuclearization of Small States and World Order:The Case of Korea,"Asian Survey,Vol.18,No.11,November 1978,p.1138.
57 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.52-55.
58 Donald S.Zagoria,and Young Kun Kim,"North Korea and the Major Powers," Asian Survey,Vol.15,No.12(December,1975),p.1020.
59 Ibid.
60 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.64.
61 Ibid.
62 "Schlesinger Warns N.Korea U.S.May Use Nuclear Arms",St.Louis Post Despatch,21 June,1975.
63 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.60.
64 W.Carpenter,"The Maintenance of U.S.Forces in Korea," report to the U.S.Department of the Army,Strategic Studies Center,Stanford University,June 1975,p.127.
65[韩]吴源哲:《朴正熙和卡特的搏斗》,《新东亚》,1994年11月,第430页。
66 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.249.
67 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.249.
68[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第237-238页。
69 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.73.
70 Sang Hun Coe,"South Korea was Close to A-Bomb Development in Early 1980s," The Associated Press,October 5,1995.
71 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,Worm Order andKorea,Seoul:Seoui National University Press,1983,p.126.
72 Ibid.,pp.121-122.
73 NH-k-1采用二级推进,固体燃料推动,最大射程为180千米。由大同机器公司和金星精密工业公司(现在的LG集团)制造。NH-k-1后来改名为“白熊”导弹。
74 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003.p.74.
75 Janne E.Nolan,Trappings of Power:Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,Washington:Brookings Institution,1991,p.50.
76 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.68.
77 "Official Hints South Korea Might Build Atom Bomb," New York Times,June 30,1977,p.4.
78 Michael J.Siler,"U.S.Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the Northeast Asian Region During the Cold War:The South Korean Case," East Asian Studies,Autumn/Winter 1998,p.70.
79 World Nuclear Association,Nuclear Power in Korea,November 2006,available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.htm
80 1976年1月26日,韩国和加拿大签署和平利用核能的协定。其中包括韩国向加拿大购买一座坎杜型重压水堆,即之后的月城1号。受到之前韩国向加拿大购买NRX实验堆事件的影响,此合作协议强调加拿大不会向韩国提供任何可以用于核武器制造的材料。See“French A-Plant Purchase Canceled,''Facts On File World News Digest,February 7,1976.
81 1980年12月,法国法马通公司拿到韩国的两座核电机组蔚珍1号和2号的合同。See "French Companies Upset Westinghouse,"The Associated Press,November 7,1 980.
82 1990年12月,加拿大原子能公司与韩国电力公司签署合同,建造月城2号。See M.H.Ahn."Canadian Company Signs Contract for Nuclear Power Plant,"The Associated Press,December 28,1990;1992年9月,加拿大国际工业部宣布,加拿大原子能公司再向韩国提供两个700兆瓦的坎杜型堆,月城3号和4号。See"AECL Sells Two More CANDUS To Korea,"Canada Newswire,September 18,1992.
83 "French Companies Upset Westinghouse," The Associated Press,November 7,1980.
84 1990年5月,韩国与苏联订立从1990年到1999年共进口390吨浓缩铀的合同。See Shin Hochul,“KEPCO to Buy About 40 Metric Tons/YR of Enriched Uranium from Soviet Union,''Nuclear Fuel,March 19,1990,p.5;1994年12月,英国核燃料公司与韩国电力公司签署协议,从1996年开始向韩国提供六氟化铀。See Pearl Marshall,“BNFL Signs UF6 Contract with KEPCO,"Nuclear Fuel,December 5,1994,p.13;2002年7月,韩国电力公司官员说,他们与哈萨克斯坦签订从2006年到2014年每年购买800吨黄饼的合同。See Cha Byung Hak,“KEPCO to Buy Kazakhstan Yellow Cake,"Chosun Ilbo,July 25.2002.
85 韩国最早的3台商用核电机组是古里1号、古里2号、和月城1号。
86 之后的6座反应堆,古里3号和4号,桂马1号和2号,蔚珍1号和2号,构成韩国的第二代核电站。在建造桂马1号和2号时,西屋公司将建造反应堆系统和涡轮发电机的技术转让给韩国公司,而且韩国核动力科技公司首次参与了这两个反应堆的设计。
87 桂马3号和4号机组就采用“系统80”的设计。桂马3号和4号的国产化程度已经很高。1988年6月13日,韩国电力公司总裁在加拿大核协会会议上讲,韩国将在2000年实现核技术的自主。他说,打算在1995-1996年运行的桂马3号和4号反应堆,将有79%的国内 设计和72%的韩国国内生产的设施和材料。See Ray Silver,“South Korea Pursuing Nuclear Self-Reliance,''Nucleonics Week,June 30,1988,p.10.
88 蔚珍3号、4号、5号、6号和桂马5号、6号就采用的是KSNP标准。
89 这项计划包括:对相关构件设计的改进、提高安全性和经济性、优化核电站厂房布置、以及降低核电站建造成本等。新古里1号和2号机组是KSNP+系列的首批机组。
90 这一设计的特点是安全性得到加强,而且运行时间延长至60年。首批APR-1400型核电机组新古里3号和4号以及新蔚珍1号和2号,目前处于合同准备阶段,预计2013-2016年投入运行。
91 "France/Korea," Nucleonics Week,28 July,1994,p.16.
92 "South Korea to Build Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant," Japan Economic Newswire,12 June 1985.
93 Gregg M.Taylor,"KEPCO Plans 18 More Reactors by 2006," Nuclear News,November 1992,p.41.
94 Han Dong Soo,"ROK to Develop Nuclear Fusion Technology," Korea Times,July 25,1995.
95 "So Korea to Participate in Fusion Energy Research Project," Asia Pulse,June 17,2003.
96 1993年12月,韩国电力公司与中国大亚湾核电站签署两年的合同,为大亚湾核电站提供部分技术支持。See Margaret L.Ryan,“Koran Nuclear Industry Takes First Steps into Exoort Market,"Nucleonics Week,June2,1994,p.1;1994年10月中旬,韩国和中国达成民用核能方面的合作协议。See"S.Korea,China Ague to Nuclear Cooperation,"Japan Economic Newswire,October 19,1994;1994年,韩国与土耳其开展核能合作。See“Late News in Brief,”Nuclear News,February 1995,p.18;1995年4月,韩国同意向越南核能项目提供技术支持,包括参与建设越南筹划中的第一个核电站。See"South Korea Backs Viemamese Nuclear Power Proiects,"Agence France Press,April 12,1995;1997年lO月,韩国表示,希望参与土耳其Akkuyu反应堆的建设和开发。See“Korea Wishes to Participate in Turkey's Nuclear Plant Proiect,''Korea Times,October 30,1997,p.2.
97 "OECD Official Says ROK May Become Nuclear Exporter," Korea Times,April 9,1999.
98 "Seoul Promoting Exports of Nuclear Power Technology," Korea Herald,January 17,2001.
99 2001年1月,韩国与巴西达成核能合作方面的协议。See"S.Korea-Brazil South Korea and Brazil Consolidate Bilateral Relations,"EFE News Service,January 18,2001;2001年8月,韩国与埃及签订和平利用核能的协议。See"Egypt,South Korea Sign Agreement on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power,"Cairo MENA,August 12,2001;2001年10月,韩国与泰国签署核能合作的备忘录。See“Korea,Thailand to Sign Memo on Atomic Energy Cooperation,''Ministry of Science and Technology,October 15.2001.
100 "ROK's Yonhap:Doosan Heavy Wins $68 Mln.Power Equipment Contract," Yonhap News Agency,August 14,2002.
101 2003年7月,韩国和罗马尼亚签署关于核能合作的谅解备忘录。该备忘录的内容是,两国合作考察罗马尼亚的塞尔那伏达(Cernavoda)3号反应堆的重建可能性。Cernavoda3号项目在1991年因为财政原因中止。同时,该备忘录还要求韩国向Cernavodal号和2号提供建设、技术指导和人力资源培训等支持。See"South Korea,Romania Sign MOU on N-Power Plant,''Yonhap News Agency,July 21,2003.
102 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.60.
103 Ibid.,p.61.
104 1989年该所又重新改回原来的名字。See Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82,"Diplomacy&Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.70.
105 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.49.
106 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.86,p.89.
107 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.124-133.
108 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 200I,p.70.
109 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.249-250.
110 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,1997,p.260.
111 Gene Kramer,"US Welcomes Korea Nuclear Accord," The Associated Press,December 31,1991;Paul Shin,"Koreas Initial Pact on Nuclear-Free Korean Pen.insula," The Associated Press,December 31,1991.
112 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),The Military Balance 1988/89,London:IISS,1988,pp.167-169.
113 Paul Shin,"U.S.Said to Stop South Korea's Nuke Bomb Plans," The Washington Times,March 29,1994;"Seoul Planned Nuclear Weapons Until 1991," Jane's Defense Weekly,April 2,1994,p.1.
114 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.250.
115[韩]《韩半岛的非核化不变,继续研究和平利用--金泳三总统讲话》,《东亚日报》,1993年11月2日,第2版。
116 "Korea Needs to Accumulate Tech to Manufacture Atomic Bombs," Korea Times,October 3,1997,p.2.
117 "ROK Ex-Generals Favor Post-Unification Nuclear Capability," Yonhap News Agency,January 19,2000.
118 Jungmin Kang and H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,p.72.http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/Development-of-NW-in-NEAsia
119 日本东海村的后处理厂从1981年开始处理乏燃料,在1997年3月因火灾运行暂停过一段时间,截至2002年底累积处理乏燃料约1009吨。青森县六个所后处理厂于1991年施工,2005年7月完成建造工作。See John H.Large,“The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia,"Greenpeace International.Large&Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.5,available at
120 1997年2月4日,日本政府表示,日本将在它的轻水堆中使用混合氧化物(MOX)燃料。这一计划预计,到2000年将在3至4个反应堆中使用混合氧化物燃料,并在2010年推广至10个左右的反应堆。到2005年,日本从欧洲接收了5吨MOX燃料,在接下来的5年中还将接收5到10吨MOX燃料。See John H.Large,“The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia,"Greenpeace International.Large&Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.5.
121 大型轻水堆(压水堆和BWR)不太适合钚的生产。石墨气冷堆和连续注料的重水堆比较适合钚的生产。韩国的CANDU堆便属于连续注料的重水堆。
122 乏燃料中的钚主要有两种同位素Pu239和Pu240。Pu240指标越高,越不利于核武器设计。钚的级别按照同位素Pu240的含量多少来定:超级钚含2%至3%,武器级钚含量小于7%,燃料级钚含7%到19%之间,反应堆级钚含19%以上。参见托马斯·科克伦等著,王连奎等译,《核武器手册:美国的核弹头生产》(第二卷),国防工业出版社,第111页。
123 John H.Large,"The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia," Greenpeace International,Large & Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.17.
124 Jungmin Kang and H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,p.72.
125 Ibid.
126 1995年中后期,韩国对混合氧化物燃料的使用也表现出兴趣。See Mark Hibbs,"Candu MOX Fabrication Costs are Unfavorable,Germans Say,"Nuclear Fuel,September 11,1995,p.8.
127 Mark Hibbs,"South Korea Renews Quest for Plutonium Separation Ability,"Nucleonics Week,October 29,1992,p.7.
128 Pearl Marshall,"BNFL,KAERI to Investigate Using REPU in South Korean Candu Stations,"Nuclear Fuel,December 30,1996,p.7.
129 Mark Hibbs,"KEPCO Wants to Reprocess Offshore,Take Back MOX and Recycle PU,REPU," Nuclear Fuel,April 7,1997,p.3;Ann MacLachlan,"Cogema's 1996 Results 'Respectable',But No 'Source of Joy',Syrota Says," Nuclear Fuel,April 7,1997,p.4.
130 Mark Hibbs,"KEPCO Says it has no Plans to Implement DUPIC Fuel Cycle," Nuclear Fuel,December 16,1996,p.11.
131 "KEPCO Plans to Use Reprocessed Nuclear Energy from Abroad," Chosun Ilbo,February 17,1997.
132 Mark Hibbs,"No Spent Fuel Reprocessing,New KEPCO CEO Chang Declares," Nuclear Fuel,October 19,1998,p.5.
133 Mark Hibbs,"ROK Told KEPCO to Postpone Offshore Reprocessing Quest," Nuclear Fuel,April 21,1997,p.12.
134 Mark Hibbs,"No Spent Fuel Reprocessing,New KEPCO CEO Chang Declares," Nuclear Fuel,October 19,1998,p.5.
135 报道说,韩国和法国的一些核工业界人士在等2001年张荣植的任期结束,他们期望新的总裁上任后会改变这一政策。这些人士主张,两座蔚珍反应堆不属于美国限制的范围,因为它的燃料是法国提供的。因此,韩国有权利对这两座堆的乏燃料进行后处理。See Mark Hibbs,"Reprocessing Bid After Chang tO Center on Ulchin Spent Fuel,"Nuclear Fuel,April 19,1999,p.3.
136 Samuel Lee,"Government Replace KEPCO President," Korea Herald,April 20,1999.
137 "South Korean Rules Out Plutonium at N.Korea's KEDO Reactors," Jiji Press Ticker Service,April 12,1999.
138 Mark Hibbs,"Chang's Successor Will Reopen Reprocessing Option,Officials Say," Nuclear Fuel,June 28,1999,p.8.
139 Mark Hibbs,"KHNP Finding Market Deregulation Disincentive to Close Fuel Cycle," Nuclear Fuel,May 13,2002,p.4.
140 Mark Hibbs,"Korean Fast Reactor Program on Leach,US Officials Say," Nucleonics Week,July 11,2002,p.8.
141 "Seoul to Start Multinational Work on Nuclear Project Next Year," Asia Pulse,November 27,2002.
142 Jungmin Kang and H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shitting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,p.73.
143 "DUPIC Celebrated Open Lab," TCNC Newsletter,April 1,2000,available at http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr/Newsletter/tcncnews.htm
144 Mark Hibbs,"US Won't Favor Candu Purchase by Korea to Deter Reprocessing," Nucleonics Week,June 4,1998,p.8.
145 当卡特在1977年宣布美国无限期推迟商业后处理政策时,日本已经完成了东海村后处理设施的建设。卡特的宣布让日本人目瞪口呆。之后,美日达成协议,日本可以进行商业后处理的活动,但日本需要在每次后处理美国来源的燃料时提请美国的同意。See Kumao Kaneko,Atsuyuki Suzuki,Jor-Shan Choi,Edward Fei,”Energy and Security in Northeast Asia:Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation,''IGCC Policy Papers,University of California,Multi-Campus Reserch Unit.Aooendix 2:Peaceful Use of Plutonium in Jaoan,available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=igcc
146 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),p.44.
147 IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11 November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_korea.html
148 Mark Hibbs,"77%U-235 Was Peak Enrichment Reported to IAEA by South Korea,"NuclearFuel,Vol.29,No.30,September 27,2004,pp.7-8;Mark Gorwitz,"The South Korean Laser Isotope Separation Experience," ISIS Online,October 5,2004,< http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/sklisword2.html>.
149 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),p.46;Jack Kim,"S.Korean Munitions Violated Nuclear Accord-Group," Reuters,October 21,2004.
150 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),p.46.
151 Mark Hibbs,"ROK Claimed IAEA Knew of U Work,Pressed for No IAEA Board Report,"Nucleonics Week,Vol.45 No.39,September 23,2004,p.1;Mark Hibbs,'"We Played this Badly,Koreans Say about IAEA Report Response," Nucleonics Week,Vol.45,No.40,September 30,2004,pp.7-8.
152 Sang-Hun Choe,"South Korea Extracted Plutonium in 1982," The Associated Press,September 9,2004.
153 See IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11 November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_ korea.html
154 日本和法国曾试验化学浓缩铀法,但在1980年代末放弃。这种方法被认为不能生产高浓缩铀。See Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujim Suzuki and Richard Tanter,“South Korea's nuclear surprise,''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),D.46.
155 IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11 November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_korea.html
156 第一代是气体扩散法,第二代是气体离心机技术。美国和法国最早在70年代开始开发激光浓缩铀技术,但之后都未能成功发展为商业浓缩铀的技术。See John H Large,The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Nuclear Weapons Technoloty in the Area of North East Asia(Korean Peninsular and Japan),Greenpeace International,Large&Associates:London,2005 May,Appendix Ⅰ。
157 "US Government Authorizations Received for Silex-General Electric Agreement," October 04,2006,available at www.silex.com.au/public/uploads/announce/US%20Government%20Authorizations%20Received.pdf
158 IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_korea.html
159 Mark Hibbs,"Korean Safety Agency to Take over Nuclear Materials Accounting Center,"Nuclear Fuel,Vol.29,No.23,November 8,2004,pp.3-5;Daniel A.Pinkston,"South Korea's Nuclear Experiments," Center for Nonproliferation Studies Research Report,November 9,2004,http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/041109.htm
160 Jungmin Kang,Tatsujiro Suzuki,Peter Hayes,"South Korea's Nuclear Mis-Adventures,"Nautilus Sepecial Report,September 10,2004,http://www.nautilus.org/archives/pub/ftp/napsnet/special_reports/0435-ROK.html
161 Paul Kerr,"IAEA:Seoul's Nuclear Sins in the Past," Arms Control Today,December 2004,http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Seoul.asp
162 Paul Kerr,"IAEA:Seoul's Nuclear Sins in the Past," Arms Control Today,December 2004,http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Seoul.asp
163 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1,January/February 2005,p.46.
164 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 200I,p.71.
165 Sangsun Shim 对一位前国防发展厅官员的言谈。 See Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:.4 Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.76.
166[韩]吴源哲:《全斗焕和美国阻止了韩国的导弹开发》,《新东亚》,1996年1月,第445-447页。
167 Lee Sng Yul,"U.S.Pressured Chun Doo Hwan to Scuttle Missile Development Program,"Korea Herald,June 10,1999,p.3.
168 NH-k-3射程为300千米,NH-k-5射程为500千米。这两种导弹的设计已经与奈基一大力神导弹的设计完全不同。See Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82,"Diplomacy&Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.71.
169 Ibid.,p.80.
170 韩国认为,这一爆炸案是朝鲜策划的恐怖式袭击。在这次爆炸案中,全斗焕失去了其半数的内阁成员。See Chuck Downs,Over the Line:North Korea's Negotiating Strategy,Washington D.C.:The AEI Press,Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute,1999,pp.162-164.
171 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vo 1.12,No.4,December 2001,p.72.
172 《导弹技术控制协议》对成员国的约束是,不能发展射程超过300公里并且载重超过500千克的导弹。而1979年美韩导弹谅解备忘录对韩国的限制是,不能发展超过180公里的导弹。
173 Bill Gertz,"South Korea Counters North's Missiles," The Washington Times,December 2,1996.
174 Ibid.
175 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.255.
176 David E.Sanger and Eric Schmitt,"U.S.Fears Arms Race on Korean Peninsula," New York Times,July 1,1999;James Risen,"South Korea Seen Trying to Extend Range of Missile," New York Times,November 14,1999.
177 Frank Sietzen,Jr.,"US/South Korea To Sign Launch Agreement," Terradaily,April 29,1999,available at http://www.terradaily.com/news/korea-99a.html
178 "Kim:This is Basically a Win-Win Policy," The Washington Times,October 19,1999.
179 David E.Sanger and Eric Schmitt,"U.S.Fears Arms Race on Korean Peninsula," New York Times,July 1,1999.
180 "Mid-Range Missiles Ordered From U.S.," Joongang Ilbo,May 1,2002,http://www.nautilus.org/archives/napsnet/dr/0201/JAN07.html#item9
181 Bill Gertz,"South Korea Counters North's Missiles," The Washington Times,December 2,1996.
182 Jong-Heon Lee,"South Korea Develops Cruise Missile," United Press International,Sep 21,2006.
183 Jung Sung-ki,"Seoul Develops 1,000-KM Cruise Missile," Korea Times,October 24,2006.
184 秦鸥,柳泳元:“韩国成立导弹司令部”,《环球时报》,2006年10月1日。
185 这一机构于1996年成为独立机构。See Peter Marquez,"South Korea:A Space Power by Proxy,"in Rebecca Jimerson and Ray Williamson,eds.,Space and Military Power in East Asia,George Washington University,http://www.gwu.edu/～spi/spacemilch6.html.
186 STRATFOR.COM,"Unintended consequences:proliferation in South Korea," Mar 7,2001,available at http://www.atimes.com/koreas/CC08Dg01.html
187 Mark Wade,"South Korea," Astronautix.com,Accessed June 21,2006.available at http://www.astronautix.com/country/korsouth.htm
188 SpaceAndTech.com,"South Korea Publishes Launch Vehicle Development Budget," January 8,2001,available at http://www.spaceandtech.com/digest/sd2001-01/sd2001-01-003.shtml
189 Mark Wade,"Korea South," Astronautix.com,available at http://www.astronautix.com/country/korsouth.htm
190 “夜间入侵者300”的飞行半径为200公里,有效载荷为45千克。See“South Korean UAVs:U.S.Rejects Sale of Global Hawk,As ROK Domestic Capabilities Grow,"WMD Insights,Dec 2005/Jan 2006 Issue,http://wmdinsights.org/11/EA2_SouthKoreanUAVs.htm
191 此后,韩国的韩国国防发展局和韩国航空航天公司开始开发一个中等飞行高度和长滞空时间(medium-altitude long-endurance,MALE)的无人机,打算在2007年或2008年取代“夜间入侵者”,然后进一步开发更为先进的高飞机高度和长滞空时间(high-altitude long-endurance,HALE)的无人机。See"South Korean UAVs:U.S.Reiects Sale of Global Hawk,As ROK Domestic Caoabilities Grow,"WMD Insights.Dec 2005/Jan 2006 Issue,available at http://wmdinsights.org/I1/EA2_SouthKoreanUAVs.htm
192 “全球鹰”属于高飞机高度和长滞空时间的无人机,有两种型号:RQ-4A,飞行半径为22236千米,有效载荷为907千克;RQ-4B,飞机半径为22780,有效载荷为1360千克。See Stephen Trimble.“Arms Agreement Means No Global Hawk for South Korea,”Flight International,July 19-25,2005,p.7.
1 Alexandre Y.Mansourov,"The Origins,Evolution,and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuc.lear Program," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1995,p.26.
2 Georgiy Kaurov,"A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y.Mansourov eds.,The North Korean Nuclear Program:Security,Strategy,and New Perspectives from Russia,Routledge:New York and London,2000,pp.15-16.
3 Alexandre Y.Mansourov,"The Origins,Evolution,and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1995,p.26.
4 Alexander Zhebin,"A Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y.Mansourov eds.,The North Korean Nuclear Program:Security,Strategy,andNew Perspectives from Russia,Routledge:New York and London,2000,p.31.
5 Georgiy Kaurov,"A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y.Mansourov eds.,The North Korean Nuclear Program:Security,Strategy,and New Perspectives from Russia,Routledge:New York and London,2000,pp.16-17.
6 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Isotope Production Laboratory,"http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/45_511.html
7 反应堆的功率可以用热功率(MWt)和电功率(MWe)来计量。钚生产堆功率的计量一般用热功率,但由于朝鲜强调其反应堆的民用性质,所以朝鲜一直使用电功率的计量方式。
8 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Nuclear Facilities:5MW(e)Experimental Reactor,"available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/45_551.html:David Albright and Kevin O'Neill,eds.,Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle,Washington,D.C.:Institute For Science And International Security,2000,pp.146-165;李彬,《朝鲜的军备发展》,载《军备控制研究与进展》,第2卷,2004年,第1期,第8页.
9 David Albright and Mark Hibbs,"North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,November 1992,p.38.
10 David Albright,"How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,p.50.
11 美国核物理学家罗伯特·艾瓦莱斯在访问宁边核设施时,询问朝鲜科学家为什么采取这一设计,朝鲜科学家的回答强调这一点。See Robert Alvarez,"North Korea:No Bygones at Yongbyon,''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,July/August 2003,p.41.
12 John H.Large,"The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia," Greenpeace International,Large & Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.11.
13 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.33.
14 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Yongbyon Fuel Fabrication Plant," available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/45_541.html
15 5WMe反应堆大约需要8000个这样的核燃料棒(由大约50吨的天然铀生产)。50MWe 反应堆大约需要64000个这样的燃料棒(需要大约400吨天然铀),而200MWe反应堆则需要224000个核燃料棒(需要大约1400吨天然铀)。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes."A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.33-34.
16 David Albright,"How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,pp.46-47.
17 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes.A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.36.
18 David Albright,"How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,p.47.
19 Ibid.
20 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.37.
21 David Albright,"How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,pp.47-48.
22 美国国务院的估计是6-8千克,美国中央情报局和防务情报局的估计是8-9千克。See NRDC Nuclear Notebook,"North Korea's Nuclear Program,2003",Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,March/April 2003,pp.75.
23 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.38.
24 美国使用卫星图片指出,朝鲜隐藏了两个地下的核废料存储场所。一处是与IRT-2000和最早的“放射化学实验室”相联系的设施,另一处是被称为“500号楼”的废料场,与后来的后处理设施相联系(美国的情报称,这个建筑的地下室被分成间隔间,来储存固体和液体的放射性废料)。IAEA要求进入这两个设施进行核查。朝鲜首先拒绝IAEA进入第一个设施核查。之后,朝鲜允许IAEA进入改装后的“500号楼”,但IAEA被告知没有美国情报所称的地下室。而且,朝鲜拒绝IAEA进一步进入以及在“500号楼”的地下采集样本的要求。1993年2月,IAEA要求对这两个设施进行“特别检查”。1993年3月,朝鲜以使用退出NPT的权利来回应IAEA的要求,从而引发了1993-1994年的核危机。See David Albright,“How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?''The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,pp.48-50.
25 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.38-39.
26 在冻结开始的前两年里,这些燃料棒被放置在一个乏燃料存储池中。在这段时间,燃料棒已经有很大程度的腐蚀。在接下来的几年中,在IAEA的监视下,这些乏燃料棒被放进400个充满了惰性气体的不锈钢筒中。这些筒由美国公司密封,然后再由IAEA贴上封条,最后放在存储池中。See Robert Alvarez,“North Korea:No Bygones at Yongbyon,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,July/August 2003,pp.41-43.
27 1998年初,根据脱北者提供的信息以及卫星图片,美国情报部门得出结论,朝鲜在宁边东北40公里的金仓里建设一个地下核设施,包括一个反应堆和一个后处理设施。经过一系列谈判,1999年3月,朝鲜允许美国进入金仓里进行调查,以换取美国的食品援助。1999年5月,美国派人视查了金仓里,但没有发现任何核设施。See“Uncovering The Truth About North Korea's Alleged Underground Nuclear Facility:The Kumchang-ri Controversy,''available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/uncover.htm
28 这8000个燃料棒被认为含有25-30千克的钚。如果按照10-30%的损失率计算的话,后处理之后大概可以获得17.5-27千克的钚,大概可以制造2-5枚核武器。See International Institute for Strategic Studies.North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.43.
29 David Sanger,"North Korea says it has made fuel for atom bombs," New York Times,July 15,2003.
50 例如,朝鲜官员告诉塞格福雷德·海克(Siegrfried Hecker),他们已经在2003年6月完成了8000个乏燃料棒的后处理。塞格福雷德·海克,斯坦福大学管理与工程系教授,核物理学家,与斯科特·赛根共同为斯坦福大学国际安全与军备控制中心(CISAC)的主任,曾担任美国洛斯一阿拉莫斯国家实验室主任。曾在2004年1月、2005年8月和2006年11月访问宁边和平壤,并多次在美国国会作证,他对朝鲜钚存量的分析成为朝鲜核状态最为重要的分析材料。See Siegfried Hecker,Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea,January 21,2004,p.6,available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf
31 Siegfried Hecker,"Technical summary of DPRK nuclear program," a paper presented at the 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference,Washington,D.C.,November 8,2005.
32 Cheon Seongwhun,Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea,Korea Institute for.National Unification,2006,p.73.
33 http://www.isis-online.org/images/dprk/dg_11sep05_5mwe_ann.jpg.
34 Cheon Seongwhun,Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea,Korea Institute for National Unification,2006,p.74.
35 Mark Hibbs,"Customs Intelligence Data Suggest DPRK Aimed at G-2 Type Centrifuge,"Nuclear Fuel,Vol.28,No.11,May 26,2003.
36 "Defector Leaked Details of North Korean Nuclear Program," Yomiuri Shimbun,December 18,2002.
37 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.41.
38 Ibid.
39 参见韩国学者千祥勋对布鲁斯·本奈特的访谈。See Cheon Seongwhun,“Assessing the Threat of North Korea's Nuclear Capability,”The Korean Journal of Deyense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅧ.No.3,Fall 2006,p.46.
40 David E.Sanger and James Dao,"U.S.Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea," New York Times,October 17,2002.
41 Dexter Filkins,"N.Korea Aid to Pakistan Raise Nuclear Fears," Los Angeles Times,August 23,1999.
42 Clenn Kessler,"Pakistan's N.Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny:Aid to Nuclear Arms Bid May Be Recent," Washington Post,November 13,2002.
43 切尼在2004年4月复旦大学的演讲中谈到,“卡扎菲从A.Q.汗那里获得了核材料生产技术和核武器设计。A.Q.汗还提供了同样的能力给朝鲜。所以,我们相信朝鲜拥有生产核武器的铀浓缩项目。”See“Remarks by the Vice President at Fudan University Followed by Student Bodv O&A.”Office ofthe Vice President,The White House,available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/print/20040415-1.html.
44 Mitchell Reiss,Robert Gallucci,"Red-handed:the truth about North Korea's weapons programs," Foreign Affairs,March/April,2005,pp.142-48
45 Salman Masood and David Rohde,"Pakistan Now Says Scientist Did Send Koreans Nuclear Gear," New York Times,Aug.25,2005.
46 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Yongbyon High Explosive Test Site,"http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/45_556.html
47 Cheon Seongwhun,"Assessing the Threat of North Korea's Nuclear Capability," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅧ.No.3,Fall 2006,p.47.
48 这份报告在1992年3月被公开于俄罗斯媒体。这份报告的全文登在1994年6月24日的 《消息报》(Izvestiya)上。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes."A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.46.
49 从1997年开始,美国侦查卫星发现朝鲜在龟城市(Kusong)附件的一处爆轰试验地址。1997年到1998年间,朝鲜至少在此地进行了3次炮轰试验。2003年7月,《纽约时报》报道,美国中情局将此处地址确定为龙德洞爆轰试验地址。See Nuclear Threat Initiative.North Korea Profile,”Yongdok-dong High Explosive Test Site,''http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/45_555.html
50 这份韩国国家情报中心(NIS)报告在韩国国会的情报委员会讨论中作证,之后在韩国媒体公开。See“Seoul Says North Korea Reprocessing Nuclear Rods,''Reuters,July 9,2003.
51 Federation of American Scientist,"CIA Responses to the Questions for the Record Form the Worldwide Threat Hearing of 11 February 2003," 18 August 2003,p.144,Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103qfr-cia.pdf
52 David Sanger,"New CIA Concerns on North Korean Weapons," New York Times,November 9,2003.
53 David Sanger and William Broad,"High Blast in North Korea Not a 'Nuclear Event,' Powell says," New York Times,Sept.12,2004.
54 David Sanger and William Broad,"U.S.Cites Signs of Korean Preparations for Nuclear Test,"New York Times,May 6,2005.
55 David Sanger and William Broad,"Pakistan may have aided North Korea A-test," New York Times,February 27,2004.
56 North Korea's Nuclear Tests in Pakistan,March 19,2004,available at http://www.kimsoft.com/2004/nk-pk-test.htm.
57 "Statement by the Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test," October 16,2006,http://www.dni.gov/announcements/20061016_release.pdf.
58 朝鲜最早的短程导弹是60年代末苏联向朝鲜提供的“蛙式”(FROG)火箭。之后不久,朝鲜就被认为很快就能够自行生产FROG系统。FROG系统有50-60公里的射程,可以投递400千克的烈性炸药或者化学武器弹头。但FROG不是弹道导弹。70年代初期,苏联开始将短程的“飞毛腿”导弹出口给其在中东的阿拉伯盟国。但并没有出口“飞毛腿”导弹给朝鲜。同时期,据西方研究者的研究,朝鲜也希望从中国获得弹道导弹,但没有成功。最后,朝鲜才转向与埃及的合作。See Joseph S.Bermudez Jr.,“A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,"Monterey Institute of International Studies.Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Occasional Paper No.2,November 1999,pp.2-8.
59 在70年代初,埃及从苏联进口了“飞毛腿”导弹,但1978年戴维营谅解之后,苏埃关系变冷,这使得埃及不得不从其它地方寻求导弹力量的维护和发展。这样,埃及开始与朝鲜合作。另外,“飞毛腿”导弹也相对容易仿制,体现在以下几方面:一、该导弹弹头在引擎停止工作时不与导弹的主体分离,这就避免了远程导弹弹头分离的技术难度。二、该导弹引擎的动力来源是煤油和硝酸,而这两者很容易生产。三、该导弹的喷气舵和导航系统也相对容易仿制。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes."A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.64.
60 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Missile Facilities,"http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/64.html
61 Joseph S.Bermudez Jr.,"A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Monterey Institute of International Studies,Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Occasional Paper No.2,November 1999,p.11.
62 Ibid.,p.12.
63 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.67.
64 Ibid.
65 US Secretary of Defense,"2000 Report to Congress:Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula," September 12,2000,available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Sept2000/korea09122000.html
66 I International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:.4 Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p,71.
67 “劳动”导弹是“火星”导弹的升级版。使用同样的液体推进技术,只不过增加了引擎的推动能力。See Joseph S.Bermudez JL,“A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,''Monterey Institute of International Studies,Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Occasional Paper No.2,November 1999,p.20.
68 "Defense Ministry:May Nodong-1 Test Successful," Yonhap News Agency,June 24,1993.
69 International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Military Balance 2003/2004,Oxford:Oxford University Press for the IISS,2003,p.160.
70 “大浦洞Ⅰ号”在朝鲜被称为“白头山Ⅰ号”。“大浦洞”是以发射场地所在的咸镜北道花台郡大浦洞的地名命名的,是国外的普遍叫法。当时,“大浦洞Ⅰ号”被认为是两级导弹,由改进后的“劳动”导弹作为第一节,“火星”导弹作为第二节。See Jeffery R.Smith."North Korea and the Bomb:High Tech Hide-and-Seek,"The Washington Post,March 18,1994.
71 第一节是改进后的“劳动”导弹,第二节使用引擎改装过的“火星”导弹。第三节是一个固体燃料的火箭。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.75.
72 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.78.
73 伦敦国际战略研究所的研究认为,朝鲜会使用由4个“劳动”导弹引擎组成的推动装置来作为“大浦洞2号”的第一节,用一个“劳动”导弹或者重新设计一个比“劳动”导弹更短但直径更大的装置作为第二节,用一个固体燃料推进的火箭作为第三节。当然,新的“大浦洞Ⅱ型”导弹会给朝鲜带来诸多的技术挑战,如第一节中4个引擎如何协调工作;朝鲜还需设计重返大气层时的热保护系统:要实现更远的射程需要将机体的重量减轻,同时也需要机体足够强壮以抵抗更大的压力。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.78-79.
74 National Intelligence Estimate,"Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years," November 1995,available at www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nie9519.htm
75 Report of Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States,July 15 1998,available at www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/newnote.html
76 National Intelligence Council,Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,September 1999,available at www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/foreign_missile_developments.htm
77 National Intelligence Council,Foreign Missile Developments,December 2001.
78 "Russia:North Korea Unable to Advance in Missile Development," Middle East Newsline,Vol.3,No.248,June 26,2001.
79 Federation of American Scientists,"No-dong Launch Facility," available at www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/Nodong.htm
80 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Missile Overview," available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/index.html
81 Cheon Seongwhun,"Assessing the Threat of North Korea's Nuclear Capability," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅧ.No.3,Fall 2006,p.50.
82 David Sanger,"CIA said to find North Korean nuclear advances," New York Times,July 1,2003.
83 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.46.
84 参见[韩]尹相虎:“军事当局:北韩拥有的钚能制造6、7个核武器”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月26日。
85[韩]“北韩核武器瞄准的是韩国”,《东亚日报》(中文版)社论,2006年10月25日。
86 一些历史研究表明,朝鲜此时可能已经有发展核武器的意图。如根据赛利格·哈里森的研究,1963年朝鲜曾要求苏联帮助他们发展核武器,但苏联拒绝了这一要求。Selig S.Harrison.Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.198.
87 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,Worm Order and Korea,Seoul National University Press,1983,p.118.
88 Alexander Zhebin,"A Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y.Mansourov eds.,The North Korean Nuclear Program.:Security,Strategy,and New Perspectives from Russia,Routledge:New York and London,2000,p.33.
89 Michael J.Mazarr,"Going Just a Little Nuclear:Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea,"International Security,Vol.20,No.2,Fall 1995,p.100.
90 Peter Hayes,"What North Korea Wants," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,December 1993,pp.8-9.
91 Andrew Mack,"A Nuclear North Korea:The Choices Are Narrowing," World Policy Journal,summer 1994,p.27.
92 Nicholas Eberstadt,"North Korea's Weapons Quest," The National Interest,Summer 2005,p.50.
93 选择稍前一点的时间,是考虑到时滞效应。
94 U.S.Forces Korea/Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report,1977," pp.54-55,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
95 "Detailed Report Says US Ruptured Denuclearization Process," Korean Central News Agency,May 12,2003,FBIS Translated Text,available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk051203.html
96 Byung-joon Ahn,"Arms Control Proposals of North and South Korea,and Their Implications for Korean Security," paper for Conference on the Arms Race and Arms Control in Northeast Asia,Korean Association of International Relations,Seoul,Aug.28,1986,p.12.
97 1958年美国在韩国首次部署核武器时,美国核部署的信息泄漏至美国和韩国的媒体,这时,朝鲜非常强烈地批评了美国的核部署。但在此之后一直到70年代中期,由于此时美国采取“不承认也不否认”的政策,朝鲜也很少公开批评美国在韩国的核部署。朝鲜的考虑是,在美国并未公开或强化核威胁时,贸然批评则会提醒美国他们特别担心美国的核威胁,这反而会促使美国强化核力量的作用。
98 "Declaration on Nuclear-Free Zone Supported," KCNA Radio,March 20,1981,translated in U.S.Joint Publications Research Service,JPRS 77888007080071,p.70.
99 "Team Spirit is Playing With Fire," Nodong Sinmun,March 17,1981,in U.S.Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service,IV-052,March 18,1981,p.D-1.
100 "N.Korea Voices Retaliation for Use of Nuclear Weapons," Pyongyang Times,June 15,1983,translated in U.S.Joint Publications Research Service,JPRS83857,p.87.
101 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,pp.135.
102 "Nodong Sinmun on U.S.Doctrine of Nuclear Umbrella," Pyongyang KCNA,July 21,1986, translated in U.S.Joint Publications Research Service,JPRSKAR 86-032-1,p.1.
103 Bruce Cumings,"Spring Thaw For Korea's Cold War?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,April 1992,pp.20.
104 地道对于核武器防护的重要性在于:地道可以直接防止光辐射;冲击波沿地表面运动,地下建筑可以有效防护冲击波;土壤对早期核辐射的防护性能也是相当高的;地下设施的相对密闭性也可以减少放射性沾染的危害。我国核技术专家乔登江院士在其著作《人类的灾难》的第四章“核武器的防护”中对这一问题有详细的描述。参见乔登江,朱焕金编著《人类的灾难--核武器与核爆炸》,清华大学出版社和暨南大学出版社,2000年12月出版,第108页到127页。我国在上世纪五六十年代的“深挖洞”政策与此理相同,有明显的核武器防护的目的,主要是针对美国的核威胁。
105 "Detailed Report Says US Ruptured Denuclearization Process," Korean Central News Agency,May 12,2003,FBIS Translated Text,available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk051203.html
106 譬如,朝鲜引用韩国Haptong新闻社1975年的报道,美国众议院在1975年审议美国1976年防务开支预算的会议中透漏,美国在韩国最高峰时曾部署约1000枚核武器。再如,朝鲜引用美国防务情报中心出版的《防务监测》1981年1月号中的描述,当时美国在韩国部署的核武器,包括80枚“诚实的约翰”导弹、192枚核航弹、152枚155毫米核炮弹和56枚八英寸核炮弹。这些信息与本研究所获得的美国在韩核部署的信息基本相符。“Detailed Report Says US Ruptured Denuclearization Process,''Korean Central News Agency,May 12.2003.
107 Ibid.
108 "Truth behind S.Korea's Development of Nukes Disclosed",Korean Central News Agency,Pyongyang,October 23,available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2004/200410/news10/25.htm
109 Ibid.
110 C.Kenneth Quinones,"South Korea's Approaches to North Korea:A Glacial Process," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,pp.28-31.
111 1984年,朝鲜向刚刚遭受水灾的韩国提供人道主义物资援助,主要是大米和衣服,韩国接受了这些物资。之后,双方将板门店的联络处交流逐渐定期化;南北双方安排南北分离的家庭在朝鲜战争后进行第一次书信交流或者会面;双方开始讨论南北经济合作的一些问题,而且谈论的议题逐渐拓宽。See C.Kenneth Quinones,“South Korea's Approaches to North Korea:A Glacial Process,''in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed..Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.32.
112 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.183-186.
113 Embassy Intelligence and Washington Instructions,"ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles," Cable from the Department of State in Washington to the U.S.Embassy in Seoul,March 4,1975,declassified 1997,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.70.
114 Memorandum of Conversation of Brent Scowcroft,Richard Sneider,William Gleysteen,September 15,1976,declassified 1995,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.73.
115 亚历山大·曼苏洛夫研究的材料来源,是他在1990年对一位苏共中央委员会国际部前高级官员的访谈。该官员在70年代负责苏联对朝政策,与金日成私交甚好。Alexandre Y.Mansourov,"The Origins,Evolution,and Current Politics ofthe North Korean Nuclear Program,''The Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1995,p.29.
116 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),The Military Balance 1981/1982, London:IISS,1981,pp.82-84.
117 韩国的军费在1980年有35亿美元,到1981年飞跃至68亿美元。在1982年到1987年,韩国军费增加至每年约78亿美元。而朝鲜从1981年到1987年,每年平均维持65亿美元的军费开支。Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.183.
118 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),The Military Balance 1988/89,London:IISS,1988,pp.167-169.
119 李春虎,《战后朝鲜的抉择:1945-1995》,复旦大学·朝鲜研究丛书,大旺社,2003年4月,第104-105。
120 Donald Stone Macdonald,The Koreans:Contemporary Politics and Society,Westview Press,Boulder & London,1988,p.169.
121 Ibid.,p.175.
122 李春虎,《战后朝鲜的抉择:1945-1995》,第107页。
123 美国前国务院官员肯尼斯·凯诺内斯(C.Kenneth Quinones)对80年代初的朝韩如此描述,“在1980年,平壤看起来已经取得对韩国的优势。朝鲜的经济是社会主义成就的一个很好表现。现代采矿业和工业设施使朝鲜出口大量的金、锌和煤到他们的共产主义阵营国家。粮食生产也持续达到高峰,并有剩余可以出口。平壤是一个两百万人居住、衣食无忧、秩序井然的完美城市。而在韩国,1980年和1981年时,政府还向美国申请粮食援助。汉城的街道又窄又乱,贫困者和失业者在酝酿着街头暴乱,催泪瓦斯则充斥者大学校园。剧烈的劳工纷争、记者被投入监狱和政治人物的腐败随处可见。而韩国此时定位的外向型出口轻工业也受到台湾、香港和其他新兴经济体的激烈竞争和挑战。”See C.Kenneth Quinones,"South Korea's Approaches tO North Korea:A Glacial Process,"'in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.33.
124 Donald Stone Macdonald,The Koreans:Contemporary Politics and Society,Westview Press,Boulder & London,1988,p.176,p.246.
125 Dae-Sook Suh,"Kim Jong Ⅱ and New Leadership in North Korea," in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee ed.,North Korea after Kim IL Sung,Lynne Rienner Publishers,Boulder,London,p.25-27.
126 Donald Stone Macdonald,The Koreans:Contemporary Politics and Society,Westview Press,Boulder & London,1988,p.214.
127 Dae-Sook Suh,"Kim Jong Ⅱ and New Leadership in North Korea," in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee ed.,North Korea after Kim IL Sung,Lynne Rienner Publishers,Boulder,London,p.24.
128 朝鲜劳动党中央委员会有248名成员,其中145名为中央委员,103名为候补委员。这一时期,劳动党中央委员会共有261次人员变动,九分之七的中央委员被更换。候补委员的变动有111次。Ibid.,p.25.
129 李春虎,《战后朝鲜的抉择:1945-1995》,第106页。
130 上引书,第119页。
131 Marcus Noland,"The Economic Situation in North Korea," in Wonmo Dong ed.,The Two Koreas and the United States:Issues of Peace,Security,and Economic Cooperation,M.E.Sharpe,New York and London,p.22.
132 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C.Hassig,North Korea Through the Looking Glass,Brookings Institution Press,Washington,D.C.,p.154.
133 这一时期,仅有一些非官方的美国人访问朝鲜,其中著名的人士包括之后成为美国议员的斯蒂芬·首勒兹(Stephen Solarz)和传教士比利·格雷厄姆(Billy Graham)等。See Robert A.Manning,"United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare,"in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman&Littlefield Publishers,p. 66.
134 Pae Sang Hak,"The Nuclear Problem in Northeast Asia and Ways to Resolve it:A North Korean Perspective," in Andrew Mack,Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia,United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,1995,p.198.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Barbara Demick,"US Flexes Muscles Before The Korea," Los Angles Times,March 21,2003;David E.Sanger and Thom Shanker,"US Sending 2 Dozen Bombers in Easy Range of North Koreans," New York Times,March 5,2003.
138 Carol Giacomo,"US Exploring Ways to Deal with N.Korea Export," Reuters,May 12,2003.
139 Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea,Princeton University Press,New Jersey,p.32.
140 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.258.
141 "Our Nuclear Deterrent Force Is Never a Means to Threaten," The Korean Central News Agency,June 9,2003,in Cheon Seongwhun,"North Korea Nuclear Crisis and the Six-Party Talks," Paper of International conference on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia organized by the Institute of International Studies and the Center for Korean Studies of Fudan University,on December 14-16,2005,Shanghai,China,pp.4.
142 Pae Sang Hak,"The Nuclear Problem in Northeast Asia and Ways to Resolve it:A North Korean Perspective," in Andrew Mack,Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia,United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,1995,p.200.
143 "Drive of Nuclear Armament," Korea Today,No.4,Juche 94,2005,p.41.
144 "Truth behind S.Korea's Development of Nukes Disclosed," Korean Central News Agency,Pyongyang,October 23,available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2004/200410/news 10/25.htm
145 Daniel A.Pinkston,"South Korea's Nuclear Experiments," Center for Nonproliferation Studies Research Report,November 9,2004,p.5,available at http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/041109.htm
146 建构主义学者温特经常引用的例子是,对于美国,朝鲜的5枚核武器比英国的500枚核武器更具威胁,因为英国是美国的朋友,而朝鲜是美国的敌人。See Alexander Wendt,"Constructing International Politics,''International Security,Vol.20,No.1,Summer 1995,p.73.
147 1996年朝鲜政府的新年社论中的一段描述,可以看出这一时期朝韩之间仍很强烈的敌对气氛。“金泳三傀儡政权注定要灭亡,……。他们描述‘朝鲜威胁'的目的是希望入侵朝鲜。假如美国和韩国仍持续寻求对抗和战争,半岛的局势就会恶化。我们不能忽视这一点,我们也不会允许任何挑衅行为。”See Chong-sik Lee,"North and South Korean Confrontation in the Nuclear Age,"in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee ed.,North Korea after Kim IL Sung,Lynne Rienner Publishers,Boulder,London,p.231.
148 L.Gordon Flake,"North Korea's Security Strategies and Initiatives Toward South Korea,"Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.50.
149 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.89-91.
150 Nam Chang-hee,"Relocating USFK Bases:Background and Implications," East Asian Review,Vol.15,No.3,Autumn 2003,pp.119-121.
151 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.92.
152 Ibid.,pp.93-96.
153 Kyung-Ae Park,"North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.90.
154 Dae-Sook Suh,"Crisis Management by New Leaders in North Korea," in Wonmo Dong ed.,The Two Koreas and the United States:Issues of Peace,Security,and Economic Cooperation,M.E.Sharpe,New York and London,p.14.
155 Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick M.Hughes,Director,U.S.Defense Intelligence Agency,before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,"Global Threats and Challenges to the United States and Its Interests Abroad," February 5,1997,p.11;Michael O' Hanlon,"Stopping A North Korean Invasion:Why Defending South Korea Is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks,"International Security,Vol.22,No.4,Spring 1998,p.135.
156 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.96-97.
157 Jeffrey W.Taliaferro,"Security Seeking under Anarchy:Defensive Realism Revisited,"International Security,Vol.25,No.3,Winter 2000/01,pp.128-129.
158 John Merrill,"North Korea in 1992:Steering Away from the Shoals," Asian Survey,Vol.33,No.1,January 1993,p.43.
159 Bruce Cumings,"U.S.-North Korean Bilateral Relations and South Korean Security," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.106.
160 参见这一时期美韩关于朝鲜政权崩溃的文章和著作。See Marcus Noland,“Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,”Foreign Affairs,May/June 1997;Karen Elliott House,“Let North Korea Collapse,”The Wall Street Journal,21 February 1997;Sung Chull Kim,North Korea in Crisis:An Assessment of Regime Stability,Seoul:Korea Institute of National Unification,1997;Scott Snyder,"North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival:Internal Problems and Implications for the Future,”Pacific Affairs,Winter 2000,pp.517-531.
161 1990年,苏联宣布苏朝贸易需要按照国际市场的价格支付硬通货,之后朝鲜便没有能力支付以前每年从俄罗斯获得的几百万吨石油。2000年之后,苏朝关系又有些升温,双方签订新的友好互助条约,但由于俄罗斯经济状况仍不景气,因此,给朝鲜带来经济好转的前景也不甚乐观。See Kongdan Oh and Ralph C.Hassig,North Korea Through the Looking Glass,Brookings Institution Press,Washington,D.C.,p.155.
162 Ibid.,p.157.
163 有几种对这一时期朝鲜受灾情况的评估:美国《世界视野》(World Vision)的副总裁安德鲁·纳茨欧(Andrew Natsios)称,朝鲜在灾荒中失去50万到100万人,而且,如果掌握更详细的信息的话,这一数字可能接近200万人,即达到总人口的十分之一。See Bruce Cumings,“U.S.-North Korean Bilateral Relations and South Korean Security,”in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.106.
164 西方研究者普遍把1998年朝鲜的卫星发射视为朝鲜核项目的一部分。核项目包括运载工具--导弹,而卫星发射的军事运用就是导弹发射。
165 Kyung-Ae Park,"North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.97.
166 “平壤各地张挂标语旗帜庆祝朝鲜核试验成功,”中国新闻网,2006年11月07日,http://news.tom.com/2006-11-07/000N/10678239.html
167 Scott D.Sagan,"Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security,Vol.21,No.3,Winter,1996-1997,p.65.
168 1993年朝鲜抵制IAEA核查时,叶利钦和克林顿联合发表声明要求朝鲜遵守核不扩散条约的承诺。俄罗斯向朝鲜施加压力,引致《劳动新闻》发表评论来批评俄罗斯的政策,“我们不能接受俄罗斯像美国的盟国一样来窒息朝鲜”。See Kongdan Oh and Ralph C.Hassig,North Korea Through the Looking Glass,Brookings Institution Press,Washington,D.C.,p.155.
169 Ibid.,p.157.
170 See Robert A.Manning,"United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare,"in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,p.66.
171 这一点用传统的政治语汇就是边缘政策(brinkmanship)。
172 Scott Snyder,"North Korean Crises and American Choices:Managing U.S.Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," in Wonmo Dong ed.,The Two Koreas and the United States:Issues of Peace,Security,and Economic Cooperation,M.E.Sharpe,New York and London,p.239.
173 Robert A.Manning,"United States-No.rth Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare," in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,p.73.
174 Scott Snyder,"North Korean Crises and American Choices:Managing U.S.Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," in Wonmo Dong ed.,The Two Koreas and the United States:Issues of Peace,Security,and Economic Cooperation,M.E.Sharpe,New York and London,pp.241-242.
175 See Leon V.Sigal,"North,On Hold...Again," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,May/June 2001,pp.34-37.
176 "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and The Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Geneva,October 21,1994,available at www.Kedo.org/pdfs/Agreed Framework.pdf
177 Robert A.Manning,"United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare," in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,pp.74-76.
178 Center for Nonproliferation Studies,North Korea Special Collection,"Uncovering The Truth About North Korea's Alleged Underground Nuclear Facility:The Kumchang-ri Controversy,"http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/uncover.htm
179 王晴:“朝鲜允诺弃核交换100万吨重油援助”,《第一财经日报》,2007年2月14日。
180 Kyung-Ae Park,"North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relmions,"in Kyunz-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Securit Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.92.
181 "North Korea Asks for US1 Billion tO halt Missile Sales,"Channel News Asia.12 July 2000;Ranian Roy,"U.S.,North Korea Near Wrap-Up of Missile TaIks,"Associated Press,12 July 2000.
182 在1993年“美朝联合声明”中,美朝双方达成三条原则:保证避免威胁和使用武力,包括核武器:不干涉他国内政;对和平实现统一的支持。这三条原则都是倾向于朝鲜利益的。See Robert A.Manning.“United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare tO Workfare,”in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman&Littlefield PubIishers,p.73.
183 Robert A.Manning,"United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare," p.72.
184 Ibid.,p.74.
185 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.258.
186 Hans Kristensen,"Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella," Section 3,"The Battle over Okinawa," http://www.nautilus.org/archives//library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-3.html
187 Memorandum of Conversation ofBrent Scowcroft,Richard Sneider,William Gleysteen,September 15,1976,declassified 1995,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.73.
188 "Drive of Nuclear Armament," Korea Today,No.4,Juche 94,2005,p.41.
1 Dong Struck,"South Korean Stresses Alliance and Dismisses Differences with U.S." The Washington Post,April 11,2003,p.A21.
2 Seongwhun Cheon,"Nuclear-Armed North Korea and South Korea's Strategic Countermeasures," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅥ,No.2,Fall 2004,p.59.
3 2006年11月初,在汉城的一个招商引资会上,卢武铉发表言论:“朝鲜核试验导致安全威胁增大是事实,但是不应该夸大这个问题。……。我认为,在目前的情况下,朝鲜核试验没有打破朝鲜半岛的军事平衡。”参见[韩]郑然旭:“卢武铉:北韩核试验没有打破南北军事均衡”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月3日。
4 在之后的新闻发布会上,大国家党发言人罗卿瑷批评到:“朝鲜核试验几乎让国民夜不能寐,但他却说核不算什么,这真令人感到怀疑,他到底是不是对韩国安全负责任的国军统帅。”参见尹钟求,张康明:“总统,您真的了解核武器的意义吗?”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月4日。
5 韩国学者千祥勋在这里引用基辛格的话来证明美国延伸威慑的可信度不高。基辛格认为,“一旦苏联用直接的核报复来威胁美国,美国发动全面核战争来保护欧洲的承诺注定要失去意义。”See Henry Kissinger,"Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance,"Survival,Vol.24,1982,p.195,quoted from Se00gwhun Cheon,"Nuclear-Armed North Korea and South Korea's.Strategic Countermeasures,"The Korean Journal of Defense Analvsis,Vol.ⅩⅥ,No.2,Fall 2004,p.56.
6 Seongwhun Cheon,"Nuclear-Armed North Korea and South Korea's Strategic Countermeasures," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅥ,No.2,Fall 2004,p.57.
7[韩]尹相虎,“军事当局:北韩拥有的钚能制造6、7个核武器”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月26日。
8[韩]“北韩核武器瞄准的是韩国”,《东亚日报》(中文版)社论,2006年10月25日。
9[韩]河泰元,“阳光政策被指造成南韩社会左倾化”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年2月6日。
10 斯科特·赛根(Scott D.Sagan)对这种核扩散的链式反应有详细的描述。See Scott D.Sagan,“Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?Three Models in Search of a Bomb,”International Security,Vol.21,No.3,1996-1997 Winter,pp.58-59.
11 IAEA对利比亚核发展的评估是,利比亚尚处于核武器发展的早期阶段,距离制造出核武器至少还需3到7年。See James Goodby,et al.,Cooperative ThreatReduction for a New Era,Defense and Technology Papers 4,Washington:National Defense University,Center for Technology and National Security Policy,p.34.
12 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.64.
13 IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11 November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_korea.html
14 Mark Hibbs,"77%U-235 Was Peak Enrichment Reported to IAEA by South Korea,"NuclearFuel,Vol.29,No.30,September 27,2004,pp.7-8;Mark Gorwitz,"The South Korean Laser Isotope Separation Experience," ISIS Online,October 5,2004,< http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/sklisword2.html>.
15 "Truth behind S.Korea's Development of Nukes Disclosed," Korean Central News Agency,Pyongyang,October 23,2004,available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2004/200410/news10/25.htm
16 James Risen,"South Korea Seen Trying to Extend Range of Missile," New York Times,November 14,1999.
17 Mark Wade,"South Korea,"Astronautix.com,available at http://www.astronautix.com/country/korsouth.htm
18 Nuclear Threat Initiative,South Korea Profile,"Nuclear Chronology:1992-2003",available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3117.html
19 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),p.46
20 Peter Hayes,"The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue," in Andrew Mack ed.,Asian Flashpoint:Security and the Korean Peninsula,Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd,p.68.
21 John H.Large,"The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia," Greenpeace International,Large & Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.1,available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/Development-of-NW-in-NEAsia
22 Sook-Jong Lee,"Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅦ,No.1,Spring 2005,pp.87-88.
23[韩]李明键,郑然旭:“卢武铉:北韩关于安保威胁的主战过于夸张”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月12日。
24[韩]李明键,董正民:“政府对北政策又回到原点”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月13日。
25[韩]尹相虎:“韩美就2012年移交作战权达成协议”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年2月26日。
26 在2007年2月24日美韩正式达成协议之后,韩国的前国防部长、联合参谋部部长、各军队负责人等70多名预备役将军举行会晤,发表对政府的抗议声明。前国防部长李钟九说:“军队元老全部反对,250万国民签署反对声明,但现政权仍然强行收回战时指挥权,我对此感到十分愤怒。”参见[韩]尹相虎:“预备役将军团体:收回作战指挥权的决定操之过急”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年2月27日。
27 朴庸玉在2007年3月延世大学召开的国际会议上发表的这番讲话。参见[韩]金昇炼,李基洪:“国际会议与会者共商北核问题”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年3月28日。
28 "Japan May 'Go Nuclear,' Paper Says," Japan Times,August 11,1993,p.4.
29 John H.Large,"The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia," Greenpeace International,Large & Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.1,available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/Development-of-NW-in-NEAsia
30 Howard W.French,"Koizumi Aide Hints at Change to No Nuclear Policy," New York Times,June 4,2002,p.10.
31 “韩国应为东北亚的核武器竞赛做准备”,《中央日报》,2006年9月6日,载至《星岛环球网》,available at http://www.singtaonet.com/pol_op/t20060907_323092.html
32 "South Korea studies options in case Japan develops nukes," Agence France-Presse,October 19,2006,available at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_Rebuffs_Talk Of_More_Detailed_Nuclear_Umbrella_For_South_Korea_999.html
33 See Alexander Wendt,"Constructing International Politics," International Security,Vol.20,No.1,Summer 1995,p.73.
34 L.Gordon Flake,"North Korea's Security Strategies and Initiatives Toward South Korea,"Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.50.
35 朝鲜核试验后,卢武铉先是表示要重新审议之前的对朝政策。但至2006年11月初,六方会谈重启的消息传出之后,韩国政府又基本转向原先的“对北包容政策”,积极准备对朝开展援助。[韩]郑然旭,尹相虎:“卢武铉:将分析核试验对收回作战权问题的影响”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月11日;
[韩]文炳基:“政府欲重新开展对北援助遭到各界批评”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月3日。
36[韩]尹相虎:“卢武铉拟制定北韩版马歇尔计划”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年2月17日。
37[韩]郑旭然,李明键,文炳基:“卢武铉:韩国若想生存,既要亲美也要亲北”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年3月27日。
38 T.V.Paul,Power versus Prudence:Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons,Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press,2000,p.111.
39 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.84.
40 Norman Levin,The Shape of Korea's Future:South Korea Attitudes Toward Unification and Long-Term Security Issues,Santa Monica:Rand,1999,p.23.
41 Cheon Seongwhun,Toward Greater Transparency in Non-Nuclear Policy:A Case of South Korea,The Korea Institute for National Unification,2005,p.85.
42 日本前首相细川护熙曾表示:“只要美国不希望看到日本退出NPT并发展自己的核威慑力量,美国就应该强化同日本的结盟联系并继续向日本提供核保护伞”。See Morihiro Hosokawa,“Are U.S.Troopsn Japan Needed?Reforming the Alliance,''Foreign Affairs,Vol.77,No.4,July/August 1998,p.5.朝鲜核试验后,日本外相麻生的言论和赖斯访日后麻生话语的转向,也可以看出美国的延伸威慑对日本核选择的重要约束作用。参见“麻生讲话令人惊讶,赖斯猛压日本核冲动”,《环球时报》,2006年10月21日。
43[韩]朴民赫:“前总统金泳三采访录”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年10月12日。
44 Jim Mannion,"US Rebuffs Talk Of More Detailed Nuclear Umbrella For South Korea,"Agence France-Presse,Oct 19,2006.
45 Kim Ji-hyun,"Defense Ministry under fire for overstating term 'extended deterrence'," Korea Herald,October 26,2006,available at http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2006/10/26/200610260045.asp
46 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton University Press:Princeton and Oxford,2002,p.249.
47 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.69.
48 Paul Shin,"U.S.Said to Stop South Korea's Nuke Bomb Plans," The Washington Times,March 29,1994;"Seoul Planned Nuclear Weapons Until 1991," Jane's Defense Weekly,2 April 1994,p.1.
49 Jungmin Kang and H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,pp.72-73.
50 参见[韩]吴源哲:《朴正熙和卡特的搏斗》,《新东亚》,1994年11月,第430页。
51 See Kumao Kaneko,Atsuyuki Suzuki,Jor-Shan Choi,Edward Fei,"Energy and Security in Northeast Asia:Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation," IGCC Policy Papers,University of California,Multi-Campus Reserch Unit,Appendix 2:Peaceful Use of Plutonium in Japan,available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=igcc
52 “麻生讲话令人惊讶 赖斯猛压日本核冲动”,《环球时报》,2006年10月21日。
53 Lee Seung-woo,"Lee Hoi-Chang,We need to consider developing nuclear weapons,"Joongang Ilbo,19 October 2006(in Korean),quoted from International Crisis Group Policy Briefing,"North Korea's Nuclear Test:The Fallout," Asian Briefing No.56,Seoul/Brussels,November 13,2006.
54 "Statement by the Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test," October 16,2006,http://www.dni.gov/announcements/20061016_release.pdf.
55 Jungmin Kang and Peter Hayes,"Technical Analysis of the DPRK Nuclear Test,"Policy Forum Online 06-89A,The Nautilus Institute,October 20th,2006,available at http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0689HayesKang.html
56 在朝鲜核试验后的韩国全国主要指挥官会议上,韩国国防部给出这样的评估数字。[韩] 尹相虎:“军事当局:北韩拥有的钚能制造6、7个核武器”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月26日。
57 塞格福雷德·海克认为,到2006年10月,朝鲜的钚拥有量为40-50千克。See Siegfried S.Hecker,"Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,"Stanford University,Center for International Security and Cooperation,November 15,2006,p.8.
58 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.46.
59 参见[韩]尹相虎:“军事当局:北韩拥有的钚能制造6、7个核武器”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月26日;
[韩]“北韩核武器瞄准的是韩国”,《东亚日报》(中文版)社论,2006年10月25日。
60 这样的国家(或者地区)可能还有很多,如澳大利亚、印尼、荷兰、挪威、罗马尼亚、南斯拉夫等,但关于它们核武器发展的公开资料非常少,因此,在谈论时把这些案例排除在外。
61 "Egypt's Mubarak Says Egypt Can Join Nuclear Club,"' Reuters,October 5,1998.
62 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.69.
63 Cheon Seongwhun,Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea,Korea Institute for National Unification,2006,p.41.
64 T.V.Paul,Power versus Prudence:Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons,Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press,2000,p.111.
65 See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.86,p.89.
66 T.V.Paul,Power versus Prudence:Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons,Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press,2000,p.97.
67 Ibid.,p.115,p.116.
68 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.64.
69 "South Africa to Abandon Missile Launching Programme," Agence France Presse,June 30,1993.
70 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.84.
71 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.69.
72 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.64.
73 Gilbert J.Brown,"From Nuclear Swords to Nuclear Plowshares," Washington Post,September 1,1992,A17;Theodor Galdi,The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement,Congressional Research Service,94-985-F,Washington,D.C.:Government Printing Office,December 6,1994,pp.1-6.
74 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.78.
75 这一点可以从巴西与美国交易的例子中找到佐证。1976年福特政府与巴西达成秘密交易。巴西放弃其在1975年与联邦德国达成的购买后处理设施的合同。作为交换,美国向巴西提供安全保证和5千万美元的军售贷款。然而,当卡特政府即将执政时,这一交易泄漏至美国的媒体。结果是,巴西退出了1976年秘密协议,又转向发展核武器的立场。See Graham Hovey,"Carter Writes to Leader of Brazil," New York Times,March 31,1977,p.2;Hobart Rowen,"U.S.Shifted on Bonn-Brazil Nuclear Deal," Washington Post,May 9,1977,A10.
76 日本NHK电视台在10月22日报道说,北韩外务省第一副相姜锡柱在2006年11月22日表示:“我们怎么能放弃核武器?难道我们是为了放弃而制造它的吗?”参见[韩]郑权铉:“北韩第一副相姜锡柱:核武器不是为了放弃而制造的”,《朝鲜日报》(中文版),2006年11月23日。
77 参见沈丁立:“朝鲜弃核和拥核,哪个更安全?”《东方早报》,2006年12月21日。
[韩]河宗大:“中国专家:北韩决不会弃核,六方会谈前路茫茫,”《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月3日。
78 Nicholas Eberstadt,"North Korea's Weaons Quest," The National Interest,Summer 2005,p.50.
79 乔纳森·保拉克(Jonathan D.Pollack)使用象征性核能力和可操作性核威慑能力这两个概念来描述朝鲜未来的核发展。See Jonathan D.Pollack,"North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015:Three Scenarios,''Asia Policy,Number 3,January 2007,PP.106-107.
80[韩]董正民:“韩国曾拒绝美国提供核保护伞”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月17日。
1 王传剑:“从‘双重遏制'到‘双重规制'--战后美韩军事同盟的历史考察”,《美国研究》,2002年第2期,第31-46页。
2 Sook-Jong Lee,"Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol..ⅩⅦ,No.1,Spring 2005,p.90.
3 李华:“继承还是超越--论冷战后驻韩美军调整”,载《美国研究》,2004年第1期,第99-100页。
4 吴心伯:《太平洋上不太平-后冷战时代的美国亚太安全战略》,复旦大学出版社,2006年版,第144页。
5 Larry A Niksch,"Korea:U.S.-Korea Relations Issues for Congress," June 16,2005.available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67839.pdf
6 杨红梅:“美韩同盟调整的动力、现状与前景”,《现代国际关系》,2005年第8期,第22页。
7 参见汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略-以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,.2007年,第224页。
8 Donald Stone Macdonald,US-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance,The Twenty-Year Re.cord:An Interpretive Summary of Archives of the US Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965,Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1992,pp.18-20.
9 Ibid.
10 Victor D.Cha,"America and South Korea:The Ambivalent Alliance?" Current History,September 2003,pp.280-282.
11 Ibid.,p.280.
12 汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略--以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年,第238页。
13 Sook-Jong Lee,"Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol..ⅩⅦ,No.1,Spring 2005,p.85.
14 汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略-以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年,第246页。
15 See Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,May 14,2003.转引自汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略-以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年,第246页。
16 扎勒米·哈利勒扎德等:《美国与亚洲:美国新战略和兵力态势》,新华出版社2001年版,第45-46页。
17[韩]朴民赫:“前总统金泳三采访录”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年10月12日。
18 希罗多德:《历史》,商务印书馆,1962年版,第683-687页。
19 陈文兵,“古希腊国际体系中的城邦反霸同盟外交”,《东北师大学报》(哲学社会科学版),1999年第5期,第21-23页。
20 翟东升:“罗马扩张中的同盟战略”,《IT经理世界》,2004年第9期,第111页。
21 迟海波:“试论美国与北约盟国在‘多边核力量'计划上的分歧”,《长春师范学院学报》,2004年第2期,第17-19页。
22[美]迈克尔·格林,帕特里克·克罗宁主编:《美日联盟:过去、现在与将来》,华宏勋等译,新华出版社,2000年版,第359页。
23 师哲:《在历史巨人身边》,中央文献研究室,1991年版,第572-573页。
24 牛军:“毛泽东与中苏同盟破裂的缘起(1957-1959)”,《国际政治研究》,2001年第2期,第54-56页。
25 Stephen Van Evera,"Primed for Peace:Europe After the Cold War," International Security,Vol.15,No.3,1990,pp.5-8.
26 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第106页。
27 参见汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略--以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年,第184页。
28 参见迈克尔·阿马斯科特:《朋友还是对手--前美国驻日大使说日本》,于铁军等译,新 华出版社1998年版,第252页。
29 沈志华:“中苏同盟破裂的原因和结果”,《中共党史研究》,2007年第2期,第31页。
30 牛军:“毛泽东与中苏同盟破裂的缘起(1957-1959)”,《国际政治研究》,2001年第2期,第56-57页。
31 李越然:《外交舞台上的新中国领袖》,外语教学与研究出版社,1994年版,第160-164页。
32 赵青海:“‘四国同盟':构想与现实”,《国际问题研究》,2007年第6期,第28-32页。
33 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第106页。
34 Paul Cornish,Partnership in Crisis:The US,Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO,London:The Royal Institute of International Affairs,1997,p.31.
35 Ibid.,p.37.
36 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第106-107页。
37 刘星:“试论日美同盟的生命力”,《世界经济与政治》,2007年第6期,第45页。
38 严圣禾:“日美同盟:一场不散的宴席?”,《南风窗》,2005年8月下,第79页。
39 参见冯昭奎、林昶:《中日关系报告》,北京:时事出版社,第257页。
40 邵迪:“帝国之梦的幻灭历程”,《河北理工大学学报》,2007年11月,第31页。
41 《毛泽东文集》第8卷,人民出版社,1999年,第19-21页。
42 V.Zubok and C.Pleshakov,Inside the Kremlin's Cold War." From Stalin to Khrushev,Boston:Harvard University Press,1996,p.223.
43 孙鸿,于海:“北约扩大的原因、性质及走向”,《河北师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),2006年第6期,第18页。
44 Stephen M.Walt,"Alliances in Theory and Practice:What Lies Ahead?" Journal of International Affairs,Vol.43,No.1,Summer/Fall 1989,pp.8-9.
45 Glenn Snyder,"Alliance Theory:A Neorealism First Cut," Journal of International Affairs,Vol.44,No.1,Spring/Summer1990,p.121.
46 Kenneth Waltz,"The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security,Vol.18,No.2,1993,pp.75-76.
47 Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf,"Neorealism,Neoliberal Institutionalism,and the Future of NATO," Security Studies,Vol.3,No.1,1993,pp.21-25.
48 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第84页。
49 Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane,"Why Does NATO Persist? An Institutionalist Approach," Working Paper,Center for International Affairs,Harvard University,pp.56-61.
50 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第87页。
51 约翰·米尔斯海默:《大国政治的悲剧》,王义桅,唐小松译,上海人民出版社,2003年版,第536页。
52 上引书,第538页。
53 上引书,第538页。
54 Robert Art,"Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO",Political Science Quarterly,Vol.111,NO.1,Spring 1996,pp.11-27.
55 孙鸿,于海:“北约扩大的原因、性质及走向”,《河北师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),2006年第6期,第18页。
56[美]兹比格纽·布热津斯基:《大棋局--美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》,中国国际问题研究所译,上海人民出版社,1998年版,第47页。
57 卞学光、丁诗传:“象征性抵制与策略性表示加入--普京对俄罗斯与北约关系的新政策”,《国际论坛》,2004年第1期,第31-32页。
58 张玉国:“同盟困境与美日同盟--日本的同盟政策分析”,《日本学论坛》,2004年第1 期,第32页。
59 刘江永:《跨世纪的日本政治、经济、外交新趋势》,时事出版社,1996年版,第38页。
60 张大林:“日美同盟向何处去”,《国际问题研究》,1996年第1期,第29页。
61 上引书,第29页。
62 Arms Control Work,"Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty," available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/749/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-npt
63 参见第二章。
64 1972年3月,朝鲜外交部发言人在谈话中指出:“朝鲜与美国和日本实现关系正常化的时机已经到来。”美国国务卿基辛格此时也表示:“我们盼望将在数年内显著地促进与中共和朝鲜的关系。”See Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Paaerson,eds.Korean-American Relations (1866-1997),Albany,NY:State University of New York Press,1999,p.110.
65 1972年,在几名美国记者和哈佛大学教授库恩(Jerome A.Cohen)访问朝鲜之后,更多的美国学者(特别是朝鲜裔学者)访问朝鲜。朝鲜进一步进行与美国建立官方联系的尝试。1974年3月,朝鲜最高人民会议发出致美国国会的公开信,建议朝美之间签订和平条约以代替朝鲜停战协定。美国虽然没有对此做出直接反应,但助理国务卿菲利浦·哈比伯(Phillip Habib)在1974年11月发表谈话指出,如果苏联和中国承认韩国,美国也将承认朝鲜。See Donald S.Zagoria and Young Kun Kim,"North Korea and the Major Powers,"Asian Survey,Vol.15,No.12,December 1975,p.1024,p.1034.
66 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.56.
67 Donald S.Zagoria and Young Kun Kim,"North Korea and the Major Powers," Asian Survey,Vol.15,No.12,December 1975,p.1024,p.1034.
68 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.56.
69 Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson,eds.Korean-American Relations(1866-1997),Albany,NY:State University of New York Press,1999,pp.116-117.
70 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.90.
71 Ibid.
72 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.75-76.
73 "Detailed Report Says US Ruptured Denuclearization Process," Korean Central News Agency,May 12,2003,FBiS Translated Text,available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk051203.html
74 参见第二章的分析。
75 C.Kenneth Quinones,"South Korea's Approaches to North Korea:A Glacial Process," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,pp.31-33.
76 陈峰君,王传剑:《亚太大国与朝鲜半岛》,北京大学出版社,2002年版,第80页。
77 从1997年底开始,朝鲜抱怨美国没有充分执行框架协议,朝鲜援引三个理由:美国没有逐步取消经济制裁的努力,美国推迟提供重油和推迟进行轻水反应堆的建设。See David G.Brown,"North Korea in 1998:A Year of Foreboding Developments,"Asian Survey,Vol.39,No.1,Jan.-Feb.1999,p.130.
78 Ibid.
79 Samuel S.Kim,"North Korea in 2000,Surviving through High Hopes of Summit Diplomacy,"Asian Survey,Vol.41,No.1,Jan.-Feb.2001,p.24.
80 起初,金泳三政府不愿意接受朝美的直接协商,但由于问题的紧迫和美国的压力,韩国勉 强默认美朝的直接会谈。在美朝谈判顺利进行之后,韩国开始对自己被边缘化的事实感到迷惑,对美朝会谈表现出不满,并主张放弃之前的“先朝美接触,后南北对话”政策,提出“同时并进”。在南北对话不能实现之后,韩国开始向美国施加压力,要求美国在谈判中反映韩国的立场,把南北经济合作与核问题的解决联系起来。参见韩献栋:“同盟政治的安全困境--连累抛弃模型的解释力及其局限”,《国际论坛》,2006年第9期,第22页。
81 韩国对1994年框架协议的批评主要集中在三点:首先,韩国认为框架协议并没有要求朝鲜彻底公布其过去的核活动,朝鲜的模糊核地位无疑对韩国意味着核威胁。美朝谈判的美方首席谈判代表罗伯特·格鲁奇(Robert Galluci)在1994年向韩国保证说,美国将把朝鲜过去核行为的百分之百透明化,但事实上,框架协议并没有做到这一点。其次,框架协议中美国向朝鲜提供消极安全保障,这是与美国向韩国的安全承诺相冲突的。韩国担心,框架协议表露出的信号是,美韩同盟针对朝鲜的“二对一”结构将转换为美国平衡朝鲜和韩国的“一对二”结构。而且,美国政府在1994年急于与朝鲜达成协议,主要是美国考虑到中期选举的结果和希望推动NPT的延长。在韩国看来,这明显是美国为了自身利益而不考虑盟国利益。See Taewoo Kim,"North Korea-US nuclear rapprochement:the South Korean dilemma,"Third World Quarterly,Vol.16,No.4,1995,p.669.
82 韩献栋:“同盟政治的安全困境--连累抛弃模型的解释力及其局限”,《国际论坛》,2006年第9期,第22页。
83 1995年的《东亚安全战略报告》,明确表示冷战后继续在东亚维持10万美军的重要性。
84 David H.Satterwhite,"North Korea in 1996:Belligerence Subsiding,Hunger Worsens," Asian Survey,Vol.37,No.1,January 1997,pp.17-18.
85 “已支一透镜演习”在1995-1998年采取电脑模拟加小规模实战演习的形式进行,当时被称为世界上规模最大的电脑模拟战争演习。See Eugene D.Santarelli,“Air Component Support to Joint Exercises,''JFQ,Autumn/winter 1997-98,pp.71-75.“鹞鹰”演习的规模是全部驻韩美军,几十万韩军以及部分美国增援部队,也被认为是当时同盟间最大规模的实兵演习。See Global Security,Foal Eagle,available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/foal-eagle.htm
86 “阿尔索伊”是一种联合战时增援演习,其内容是:一旦朝鲜半岛爆发战争,从朝鲜半岛以外赶来增援的美军立即对韩国军队进行接收(reception)、集结(staging)、前运(onward-movement)和整合(integration)。这四项演习内容的英文缩略语RSOI的汉语音译就是“阿尔索伊”。
87 “阿尔索伊”演习开始于1994年,开始主要是计算机模拟指挥所和小规模实兵演习为主,但从2001年开始,本来是配角的实兵演习变成主角,参与人数从原先的数千人,增加到2001年的1万人,再增加到2002年的70万人。参见李京进,马晓莉:“美韩军演大起底”,《环球军事》,2002年第7期,第16-17页。
88 李敏全,刘忠杰:“耐人寻味的美韩‘阿尔索伊'军事演习”,《现代军事》,2004年6月,第28-30页。
89 李京进,马晓莉:“美韩军演大起底”,《环球军事》,2002年第7期,第16页。
90 陈列兢,“破译50年来最大规模的美韩联合军事演习”,《国际展望》,2002年4月,总第441期,第17页。
91 江山:“俄罗斯以军事演习还击北约东扩”,《现代军事》,2004年6月,第25页。
92 上引文,第27页。
93 洪建军:“北约东扩的影响”,《现代国际关系》,2004年第4期,第37-38页。
94 王占清、钱洪亭:“俄战略轰炸机重新抵近北约大门”,《环球军事》,2007年第9期,第12-13页。
95 徐万胜:“论日美同盟与中日关系”,《国际问题研究》,2006年第4期,第52页。
96 杨伯江:“强化日美同盟:日本面向21世纪的战略起跳板?”,《现代国际关系》,1999年第6期,第27页。
97[德]杜浩著:《冷战后中日安全关系》,中译本,世界知识出版社,2004年版,第171页。
98 徐万胜:“论日美同盟与中日关系”,《国际问题研究》,2006年第4期,第52页。
99 Jane M.O.Sharp,"After Reykjavik:Arms Control and the Allies," International Affairs,Vol.63,No.2,Spring 1987,pp.241-242.
100 安·安·葛罗米柯主编:《苏联对外政策史》(下),人民大学出版社,1989年版,第639页。
101 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第215-231页。
102 Jane M.O.Sharp,"After Reykjavik:Arms Control and the Allies," International Affairs,Vol.63,No.2,Spring 1987,pp.245-246.
103 Ibid.,19.246.
104 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第226页。
105 上引书,第255页。
106 Jane M.O.Sharp,"After Reykjavik:Arms Control and the Allies," International Affairs,Vol.63,No.2,Spring 1987,p.247.
107 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第296页。
108 许海云:“北约扩张的历史与现实分析”,《中国人民大学学报》,2007年第3期,第107页。
109 罗志刚:“浅析中东欧国家加入北约对俄罗斯的影响”,《国际观察》,2007年第2期,第10页。
110 许海云:“北约扩张的历史与现实分析”,《中国人民大学学报》,2007年第3期,第107页。
111 刘华兰:“新世纪俄罗斯与北约关系发展研究”,湘潭大学硕士论文,2005年5月,第8页。
112 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第371页。
113 刘华兰:“新世纪俄罗斯与北约关系发展研究”,湘潭大学硕士论文,2005年5月,第10页。
114 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第371页。。
115 畅征:“‘北约'东扩与美俄关系”,《领导科学》,2007年第16期,第51页。
116 李兴:“北约欧美双东扩:俄罗斯不同对策及其原因分析”,《俄罗斯中亚东欧研究》,2005年第2期,第59-60页。
117 畅征:“‘北约'东扩与美俄关系”,《领导科学》,2007年第16期,第51页。
118 上引文,第51页。
119 “紧绷的北约与俄罗斯关系”,2007年12月10日,新华网,http://zjc.zjol.com.cn/05zjc/system/2007/12/10/009039023.shtml
120 ”这些指标的提出受到格伦·施奈德的同盟困境分析的启发。格伦·施奈德提出,影响同盟困境中结盟方行为的因素包括:对盟友的相对依赖性、盟国的战略价值、联盟盟约的清晰度、结盟方的利益相互分享的程度、结盟方最近的行为记录五个因素。本研究在选取同盟稳定状态的影响因素和衡量指标时,对施奈德的分析进行了批判性的吸收。See Glenn H.Snyder,“The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,''World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,pp.471-475.
121 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,p.473.
122 Robert Keohane,"Alliance,Threats and the Use of Neorealism," International Security,Summer 1988,Vol.13,No.1,pp.174-175.
123 肯尼思·沃尔兹和斯蒂芬·沃尔特坚持认为这一点。See Kenneth N.Waltz,“Structural Realism after the Cold War,”International Security,Summer 2000,Vol.25,No.1,pp.5-41;Stephen M.Malt,“Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,”Survival,Spring 1997,Vol.39,No.1,pp.166-167.
124 朝鲜战争的过程可以充分说明这一点。
125 二战结束初期,美国政府内部对朝鲜半岛的价值产生严重分歧,美国国务院认为,支持一个非共产主义的政权是有意义的。而美国军方则认为,韩国在未来远东对抗中微不足道,而且是一个军事包袱。到1950年美国国务卿艾奇逊发表“西太平洋环形防线”时,朝鲜半岛被排除在美国划定的防线之外。这条防线从阿留申群岛开始到日本列岛,然后通过琉球群岛延至菲律宾。
126 Steven Hugh Lee,The Origins of the Cold War in Asia,Columbia:Columbia University Press,1995,p.281.
127 汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略-以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,复旦大学博士论文,2005年4月,第137页。
128 该条约第三条规定,“每一方都承认:在太平洋地区对缔约国任何一方的武装进攻,无论是对目前在各该方管辖下的领土的进攻,或是对以后经缔约国一方承认合法地置于另一方管辖下的领土的直攻,都是危及它自己的和平与安全,并宣布,它将按照它的宪法程序采取行动以对付共同的危险。”上引书,第206页。
129 上引书,第138页。这一事例发生在1968年,应该属于上一阶段。但是这一事例所表现出现的特征是属于这一阶段的。因此,本研究在分析时把它放在这里讨论。
130 这两个事件的发生时间都是1978年底,而且反映的特征与1979-1991年这一时间段的特征非常一致,因此,本文将这两个事件都归于这一时间段讨论。
131 "U.S.Said to Seek Regional Role for Forces in Korea," JoongAng Daily,October 10,2003,available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200310/10/200310100004305439900090209021.html.
132 Sook-Jong Lee,"Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol..ⅩⅦ,No.1,Spring 2005,pp.86-89.
133 陈乐民:《战后英国外交史》,世界知识出版社,1994年版,第141页。
134 张颖:“‘闪电'导弹危机与美英核‘特殊关系'”,《世界历史》,2007年第2期,第125-128页。
135 冯梁:《英美特殊关系:文化基础与历史演变》,《欧洲》,2002年第4期,第83页。
136 赵怀普:“从‘特殊关系'走向‘正常关系'--战后美欧关系纵论”,《国际论坛》,2006年第2期,第45页。
137 1967年底,英国被迫做出从苏伊士运河以东撤离的决定,这表明“英国在这个关键地区的影响几乎消失了”。参见巴蒂斯特·迪罗塞尔:《外交史1919-1978》(下册),上海译文出版,1982年版,第211页。
138 冯梁:“英美特殊关系:文化基础与历史演变”,《欧洲》,2002年第4期,第85页。
139 罗会钧:“冷战后的英美‘特殊关系'”,《外交学院学报》,2003年第2期,第37页。
140 彭俊:“里根政府与英阿马岛战争”,《贵州师范大学学报》(社会科学版),2004年第4期,第27页。
141 赵怀普:“美英特殊关系与国际秩序”,《美国研究》,2004年第4期,第75页。
142 周锡生:“克林顿修补美欧关系”,《嘹望新闻周刊》,1995年第51期,第40页。
143 转引自罗会钧:“冷战后的英美‘特殊关系'”,《外交学院学报》,2003年第2期,第37页。
144 崔洪建:“从反恐合作看英美特殊关系”,《国际问题研究》,2003年第1期,第36-40页。
145 罗会钧:“冷战后的英美‘特殊关系'”,《外交学院学报》,2003年第2期,第37页。
146 一位法国学者写到,“戴高乐的法国国际利益观和他的对外政策议程在其卸任后许多年 里继续决定着法国政府的优先考虑。……这意味着直到20世纪80年代中期,法国的对外政策议程一直为需要维持与联邦德国的特殊关系、发挥全球作用和保持对美独立的愿望所主导。”转引自刘得手:“法美分歧原因的历史考察”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第6期,第24—25页。
147 杨小梅:“戴高乐抗美独立的外交实践”,《沈阳教育学院学报》,2001年12月,第30页。
148 布赖恩·克罗泽:《戴高乐传(下)》,中译本,商务印书馆,1978年版,第690页。
149 1991年前南危机爆发后,英法在危机处理中无所作为。而只有美国率领北约介入,才逆转了升级中的波斯尼亚冲突,在1995年达成代顿协议。刘得手:“法美分歧原因的历史考察”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第6期,第26-27页。
150 周国栋:“法国重返北约有期”,《国际展望》,1996年13期,第5-6页。
151 苏惠民:“美英VS法德:西方联盟分裂?”,《世界知识》,2003年第6期,第29页。
152 刘得手:“法美分歧原因的历史考察”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第6期,第29页。
153 刘馗:“联邦德国阿登纳时期对美政策述评”,《湖北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2007年第4期,第90页。
154 周红:“‘两极格局'时期的德美关系”,《理论学习》,2006年第9期,第50页。
155 上引文,第50页。
156 朱忠武:《联邦德国总理科尔》,四川人民出版社,1997年版,第310页。
157 杨洁勉等:《国际恐怖主义与当代国际关系》,贵州人民出版社,2002年,第286页。
158 徐万胜:“论日美同盟的转变:从‘冷战后'到‘9·11后'”,《国际论坛》,2005年第6期,第7页。
159 汪伟民:“持久的不均衡:战后美日、美韩联盟比较研究”,《史学集刊》,2006年第5期,第52页。
160 徐万胜:“论日美同盟的转变:从‘冷战后'到‘9·11后'”,《国际论坛》,2005年第6期,第7页。
161 刘星:“试论日美同盟的生命力”,《世界经济与政治》,2007年第6期,第40页。
162 徐万胜:“论日美同盟的转变:从‘冷战后'到‘9·11后'”,《国际论坛》,2005年第6期,第8页。
163 刘星:“试论日美同盟的生命力”,《世界经济与政治》,2007年第6期,第41页。
1 Yoo Young Ock,"Pyongyang's Efforts to Improve Relations with Washington and Tokyo and Seoul's Position,"(韩)民族统一院:《关于朝鲜半岛统一问题的资料汇编》(英文版),1995年10月31日。转引自汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略--以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年版,第236页。
2 我国青年学者孙德刚在研究中使用“准联盟”这一词来指称“非正式同盟”。本文不太赞同这一提法。因为“准”的含义是“准备,或者下一步将如何”,所以“准联盟”从字面来理解则是下一步将会成为正式同盟,但现在还不是。但他分析时提到的很多“准联盟”,如上世纪60年代的埃及和印度与苏联的“准联盟”,战后以色列与美国的“准联盟”,上世纪七八十年代中国同美国的“准联盟”,这些后来都没有发展为正式同盟。所以,本文认为,更加准确的提法应该是“非正式同盟”。参见孙德刚:“准联盟:中国的战略选择”,《社会观察》,2006年第7期,第28-29页。
3 一些观察家将上合组织看成北约的制衡力量,把上合组织的联合军演看成军事同盟的前奏。但我国官方和主流学界都公开不谈这一点。参见洪源:“上合组织军演并非军事同盟前奏”,《国际展望》,2007年第16期,第10-11页。
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美国军控与裁军署(Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)http://www.acda.gov/
美国国防情报局(Defense Intelligence Agency)http://www.dia.mil/
美国国家安全局(National Security Agency)http://www.nsa.gov:8080/
美国国家安全委员会(National Security Council)http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html
美国核管理委员会(Nuclear Regulatory Commission) http://www.nrc.gov/
美国国务院军品管制局(Office of Defense Trade Controls,DTC)http://www.pmdtc.org/
驻韩美军司令部(US Forces Korea)http://www.korea.army.mil/
韩国外交通商部(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade)http://www.mofat.go.kr/mofat/index.iso
韩国统一部(Ministry of Unification)http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp
韩国工业贸易与能源部(Ministry of Commerce,Industry,and Energy)http://www.mocie.go.kr/index2.html
韩国科技部(Ministry of Science and Technology)http://www.most.go.kr/
韩国防务安全司令部(Defense Security Command)http://www.dsc.or.kr/
韩国国防部防务发展局(Agency for Defense Development)http://addwww.kreonet.re.kr/
韩国防务分析研究院(Korea Institute for Defense Analysis)http://www.kida.re.kr/english2005/
韩国原子能研究所(Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute)http://www.kaeri.re.kr/engnew/
韩国外交安保研究院(Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security,IFANS)http://www.ifans.go.kr/ie/index.jsp
韩国国家统一研究院(Korea Institute for National Unification,KINU)http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/
韩国电力公司(Korea Electric Power Corp.,KEPCO)http://www.kepco.co.kr/eng/
国际原子能机构:朝鲜专题(International Atomic Energy Agency:In Focus:IAEA and DPRK)http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/
朝鲜半岛能源开发机构(Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization,KEDO)http://www.kedo.org/
韩国联合通讯社(Yonhap News Agency)中英韩日四种语言http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/
《朝鲜日报》(Chosun Ilbo)中英韩日四种语言http://www.chosun.com/
《中央日报》(JongAng Daily)韩文和英文 http://www.joins.com/
《东亚日报》(Dong-A ILbo)中英韩日四种语言http://www.donga.com/
韩国国家广播公司(Korean Broadcasting Service)韩英文http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/
《韩国日报》(Hankook Ilbo)韩文http://www.hankooki.com/
《韩国时报》(Korea Times)英文http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/index.asp
《韩国先驱报》(Korea Herald)英文http://koreaherald.co.kr/
京乡新闻(Kyung Hyang Daily News)韩文http://www.khan.co.kr/
The People's Korea,(英文版)http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/
Korean Central New Agency of DPRK KCNA,(英文版)http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm
联合国新闻中心:朝鲜(UN News Centre:Democratic People's Republic of Korea)http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=69&Body=Korea&Body1=d emocratic
英国广播公司:朝鲜(BBC News Country Profile:North Korea)http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_rofiles/1131421.stm
美国有线新闻电视网:朝鲜核危机(CNN Special Report:North Korea Nuclear Tension)http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/nkorea/
世界新闻回顾:朝鲜核武器(World Press Review:North Korea Nuclear Weapons )http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/904.cfm
雅虎新闻:朝鲜(Yahoo! News Full Coverage:North Korea)http://story.news.yahoo.corn/fc?cid=34&tmpl=fc&in=World&cat=North_Korea
美国民意调查机构皮尤研究中心:国际公众对朝鲜的关注(Pew Research Center:International Public Concern About North Korea)http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=67
美国公共电视网前线栏目:金的核赌博(PBS Frontline:Kim's Nuclear Gamble)http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/
美国公共电视网的在线新闻一小时:朝鲜核危机(PBS Online NewsHour:North Korea:Nuclear Standoff)http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/northkorea/
英国《卫报》:朝鲜和韩国(Guardian Unlimited Special Report:North and South Korea)http://www.guardian.co.uk/korea/0,2759,331519,00.html
美国军控协会:朝鲜(Arms Control Association:Country Resources)http://www.armscontrol.org/country/northkorea/
美国防务信息中心:朝鲜核武器(Center for Defense Information:Fact Sheet:North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program)http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/nk-fact-sheet.cfm
美国蒙特雷国际问题研究不扩散研究中心:朝鲜特辑(Center for Nonproliferation Studies:North Korea Special Collection)http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/
美国科学家联盟:朝鲜特殊武器(Federation of American Scientists:North Korea Special Weapons Guide)http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/index.html
美国科学联盟:韩国特殊武器(Federation of American Scientists:South Korea Special Weapons)http://www.fas.org/news/skorea/index.html
斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所:韩国概况(SIPRI:South Korea Country Profile)http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/cnsc3kos.html
卡耐基国际和平基金会:朝鲜(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:North Korea)http://www.camegieendowment.org/npp/index.cfm?fa=view&nppID=1000090
美国鹦鹉螺研究所:朝鲜概况(The Nautilus Institute:DPRK Briefing Book)http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/aboutDPRK/index.html
美国布鲁金斯学会:朝鲜半岛(The Brookings Institution:Korea)http://www.brook.edu/fp/research/projects/korea/korea.htm
全球安全组织:朝鲜危机(GlobalSeeurity.org:Korea Crisis)http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-crisis.htm
全球安全组织:韩国特殊武器(GlobalSecurity.org:South Korea Special Weapons)http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rok/index.html
美国科学与国际安全研究所:朝鲜(Institute for Science and International Security:North Korea)http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/index.html
美国乔治·华盛顿大学的国家安全档案:朝鲜与核武器(National Security Archive:North Korea and Nuclear Weapons:The Declassified U.S.Record)http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/
美国核威胁倡议组织:韩国概览(Nuclear Threat Initiative:South Korea Profile)http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3046.html
美国核威胁倡议组织:朝鲜概况(Nuclear Threat Initiative:Nouth Korea Profile)http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/index.html
Koreascope,(韩国对朝鲜生活的描述和透视)英文http://www.koreascope.com/
North Korea Zone(关于朝鲜信息的交流和讨论网页)英文http://www.nkzone.org/nkzone/
2 上引书,第10页。
3 在朝鲜战争中美国的几次核恐吓和核外交,美国学者已经根据解密材料进行了详细和充分的分析。See Roger Dingman,"Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,"International Security,Vol.13,No.3,Winter 1988/1989,pp.50-91;Edward Friedman,"Nuclear Blackmail and the End of the Korean War,"Modern China,Vol.1,No.1,Jan.,1975,pp.75-91;Rosemary J.Foot,"Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,"International Security,Vol.13,No.3,Winter 1988-1989,pp.92-112;Roger M.Anders,"The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War:Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control,"Military Affairs,Vol.52,No.1,January 1988,pp.1-6.
4 Natural Resources Defense Council,Nuclear Program,available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/default.asp
5 The Federation of American Scientists,The Nuclear Information Project,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/
6 The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/index.html
7 The Brookings Institution,Foreign Policy Studies,The U.S.Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project,available at http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/weapons.htm
8 美国乔治·华盛顿大学的国家安全档案项目在2000年赢得美国乔治·伯克(George Polk)新闻奖,被誉为“世界上最大的关于解密文件的非政府图书馆”(《洛杉矶时报》,2001年1月16日)。The National Security Archive,Nuclear History,available at http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nuchis.html
9 Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,and Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅰ:U.S.Nuclear Forces and Capabilities,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Publishing Company,1984;Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Robert S.Norris,and Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅱ:U.S.Nuclear Warhead Production,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Publishing Company,1987;Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Milton M.Hoenig,and Robert S.Norris,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅲ:U.S.Nuclear Warhead Facility Profiles,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Press,1987;Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Robert S.Norris,and Jeffrey I.Sands,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅳ:Soviet Nuclear Weapons,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Press,1989;Robert S.Norris,Andrew Burrows,Richard Fieldhouse,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Vol.5,British,French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons,Ballinger,1994.
10 NRDC,Thomas B.Cochran,available at http://www.nrdc.org/reference/profiles/prococh.asp
11 威廉·阿金,目前是《华盛顿邮报》的网络专栏作家,同时也是哈佛大学卡尔人权政策中心的研究人员。1985年到2002年,他负责《原子核科学家公报》的“定论栏目”(Last Word),也是NRDC核笔记本栏目的主笔之一,他还曾参与1984-2002年的《SIPRI年鉴》中“核武器”部分的编写工作。同时,他还是《核武器手册》主要作者之一和1985年《核战场》(Nuclear Battlefields)一书的合著者之一。Wikipedia,William Arkin,available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Arkin
12 罗伯特·诺里斯,美国自然资源保护委员会(NRDC)的核项目的高级研究人员。他为《原子核科学家公报》中的NRDC核笔记本栏目贡献了100多篇文章。他也是《核武器手册》的作者之一。NRDC,Bibliography of Works by Robert S.Norris,available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/norris/norrispubs.asp
13 汉斯·克里斯汀生,美国科学家联盟的核信息项目的负责人。在1998-2002年,他负责鹦鹉螺研究所的核战略项目,2002-2005年,他成为自然保护委员会的核项目顾问。Federation of American Scientist,Hans M.Kristensen,available at http://www.fas.org/static/staffbios.jsp
14 William M.Arkin and Richard W.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefields:Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,MA:Ballinger,1985.
15 斯蒂芬·舒瓦兹,著名的《不扩散评论》(The Nonproliferation Review)的编辑。曾为《原子核科学家公报》的执行主任,并曾任布鲁斯金学会的外交政策研究项目的项目主任。CNS Staff:Stephen I.Schwartz,available at http://cns.miis.edu/cns/staff/sschwartz.htm
16 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998.
17 威廉·布尔,乔治·华盛顿大学的国家安全档案项目的高级分析员,负责国家安全档案的核历史部分。The National Security Archive,Dr.William Burr,available at http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/nsa/arc_staff.html
18 该中心是美国在防扩散领域研究的最大非政府组织之一。该中心在2007年更名为詹姆士·马丁不扩散研究中心。该中心出版著名的《不扩散评论》(The Nonproliferation Review)杂志。The Center for Nonproliferation Studies,available at http://cns.miis.edu/
19 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,nonproliferation,available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/
20 该中心由之前的国际安全与军备控制中心(Center for International Security and Arms Control,CISAC)更名而来。The Center for International Security and Cooperation,available at http://cisac.stanford.edu/
21 美国军控协会是美国的政府研究机构。出版著名的《今日军控》(Arms Control Today,ACT)刊物。Arms Control Association,available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
22 The Institute for Science and International Security,available at http://www.isis-online.org/
23 该中心主办有著名的《华盛顿季刊》(Washington Quarterly)。Center for Strategic&International Studies,International Security Program Proiect on Nuclear Issues,available at http://www.csis.org/
24 Henry L.Stimson Centre,The Cooperative Nonproliferation Program,available at http://www.stimson.org/cnp/programhome.cfm
25 该中心出版刊物《防务监控》(The Defense Monitor)。World Security Institute,The Center for Defense Information.available at http://www.cdi.org/about/index.cfm
26 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,The Nonproliferation,Homeland and International Security,available at http://www.llnl.gov/llnl/organization/nai.jsp
27 Sandia National Labortary,Nonproliferation program,available at http://www.sandia.gov/mission/nonprolif/index.html
28 斯科特·赛根,斯坦福大学政治学教授,国际安全与军备控制中心(CISAC)的共同主任。其他主要著作包括Moving Targets:Nuclear Strategy and National Security(Princeton University Press,1989);The Limits of Safety:Organizations,Accidents,and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press,1993)。CISAC,Scott D.Sagan,available at http://cisac.stanford.edu/people/2223/
29 Scott D.Sagan,and Kenneth N.Waltz,The Spread of Nuclear Weapons:A Debate Renewed,W.W.Norton,2002.
30 乔治·奎斯特,马里兰大学的政府和政治系主任,在核军控和核不扩散方面著述颇丰,其他著作包括Nuclear Diplomacy:The First Twenty-five Years(New York:Dunellen,1970);Nuclear Monopoly(New Brunswick,New Jersey:Transaction Books:2000).The Source for Strategic and Security Research,George H.Quester,available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?q=372
31 George H.Quester,The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press,1973;George H.Quester,The Future of Nuclear Deterrence,Lexington,Mass.:D.C.Heath,1986.
32 理查德·贝茨,哥伦比亚大学教授,曾为布鲁金斯学会高级研究人员。Columbia University ISERP,Richard Betts,available at http://www.iserp.columbia.edu/people/betts.html
33 Richard Betts,Nuclear Blackmail andNuclear Balance,Washington:The Brookings Institution,1987.
34 刘易斯·邓恩(Lewis Dunn),美国智库科学应用国际公司副总裁(Science Applications International Corporation,SAIC),曾任美国军控与裁军署助理署长,在武器扩散、国家安全和军控政策方面有很多著述。Council on Foreign Relations,Lewis Dunn,available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/2771/after_the_tests.html
35 Lewis Dunn,Controlling the Bomb." Nonproliferation in the 1980s,New Haven:Yale University Press,1982.
36 格雷厄姆·艾利森,哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的贝尔弗科学与国际事务中心主任,曾任里根时期的国防部长特别顾问和克林顿时期负责政策和计划的助理国防部长。另著有Nuclear Terrorism:The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe(Times Books,2004).Wikipedia,Graham T.Allison,available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_T._Allison
37 Graham Allison,Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy:Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material,Cambridge,Mass.:The MIT Press,1996.
38 兰德尔·卡罗琳·福斯博格,美国智库防务与裁军研究所(the Institute for Defense&Disarmament Studies,IDDS) 执行所攻。 Cambridge Forum Speakers 1970-1990,Randall Forsberg,available at http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/cfs/randall_caroline_forsberg.php
39 Randall Caroline Forsberg,Nonproliferation Primer:Preventing the Spread of Nuclear,Chemical and Biological Weapons,Cambridge,Mass.:The MIT Press,1995.
40 戴维·奥尔布莱特(David Albright),科学与国际安全研究所(ISIS)的创立者和主席,物理学家。从上世纪80年代开始评估世界范围内的钚和高浓缩铀的存量,以详细和科学的裂变材料的技术分析闻名。ISIS,Biography of David Albright,available at http://www.isis-online.org/about/staff/dalbright.html
41 David Albright,Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996:World Inventories,Capabilities and Policies,Sweden:SIPRI,1997
42 里昂那德·斯拜克特(Leonard S.Spector),蒙特雷国际问题研究所的不扩散研究中心副主任。他曾任美国能源部国家核安全局(National Nuclear Security Administration)负责军控和不扩散的助理副局长(Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation),也曾任卡耐基国际和平基金会的核不扩散项目的主任。其他著作为Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1995:A Guide in Maps and Charts(with Mark McDonough and Evan Medeiros,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,1995);The Undeclared Bomb:The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,1987-1988(Harper Business,1990).See CNS Staff:Leonard S.Spector,available at http://cns.miis.edu/cns/staff/lspect.htm
43 Leonard S.Spector and Jacqueline Smith,Nuclear Ambitions:The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,1989-1990,Boulder(CO):Westview,1990.
44 米切尔·赖斯(Mitchell Reiss),威廉-玛丽学院副院长,曾任美国国务院政策计划办公室主任(2003-2005)。Wikipedia,Mitchell Reiss,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitchell_Reiss
45 Mitchell Reiss,Bridled Ambition:Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, Washington,D.C.:Woodrow Wilson Center Press,1995.
46 IISS,Proliferation and Nonproliferation,available at http://www.iiss.org/programmes/proliferation-and-non-proliferation
47 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,Non-proliferation and Export Control Project,available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/
48 该中心出版有刊物《裁军外交》(Disarmament Diplomacy )。The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy,available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/
49 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004.
50 五卷本中前两卷被翻译为中文。托马斯·B·科克伦等著,柯情山等译,《核武器手册(第一卷):美国的核力量和能力》,解放军出版社,1985年版;托马斯·B·科克伦等著,王连奎等译,《核武器手册(第二卷):美国的核弹头生产》,国防工业出版社,1990年版。
51 约翰·纽豪斯:《核时代的战争与和平》,军事科学出版社,1989年版。
52 麦乔治·邦迪著,褚广友等译:《美国核战略》,世界知识出版社,1991年版。
53 劳伦斯·弗里德曼:《核战略的演变》,黄钟青译,中国社会科学出版社,1990年版。
54 徐光裕著:《核战略纵横》,国防大学出版社,1987年版。
55 祁学远:《世界有核国家的核力量与核政策》,军事科学出版社,1991年版。
56 王仲春等编译:《美国五角大楼核作战计划揭密》,山西人民出版社,1992年版。
57 王仲春,夏立平:《美国核力量与核战略》,国防大学出版社,1995年版。
58 陈崇北等著:《威慑战略》,军事科学出版社,1989年版。
59 美国军备控制协会著:《军备控制概论》,中国军事科学院外国军事研究部译,军事科学出版社,1993年版。
60 王羊:《美苏军备竞赛与控制研究》,军事科学院出版社,1993年版。
61 朱明权:《核扩散:危险与防止》,上海科学技术文献出版社,1995年版。
62 潘振强主编:《国际裁军与军备控制》,国防大学出版社,1996年版。
63 杜祥琬:《核军备控制的科学技术基础》,国防工业出版社,1996年版。
64 朱锋:《弹道导弹防御计划与国际安全》,上海人民出版社,2001年版。
65 吴莼思:《威慑理论与导弹防御》,长征出版社,2001年版。
66 朱强国:《美国战略导弹防御计划的动因》,世界知识出版社,2004年版。
67 夏立平:《亚太地区军备控制与安全》,上海人民出版社,2002年版。
68 朱明权、吴莼思、苏长和:《威慑与稳定--中美核关系》,时事出版社.,2005年版。
69 吴大辉:《防范与合作--苏联解体后的俄美核安全关系(1991-2005)》,人民出版社,2005年版。
70 The Center for Nonproliferation Studies,The East Asia Nonproliferation Program,available at http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/index.htm
71 The Nautilus Institute,The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network,available at http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html
72 The International Institute For Strategic Studies,Korean Security Project,available at http://www.iiss.org/programmes/north-east-asia/korean-security-project
73 Harvard University,Korea Institute,available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/～korea/
74 University of California,Berkeley,Center for Korean Studies,available at http://ieas.berkeley.edu/cks/
75 Comubia University,The Center for Korean Research,available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ckr/
76 University of California,Los Angeles,Center for Korean Studies,available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/korea/
77 University of Hawaii,The Center for Korean Studies,available at http://www.hawaii.edu/korea/
78 Cornell University Department of Asian Studies,available at http://lrc.cornell.edu/asian
79 Georgetown University,Asian Studies Program,available at http://asianstudies.georgetown.edu/
80 The George Washington University,The Sigur Center for Asian Studies,available at http://www.gwu.edu/～sigur/
81 University of Oxford,Faculty of Oriental Studies,Korean Studies,available at http://www.orinst.ox.ac.uk/ea/korean/
82 The University of British Columbia,The Centre for Korean Research,available at http://www.iar.ubc.ca/centres/ckr/
83 赛利格·哈里森,伍德罗·威尔逊国际学者中心(the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars)高级研究员。1972年,他代表《华盛顿邮报》和另一名《纽约时报》记者访问朝鲜,并会见金日成,是朝鲜战争后首次访问朝鲜的美国人。1989年,哈里森主持卡耐基基金会资助的国际会议,首次使朝鲜的新闻发言人和美国官员同场讨论。1992年,哈里森组团访问朝鲜,首次基本证实朝鲜后处理钚的事实。See Institute for Corean-American Studies,Selig S.Harrision,available at http://www.icasinc.org/bios/harrison.html
84 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002.
85 约瑟夫·贝鲁兹,《简式情报评论》(Jane's Intelligence Review)顾问,最著名的朝鲜防务和情报问题专家。在朝鲜问题上的专著还有:North Korean Special Forces(Jane's Information Group,1988);Terrorism:The North Korean Connection(Taylor&Francis,1990)。See Amacon,Joseph Bermudez,available at http://www.coasttocoastam.com/guests/631.html
86 Joseph S.Bermudez Jr.,The Armed Forces of North Korea,New York:I.B.Tauris Publishers,2001.
87 唐·奥博多佛,霍普金斯大学尼采国际问题高等研究院(Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,SAIS)教授,著名记者。38年记者生涯,其中25年在《华盛顿邮报》。Wikipedia,Don Oberdorfer,available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Don_Oberdorfer
85 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997.
89 布鲁斯·卡明斯,芝加哥大学历史系教授,当代朝鲜半岛史专家。在朝鲜半岛问题上的其它著作为The Origins of The Korean War(Princeton University Press,1981);Parallax Visions:Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations(Duke University Press,1999)。See The UniversitV of Chicage,Department of History,available at http://history.uchicago.edu/faculty/cumings.html
90 Bruce Cumings,Korea's Place in the Sun:A Modern History,New York:W.W.Norton,1997:Bruce Cumings.North Korea:Another Country,New York:W.W.Norton,2003.
91 利昂·西格尔,纽约社会科学研究委员会的东北亚合作安全项目主任,1979-1981年曾为美国国务院政治军事办公室主任特别助理,1989-2005年为《纽约时报》编委会成员。See Center for American Progress,Leon V.Sigal,available at http://www.americanprogress.org/aboutus/scholars/SigalLeon.html
92 Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea,NJ:Princeton University Press.1998.
93 彼得·海斯,鹦鹉螺安全和可持续发展研究所(the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development)的执行主任。另著有American Lake:Nuclear Peril in the Pacific (Co-author with Lyubza Zarsky,Penguin,1987)。The Nautilus Institute,Peter Hayes,available at http://www.nautilus.org/admin/staff/peter.html
94 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lexington:Lexington Books,1991.
95 安德鲁·麦克,英国哥伦比亚大学人类安全中心(the Human Security Center)主任。See Liu Institute for Global Issues,Andrew Mack,available at http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/about/index.cfm?fuseaction=bio&peopleID= 10
96 Andrew Mack,ed.,Asian Flashpoint:Security and the Korean Peninsula,Canberra:Allen &Unwin,1993.
97 尼古拉斯·艾伯斯塔特,美国企业研究所(the American Enterprise Institute)新美国世纪项目(the Project for the New American Century)研究员。在朝鲜半岛问题上的专著还有Korea Approaches Reunification(M.E.Sharpe,1995).Rightweb,Nicholas Eberstadt,available at http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1141
98 Nicholas Eberstadt,The End of North Korea,Washington:American Enterprise Institute Press,1999.
99 塞缪尔·金,美国哥伦比亚大学怀泽海东亚研究所(Weatherhead East Asian Institute)高级研究员,曾任哥伦比亚韩国研究中心副主任(1995-2006)。他在朝鲜半岛问题上的编著包括:North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era(ed.,Oxford University Press,1998);Korea's Globalization(ed.,Cambridge University Press,2000);North Korea and Northeast Asia(ed.,Rowman & Littlefield,2002);Korea's Democratization(ed.,Cambridge University Press,2003 ).Weatherhead East Asian Institute,Professor Samuel S.Kim,available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/weai/scholars/kim.html
100 Samuel S.Kim,The Two Koreas and the Great Powers,New York:Cambridge University Press,2006.
101 徐大肃,美国夏威夷大学政治学教授和韩国研究所所长。Columbia University Press,Dae-Sook Suh,available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cup/catalog/data/978023106/9780231065733.HTM
102 Dae-Sook Suh,Kim Il-Sung:North Korean Leader,New York:Columbia University Press,1995.
103 爱德华·奥尔森,美国海军研究生学院教授,亚洲事务专家。在朝鲜半岛问题上的著作有:Korea,The Divided Nation(Praeger Security International,2005) 。 Naval Postgraduate School,Edward A.Olsen,available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/people/olsen.asp
104 Edward A.Olsen,Toward Normalizing U.S.--Korea Relations:In Due Course? Boulder,CO:L.Rienner Publishers,2002.
105 斯科特·施奈德,美国亚洲基金会的高级研究员,朝韩外交政策以及美国朝鲜半岛政策问题专家。The Asia Foundation,Scott Snyder,available at http://www.asiafoundation.org/Guide/snyder.html
106 Scott Snyder,Negotiating on the Edge:North Korean Negotiating Behavior,Washington:United States Institute of Peace Press,1999.
107 道格拉斯·潘道,美国智库Cato研究所高级研究人员。他曾担任里根的特别助理和里根在1980总统选举时的高级政策分析师。CATO Institute,Doug Bandow,available at http://www.cato.org/people/bandow.html
108 Douglas Bandow,Tripwire:Korea and U.S.Foreign Policy in a Changed World,Washington,D.C.:The Cato Institute,1996.
109 维克多·车,乔治敦大学副教授,曾在小布什政府的国家安全委员会中担任亚洲事务顾问,主要著作为 Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford University Press,1999).Georgetown University,Victor D.Cha,available at http://www8.georgetown.edu/departments/government/faeulty/chav/
110 戴维·姜,达特茅斯学院(Dartmouth College)副教授,朝鲜半岛问题专家。
111 Victor D.Cha,and David C.Kang,Nuclear North Korea:A Debate on Engagement Strategies, New York:Columbia University Press,2003.
112 米切尔·梅扎,美国国家战争学院(The U.S.National War College)教授,曾为战略和国际研究中心(the Center for Strategic and International Studies,CSIS)的新千年项目主任(the New Miilennium Project)和华盛顿季刊(the Washington Quarterly)的编辑。
113 Michael J.Mazarr,North Korea and the Bomb:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,New York,NY:St.Martin's Press,1995.
114 Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security,available at http://www.ifans.go.kr/ie/index.jsp
115 Korea Institute for National Unification,available at http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/
116 Korea National Defense University,Research Institute on National Security Affairs,available at http://www.kndu.ac.kr/eng/
117 Korea Institute for Defense Analysis,available at http://www.kida.re.kr/english2005/
118 The Sejong Institute,available at http://www.sejong.org/
119 Kyungnam University,The Institute for Far Eastern Studies,available at http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/
120 Yonsei University,The Institute for Korean Unification Studies,available at http://suny.yonsei.ac.kr/～ikus/main_eng.html
121 Korea University,The Ilmin International Relations Institute,available at http://www.korea.ac.kr/～ilmin/
122 Keimyung University,the International Research Institute for Korean Studies,available at http://eng.actakoreana.org/
123 East Asia Institute,available at http://www.eai.or.kr/english/
124 河英善,韩国首尔国立大学教授。
125 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983.
126 韩昇洲,现任韩国总理,韩国高丽大学国际关系研究所前所长。他曾担任韩国外交部长(1993-1994)。在担任韩国外交部长期间,他协调协调美韩对朝政策的努力受到广泛赞誉。他另著有Changing values in Asia:their impact on governance and development(Tokyo:Japan Center for International Exchange,1999)。Korea Unniverstiy,HAN Sung-Joo,available at http://www.korea.ac.kr/～ilmin/staff-bio-hsj.htm
127 Han Sung-Joo and Gerald Curtis,ed.,The U.S.-South Korean Alliance:Evolving Patterns in Security Relations,Lexington,MA:Heath,1983.
128 文正仁,现为韩国外交通商部国际安全事务大使,韩国延世大学(Yonsei University)政治学教授。Pacific Council,Dr.Chung-In Moon,available at http://www.pacificcouncil.org/interior.aspx?pageID=About&subID=31&itemID=10518
129 Chung-In Moon,ed.,Arms control on the Korean Peninsula,Yonsei University Press Seoul,1996.
130 千祥勋,韩国统一研究院高级研究人员。另著有U.S.National Missile Defense and South Korea's National Security(Seoul:KINU,2001);Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean Peninsula:A Comprehensive Approach(Albuquerque,NM:Cooperative Monitoring Center,SNL,1999)。See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Seongwhun Cheon,available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1290
131 Cheon Seongwhun,Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea,Korea Institute for National Unification,2006;Cheon Seongwhun,Non-Nuclear Policy of the Unified Korea:Looking Beyond and Being in the Process of Unification,Seoul:Korea Institute for National Unification,2002.
132 Kim Jung-Ik,The Future of the US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship,ST.Martin's Press,1996.
133 于美华:“‘朝鲜核问题'的来龙去脉”,《国际资料信息》,1994年第5期,第6-9页。
134 程玉洁:“朝鲜核问题的来龙去脉”,《现代国际关系》,1994年第9期,第43-47页。
135 于美华:“朝鲜半岛形势及中国政策分析”,《现代国际关系》,1996年第10期,第34-38页。
136 韩镇涉:“关于东北亚未来安全问题的几点看法”,《当代亚太》,1995年第5期,第49-54页。
137 虞少华:“朝鲜半岛形势的发展与前景”,《国际问题研究》,1997年第4期,第11-18页。
138 朴键一:“朝鲜核问题及其未来走向”,《当代亚太》,2003年第3期,第23-26页;
朴键一:“北京六方会谈与朝鲜核问题的前景”,《当代亚太》,2003年第10期,第42-46页。
139 李敦球:“朝鲜为何打核牌”,《世界知识》,2005年第7期,第26-28页。
140 时永明:“朝鲜核问题与东北亚安全”,《国际问题研究》,2003年第5期,第52-54页。
141 沈丁立:“朝鲜和伊朗的核问题”,载《美国问题研究》,第四缉,时事出版社,倪世雄,刘永涛主编,2005年,第332-341页。
142 于迎丽:“朝核问题与东北亚安全合作”,《国际观察》,2004年第6期,第34-39页。
143 刘鸣:“朝鲜半岛新一轮核风波解读”,《社会观察》,2003年第1期,第21-22页。
144 杨红梅:“朝鲜核危机的症结及走向”,《现代国际关系》,2003年第5期,第21-26页。
145 崔志鹰:“‘核危机'与朝美关系前景”,《东北亚论坛》,2003年第4期,第12-15页。
146 石源华:“‘六方会谈'机制化:东北亚安全合作的努力方向”,《国际观察》,2005年第2期。
147 任晓:“六方会谈与东北亚多边安全机制的可能性”,《国际问题研究》,2005年第1期,第38-41。
148 王少普:“朝鲜半岛缓和进程与东北亚局势”,《国际观察》,2001年第2期,第45-48页。
149 杨红梅:“朝鲜缔结朝美‘和平协定'的构想与努力”,《世界经济研究》,2003年第3期,第53-57页。
150 李敦球:“韩国也出核问题”,《世界知识》,2004年第19期,第32-34页。
151 程玉洁:“韩国核风波的来龙去脉”,《国际资料信息》,2004年第11期,第16-19页。
152 朱锋:“导弹试射、六方会谈与多边谈判中的‘安全困境'”,《现代国际关系》,2006年第8期,第25-31页。
153 石源华:“朝鲜核试爆与重开六方会谈”,《东北亚论坛》,2007年第1期,第53-57页。
154 姜宅九:“中国参与六方会谈:斡旋角色与前景”,《当代亚太》,2007年第2期,第30-35页。
155 李开盛:“中国对朝核问题影响的定量分析”,《世界经济与政治》,2007年第4期,第48-53页。
156 刘阿明,姚晓玫:“朝鲜核问题与中美利益博弈”,《国际观察》,2007年第2期,第73-79页。
157 沈丁立:“朝鲜核试验和中朝关系及中国的选择”,《青年参考》,2006年9月16日。
158 崔立如:“朝鲜半岛安全问题:中国的作用”,《现代国际关系》,2006年第9期,第42-47页。
159 张琏瑰:“朝鲜核试验后的局势和中国的选择”,《新远见》,2007年第2期,第20-40页。
160 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991.
161 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley, 1997,pp.255-259.
162 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,pp.197-200.
163 尽管该文件仍为部分解密,但解密的部分对1945年到1977年的美国海外核部署的时间、地点以及背景已经有较为详细的描述。这个文件的附录B名为《1951-1977年在各国的部署年表》(Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977),是所述时期美国在各国核部署的情况略表,包括部署武器的名称、部署时间和撤出时间。这份解密材料可以为冷战时期核历史的研究者提供重要参考。
164 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983.
165 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003.
166 姜政敏(Jungmin Kang),美国斯坦福大学的国际安全与军备控制中心(CISAC)的科研人员。姜的研究特点是把核能领域的技术分析引入核政策研究。CISAC,Jungmin Kang,available at http://cisac.stanford.edu/people/jungminkang/
167 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1,January/February 2005,pp.40-49.
168 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,pp.53-80.
169 Peter Hayes,"The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue," in Andrew Mack ed.,Asian Flashpoint:Security and the Korean Peninsula,Allen & Unwin,1993,pp.51-83.
170 王连成:“对韩国核能力的初步分析”,载中国军控与裁军协会:《2005:国际军备控制与裁军报告》,世界知识出版社,2005年1月,第81-93页。
171 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004.
172 David Albright and Kevin O'Neill,eds.,Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle,Washington,D.C.:Institute For Science And International Security,2000.
173 亚历山大·曼苏洛夫(Alexandre Y.Mansourov),美国亚太安全研究中心(Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies)副教授,主编有Bytes and Bullets:Information Technology Revolution and National Security on the Korean Peninsula(APCSS:Honolulu,HI,2005);A Turning Point:Democratic Consolidation in the ROK and Strategic Readjustment in the US-ROK Alliance(APCSS:Honolulu,HI,2005);The North Korean Nuclear Program:Security,Strategy,and New Perspectives from Russia(together with Dr.Clay J.Moltz,Routledge Press:New York,2000)。Institute for Corean-American Studies,Alexandre Y.Mansourov,available at http://www.icasinc.org/bios/mansouro.html
174 Alexandre Y.Mansourov,"The Origins,Evolution,and Current Politics ofthe North Korean Nuclear Program,"The Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1995,pp.25-38.
175 Robert Alvarez,"North Korea:No Bygones at Yongbyon,"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,July/August 2003,pp.39-45.
176 李彬:《朝鲜的军备发展》,载《军备控制研究与进展》,第2卷,2004年,第1期,第7-12页。
177 Michael J.Mazarr,"Going Just a Little Nuclear:Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea,"International Security,Vol.20,No.2(Fall 1995),pp.92-122.
178 Peter Hayes,"What North Korea Wants,"The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,December 1993,pp.8-10.
179 Andrew Mack,"A Nuclear North Korea:The Choices Are Narrowing," World Policy Journal summer 1994,p.27-35.
180 Nicholas Eberstadt,"Noah Korea's Weaons Quest," The National Interest,Summer 2005,pp.49-52.
181 Jonathan D.Pollack,"North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015:Three Scenarios,"Asia Policy,Number 3,January 2007,pp.105-123.
182 沈丁立:“朝鲜弃核和拥核,哪个更安全?”《东方早报》,2006年12月21日。
183 Peter Hayes,"The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue," in Andrew Mack ed.,Asian Flashpoint:Security and the Korean Peninsula,Allen & Unwin,1993,pp.78-79.
184 Brad Roberts,"East Asia's Nuclear Future:A Long-Term View of Threat Reduction," Institute For Defense Analyses,IDA Document P-3641,p.6,pp.16-21.
185 International Crisis Group,"North Korea's Nuclear Test:The Fallout," Policy Briefing,No.56,Seoul/Brussels,13 November 2006,p.9.
186 Robyn Lim,"Australia and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence," The Center for Independent Studies,Issue Analysis,No.81,1 March 2007,pp.4-5.
187 Alliance一词在中文翻译时,有时被译为“同盟”,有时被译为“联盟”,但意思基本都是一样的。本文在这里统一为“同盟”。
188 George Liska,Nations in Alliance:the Limits of Interdependence,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press,1968,p.4.
189 Arnold Wolfers,"Alliances," in David L.Sills(ed.),International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,New York:Macmillan,1968,pp.268-269.
190 Warren F.Kimball,"Alliances,Coalitions,and Ententes",in Alexander DeConde(eds.),Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy,New York:Charles Scribner's Sons,1978,pp.1-2.
191 Glenn H.Snyder,Alliance Politics,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1987,p.4.
192 Glenn H.Snyder,"Alliance Theory:A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs,Vol.44,No.1,Spring 1990,p.104.
193 Robert Osgood,Alliances and American Foreign Policy,Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins Press,1968,p.18.
194 Stephen M.Walt,The Origins of Alliances,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1987,p.12.
195 参见孙德刚,“联而不盟:国际安全合作中的准联盟理论”,《外交评论》,2007年第12期,第64页。
196 参见于铁军:“国际政治中的同盟理论:进展与争论”,《欧洲》,1999年第5期,第16页。
197 参见孙德刚,“国际安全之联盟理论探析”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第4期,第41页。
198 Hans J.Morgenthau,"Alliances in Theory and Practice",in Arnold Wolfers ed.,Alliance Policy in the Cold War,Baltimore,MD:The Johns Hopkins Press,1959,pp.184-212.
199 George F.Liska,Nations in Alliance:The Limits of Interdependence,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press,1962,p.1.
200 William H.Riker,The Theory of Political Coalitions,New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,1962,p.174.
201 Pierre M.Gallois,"U.S.Strategy and the Defense of Europe,"Obis,Summer 1963,Vol.Ⅶ.No.2,pp-226-249;Henry A.Kissinger,The Troubled Partnership,Westport,CT:Greenwood Press,1982,pp.11-13.
202 参见于铁军:“国际政治中的同盟理论:进展与争论”,《欧洲》,1999年第5期,第18页。
203 Stephen M.Walt,The Origins of Alliances,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1987,p.7.
204 Ibid.,p.275.
205 Stephen Walt,"Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security,Spring 1985,p.10.
206 Randall L.Schweller,"Neorealisms Status-Quo Bias:What Security Dilemma?",in Benjamin Frankel ed.,Realism:Restatements and Renewal,London:Frank Cass,1996,pp.90-121.
207 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,July 1984,Vol.34,No.3,pp.461-495.
208 Thomas J.Christensen and Jack Snyder,"Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks:Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization,Spring 1990,Vol.44,No.2,pp.144-147.
209 参见于铁军:“国际政治中的同盟理论:进展与争论”,《欧洲》,1999年第5期,第22页。
210 Robert O.Keohane,"Alliance,Threats and the Uses of Neorealism,"International Security,Summer 1988,Vol.13,No.1,pp.174-175.
211 Stephen M.Walt,"Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival,Spring.1997,Vol.39,No.1,pp.166-167.
212 参见于铁军:“国际政治中的同盟理论:进展与争论”,《欧洲》,1999年第5期,第24页。
213 Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney,ed.,US Allies in A Changing World,London:FRANKCASS,2001,pp.29-48.
214 Stephen M.Walt,"Why Alliances Endure or Collapse",Survival,Spring 1997,Vol.39,No.1,pp.169-170.
215 Michael C.Desch,"Culture Clash:Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies",International Security,Summer 1998,Vol.23,No.1,p.165.
216 参见孙德刚,“国际安全之联盟理论探析”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第4期,第52页。
217 Hans J.Morgenthau,"Alliances in Theory and Practice",in Arnold Wolfers ed.,Alliance Policy in the Cold War,Baltimore,MD:The Johns Hopkins Press,1959,pp.188-191.
218 Robert L.Rothestein,Alliances and Small Powers,New York:Columbia University Press,1968,p.11.
219 Victor D.Cha,Alignment despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle,Stanford:Stanford University Press,1999.
220 Hans J.Morgenthau,"Alliances in Theory and Practice",in Arnold Wolfers ed.,Alliance Policy in the Cold War,Baltimore,MD:The Johns Hopkins Press,1959,pp.184-212;Robert E.Osgood,Alliance and American Foreign Policy,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press,1968.
221 Stephen M.Walt,The Origins of Alliances,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1987,p.149.
222 Randall L.Schweller,"Bandwagoning for Profit:Bring the Revisionist State Back in,"International Security,Vol.19,No.1,Summer 1994,pp.80- 81.
223 Robert O.Keohane,"Alliance,Threats and the Uses of Neorealism,"International Security,Summer 1988,Vol.13,No.1,pp.174-175.
224 Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney,ed.,US Allies in A Changing World,London:FRANKCASS,2001,pp.29-48.
225 Richard E.Neustadt,Alliance Politics,New York:Columbia University Press,1970.
226 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,pp.466-468.
227 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser,"An Economic Theory of Alliance," Review of Economics and Statistics,August 1966,pp.266-279.
228 William H.Riker,The Theory of Political Coalitions,New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,1962,p.174.
229 Charles W.Kegley,Jr.and Gregory A.Raymond,When Trust Breaks Down:Alliance Norms and World Politics,South Carolina:University of South Carolina Press,1990,p.107.
230 王帆:“联盟管理理论与联盟管理困境”,《欧洲研究》,2006年第4期,第112页。
231 曼瑟尔·奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,陈郁等译,上海三联书店,1996年版,译者前言第5页。
232 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,pp.468-471.
233 王帆:“联盟管理理论与联盟管理困境”,《欧洲研究》,2006年第4期,第111-125页。
234 赵怀普、王前:“单极与多极:北约还是铁板一块吗?”,《当代世界》,2004年第4期,第19-21页。
235 丁菲娅:“美欧分歧对北约发展的影响”,《国际问题研究》,2004年第1期,第48-52页。
236 王学军:“冷战后欧美联盟的动力与趋势”,《教学与研究》,2007年第7期,第67-72页。
237 张景全:“从同盟机制角度看美国对日本历史问题的态度”,《当代亚太》,2006年第9期,第26-30页。
238 何英莺:《论战后日美军事同盟中的摩擦关系》,复旦大学博士论文,指导教师:朱明权教授,2003年4月。
239 Hans J.Morgenthau,"Alliances in Theory and Practice",in Arnold Wolfers ed.,Alliance Policy in the Cold War,Baltimore,MD:The Johns Hopkins Press,1959,pp.184-212.
240[美]斯蒂芬·沃尔特:《联盟的起源》,周丕启译,北京大学出版社,2007年版,第149-153页。
241 Randall L.Schweller,"Neorealisms Status-Quo Bias:What Security Dilemma?",in Benjamin Frankel ed.,Realism:Restatements and Renewal,London:Frank Cass,1996,pp.90-121.
242 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,p.466-367.
243 这是美国第八军自己编撰的历史档案,每年一本。档案很详细地描述了第八军的作战战略、编制部署、人员和财务等。该档案涉及核武器部署的部分仍然保密,但从档案中仍可以发现一些关于核部署的有价值的信息。这些档案由鹦鹉螺研究院申请解密,可以从鹦鹉螺研究院的网页中获得。The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,"Military Histories,"available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
244 这是美国太平洋司令部的历史档案,与第八军的历史档案情况基本相似。The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,"Military Histories," available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
1 Bruce Cumings,"Nuclear Imbalance of Terror:The American Surveillance Regime and North Korea's Nuclear Programme," in Raju G.C.Thomas,ed.,The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime:Prospects for the 21st Century,Basingstoke:Macmillan,1998,p.214.
2 Donald Stone Macdonald,US-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance,The Twenty-Year Record:An Interpretive Summary of Archives of the US Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965,Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1992,p.23.
3 1956年,这一机构基本上已经不发挥作用了。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg."American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.34.
4 Donald Stone Macdonald,US-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance,The Twenty-Year Record." An Interpretive Summary of Archives of the US Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965,Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1992,pp.78-79.
5 Ibid.,pp.23-24.
6 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp.4-5,available at http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/news/19991020/index.html
7 1950年6月,杜鲁门批准在英国部署89个原子弹的非核部分,以支持战略空军司令部在英国部署的轰炸机。到1950年7月,这些非核部分在英国完成部署。这一时期,原子弹的钚或者铀芯(又称为核胶囊,nuclear capsule)与非核的外壳是分开放置的。美国原子能委员会对核部件进行保管,只有通过总统的授权,才可以交给军方。在战争的情况下,这些核部件被快速地运到部署有非核部分的基地,组成完整的核武器使用。部署非核部分的考虑是,前沿部署这些庞大而且赘重的非核部分,要比在危机时候运送完整的一个原子弹更快和更容易。See Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,“Where they were,''The Bulletin D7r the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.27。关于核武器发展早期的非核部分和核部件的权力监管,《核武器手册》中有详细描述。See Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Robea S.Norris,Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅱ:U.S.Nuclear Warhe.ad Production,Ballinger Pub.Co.,Cambridge,England,1987,p.2;托马斯·B·科克伦等著,王连奎等译,《核武器手册(第二卷):美国的核弹头生产》,国防工业出版社,1990年版,第2页。
8 当时,一些美国官员认为,朝鲜战争是苏联为入侵西欧而转移美国注意力的阴谋。See Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,“Where they were,''The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.27.
9 杜鲁门任命空军参谋总长豪伊特·坎登博格(Hoyt S Candenberg)作为参联会的执行人员,来保管这些核胶囊。See Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,“Where they were,''The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.29;Roger Dingman,”Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,''International Security,Vol.13,No.3,Winter 1988/1989,p.72.
10 曾任美国国家安全顾问的麦乔治·邦迪对这一政策及其核意义有详细的描述。参见麦乔治·邦迪著,褚广友等译:《美国核战略》,世界知识出版社,1991年版,第339页。
11 法国仅部署过非核部分。See Office ofthe Secretary of Defense,“History ofthe Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,“Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977,"p.6.
12 Ibid.,pp.4-5.
13 “斗牛士”导弹的射程为1000千米。美国在韩国部署的可以携带核航弹的飞机有F-100、F-105、F-4和F-16。其中F-100作战半径为885千米,F-105为1191,F-4作战半径为1060千米,但对地面目标攻击距离为1610千米。F-16作战半径为925千米。以韩国的乌山空军基地为中心的1000千米范围,可以攻击到苏联的海参崴和中国的东北、山东等东部地区。这些武器系统的射程和作战半径的数据来自:Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,”Martin SSM-A-1/B-61/TM-61/MGM-1 Matador",http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-1.html;Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,and Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅰ:U.S.Nuclear Forces and Capabilities,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Ballinger Publishing Company,1984,p.216,p.221,226.
14 杜鲁门在1948年将军费上限限定为144亿美元,但参联会强烈反对,认为这样的预算会丢掉欧洲。这样的预算争执在杜鲁门时期一直存在。See Kevin O'Neill,“Building the Bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.13.艾森豪威尔在其执政时期同样认为,联邦预算过于庞大,最可能节约的部门就是国防部。参见麦乔治·邦迪著,褚广友等译:《美国核战略》,世界知识出版社,1991年版,第339页。
15 20世纪50年代,一吨TNT炸药需要1700美元,而使用裂变物质产生同样当量的爆炸力只需23美元。参见约翰·纽豪斯:《核时代的战争与和平》,军事科学出版社,1989年版,第164页。1951年,联合原子能委员会主席布赖恩·麦克马洪提出参议院第46号决议案, 在此决议案辩论时,他讲到,“通过核武器这种和平力量的真正支柱,美国能打击任何地方的敌人,……,这会挽救国家的经济崩溃。一个装备有原子弹的陆军、海军和空军,意味着花在许多传统武器上的上百亿美元的费用将减少。”See Kevin O'Neill,“Building the Bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.19-20。
16 这一句话出自艾森豪威尔1953年12月在联合国大会的一次演讲中,他在演讲中宣布:“在我们的部队里,原子武器实际上已经取得了常规武器的地位,……,陆军、海军、空军和海军陆战队有能力将这种武器用于军事目的。”这个宣布在当时可能还有点夸大其辞,但几年后,核武器已经被大范围地引入美国的作战部队中。在不到十年的时间里,这些部队的任何一支小分队里已经很难发现没有核武器的存在。See Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,“Deploying the bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.152-153。
17 对五群制师编制调整最详细的描述是,约翰·米德雷的《致命的虚幻:陆军在核战场中的政策》的第二章“原子陆军:五群制的发展”。See“Chapter Ⅱ,The Atomic Army:Development of the Pentomic Division,''in John J.Midgley,Jr.,Deadly Illusions:Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield,Boulder and London:Westview Press,1986,pp.31-85.
18 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.35.
19 See Richard G.Stilwell,and Donald Zagoria,Arguments against US Troop Reductions in Korea,in Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report,1977",p.348.;George McGovern,"The US Risk in Korea," in Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report,1977",p.333,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
20 Ibid.,p.346.
21 Bruce Cumings,"Nuclear Imbalance of Terror:The American Surveillance Regime and North Korea's Nuclear Programme," in Raju G.C.Thomas,ed.,The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime:Prospects for the 21st Century,Basingstoke:Macmillan,1998,p.215.
22 Operations Research Office,Johns Hopkins University,Semi-Annual Report 9:2,July 1-Dec.31,1956,contents page.
23 Thomas B.Allen,War Games:The Secret World of the Creators,Players,and Policy Makers Rehearsing World War Ⅲ Today,New York:McGraw-Hill,1987,1919.51-55.
24 1953年停战协定谈判时,李承晚就表示反对。停战协定签订后,李又多次宣称要重新进入战争。See Donald Stone Macdonald,US-Korean Relationsfrom Liberation to Self-Reliance,The Twenty-Year Record:An Interpretive Summary of Archives of the US Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965,Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1992,pp.18-20.
25 Bruce Cumings,“Nuclear Imbalance of Terror:The American Surveillance Regime and North Korea's Nuclear Programme,''in Raju G.C.Thomas,ed.,The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime:Prospects for the 21st Century,Basingstoke:Macmillan,1998,p.216.
26 参见本章的第三节。
27 Hans Kristensen,”Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella,"Section 3,”The Battle over Okinawa,''http://www.nautilus.org/archives//library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-3.html
28 这一信息是美国学者彼得·海斯在与驻韩美军的退役军官访谈中得到的。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.35.
29 Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Quarterly Historical Summary:Historical Report,April-June 1966," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,G3,declassified,p.15.
30 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.50.
31 Thomas B.Allen,War Games." The Secret World of the Creators,Players,and Policy Makers Rehearsing Worm War Ⅲ Today,New York:McGraw-Hill,1987,pp.51-55.
32 60年代末期,是一个美国经济和政治实力都相对下降的时期。尼克松决心恢复美国在世界事务中的中心地位。1969年,尼克松宣布美国不再保卫那些微不足道的利益,希望可以从各个地区的安全承诺中解脱出来。在尼克松-基辛格的世界大棋局中,朝鲜半岛是相对不重要的。尼克松试图构建以一个离岸海军为主导的东亚战略。这一战略要求减少对韩国的军事承诺,以避免对地区冲突的再度卷入。See F.Schurmann,The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon:The Grand Design,Berkeley,1987,p.2.
33 这一次撤出了驻韩美军总数6万人中的2万人。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.13.
34 1971年,国防部长梅尔文·莱尔德(Melvin Laird)签署了一个决策备忘录,内容是,到1974年底,剩下的第二步兵师要减少一个旅。但第二年,这个截至日期延长到1975年。1974年,继任的施莱辛格在国会建议,驻韩美军应完全逐渐撤离,由驻扎在夏威夷的陆军和关岛的海军组成的流动后备力量来接替。以强硬著称的施莱辛格之所以支持撤军,是因为他认为这样可以更有效地与苏联竞争。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.55;“Mobile Force Eyed for GIs in Korea,''Korea Herald,March 3,1974,p.1.
35 1974年12月,在对汉城的一次简短访问中,福特明确对朴正熙说:“我们没有从韩国撤军的意图。”针对韩国对美国进一步撤出的忧虑,国防部长施莱辛格在1975年8月访问汉城,私下对朴正熙说,他“预见(美国对韩政策)在今后五年内不会有太大变化”。See Thomas J.Barnes,“Secretary Schlesinger's Discussion in Seoul,''Nmional Security Council Memorandum,Nov.29,1975,declassified 1995,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.430.
36 See Thomas J.Barnes."Secretary Schlesinger's Discussion in Seoul,''Nmional Security Council Memorandum,Nov.29,1975,declassified 1995.
37 卡特的竞选团队希望卡特与福特总统有所区别。而在孤立主义情绪盛行的后越战时代,从韩国撤军是个很好的议题。同时,通过宣扬撤军,卡特可以得到金融保守派和国际自由派的支持。金融保守派希望盟国分享更多的防务支出,而国际自由派则担心与朝鲜的冲突自动升级为核战争。也有人认为,推崇人权的卡特看到关于朴正熙政府对其民众暴行的第一手记录,对韩国政府心生厌恶而决定撤军。See Cyrus Vance,Hard Choice:Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy,New York:Simon and Schuster,1983,p.449.
38 譬如,驻韩美军总参谋长约翰·辛拉伯(John Singlaub)对《华盛顿邮报》记者说,“假如美国如期撤出地面部队的话,那将导致战争。”辛拉伯之后受到卡特的批评,并被调出韩国。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.90.
39 国务卿万斯、国防部长哈罗德·布朗、负责东亚事务的助理国务卿理查德·豪尔布鲁克(Richard Holbrooke)此时都开始阻挠撤军计划的进行。就连布热津斯基在1978年都开始表示,撤军计划可能是错误的。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.89-93.
40 1978年4月,参议院武装部队委员会第一次对卡特的撤军政策进行批评。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.79.
41 卡特最初计划第一批撤出6000人,之后调整为撤出800人的战斗营和2600名非战斗人员。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.93-94
42 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.103-104;Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,pp.70-84.
43 Global Security,Camp Page,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-page.htm
44 卡特在竞选时宣布:“我们有700枚核武器在韩国,我认为任何一个都没有存在的理由。”See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.89.
45 参见《华盛顿邮报》记者奥博多佛1995年对哈罗德·布朗的访谈。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.89.
46 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato,U.S.Policy toward Japan and Korea:A Changing Influence Relationship,New York:Praeger,1982,pp.111-112.
47 National Security Study Memorandum 226,"Review of U.S.Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," May 2.7,1977,declassified 1994,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans.:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.433.
48 V.Guldry,"U.S.Nuclear Weapons to Leave South Korea When Troops Depart," Washington Star,June 14,1977.
49 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.84.
50 1977年,美国在韩核武器数量为660-700件。 到1981年卡特政府结束时,减少为250件左右。参见第二节第五部分“在韩国核武器的数量”中的分析。
51 就“诚实的约翰”而言,陆军在1976年卡特当选之前就准备让它们全部退役。See U.S.Senate,Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,“Military Construction Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980," Hearings,U.S.Government Printing Office,Washington,D.C.,1979,p.181.
52 Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato,U.S.Policy toward Japan and Korea:A Changing Influence Relationship,New York:Praeger,1982,p.114.
53 Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.Vol.55.No.6.November/December 1999,pp.30-31.
54 当时国会批评核武器信息极度保密,“美国驻一些国家的大使都不知道是否美国在其所驻国家部署了核武器。”See Hans Kristensen,“Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella,''Section 3,“The Battle over Okinawa,''http://www.nautilus.org/archives//library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-3.html
55 Ibid.
56 Command in Chief,U.S.Pacific Command,"CINCPAC Command History 1974," Volume Ⅰ,September 25,1975,p.262,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
57 Ibid.,p.263.
58 1977年太平洋司令部档案记载了以下内容:同样出于对核武器存储安全的考虑,太平洋司令部于1977年6月6日到10日对韩国的存储基地进行了检查。其中提及的存储基地为阿姆斯基地、群山空军基地和乌山空军基地。这份档案还记载,在乌山空军基地的核武器存储设施在这年的晚些时候停止使用。See Commander in Chief,U.S.Pacific Command(CINCPAC).“CINCPAC Command History for 1977,''Volume Ⅱ,September 1,1978,pp.431-432,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Proiect,available at hap://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
59 "Schlesinger Wams N.Korea U.S.May Use Nuclear Arms," St.Louis Post-Dispatch,June 22,1975.
60 William Burr,"Looking Back:The Limit of Limited Nuclear War," Arms Control Today,January/February 2006 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-Lookingback.asp
61 U.S.Forces Korea/Eighth U.S.Army,"1976 Annual Historical Report," p.ⅲ,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
62 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.93.
63 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.75-76.
64 危机是由联合安全区的一颗大树引起的。由于是夏季,这颗树非常茂密。美国士兵认为这颗树遮挡了他们观察朝鲜那边情况的视线,因此美国士兵就到联合安全区去修剪这颗树。随即赶来的朝鲜士兵不让美军对树进行修剪,因为他们认为联合安全区的任何东西都不能被破坏。在争执中冲突发生,美国两名军官被杀死。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.74.
65 在讨论之前,美国对危机已经迅速做出第一反应:将驻韩美军和韩国的警戒状态升级到最高的战争准备状态;从冲绳和爱达荷州各调遣一个空军中队的F-4战斗机和F-111战斗轰炸机至韩国;从关岛起飞的重型轰炸机B-52开始在接近朝鲜的上空做模拟轰炸的飞行演习;美国航母中途号从日本开往韩国领海。See Conrad Delateur,“Murder at Panmunjom:The Role of Theatre Commander in Crisis Resolution,''The Senior Seminar Of Foreign Service Institute,United States Department of State,Twenty-Nimh Session,March,1987,p.12,Declassified,http://www.nautilus.org/foia/panmunjom.html
66 用一些高级官员的话说,“朝鲜人是野人”,意即他们是不理智的。他们担心,即便是小规模的军事打击也会引发朝鲜的剧烈军事反应。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.78-79.
67 保罗·班扬是美国传说中的伐木巨人。Conrad Delateur,"Murder at Panmunjom:The Role of Theatre Commander in Crisis Resolution,"The Senior Seminar of Foreign Service Institute.United States Department of State,Twenty-Ninth Session,March,1987,pp.19-20.,Declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Projeet,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/panmunjom.html
68 Ibid.,pp.20-21.
69 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.81.
70 Ibid.,p.82.
71 在1969年危机中,朝鲜在第二年才释放了扣留人员,而且朝鲜一直扣留着美国的情报船。同时,朝鲜并不认为自己的行为有错误,也没有向美国表示歉意。
72 Science Applications,Inc.,Vulnerability of North Korean Forces:Evaluation of Vulnerability of North Korean Divisions to Tactical Nuclear Weapons,Report to U.S.Defense Nuclear Agency,DNA 4570F-1,Malean,Va.,March 1978,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/NKVulnerability.html.
73 Ibid.,p.2-18,p.4-2,p.4-3,p.5-1,p.5-2.
74 Ibid.,p.1-6.
75 Ibid.,p.3,p.4-2.
76 美国学者在讨论朝鲜战争爆发的历史时经常强调:1949年到1950年初,美国参联会不认为朝鲜半岛对于美国安全是重要的,甚至麦克阿瑟开始时也如此认为,以至于1950年1月,国务卿艾奇逊告诉国家新闻社,“遏制共产主义的边界已经划定,朝鲜半岛被排除在自由世界防线之外”。这一讲话被认为向金日成传递了美国默许他攻击南方的信号。George McGovern.“The US Risk in Korea,''in Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,“Annual Historical Report,1977",p.330,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
77 Korea Herald,"Mobile Force Eyed for GIs in Korea," March 3,1974,p.1;"Schlesinger Warns N.Korea U.S.May Use Nuclear Arms," St.Louis Post-Dispatch,June 22,1975.
78 这一问题主要在第三章中进行讨论。
79 基辛格在给美国驻韩大使的电报中清晰地表达了这一观点。See Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.70.
80 地道和前沿部署是应对核威胁较为实用和有效的方式。参见乔登江,朱焕金编著:《人类的灾难--核武器与核爆炸》,清华大学出版社和暨南大学出版社,2000年12月出版,第108-127页。
81 Richard G.Stilwell,and Donald Zagoria,Arguments against US Troop Reductions in Korea,in Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report,1977",p.347,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
82 Ibid.,pp.346-347.
83 在里根的反苏政策中,美国给予亚洲足够的关注。里根的亚洲政策有三部分组成:加强与中国的军事合作、巩固与日本的结盟联系和加强在韩国的军事能力。
84 它产生的背景是里根政府1.7万亿美元的五年巨额防务开支计划和国防部长卡斯巴·温伯杰(Caspar Weinberger)的《1984-1988年防务指针》(1984-88 Defense Guidance)的公布。See Martha Wenger,"AirLand Battle Doctrine,"MERIP Reports,No.111,Rapid Deployment and Nuclear War,January 1983,p.12.
85 Ibid.
86 Robert S.Dudney,"The New Army with New Punch," US News & World Report,September 20,1982,pp.59-60.
87 Martha Wenger,"AirLand Battle Doctrine," MERIP Reports,No.111,Rapid Deployment and Nuclear War,January 1983,p.13.
88 Ibid.,p.13.
89 Colonel William G.Hanne,"The Integrated Battlefield," Military Review,June 1982,p.40.
90 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.93.
91 W.Livsey,"U.S.and ROK Readiness," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum,10:1,Summer 1985,p.44.
92 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.91.
93 R.Halloran,"Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy for Fighting a Long Nuclear War," New York Times,May 30,1982.
94 1983年的“协作精神”演习,美韩共191700人参加。其中,美国有73700人参与(41500人来自朝鲜半岛以外),韩国有118000人参与。到1984年,“协作精神”演习总人数超过20万人。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.93.
95 G.Jochum,"Team Sprit 84:Amphibious Exercises Provide Readiness," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum,Vol.9,No.2,Fall 1984,p.5;W.Livsey,"U.S.and ROK Readiness," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum,Vol.10,No.1,Summer 1985,p.43.
96 参见利昂·斯格尔(Leon V.Sigal)在1996年对格雷格的访谈。See Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea.Princeton University Press.New Jersey.p.28.
97 Colin Powell,My American Journey,New York:Random House,1995,p.540.
98 "Issues and Opportunities in U.S.-Korean Relations," A Report of the Committee on U.S.-R.O.K.Relations,cosponsored by the East-West Center and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs,February 11,1991.
99 William J.Crowe and Alan D.Romberg,"Rethinking Security in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs,Spring 1991,p.134.
100 See Eli Corin,"Presidential Nuclear Initiatives:An Alternative Paradigm for Arms Control,"Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Monterey Institute of International Studies,March 2004,http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_41a.html
101 尽管此次美国并没有完全撤回所有海外部署的核武器,根据NRDC和美国其它研究机构的报告,美国至今仍在欧洲6个国家保留了核航弹。See Hans M.Kristensen,“U.S.Nuclear Weapons in Europe:A review of post-Cold War policy,force levels,and war planning,''Natural Resources Defense Council,February 2005,http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp
102 Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,pp.29-30.
103 James Ki.m,"Rob Declares South Korea is Free of Nuclear Weapons," United Press International,December 18,1991;Kelly Smith Tunney,"President:South Korea is Nuclear-Free,"The Associated Press,18 December 1991.
104 Mitchell Reiss,Bridled Ambition:Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities,Washington:Woodrow Wilson Center Press,1995,p.238.
105 Hans M.Kristensen,"The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea," The Nuclear Information Project,Nuclear Brief September 28,2005,http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/withdrawal.htm
106 Commander in Chief US Pacific Command,"Command History1991," Volume Ⅰ,p.90-91.declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
107 Ibid.,p.91.
108 Ibid.,p.92.
109 Hans M.Kristensen,"The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea," Nuclear Brief September 28,2005.
110 当核炮弹开始从群山空军基地撤出的时候,《华盛顿邮报》在1991年10月12日发表文章说,美国已经决定将暂时保留对B61核航弹的撤出。结合美国仍在欧洲部署核航弹的情况来看,美国最初不撤出核航弹的决定是合乎逻辑的。See Hans M.Kristensen,“The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea,''Nuclear Brief September 28.2005.
111 Ibid.
112 对美国的核撤出计划,朝鲜开始反应冷淡,并称朝鲜仍然受到美国远程核武器攻击的威胁。因此,朝鲜开始坚持的立场是:只要韩国仍在美国核保护伞之下,视查其核设施便是不允许的。但一个较大的政策转向出现在11月26日,朝鲜宣布:只要美国允许对其基地进行检查来确认所有的核武器已经撤走,朝鲜就可以接受对其核设施的核查。同时,朝鲜表示欢迎布什总统9月27日的倡议,并称,“当美国开始从韩国撤出核武器时,朝鲜会签署核安全保障协议”。See Hans M.Kristensen,“The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea".
113 11月28日,韩国的联合通讯社报道,韩国和美国已经同意在年底完成核撤出,并计划在1992年1月初宣布韩国的无核地位。See Hans M.Kristensen,“The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea".
114 William J.Crowe and Alan D.Romberg,"Rethinking Security in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs,Spring 1991,p.134.
115 对核禁忌(nuclear taboo)最详细的分析参见尼娜·泰勒沃德(Nina Tannenwald)的文章。See Nina Tannenwald,“Stigmatizing the Bomb:Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,''International Security,Vol 29,No.4(Spring 2005,),pp.5-49.
116 Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,p.29.
117 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp.2-7,available at http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/news/19991020/index.html
118 例如,美国在韩国部署的核武器种类较多,而美国在全球核部署中种类较多的国家和地区仅为德国、意大利、关岛、冲绳、夏威夷和韩国等有限的几个;1958年美国在韩国部署“诚实的约翰”导弹和280毫米原子炮是学术界较为确认的信息,可以明显地帮助区分:到1977年时美国在很多国家和地区的核部署已经完全撤出,而在韩国的核部署是在1991年完全撤出的。通过撤出时间的信息也可以确认韩国的核部署情况。
119 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp 4-5.
120 彼得·海斯的依据来自国防部的解密材料。See J.Cary,“U.S.Military Bases Overseas:An Exploratory Investigation,''report from Institute for Defense Analyses,International and Social Studies Division to Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense,International Security Affairs,U.S.Defense Department,Research Paper P-397,Arlington,Va.,June 1967,p.43;Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.35.
121 Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.30.
122 附录B记载了美国在其它地方部署“斗牛士”导弹的情况:在德国的部署时间是1955年4月,撤出时间是1962年9月;在冲绳的部署时间是1957年9月到12月,撤出时间是1960年12月;在中国台湾部署的时间是1958年1月,撤出时间是1962年1月。Office ofthe Secretary of Defense,“History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945through Seplember 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,“Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977,''pp.4-7.
123 1976年太平洋司令部档案描述了当时“长矛”导弹在韩国部署时各司令部之间的意见纷争。陆军建议在韩国部署“长矛”导弹,因为“韩国是最可能使用地面(发射的)核武器的地区”。太平洋司令部同意这一点,但是建议在“长矛”导弹部署之后,把这一时期已经老化的“诚实的约翰”导弹和“奈基-大力神”导弹撤出。驻韩美军司令部(USFK)考虑到奈基独特的防空能力,而不同意撤出奈基。这时,参联会考虑到,在韩国部署“长矛”导弹的问题上,总统会与各部门讨论很长时间,所以就先行把打算在韩国部署的“长矛”导弹的核弹头运到关岛。1976年太平洋司令部档案记载,在1976年12月,为韩国的“长矛”导弹配置的核弹头已经运到关岛的海军基地。Command in Chief,U.S.Pacific Command,”CINCPAC Command History 1976,'' Volume Ⅰ,pp.159-160,p.197,available a1http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/CINCPAC76.pdf
124 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,p.252.
125 J.Anderson,"Neutron Bombs Could Be Used in South Korea," Washington Post,May 4,1983,p.Col3.
126 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.103.
127 Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,"Deploying the bomb," in Stephen Ⅰ.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.154.
128 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Martin SSM-A-12/M4/MGM-18 Lacrosse," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-18.html
129 Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,"Deploying the bomb," in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,13rookings Institution Press,1998,p.156.
130 “斗牛士”导弹在全球服役最晚至1961年。See Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak.and Stephen I.Schwartz,“Deploying the bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.149.
131 “中士”导弹在全球最晚服役至1977年。See Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,“Deploying the bomb,''in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.148.
132 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit." The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91.
133 Hans M.Kristensen,"The Withdrawal of U.S.Nuclear Weapons From South Korea," The Nuclear Information Project,Nuclear Brief September 28,2005,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/withdrawal.htm
134 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Douglas M31/M50/MGR-1 Honest John," http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/r-1.html
135 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit." The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
136 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Martin SSM-A-1/B-61/TM-61/MGM-1 Matador," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-1.html
137 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit." The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
138 因为在发射该导弹之前,需要一个前沿的侦查小队先接近打击目标,然后在前方发射信号,经雷达捕捉到信号后,再给导弹发射命令。因此,在黑夜和天气不好时,或者雷达系统出现拥堵或遭受反措施时,该导弹很容易误击目标。
139 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Martin SSM-A-12/M4/MGM-18 Lacrosse," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-18.html
140 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
141 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"Western Electric SAM-A-25/M6/MIM-14 Nike Hercules," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-14.html
142 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
143 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"JPL/Sperry SSM-A-27/M15/MGM-29 Sergeant," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-29.html
144 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.193.
145 Ibid.
146 Designation-Systems.Net,Directory of U.S.Military Rockets and Missiles,"LTV MGM-52Lance," available at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-52.html
147 The Nuclear Weapon Archive,"Complete List of All U.S.Nuclear Weapons," 14 October 2006,available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html
148 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp.4-7.
149 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91,p.192.
150 钱聚瑛:《世界火炮手册》,兵器工业出版社,1992年版,第93-94页。
151 上引书,第97-100页。
152 The Nuclear Weapon Archive,"Complete List of All U.S.Nuclear Weapons," 14 October 2006,available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html
153 钱聚瑛:《世界火炮手册》,兵器工业出版社,1992年版,第69-70页。
154 其中M109、M109A1和M109A2/A3分别于1963、1973和1980年服役。上引书,第78-82页。
155 使用火箭增程弹的射程可达30千米。上引书,第71-73页。
156 The Nuclear Weapon Archive,"Complete List of All U.S.Nuclear Weapons," 14 October 2006,available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html
157 Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak,and Stephen I.Schwartz,"Deploying the bomb," in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit." The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.192.
158 早期核弹的主要运载工具是飞机,因此,早期核弹多数都是核航弹。美国开发出的核航弹的型号包括MK-Ⅰ、MK-Ⅲ、MK-4、MK-5、MK-6、MK-7、MK-8、MK-11、MK-12、TX/MK-14、MK-15、TX-16、EC-17、MK-17、MK-18、B21、EC-24、B24、B27、B28、B36、B39、B41、B43、B53、B57、B61、B83。See The Nuclear Weapon Archive.“Complete List Of All U.S.Nuclear Weapons,"14 October 2006,available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html
159 乌山和群山是二战后至今美国驻韩空军的两大重要基地。美国在这里部署着驻韩空军的主要战斗部队。这里作战飞机部署的基本情况是:朝鲜战争期间是F-86、1950年代末部署F-100、1962-1963年部署F-105、在1968-1969年部署F-106、在1971年开始部署F-4、在里根总统执政后(1983年)开始部署A-10和F-16。这些飞机中可以携带核武器的飞机为F-100、F-105、F-4和F-16。See Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅰ:U.S.Nuclear Forces and Capabilities,Ballinger Pub.Co.,Cambridge,England,1984,p.216,p.221,226.
160 F-100可以运载MK-7、B-28、B-43、B-57、B-61。F-105和F-4可以携带B-28、B-43、B-57、B-61。F-16则仅能携带B-61。Robert S.Norris,Steven M.Kosiak and Stephen I.Schwartz,“Deploying the bomb,”in Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.191;Andteas Parsch,Designation-Systems.Net,“Designations Of U.S.Nuclear Weapons,''available at http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/nuke.html
161 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91.
162 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.95.
163 W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231
164 第六军需品营归负责整个驻韩美军后勤的第19支援司令部管辖。See Peter Hayes.Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,pp.249-250.
165 之后,乌山空军基地不再存储核武器。而群山空军基地之后成为核武器存储的主要地点。
166 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,p.250.
167 第4导弹司令部总部在春川附近的佩奇基地(Page)。第4导弹司令部在1978年撤销。参见Global Security,"Camp Page,"available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-page.htm
168 80年代,第二步兵师的师部炮兵总部设在斯坦利基地(Stanley),由两个155毫米榴弹炮炮兵营和一个全般支持的炮兵营组成。两个155毫米榴弹炮炮兵营总部也在斯坦利基地,它们为第二步兵师的第一和第二旅直接提供火力支持。每个155毫米炮兵营由三个连组成,每连6个榴弹炮。全般支持的炮兵营总部设在议政府附近的爱沙俑基地(Essayons),由两个203毫米自行榴弹炮连(每连6个炮)和一个由9个发射车的多功能导弹发射系统组成。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,pp.252-253.
169 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,pp.250-251.
170 如在70年代前期,乌山空军基地的核打击任务由部署在那里的第51战术战斗机联队完成。主战飞机是F-4E。See W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231.
171 到70年代后期,核作战任务主要由在群山基地的第8战术战斗机联队完成。F-16在1981年取代F-4成为主战飞机。See W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231.
172 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.49.
173 群山军事基地离非军事区约有250公里。光州离非军事区约330公里。
174 美国第八军档案中记载,1966年5月20日,第八军举行会议,确定了一个范围广泛的核武器存储和运输的支持网络。乌山空军基地被确定为核武器运输和协调的中心,直升机运输被确立为核武器运输的主要方式。同时,美国驻韩陆军和空军之间就核武器的运输和接受程序方面达成了一些机制和协议。部署的核武器基本上都是陆军的,而运输要通过空军,因此,需要相互协调的机制。See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.48.
175 乌山军事基地离非军事区约有70公里。
176 1974年,出于安全的考虑,太平洋司令部对太平洋地区的核武器存储基地地进行了视察。该档案描述了这一过程,并在其中提到了韩国的存储地址。Command in Chief U.S.Pacific Command,“CINCPAC Command History 1974,''Volume I,September 25,1975,p.100,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
177 Stephen I.Schwartz,"Bombs in the Backyard:Bases and Facilities with Significant Current or Historical U.S.Nuclear Weapons or Naval Nuclear Propulsion Missions," U.S.Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project,August 2002,available at http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/basesize.htm
178 Commander in Chief,U.S.Pacific Command(CINCPAC),"CINCPAC Command History for 1977," Volume Ⅱ,September 1,1978,p.431-432,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
179 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,Appendix A:U.S.Nuclear Organization and Infrastructure in South Korea,p.250.
180 See Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.30.
181 Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,pp.86-91.
182 Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.30.
183 Office of the Secretary of Defense,"History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977," pp.4-5,available at http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/news/19991020/index.html
184 Hans Kristensen,"Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella," Section 3,"The Battle over Okinawa," http://www.nautilus.org/archives//library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-3.html
185 美国在1972年撤出在冲绳的核部署,在1974年撤出在菲律宾和中国台湾的核部署。See Office of the Secretary of Defense.“History ofthe Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons:July 1945 through September 1977",1978,declassified,Appendix B,"Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977,"pp.2-7.
186 "South Korea Summary," DMS Market Intelligence Report,1978,pp.7-8.
187 R.Halloran,"Report to Congress Provides Figures for Nuclear Arsenal," New York Times,November 15,1983.
188 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.85.
189 参见第一节第二部分中“卡特撤军中核武器的地位”的分析。
190 W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231.
191 1988年核地雷全部撤出部署,而在此之前,美国在韩部署的核地雷的数量约为20枚。See Stephen I.Schwartz,ed.,Atomic Audit:The Costs and Consequences of U.S.Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,Brookings Institution Press,1998,p.86-91;W.Arkin and R.Fieldhouse,Nuclear Battlefield,Global Links in the Arms Race,Cambridge,Mass.:Ballinger,1985,p.231.
192 U.S.Forces Korea/Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report," Seoul 1978,p.6,declassified by The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
193 Ibid.
194 W.Scott and T.Y.Lee,"ROK-US Combined Forces Command," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum,Fall 1982,p.29.
195 T.Carrington,"Koreans Harbor Resentment of the U.S.Over Their Subordinate Role in Defense," Wall Street Journal,July 28,1987,p.28.
196 与美国缔结有核合作双边协定的北约国家有比利时、加拿大、希腊、意大利、荷兰、土耳其、英国和西德。See Thomas B.Cochran,William M.Arkin,Milton M.Hoenig,Nuclear Weapons Databook,Volume Ⅰ:U.s.Nuclear Forces and Capabilities,Ballinger Pub.Co.,Cambridge,England,1984,p.94.
197 Robert S.Norris,William M.Arkin and William Burr,"Where they were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.55,No.6,November/December 1999,p.30.
198 Ibid.
199 Paul Buteux,The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO,1965-1980,New York:Cambridge University Press,1983,p.87.
200 Ibid.,p.212.
201 Ibid.,p.50,69.
202 Headquarters Eighth U.S.Army,"Quarterly Historical Summary Historical Report,April-June 1966," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,Seoul,1966,p.16,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html.
203 Ibid.,p.9.
204 Ibid.
205 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,pp.109-110.
206 Headquarters,Eighth U.S.Army,Organization and Functions,Regulation 10-1,May 22,1984,pp.5-21,27,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
207 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.111.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.,p.112.
210 Nineteenth Support Command,"Annual Historical Review CY 1985," p.17,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
211 Ninth Air Force Air Combat Command,"History of 4th Fighter Wing:January-June 1998,"Vol.1,December 1998,declassified,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/4fw98.pdf;Hans M.Kristensen,"U.S.Nuclear Strike Planning Against North Korea," The Nuclear Information Project,Nuclear Brief,September 28,2005,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/koreaplanning.htm
212 Hans M.Kristensen,"Preemptive Posturing;What happened to deterrence?" Bulletin of Atomic Scientist,September/October 2002,pp.55-56.
213 Office of the Inspector General,DoD,"Year 2000 Compliance of the Trident Submarine Command and Control System," Report No.99-167,May 24,1999,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/IG99-167.pdf
214 Hans M.Kristensen,"U.S.Nuclear Strike Planning Against North Korea," The Nuclear Information Project,Nuclear Brief,September 28,2005,available at http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/koreaplanning.htm
215 American Nukes in South Korea,available at http://www.kimsoft.com/2003/us-nukes-sk.htm
216 Ibid
217 朱锋:“‘核态势评估报告'与小布什政府新核战略”,《世界经济与政治》,2002年第6期,第22页。
218 上引文,第23-24页。
219 "Nuclear Posture Review:Excerpts," pp.16-17,available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm
220 吴大辉:《防范与合作:苏联解体后的俄美核安全关系(1991-2005)》,人民出版社,2005年版,第1页。
221 Hans M.Kristensen,"Preemptive Posturing:What Happened to Deterrence?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 2002,p.58.
222 Jonas Siegel,"In Harm's Way," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,May/June 2005,p.34.
223 Sohn Suk-joo,"S.Korea divided over redeployment of U.S.tactical nuclear weapons," Yonhap News Agency,October 19,2006.
224[韩]朴民赫:“前总统金泳三采访录”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月12日。
225[韩]尹相虎:“韩美决定制定‘核保护伞'具体方案”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月20日。
226[韩]尹相虎:“韩美签署《核伞保护具体保障》声明”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月21日;[韩]尹相虎:“韩美就作战指挥权收回时间达成协议“,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月23日。
1 See Arnold Kramish,The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy,New York:Harper & Row,1963,pp.3-9;Peter R.Lavoy,"The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace," Arms Control Today,December 2003,available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Lavoy.asp
2 John A.Hall,"Atoms for Peace,or War," Foreign Affairs,July 1965,p.505.
3 到1958年,在海外接受培训的韩国科学家达到89人。See Young-Sun Ha,Nuc&ar Proliferation,World Order andKorea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.83.
4 Nuclear Threat Initiative,South Korea Profile,Nuclear Chronology,available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3046.html
5 Eighth United States Army,Staff Historian's Office,"Chronology:1 January 1968-30 June 1968," p.17,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
6 Nuclear Threat Initiative,South Korea Profile,Nuclear Chronology,available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3046.html
7 Ibid.
8 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,pp.83-84.
9 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003.p55.
10 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.88.
11 Ibid.
12 Jungmin Kang & H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shitting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,p.71.
13 Ibid.
14 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.102.
15 古里反应堆在1978年开始工作。
16 Nuclear Threat Iniative,South Korea Profile,Nuclear Chronology,available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3046.html
17 See Mark Hibbs,"Legacy of Secret Nuclear Program Led U.S.to Blunt R.O.K.Cooperation,"Nucleonics Week,January 7,1999,p.10.
18 Yong-sun Ha,"Nucleadzation of Small States and World Order:The Case of Korea,",Asian Survey,Vol.18,No.11,November 1978,p.1137.
19 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.58.
20 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order andKorea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.127.
21 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.59.
22[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第228页。
23 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.247.
24[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第220-255页。
25 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.69.
26 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.65.
27 从韩国政府的官僚体制上看,国防发展局和防务工业署归国防部,工业发展研究所归商业部,韩国科技所归科技部。See Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.70.
28[韩]吴源哲:《全斗焕和美国阻止了韩国的导弹开发》,《新东亚》,1996年1月,第423-447页。
29 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.72.
30[韩]具祥会:《开发武器系统的30年》,《国防与技术》,1998年,第86-91页。
31 Janne E.Nolan,Trappings of Power:Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,Washington:Brookings Institution,1991,p.49-50.
32 Peter Hayes,"The Two Koreas and the International Missile Trade," in W.C.Potter and H.W.Jencks,ed.,The International Missile Bazaar,Bouler:Westview Press,1993,p.136-138.
33 Peter Hayes,"Early Indicators:ROK Long-Range Missile Capabilities," NAPSNET,published by the Nautilus Institute,Berkeley,California,November 17,1999,p.2.
34 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.62.
35 朝鲜“自主防卫的四点方针”的内容是:一、武装全部人口,建立一支装备精良的民兵和一支准备作战的预备役部队;二、强化重要的工业、运输和信息中心的防御工事,和增加军事设施的防御能力;三、训练一支精英的军官队伍;四、实现军事装备和军事作战理念的现代化。See Kim Jung-Ik,The Future of the US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship,New York:St.Martin's Press,1996,p.20.
36 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),The Military Balance 1970/71,London:IISS,1970,pp.45-46.
37 Kim Jung-Ik,The Future of the US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship,New York:St.Martin's Press,1996,p.38.
38 Ibid.,pp.38-40.
39 1968年1月18日,朝鲜突击队31人从非军事区的南界潜入韩国境内。据韩国描述,朝鲜突击队的任务是攻入韩国总统府青瓦台刺杀朴正熙。1月21日,突击队已经行进到离总统府800米的地方,但遭遇韩国的警察,之后,突击队分散为小组,分开行动。这些突击队员仅有一人被抓获,其余被韩国武装力量杀死,或自杀。See Chuck Downs,Over the Line:North Korea's Negotiating Strategy,Washington D.C.:The AEI Press,Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute,p.121.
40 美国认为,美国的情报船在靠近朝鲜海域的公海上游弋,但被朝鲜非法扣留。而朝鲜认为,美国的间谍船进入朝鲜海域,侵犯朝鲜主权,所以朝鲜扣留该船。一年之后,朝鲜释放了船员,但未归还美国的船只。See Chuck Downs,Over the Line:North Korea's Negotiating Strategy,Washington D.C.,The AEI Press,Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute,1999,PP.122-123.
41 1969年4月,朝鲜击落了一架美国海军的EC-121侦察机,飞机上的31名美国海军人员遇难。平壤电台广播认为,朝鲜击落了一架入侵朝鲜领空的飞机。而美国坚持说,像之前的几百架飞机一样,EC-121正在执行一个例行的侦查任务,平行于朝鲜飞过日本海。See Chuck Downs,Over the Line:North Korea's Negotiating Strategy,Washington D.C.:The AEI Press,Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute,1999,p.146.
42 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.55.
43 参见[韩]吴源哲:《韩国式的经济建设》,汉城:起亚经济研究所出版,第28页。
44 当1970年3月美国表示要撤军时,韩国领导人就表现出强烈的不满。然而,美国并没有与韩国商谈撤军事宜。1970年8月,美国副总统斯皮罗·阿格纽(Spiro T.Agnew)访问汉城,朴正熙以一种很不客气的口吻向阿格纽阐述了撤军带来的问题。原先计划为一个小时的会议进行了六个小时。但是,在离开汉城前的新闻发布会上,阿格纽仍然强调,所有的美国军队在5年内将被完全撤离,这无疑更加剧了韩国的忧虑。See Seung-Young Kim,“Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82,"Diplomacy&Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.55.
45 Ibid.
46 韩国在1964年向南越派出了2218名医护人员和工程部队,在1965年派出一个步兵师 18904人,在1966年又派出另外一个步兵师23865人,在1967年派出海军部队2963人。到1967年时,韩国在南越驻军总数达5万人。至于韩国向南越派兵的原因,朴正熙的说法是,“这是我们增强自由世界前线的道德责任的一部分,同时也是向帮助过韩国的人们表达谢意的一种方式”。实际上,更加现实的原因是,韩国希望以这种方式稳住美国在韩国的军事存在。因为之前有报道,美国打算撤出在韩国的驻军来增加在南越的常规力量。See Kim Jung-Ik,The Future of US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship,ST.Martin's Press,INC.,1996,p.36.
47 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.127.
48 See U.S.House Committee on International Relations,Subcommittee of International Organization,Report,Investigation of Korea-American Relations,October 31,1978,Washington,D.C.:U.S.Government Printing Office,1978,p.80;William Gleysteen Jr.,Massive Entanglement,Marginal Influence:Carter and Korea in Crisis,Washington,DC.:Brookings 1999,p.23.
49[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第226页,第237页。
50 Ibid.
51 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,World Order and Korea,Seoul:Seoul National University Press,1983,p.127.
52 Embassy Intelligence and Washington Instructions,DOS cable "ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,"March 4,1975,declassified 1997,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.70.
53 Yong-sun Ha,"Nuclearization of Small States and World Order:The Case of Korea," Asian Survey,Vol.18,No.11,November 1978,p.1137.
54 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.64.
55[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第234页。
56 假如韩国拥有后处理能力的话,从古里堆中取出的乏燃料一年可以生产出20-28个当量为2万吨TNT的核武器。See Yong-sun Ha,"Nuclearization of Small States and World Order:The Case of Korea,"Asian Survey,Vol.18,No.11,November 1978,p.1138.
57 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.52-55.
58 Donald S.Zagoria,and Young Kun Kim,"North Korea and the Major Powers," Asian Survey,Vol.15,No.12(December,1975),p.1020.
59 Ibid.
60 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.64.
61 Ibid.
62 "Schlesinger Warns N.Korea U.S.May Use Nuclear Arms",St.Louis Post Despatch,21 June,1975.
63 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.60.
64 W.Carpenter,"The Maintenance of U.S.Forces in Korea," report to the U.S.Department of the Army,Strategic Studies Center,Stanford University,June 1975,p.127.
65[韩]吴源哲:《朴正熙和卡特的搏斗》,《新东亚》,1994年11月,第430页。
66 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.249.
67 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.249.
68[韩]赵甲济:《韩半岛的核游戏》,《朝鲜月刊》,1990年4月,第237-238页。
69 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.73.
70 Sang Hun Coe,"South Korea was Close to A-Bomb Development in Early 1980s," The Associated Press,October 5,1995.
71 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,Worm Order andKorea,Seoul:Seoui National University Press,1983,p.126.
72 Ibid.,pp.121-122.
73 NH-k-1采用二级推进,固体燃料推动,最大射程为180千米。由大同机器公司和金星精密工业公司(现在的LG集团)制造。NH-k-1后来改名为“白熊”导弹。
74 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003.p.74.
75 Janne E.Nolan,Trappings of Power:Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,Washington:Brookings Institution,1991,p.50.
76 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.68.
77 "Official Hints South Korea Might Build Atom Bomb," New York Times,June 30,1977,p.4.
78 Michael J.Siler,"U.S.Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the Northeast Asian Region During the Cold War:The South Korean Case," East Asian Studies,Autumn/Winter 1998,p.70.
79 World Nuclear Association,Nuclear Power in Korea,November 2006,available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.htm
80 1976年1月26日,韩国和加拿大签署和平利用核能的协定。其中包括韩国向加拿大购买一座坎杜型重压水堆,即之后的月城1号。受到之前韩国向加拿大购买NRX实验堆事件的影响,此合作协议强调加拿大不会向韩国提供任何可以用于核武器制造的材料。See“French A-Plant Purchase Canceled,''Facts On File World News Digest,February 7,1976.
81 1980年12月,法国法马通公司拿到韩国的两座核电机组蔚珍1号和2号的合同。See "French Companies Upset Westinghouse,"The Associated Press,November 7,1 980.
82 1990年12月,加拿大原子能公司与韩国电力公司签署合同,建造月城2号。See M.H.Ahn."Canadian Company Signs Contract for Nuclear Power Plant,"The Associated Press,December 28,1990;1992年9月,加拿大国际工业部宣布,加拿大原子能公司再向韩国提供两个700兆瓦的坎杜型堆,月城3号和4号。See"AECL Sells Two More CANDUS To Korea,"Canada Newswire,September 18,1992.
83 "French Companies Upset Westinghouse," The Associated Press,November 7,1980.
84 1990年5月,韩国与苏联订立从1990年到1999年共进口390吨浓缩铀的合同。See Shin Hochul,“KEPCO to Buy About 40 Metric Tons/YR of Enriched Uranium from Soviet Union,''Nuclear Fuel,March 19,1990,p.5;1994年12月,英国核燃料公司与韩国电力公司签署协议,从1996年开始向韩国提供六氟化铀。See Pearl Marshall,“BNFL Signs UF6 Contract with KEPCO,"Nuclear Fuel,December 5,1994,p.13;2002年7月,韩国电力公司官员说,他们与哈萨克斯坦签订从2006年到2014年每年购买800吨黄饼的合同。See Cha Byung Hak,“KEPCO to Buy Kazakhstan Yellow Cake,"Chosun Ilbo,July 25.2002.
85 韩国最早的3台商用核电机组是古里1号、古里2号、和月城1号。
86 之后的6座反应堆,古里3号和4号,桂马1号和2号,蔚珍1号和2号,构成韩国的第二代核电站。在建造桂马1号和2号时,西屋公司将建造反应堆系统和涡轮发电机的技术转让给韩国公司,而且韩国核动力科技公司首次参与了这两个反应堆的设计。
87 桂马3号和4号机组就采用“系统80”的设计。桂马3号和4号的国产化程度已经很高。1988年6月13日,韩国电力公司总裁在加拿大核协会会议上讲,韩国将在2000年实现核技术的自主。他说,打算在1995-1996年运行的桂马3号和4号反应堆,将有79%的国内 设计和72%的韩国国内生产的设施和材料。See Ray Silver,“South Korea Pursuing Nuclear Self-Reliance,''Nucleonics Week,June 30,1988,p.10.
88 蔚珍3号、4号、5号、6号和桂马5号、6号就采用的是KSNP标准。
89 这项计划包括:对相关构件设计的改进、提高安全性和经济性、优化核电站厂房布置、以及降低核电站建造成本等。新古里1号和2号机组是KSNP+系列的首批机组。
90 这一设计的特点是安全性得到加强,而且运行时间延长至60年。首批APR-1400型核电机组新古里3号和4号以及新蔚珍1号和2号,目前处于合同准备阶段,预计2013-2016年投入运行。
91 "France/Korea," Nucleonics Week,28 July,1994,p.16.
92 "South Korea to Build Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant," Japan Economic Newswire,12 June 1985.
93 Gregg M.Taylor,"KEPCO Plans 18 More Reactors by 2006," Nuclear News,November 1992,p.41.
94 Han Dong Soo,"ROK to Develop Nuclear Fusion Technology," Korea Times,July 25,1995.
95 "So Korea to Participate in Fusion Energy Research Project," Asia Pulse,June 17,2003.
96 1993年12月,韩国电力公司与中国大亚湾核电站签署两年的合同,为大亚湾核电站提供部分技术支持。See Margaret L.Ryan,“Koran Nuclear Industry Takes First Steps into Exoort Market,"Nucleonics Week,June2,1994,p.1;1994年10月中旬,韩国和中国达成民用核能方面的合作协议。See"S.Korea,China Ague to Nuclear Cooperation,"Japan Economic Newswire,October 19,1994;1994年,韩国与土耳其开展核能合作。See“Late News in Brief,”Nuclear News,February 1995,p.18;1995年4月,韩国同意向越南核能项目提供技术支持,包括参与建设越南筹划中的第一个核电站。See"South Korea Backs Viemamese Nuclear Power Proiects,"Agence France Press,April 12,1995;1997年lO月,韩国表示,希望参与土耳其Akkuyu反应堆的建设和开发。See“Korea Wishes to Participate in Turkey's Nuclear Plant Proiect,''Korea Times,October 30,1997,p.2.
97 "OECD Official Says ROK May Become Nuclear Exporter," Korea Times,April 9,1999.
98 "Seoul Promoting Exports of Nuclear Power Technology," Korea Herald,January 17,2001.
99 2001年1月,韩国与巴西达成核能合作方面的协议。See"S.Korea-Brazil South Korea and Brazil Consolidate Bilateral Relations,"EFE News Service,January 18,2001;2001年8月,韩国与埃及签订和平利用核能的协议。See"Egypt,South Korea Sign Agreement on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power,"Cairo MENA,August 12,2001;2001年10月,韩国与泰国签署核能合作的备忘录。See“Korea,Thailand to Sign Memo on Atomic Energy Cooperation,''Ministry of Science and Technology,October 15.2001.
100 "ROK's Yonhap:Doosan Heavy Wins $68 Mln.Power Equipment Contract," Yonhap News Agency,August 14,2002.
101 2003年7月,韩国和罗马尼亚签署关于核能合作的谅解备忘录。该备忘录的内容是,两国合作考察罗马尼亚的塞尔那伏达(Cernavoda)3号反应堆的重建可能性。Cernavoda3号项目在1991年因为财政原因中止。同时,该备忘录还要求韩国向Cernavodal号和2号提供建设、技术指导和人力资源培训等支持。See"South Korea,Romania Sign MOU on N-Power Plant,''Yonhap News Agency,July 21,2003.
102 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.60.
103 Ibid.,p.61.
104 1989年该所又重新改回原来的名字。See Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82,"Diplomacy&Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.70.
105 Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.49.
106 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.86,p.89.
107 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.124-133.
108 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 200I,p.70.
109 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.249-250.
110 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,1997,p.260.
111 Gene Kramer,"US Welcomes Korea Nuclear Accord," The Associated Press,December 31,1991;Paul Shin,"Koreas Initial Pact on Nuclear-Free Korean Pen.insula," The Associated Press,December 31,1991.
112 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),The Military Balance 1988/89,London:IISS,1988,pp.167-169.
113 Paul Shin,"U.S.Said to Stop South Korea's Nuke Bomb Plans," The Washington Times,March 29,1994;"Seoul Planned Nuclear Weapons Until 1991," Jane's Defense Weekly,April 2,1994,p.1.
114 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.250.
115[韩]《韩半岛的非核化不变,继续研究和平利用--金泳三总统讲话》,《东亚日报》,1993年11月2日,第2版。
116 "Korea Needs to Accumulate Tech to Manufacture Atomic Bombs," Korea Times,October 3,1997,p.2.
117 "ROK Ex-Generals Favor Post-Unification Nuclear Capability," Yonhap News Agency,January 19,2000.
118 Jungmin Kang and H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,p.72.http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/Development-of-NW-in-NEAsia
119 日本东海村的后处理厂从1981年开始处理乏燃料,在1997年3月因火灾运行暂停过一段时间,截至2002年底累积处理乏燃料约1009吨。青森县六个所后处理厂于1991年施工,2005年7月完成建造工作。See John H.Large,“The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia,"Greenpeace International.Large&Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.5,available at
120 1997年2月4日,日本政府表示,日本将在它的轻水堆中使用混合氧化物(MOX)燃料。这一计划预计,到2000年将在3至4个反应堆中使用混合氧化物燃料,并在2010年推广至10个左右的反应堆。到2005年,日本从欧洲接收了5吨MOX燃料,在接下来的5年中还将接收5到10吨MOX燃料。See John H.Large,“The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia,"Greenpeace International.Large&Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.5.
121 大型轻水堆(压水堆和BWR)不太适合钚的生产。石墨气冷堆和连续注料的重水堆比较适合钚的生产。韩国的CANDU堆便属于连续注料的重水堆。
122 乏燃料中的钚主要有两种同位素Pu239和Pu240。Pu240指标越高,越不利于核武器设计。钚的级别按照同位素Pu240的含量多少来定:超级钚含2%至3%,武器级钚含量小于7%,燃料级钚含7%到19%之间,反应堆级钚含19%以上。参见托马斯·科克伦等著,王连奎等译,《核武器手册:美国的核弹头生产》(第二卷),国防工业出版社,第111页。
123 John H.Large,"The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia," Greenpeace International,Large & Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.17.
124 Jungmin Kang and H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,p.72.
125 Ibid.
126 1995年中后期,韩国对混合氧化物燃料的使用也表现出兴趣。See Mark Hibbs,"Candu MOX Fabrication Costs are Unfavorable,Germans Say,"Nuclear Fuel,September 11,1995,p.8.
127 Mark Hibbs,"South Korea Renews Quest for Plutonium Separation Ability,"Nucleonics Week,October 29,1992,p.7.
128 Pearl Marshall,"BNFL,KAERI to Investigate Using REPU in South Korean Candu Stations,"Nuclear Fuel,December 30,1996,p.7.
129 Mark Hibbs,"KEPCO Wants to Reprocess Offshore,Take Back MOX and Recycle PU,REPU," Nuclear Fuel,April 7,1997,p.3;Ann MacLachlan,"Cogema's 1996 Results 'Respectable',But No 'Source of Joy',Syrota Says," Nuclear Fuel,April 7,1997,p.4.
130 Mark Hibbs,"KEPCO Says it has no Plans to Implement DUPIC Fuel Cycle," Nuclear Fuel,December 16,1996,p.11.
131 "KEPCO Plans to Use Reprocessed Nuclear Energy from Abroad," Chosun Ilbo,February 17,1997.
132 Mark Hibbs,"No Spent Fuel Reprocessing,New KEPCO CEO Chang Declares," Nuclear Fuel,October 19,1998,p.5.
133 Mark Hibbs,"ROK Told KEPCO to Postpone Offshore Reprocessing Quest," Nuclear Fuel,April 21,1997,p.12.
134 Mark Hibbs,"No Spent Fuel Reprocessing,New KEPCO CEO Chang Declares," Nuclear Fuel,October 19,1998,p.5.
135 报道说,韩国和法国的一些核工业界人士在等2001年张荣植的任期结束,他们期望新的总裁上任后会改变这一政策。这些人士主张,两座蔚珍反应堆不属于美国限制的范围,因为它的燃料是法国提供的。因此,韩国有权利对这两座堆的乏燃料进行后处理。See Mark Hibbs,"Reprocessing Bid After Chang tO Center on Ulchin Spent Fuel,"Nuclear Fuel,April 19,1999,p.3.
136 Samuel Lee,"Government Replace KEPCO President," Korea Herald,April 20,1999.
137 "South Korean Rules Out Plutonium at N.Korea's KEDO Reactors," Jiji Press Ticker Service,April 12,1999.
138 Mark Hibbs,"Chang's Successor Will Reopen Reprocessing Option,Officials Say," Nuclear Fuel,June 28,1999,p.8.
139 Mark Hibbs,"KHNP Finding Market Deregulation Disincentive to Close Fuel Cycle," Nuclear Fuel,May 13,2002,p.4.
140 Mark Hibbs,"Korean Fast Reactor Program on Leach,US Officials Say," Nucleonics Week,July 11,2002,p.8.
141 "Seoul to Start Multinational Work on Nuclear Project Next Year," Asia Pulse,November 27,2002.
142 Jungmin Kang and H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shitting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,p.73.
143 "DUPIC Celebrated Open Lab," TCNC Newsletter,April 1,2000,available at http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr/Newsletter/tcncnews.htm
144 Mark Hibbs,"US Won't Favor Candu Purchase by Korea to Deter Reprocessing," Nucleonics Week,June 4,1998,p.8.
145 当卡特在1977年宣布美国无限期推迟商业后处理政策时,日本已经完成了东海村后处理设施的建设。卡特的宣布让日本人目瞪口呆。之后,美日达成协议,日本可以进行商业后处理的活动,但日本需要在每次后处理美国来源的燃料时提请美国的同意。See Kumao Kaneko,Atsuyuki Suzuki,Jor-Shan Choi,Edward Fei,”Energy and Security in Northeast Asia:Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation,''IGCC Policy Papers,University of California,Multi-Campus Reserch Unit.Aooendix 2:Peaceful Use of Plutonium in Jaoan,available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=igcc
146 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),p.44.
147 IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11 November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_korea.html
148 Mark Hibbs,"77%U-235 Was Peak Enrichment Reported to IAEA by South Korea,"NuclearFuel,Vol.29,No.30,September 27,2004,pp.7-8;Mark Gorwitz,"The South Korean Laser Isotope Separation Experience," ISIS Online,October 5,2004,< http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/sklisword2.html>.
149 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),p.46;Jack Kim,"S.Korean Munitions Violated Nuclear Accord-Group," Reuters,October 21,2004.
150 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),p.46.
151 Mark Hibbs,"ROK Claimed IAEA Knew of U Work,Pressed for No IAEA Board Report,"Nucleonics Week,Vol.45 No.39,September 23,2004,p.1;Mark Hibbs,'"We Played this Badly,Koreans Say about IAEA Report Response," Nucleonics Week,Vol.45,No.40,September 30,2004,pp.7-8.
152 Sang-Hun Choe,"South Korea Extracted Plutonium in 1982," The Associated Press,September 9,2004.
153 See IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11 November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_ korea.html
154 日本和法国曾试验化学浓缩铀法,但在1980年代末放弃。这种方法被认为不能生产高浓缩铀。See Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujim Suzuki and Richard Tanter,“South Korea's nuclear surprise,''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),D.46.
155 IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11 November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_korea.html
156 第一代是气体扩散法,第二代是气体离心机技术。美国和法国最早在70年代开始开发激光浓缩铀技术,但之后都未能成功发展为商业浓缩铀的技术。See John H Large,The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Nuclear Weapons Technoloty in the Area of North East Asia(Korean Peninsular and Japan),Greenpeace International,Large&Associates:London,2005 May,Appendix Ⅰ。
157 "US Government Authorizations Received for Silex-General Electric Agreement," October 04,2006,available at www.silex.com.au/public/uploads/announce/US%20Government%20Authorizations%20Received.pdf
158 IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_korea.html
159 Mark Hibbs,"Korean Safety Agency to Take over Nuclear Materials Accounting Center,"Nuclear Fuel,Vol.29,No.23,November 8,2004,pp.3-5;Daniel A.Pinkston,"South Korea's Nuclear Experiments," Center for Nonproliferation Studies Research Report,November 9,2004,http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/041109.htm
160 Jungmin Kang,Tatsujiro Suzuki,Peter Hayes,"South Korea's Nuclear Mis-Adventures,"Nautilus Sepecial Report,September 10,2004,http://www.nautilus.org/archives/pub/ftp/napsnet/special_reports/0435-ROK.html
161 Paul Kerr,"IAEA:Seoul's Nuclear Sins in the Past," Arms Control Today,December 2004,http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Seoul.asp
162 Paul Kerr,"IAEA:Seoul's Nuclear Sins in the Past," Arms Control Today,December 2004,http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Seoul.asp
163 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1,January/February 2005,p.46.
164 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 200I,p.71.
165 Sangsun Shim 对一位前国防发展厅官员的言谈。 See Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:.4 Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.76.
166[韩]吴源哲:《全斗焕和美国阻止了韩国的导弹开发》,《新东亚》,1996年1月,第445-447页。
167 Lee Sng Yul,"U.S.Pressured Chun Doo Hwan to Scuttle Missile Development Program,"Korea Herald,June 10,1999,p.3.
168 NH-k-3射程为300千米,NH-k-5射程为500千米。这两种导弹的设计已经与奈基一大力神导弹的设计完全不同。See Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82,"Diplomacy&Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.71.
169 Ibid.,p.80.
170 韩国认为,这一爆炸案是朝鲜策划的恐怖式袭击。在这次爆炸案中,全斗焕失去了其半数的内阁成员。See Chuck Downs,Over the Line:North Korea's Negotiating Strategy,Washington D.C.:The AEI Press,Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute,1999,pp.162-164.
171 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vo 1.12,No.4,December 2001,p.72.
172 《导弹技术控制协议》对成员国的约束是,不能发展射程超过300公里并且载重超过500千克的导弹。而1979年美韩导弹谅解备忘录对韩国的限制是,不能发展超过180公里的导弹。
173 Bill Gertz,"South Korea Counters North's Missiles," The Washington Times,December 2,1996.
174 Ibid.
175 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.255.
176 David E.Sanger and Eric Schmitt,"U.S.Fears Arms Race on Korean Peninsula," New York Times,July 1,1999;James Risen,"South Korea Seen Trying to Extend Range of Missile," New York Times,November 14,1999.
177 Frank Sietzen,Jr.,"US/South Korea To Sign Launch Agreement," Terradaily,April 29,1999,available at http://www.terradaily.com/news/korea-99a.html
178 "Kim:This is Basically a Win-Win Policy," The Washington Times,October 19,1999.
179 David E.Sanger and Eric Schmitt,"U.S.Fears Arms Race on Korean Peninsula," New York Times,July 1,1999.
180 "Mid-Range Missiles Ordered From U.S.," Joongang Ilbo,May 1,2002,http://www.nautilus.org/archives/napsnet/dr/0201/JAN07.html#item9
181 Bill Gertz,"South Korea Counters North's Missiles," The Washington Times,December 2,1996.
182 Jong-Heon Lee,"South Korea Develops Cruise Missile," United Press International,Sep 21,2006.
183 Jung Sung-ki,"Seoul Develops 1,000-KM Cruise Missile," Korea Times,October 24,2006.
184 秦鸥,柳泳元:“韩国成立导弹司令部”,《环球时报》,2006年10月1日。
185 这一机构于1996年成为独立机构。See Peter Marquez,"South Korea:A Space Power by Proxy,"in Rebecca Jimerson and Ray Williamson,eds.,Space and Military Power in East Asia,George Washington University,http://www.gwu.edu/～spi/spacemilch6.html.
186 STRATFOR.COM,"Unintended consequences:proliferation in South Korea," Mar 7,2001,available at http://www.atimes.com/koreas/CC08Dg01.html
187 Mark Wade,"South Korea," Astronautix.com,Accessed June 21,2006.available at http://www.astronautix.com/country/korsouth.htm
188 SpaceAndTech.com,"South Korea Publishes Launch Vehicle Development Budget," January 8,2001,available at http://www.spaceandtech.com/digest/sd2001-01/sd2001-01-003.shtml
189 Mark Wade,"Korea South," Astronautix.com,available at http://www.astronautix.com/country/korsouth.htm
190 “夜间入侵者300”的飞行半径为200公里,有效载荷为45千克。See“South Korean UAVs:U.S.Rejects Sale of Global Hawk,As ROK Domestic Capabilities Grow,"WMD Insights,Dec 2005/Jan 2006 Issue,http://wmdinsights.org/11/EA2_SouthKoreanUAVs.htm
191 此后,韩国的韩国国防发展局和韩国航空航天公司开始开发一个中等飞行高度和长滞空时间(medium-altitude long-endurance,MALE)的无人机,打算在2007年或2008年取代“夜间入侵者”,然后进一步开发更为先进的高飞机高度和长滞空时间(high-altitude long-endurance,HALE)的无人机。See"South Korean UAVs:U.S.Reiects Sale of Global Hawk,As ROK Domestic Caoabilities Grow,"WMD Insights.Dec 2005/Jan 2006 Issue,available at http://wmdinsights.org/I1/EA2_SouthKoreanUAVs.htm
192 “全球鹰”属于高飞机高度和长滞空时间的无人机,有两种型号:RQ-4A,飞行半径为22236千米,有效载荷为907千克;RQ-4B,飞机半径为22780,有效载荷为1360千克。See Stephen Trimble.“Arms Agreement Means No Global Hawk for South Korea,”Flight International,July 19-25,2005,p.7.
1 Alexandre Y.Mansourov,"The Origins,Evolution,and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuc.lear Program," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1995,p.26.
2 Georgiy Kaurov,"A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y.Mansourov eds.,The North Korean Nuclear Program:Security,Strategy,and New Perspectives from Russia,Routledge:New York and London,2000,pp.15-16.
3 Alexandre Y.Mansourov,"The Origins,Evolution,and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1995,p.26.
4 Alexander Zhebin,"A Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y.Mansourov eds.,The North Korean Nuclear Program:Security,Strategy,andNew Perspectives from Russia,Routledge:New York and London,2000,p.31.
5 Georgiy Kaurov,"A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y.Mansourov eds.,The North Korean Nuclear Program:Security,Strategy,and New Perspectives from Russia,Routledge:New York and London,2000,pp.16-17.
6 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Isotope Production Laboratory,"http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/45_511.html
7 反应堆的功率可以用热功率(MWt)和电功率(MWe)来计量。钚生产堆功率的计量一般用热功率,但由于朝鲜强调其反应堆的民用性质,所以朝鲜一直使用电功率的计量方式。
8 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Nuclear Facilities:5MW(e)Experimental Reactor,"available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/45_551.html:David Albright and Kevin O'Neill,eds.,Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle,Washington,D.C.:Institute For Science And International Security,2000,pp.146-165;李彬,《朝鲜的军备发展》,载《军备控制研究与进展》,第2卷,2004年,第1期,第8页.
9 David Albright and Mark Hibbs,"North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,November 1992,p.38.
10 David Albright,"How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,p.50.
11 美国核物理学家罗伯特·艾瓦莱斯在访问宁边核设施时,询问朝鲜科学家为什么采取这一设计,朝鲜科学家的回答强调这一点。See Robert Alvarez,"North Korea:No Bygones at Yongbyon,''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,July/August 2003,p.41.
12 John H.Large,"The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia," Greenpeace International,Large & Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.11.
13 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.33.
14 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Yongbyon Fuel Fabrication Plant," available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/45_541.html
15 5WMe反应堆大约需要8000个这样的核燃料棒(由大约50吨的天然铀生产)。50MWe 反应堆大约需要64000个这样的燃料棒(需要大约400吨天然铀),而200MWe反应堆则需要224000个核燃料棒(需要大约1400吨天然铀)。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes."A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.33-34.
16 David Albright,"How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,pp.46-47.
17 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes.A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.36.
18 David Albright,"How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,p.47.
19 Ibid.
20 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.37.
21 David Albright,"How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,pp.47-48.
22 美国国务院的估计是6-8千克,美国中央情报局和防务情报局的估计是8-9千克。See NRDC Nuclear Notebook,"North Korea's Nuclear Program,2003",Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,March/April 2003,pp.75.
23 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.38.
24 美国使用卫星图片指出,朝鲜隐藏了两个地下的核废料存储场所。一处是与IRT-2000和最早的“放射化学实验室”相联系的设施,另一处是被称为“500号楼”的废料场,与后来的后处理设施相联系(美国的情报称,这个建筑的地下室被分成间隔间,来储存固体和液体的放射性废料)。IAEA要求进入这两个设施进行核查。朝鲜首先拒绝IAEA进入第一个设施核查。之后,朝鲜允许IAEA进入改装后的“500号楼”,但IAEA被告知没有美国情报所称的地下室。而且,朝鲜拒绝IAEA进一步进入以及在“500号楼”的地下采集样本的要求。1993年2月,IAEA要求对这两个设施进行“特别检查”。1993年3月,朝鲜以使用退出NPT的权利来回应IAEA的要求,从而引发了1993-1994年的核危机。See David Albright,“How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?''The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,September/October 1994,pp.48-50.
25 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.38-39.
26 在冻结开始的前两年里,这些燃料棒被放置在一个乏燃料存储池中。在这段时间,燃料棒已经有很大程度的腐蚀。在接下来的几年中,在IAEA的监视下,这些乏燃料棒被放进400个充满了惰性气体的不锈钢筒中。这些筒由美国公司密封,然后再由IAEA贴上封条,最后放在存储池中。See Robert Alvarez,“North Korea:No Bygones at Yongbyon,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,July/August 2003,pp.41-43.
27 1998年初,根据脱北者提供的信息以及卫星图片,美国情报部门得出结论,朝鲜在宁边东北40公里的金仓里建设一个地下核设施,包括一个反应堆和一个后处理设施。经过一系列谈判,1999年3月,朝鲜允许美国进入金仓里进行调查,以换取美国的食品援助。1999年5月,美国派人视查了金仓里,但没有发现任何核设施。See“Uncovering The Truth About North Korea's Alleged Underground Nuclear Facility:The Kumchang-ri Controversy,''available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/uncover.htm
28 这8000个燃料棒被认为含有25-30千克的钚。如果按照10-30%的损失率计算的话,后处理之后大概可以获得17.5-27千克的钚,大概可以制造2-5枚核武器。See International Institute for Strategic Studies.North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.43.
29 David Sanger,"North Korea says it has made fuel for atom bombs," New York Times,July 15,2003.
50 例如,朝鲜官员告诉塞格福雷德·海克(Siegrfried Hecker),他们已经在2003年6月完成了8000个乏燃料棒的后处理。塞格福雷德·海克,斯坦福大学管理与工程系教授,核物理学家,与斯科特·赛根共同为斯坦福大学国际安全与军备控制中心(CISAC)的主任,曾担任美国洛斯一阿拉莫斯国家实验室主任。曾在2004年1月、2005年8月和2006年11月访问宁边和平壤,并多次在美国国会作证,他对朝鲜钚存量的分析成为朝鲜核状态最为重要的分析材料。See Siegfried Hecker,Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea,January 21,2004,p.6,available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf
31 Siegfried Hecker,"Technical summary of DPRK nuclear program," a paper presented at the 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference,Washington,D.C.,November 8,2005.
32 Cheon Seongwhun,Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea,Korea Institute for.National Unification,2006,p.73.
33 http://www.isis-online.org/images/dprk/dg_11sep05_5mwe_ann.jpg.
34 Cheon Seongwhun,Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea,Korea Institute for National Unification,2006,p.74.
35 Mark Hibbs,"Customs Intelligence Data Suggest DPRK Aimed at G-2 Type Centrifuge,"Nuclear Fuel,Vol.28,No.11,May 26,2003.
36 "Defector Leaked Details of North Korean Nuclear Program," Yomiuri Shimbun,December 18,2002.
37 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.41.
38 Ibid.
39 参见韩国学者千祥勋对布鲁斯·本奈特的访谈。See Cheon Seongwhun,“Assessing the Threat of North Korea's Nuclear Capability,”The Korean Journal of Deyense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅧ.No.3,Fall 2006,p.46.
40 David E.Sanger and James Dao,"U.S.Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea," New York Times,October 17,2002.
41 Dexter Filkins,"N.Korea Aid to Pakistan Raise Nuclear Fears," Los Angeles Times,August 23,1999.
42 Clenn Kessler,"Pakistan's N.Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny:Aid to Nuclear Arms Bid May Be Recent," Washington Post,November 13,2002.
43 切尼在2004年4月复旦大学的演讲中谈到,“卡扎菲从A.Q.汗那里获得了核材料生产技术和核武器设计。A.Q.汗还提供了同样的能力给朝鲜。所以,我们相信朝鲜拥有生产核武器的铀浓缩项目。”See“Remarks by the Vice President at Fudan University Followed by Student Bodv O&A.”Office ofthe Vice President,The White House,available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/print/20040415-1.html.
44 Mitchell Reiss,Robert Gallucci,"Red-handed:the truth about North Korea's weapons programs," Foreign Affairs,March/April,2005,pp.142-48
45 Salman Masood and David Rohde,"Pakistan Now Says Scientist Did Send Koreans Nuclear Gear," New York Times,Aug.25,2005.
46 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Yongbyon High Explosive Test Site,"http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/45_556.html
47 Cheon Seongwhun,"Assessing the Threat of North Korea's Nuclear Capability," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅧ.No.3,Fall 2006,p.47.
48 这份报告在1992年3月被公开于俄罗斯媒体。这份报告的全文登在1994年6月24日的 《消息报》(Izvestiya)上。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes."A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.46.
49 从1997年开始,美国侦查卫星发现朝鲜在龟城市(Kusong)附件的一处爆轰试验地址。1997年到1998年间,朝鲜至少在此地进行了3次炮轰试验。2003年7月,《纽约时报》报道,美国中情局将此处地址确定为龙德洞爆轰试验地址。See Nuclear Threat Initiative.North Korea Profile,”Yongdok-dong High Explosive Test Site,''http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/45_555.html
50 这份韩国国家情报中心(NIS)报告在韩国国会的情报委员会讨论中作证,之后在韩国媒体公开。See“Seoul Says North Korea Reprocessing Nuclear Rods,''Reuters,July 9,2003.
51 Federation of American Scientist,"CIA Responses to the Questions for the Record Form the Worldwide Threat Hearing of 11 February 2003," 18 August 2003,p.144,Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103qfr-cia.pdf
52 David Sanger,"New CIA Concerns on North Korean Weapons," New York Times,November 9,2003.
53 David Sanger and William Broad,"High Blast in North Korea Not a 'Nuclear Event,' Powell says," New York Times,Sept.12,2004.
54 David Sanger and William Broad,"U.S.Cites Signs of Korean Preparations for Nuclear Test,"New York Times,May 6,2005.
55 David Sanger and William Broad,"Pakistan may have aided North Korea A-test," New York Times,February 27,2004.
56 North Korea's Nuclear Tests in Pakistan,March 19,2004,available at http://www.kimsoft.com/2004/nk-pk-test.htm.
57 "Statement by the Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test," October 16,2006,http://www.dni.gov/announcements/20061016_release.pdf.
58 朝鲜最早的短程导弹是60年代末苏联向朝鲜提供的“蛙式”(FROG)火箭。之后不久,朝鲜就被认为很快就能够自行生产FROG系统。FROG系统有50-60公里的射程,可以投递400千克的烈性炸药或者化学武器弹头。但FROG不是弹道导弹。70年代初期,苏联开始将短程的“飞毛腿”导弹出口给其在中东的阿拉伯盟国。但并没有出口“飞毛腿”导弹给朝鲜。同时期,据西方研究者的研究,朝鲜也希望从中国获得弹道导弹,但没有成功。最后,朝鲜才转向与埃及的合作。See Joseph S.Bermudez Jr.,“A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,"Monterey Institute of International Studies.Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Occasional Paper No.2,November 1999,pp.2-8.
59 在70年代初,埃及从苏联进口了“飞毛腿”导弹,但1978年戴维营谅解之后,苏埃关系变冷,这使得埃及不得不从其它地方寻求导弹力量的维护和发展。这样,埃及开始与朝鲜合作。另外,“飞毛腿”导弹也相对容易仿制,体现在以下几方面:一、该导弹弹头在引擎停止工作时不与导弹的主体分离,这就避免了远程导弹弹头分离的技术难度。二、该导弹引擎的动力来源是煤油和硝酸,而这两者很容易生产。三、该导弹的喷气舵和导航系统也相对容易仿制。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes."A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.64.
60 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Missile Facilities,"http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/64.html
61 Joseph S.Bermudez Jr.,"A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Monterey Institute of International Studies,Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Occasional Paper No.2,November 1999,p.11.
62 Ibid.,p.12.
63 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.67.
64 Ibid.
65 US Secretary of Defense,"2000 Report to Congress:Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula," September 12,2000,available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Sept2000/korea09122000.html
66 I International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:.4 Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p,71.
67 “劳动”导弹是“火星”导弹的升级版。使用同样的液体推进技术,只不过增加了引擎的推动能力。See Joseph S.Bermudez JL,“A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,''Monterey Institute of International Studies,Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Occasional Paper No.2,November 1999,p.20.
68 "Defense Ministry:May Nodong-1 Test Successful," Yonhap News Agency,June 24,1993.
69 International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Military Balance 2003/2004,Oxford:Oxford University Press for the IISS,2003,p.160.
70 “大浦洞Ⅰ号”在朝鲜被称为“白头山Ⅰ号”。“大浦洞”是以发射场地所在的咸镜北道花台郡大浦洞的地名命名的,是国外的普遍叫法。当时,“大浦洞Ⅰ号”被认为是两级导弹,由改进后的“劳动”导弹作为第一节,“火星”导弹作为第二节。See Jeffery R.Smith."North Korea and the Bomb:High Tech Hide-and-Seek,"The Washington Post,March 18,1994.
71 第一节是改进后的“劳动”导弹,第二节使用引擎改装过的“火星”导弹。第三节是一个固体燃料的火箭。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.75.
72 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.78.
73 伦敦国际战略研究所的研究认为,朝鲜会使用由4个“劳动”导弹引擎组成的推动装置来作为“大浦洞2号”的第一节,用一个“劳动”导弹或者重新设计一个比“劳动”导弹更短但直径更大的装置作为第二节,用一个固体燃料推进的火箭作为第三节。当然,新的“大浦洞Ⅱ型”导弹会给朝鲜带来诸多的技术挑战,如第一节中4个引擎如何协调工作;朝鲜还需设计重返大气层时的热保护系统:要实现更远的射程需要将机体的重量减轻,同时也需要机体足够强壮以抵抗更大的压力。See International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.78-79.
74 National Intelligence Estimate,"Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years," November 1995,available at www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nie9519.htm
75 Report of Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States,July 15 1998,available at www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/newnote.html
76 National Intelligence Council,Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,September 1999,available at www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/foreign_missile_developments.htm
77 National Intelligence Council,Foreign Missile Developments,December 2001.
78 "Russia:North Korea Unable to Advance in Missile Development," Middle East Newsline,Vol.3,No.248,June 26,2001.
79 Federation of American Scientists,"No-dong Launch Facility," available at www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/Nodong.htm
80 Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile,"Missile Overview," available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/index.html
81 Cheon Seongwhun,"Assessing the Threat of North Korea's Nuclear Capability," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅧ.No.3,Fall 2006,p.50.
82 David Sanger,"CIA said to find North Korean nuclear advances," New York Times,July 1,2003.
83 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.46.
84 参见[韩]尹相虎:“军事当局:北韩拥有的钚能制造6、7个核武器”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月26日。
85[韩]“北韩核武器瞄准的是韩国”,《东亚日报》(中文版)社论,2006年10月25日。
86 一些历史研究表明,朝鲜此时可能已经有发展核武器的意图。如根据赛利格·哈里森的研究,1963年朝鲜曾要求苏联帮助他们发展核武器,但苏联拒绝了这一要求。Selig S.Harrison.Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.198.
87 Young-Sun Ha,Nuclear Proliferation,Worm Order and Korea,Seoul National University Press,1983,p.118.
88 Alexander Zhebin,"A Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y.Mansourov eds.,The North Korean Nuclear Program.:Security,Strategy,and New Perspectives from Russia,Routledge:New York and London,2000,p.33.
89 Michael J.Mazarr,"Going Just a Little Nuclear:Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea,"International Security,Vol.20,No.2,Fall 1995,p.100.
90 Peter Hayes,"What North Korea Wants," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,December 1993,pp.8-9.
91 Andrew Mack,"A Nuclear North Korea:The Choices Are Narrowing," World Policy Journal,summer 1994,p.27.
92 Nicholas Eberstadt,"North Korea's Weapons Quest," The National Interest,Summer 2005,p.50.
93 选择稍前一点的时间,是考虑到时滞效应。
94 U.S.Forces Korea/Eighth U.S.Army,"Annual Historical Report,1977," pp.54-55,declassified by Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Project,available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons.html
95 "Detailed Report Says US Ruptured Denuclearization Process," Korean Central News Agency,May 12,2003,FBIS Translated Text,available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk051203.html
96 Byung-joon Ahn,"Arms Control Proposals of North and South Korea,and Their Implications for Korean Security," paper for Conference on the Arms Race and Arms Control in Northeast Asia,Korean Association of International Relations,Seoul,Aug.28,1986,p.12.
97 1958年美国在韩国首次部署核武器时,美国核部署的信息泄漏至美国和韩国的媒体,这时,朝鲜非常强烈地批评了美国的核部署。但在此之后一直到70年代中期,由于此时美国采取“不承认也不否认”的政策,朝鲜也很少公开批评美国在韩国的核部署。朝鲜的考虑是,在美国并未公开或强化核威胁时,贸然批评则会提醒美国他们特别担心美国的核威胁,这反而会促使美国强化核力量的作用。
98 "Declaration on Nuclear-Free Zone Supported," KCNA Radio,March 20,1981,translated in U.S.Joint Publications Research Service,JPRS 77888007080071,p.70.
99 "Team Spirit is Playing With Fire," Nodong Sinmun,March 17,1981,in U.S.Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service,IV-052,March 18,1981,p.D-1.
100 "N.Korea Voices Retaliation for Use of Nuclear Weapons," Pyongyang Times,June 15,1983,translated in U.S.Joint Publications Research Service,JPRS83857,p.87.
101 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg." American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,pp.135.
102 "Nodong Sinmun on U.S.Doctrine of Nuclear Umbrella," Pyongyang KCNA,July 21,1986, translated in U.S.Joint Publications Research Service,JPRSKAR 86-032-1,p.1.
103 Bruce Cumings,"Spring Thaw For Korea's Cold War?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,April 1992,pp.20.
104 地道对于核武器防护的重要性在于:地道可以直接防止光辐射;冲击波沿地表面运动,地下建筑可以有效防护冲击波;土壤对早期核辐射的防护性能也是相当高的;地下设施的相对密闭性也可以减少放射性沾染的危害。我国核技术专家乔登江院士在其著作《人类的灾难》的第四章“核武器的防护”中对这一问题有详细的描述。参见乔登江,朱焕金编著《人类的灾难--核武器与核爆炸》,清华大学出版社和暨南大学出版社,2000年12月出版,第108页到127页。我国在上世纪五六十年代的“深挖洞”政策与此理相同,有明显的核武器防护的目的,主要是针对美国的核威胁。
105 "Detailed Report Says US Ruptured Denuclearization Process," Korean Central News Agency,May 12,2003,FBIS Translated Text,available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk051203.html
106 譬如,朝鲜引用韩国Haptong新闻社1975年的报道,美国众议院在1975年审议美国1976年防务开支预算的会议中透漏,美国在韩国最高峰时曾部署约1000枚核武器。再如,朝鲜引用美国防务情报中心出版的《防务监测》1981年1月号中的描述,当时美国在韩国部署的核武器,包括80枚“诚实的约翰”导弹、192枚核航弹、152枚155毫米核炮弹和56枚八英寸核炮弹。这些信息与本研究所获得的美国在韩核部署的信息基本相符。“Detailed Report Says US Ruptured Denuclearization Process,''Korean Central News Agency,May 12.2003.
107 Ibid.
108 "Truth behind S.Korea's Development of Nukes Disclosed",Korean Central News Agency,Pyongyang,October 23,available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2004/200410/news10/25.htm
109 Ibid.
110 C.Kenneth Quinones,"South Korea's Approaches to North Korea:A Glacial Process," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,pp.28-31.
111 1984年,朝鲜向刚刚遭受水灾的韩国提供人道主义物资援助,主要是大米和衣服,韩国接受了这些物资。之后,双方将板门店的联络处交流逐渐定期化;南北双方安排南北分离的家庭在朝鲜战争后进行第一次书信交流或者会面;双方开始讨论南北经济合作的一些问题,而且谈论的议题逐渐拓宽。See C.Kenneth Quinones,“South Korea's Approaches to North Korea:A Glacial Process,''in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed..Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.32.
112 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.183-186.
113 Embassy Intelligence and Washington Instructions,"ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles," Cable from the Department of State in Washington to the U.S.Embassy in Seoul,March 4,1975,declassified 1997,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.70.
114 Memorandum of Conversation of Brent Scowcroft,Richard Sneider,William Gleysteen,September 15,1976,declassified 1995,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.73.
115 亚历山大·曼苏洛夫研究的材料来源,是他在1990年对一位苏共中央委员会国际部前高级官员的访谈。该官员在70年代负责苏联对朝政策,与金日成私交甚好。Alexandre Y.Mansourov,"The Origins,Evolution,and Current Politics ofthe North Korean Nuclear Program,''The Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1995,p.29.
116 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),The Military Balance 1981/1982, London:IISS,1981,pp.82-84.
117 韩国的军费在1980年有35亿美元,到1981年飞跃至68亿美元。在1982年到1987年,韩国军费增加至每年约78亿美元。而朝鲜从1981年到1987年,每年平均维持65亿美元的军费开支。Sangsun Shim,The Causes of South Korea's Nuclear Choices:A Case Study in Nonproliferation,doctoral dissertation,University of Maryland,2003,p.183.
118 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),The Military Balance 1988/89,London:IISS,1988,pp.167-169.
119 李春虎,《战后朝鲜的抉择:1945-1995》,复旦大学·朝鲜研究丛书,大旺社,2003年4月,第104-105。
120 Donald Stone Macdonald,The Koreans:Contemporary Politics and Society,Westview Press,Boulder & London,1988,p.169.
121 Ibid.,p.175.
122 李春虎,《战后朝鲜的抉择:1945-1995》,第107页。
123 美国前国务院官员肯尼斯·凯诺内斯(C.Kenneth Quinones)对80年代初的朝韩如此描述,“在1980年,平壤看起来已经取得对韩国的优势。朝鲜的经济是社会主义成就的一个很好表现。现代采矿业和工业设施使朝鲜出口大量的金、锌和煤到他们的共产主义阵营国家。粮食生产也持续达到高峰,并有剩余可以出口。平壤是一个两百万人居住、衣食无忧、秩序井然的完美城市。而在韩国,1980年和1981年时,政府还向美国申请粮食援助。汉城的街道又窄又乱,贫困者和失业者在酝酿着街头暴乱,催泪瓦斯则充斥者大学校园。剧烈的劳工纷争、记者被投入监狱和政治人物的腐败随处可见。而韩国此时定位的外向型出口轻工业也受到台湾、香港和其他新兴经济体的激烈竞争和挑战。”See C.Kenneth Quinones,"South Korea's Approaches tO North Korea:A Glacial Process,"'in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.33.
124 Donald Stone Macdonald,The Koreans:Contemporary Politics and Society,Westview Press,Boulder & London,1988,p.176,p.246.
125 Dae-Sook Suh,"Kim Jong Ⅱ and New Leadership in North Korea," in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee ed.,North Korea after Kim IL Sung,Lynne Rienner Publishers,Boulder,London,p.25-27.
126 Donald Stone Macdonald,The Koreans:Contemporary Politics and Society,Westview Press,Boulder & London,1988,p.214.
127 Dae-Sook Suh,"Kim Jong Ⅱ and New Leadership in North Korea," in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee ed.,North Korea after Kim IL Sung,Lynne Rienner Publishers,Boulder,London,p.24.
128 朝鲜劳动党中央委员会有248名成员,其中145名为中央委员,103名为候补委员。这一时期,劳动党中央委员会共有261次人员变动,九分之七的中央委员被更换。候补委员的变动有111次。Ibid.,p.25.
129 李春虎,《战后朝鲜的抉择:1945-1995》,第106页。
130 上引书,第119页。
131 Marcus Noland,"The Economic Situation in North Korea," in Wonmo Dong ed.,The Two Koreas and the United States:Issues of Peace,Security,and Economic Cooperation,M.E.Sharpe,New York and London,p.22.
132 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C.Hassig,North Korea Through the Looking Glass,Brookings Institution Press,Washington,D.C.,p.154.
133 这一时期,仅有一些非官方的美国人访问朝鲜,其中著名的人士包括之后成为美国议员的斯蒂芬·首勒兹(Stephen Solarz)和传教士比利·格雷厄姆(Billy Graham)等。See Robert A.Manning,"United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare,"in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman&Littlefield Publishers,p. 66.
134 Pae Sang Hak,"The Nuclear Problem in Northeast Asia and Ways to Resolve it:A North Korean Perspective," in Andrew Mack,Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia,United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,1995,p.198.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Barbara Demick,"US Flexes Muscles Before The Korea," Los Angles Times,March 21,2003;David E.Sanger and Thom Shanker,"US Sending 2 Dozen Bombers in Easy Range of North Koreans," New York Times,March 5,2003.
138 Carol Giacomo,"US Exploring Ways to Deal with N.Korea Export," Reuters,May 12,2003.
139 Leon V.Sigal,Disarming Strangers:Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea,Princeton University Press,New Jersey,p.32.
140 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.258.
141 "Our Nuclear Deterrent Force Is Never a Means to Threaten," The Korean Central News Agency,June 9,2003,in Cheon Seongwhun,"North Korea Nuclear Crisis and the Six-Party Talks," Paper of International conference on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia organized by the Institute of International Studies and the Center for Korean Studies of Fudan University,on December 14-16,2005,Shanghai,China,pp.4.
142 Pae Sang Hak,"The Nuclear Problem in Northeast Asia and Ways to Resolve it:A North Korean Perspective," in Andrew Mack,Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia,United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,1995,p.200.
143 "Drive of Nuclear Armament," Korea Today,No.4,Juche 94,2005,p.41.
144 "Truth behind S.Korea's Development of Nukes Disclosed," Korean Central News Agency,Pyongyang,October 23,available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2004/200410/news 10/25.htm
145 Daniel A.Pinkston,"South Korea's Nuclear Experiments," Center for Nonproliferation Studies Research Report,November 9,2004,p.5,available at http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/041109.htm
146 建构主义学者温特经常引用的例子是,对于美国,朝鲜的5枚核武器比英国的500枚核武器更具威胁,因为英国是美国的朋友,而朝鲜是美国的敌人。See Alexander Wendt,"Constructing International Politics,''International Security,Vol.20,No.1,Summer 1995,p.73.
147 1996年朝鲜政府的新年社论中的一段描述,可以看出这一时期朝韩之间仍很强烈的敌对气氛。“金泳三傀儡政权注定要灭亡,……。他们描述‘朝鲜威胁'的目的是希望入侵朝鲜。假如美国和韩国仍持续寻求对抗和战争,半岛的局势就会恶化。我们不能忽视这一点,我们也不会允许任何挑衅行为。”See Chong-sik Lee,"North and South Korean Confrontation in the Nuclear Age,"in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee ed.,North Korea after Kim IL Sung,Lynne Rienner Publishers,Boulder,London,p.231.
148 L.Gordon Flake,"North Korea's Security Strategies and Initiatives Toward South Korea,"Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.50.
149 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.89-91.
150 Nam Chang-hee,"Relocating USFK Bases:Background and Implications," East Asian Review,Vol.15,No.3,Autumn 2003,pp.119-121.
151 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.92.
152 Ibid.,pp.93-96.
153 Kyung-Ae Park,"North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.90.
154 Dae-Sook Suh,"Crisis Management by New Leaders in North Korea," in Wonmo Dong ed.,The Two Koreas and the United States:Issues of Peace,Security,and Economic Cooperation,M.E.Sharpe,New York and London,p.14.
155 Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick M.Hughes,Director,U.S.Defense Intelligence Agency,before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,"Global Threats and Challenges to the United States and Its Interests Abroad," February 5,1997,p.11;Michael O' Hanlon,"Stopping A North Korean Invasion:Why Defending South Korea Is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks,"International Security,Vol.22,No.4,Spring 1998,p.135.
156 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS),North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,pp.96-97.
157 Jeffrey W.Taliaferro,"Security Seeking under Anarchy:Defensive Realism Revisited,"International Security,Vol.25,No.3,Winter 2000/01,pp.128-129.
158 John Merrill,"North Korea in 1992:Steering Away from the Shoals," Asian Survey,Vol.33,No.1,January 1993,p.43.
159 Bruce Cumings,"U.S.-North Korean Bilateral Relations and South Korean Security," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.106.
160 参见这一时期美韩关于朝鲜政权崩溃的文章和著作。See Marcus Noland,“Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,”Foreign Affairs,May/June 1997;Karen Elliott House,“Let North Korea Collapse,”The Wall Street Journal,21 February 1997;Sung Chull Kim,North Korea in Crisis:An Assessment of Regime Stability,Seoul:Korea Institute of National Unification,1997;Scott Snyder,"North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival:Internal Problems and Implications for the Future,”Pacific Affairs,Winter 2000,pp.517-531.
161 1990年,苏联宣布苏朝贸易需要按照国际市场的价格支付硬通货,之后朝鲜便没有能力支付以前每年从俄罗斯获得的几百万吨石油。2000年之后,苏朝关系又有些升温,双方签订新的友好互助条约,但由于俄罗斯经济状况仍不景气,因此,给朝鲜带来经济好转的前景也不甚乐观。See Kongdan Oh and Ralph C.Hassig,North Korea Through the Looking Glass,Brookings Institution Press,Washington,D.C.,p.155.
162 Ibid.,p.157.
163 有几种对这一时期朝鲜受灾情况的评估:美国《世界视野》(World Vision)的副总裁安德鲁·纳茨欧(Andrew Natsios)称,朝鲜在灾荒中失去50万到100万人,而且,如果掌握更详细的信息的话,这一数字可能接近200万人,即达到总人口的十分之一。See Bruce Cumings,“U.S.-North Korean Bilateral Relations and South Korean Security,”in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.106.
164 西方研究者普遍把1998年朝鲜的卫星发射视为朝鲜核项目的一部分。核项目包括运载工具--导弹,而卫星发射的军事运用就是导弹发射。
165 Kyung-Ae Park,"North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.97.
166 “平壤各地张挂标语旗帜庆祝朝鲜核试验成功,”中国新闻网,2006年11月07日,http://news.tom.com/2006-11-07/000N/10678239.html
167 Scott D.Sagan,"Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security,Vol.21,No.3,Winter,1996-1997,p.65.
168 1993年朝鲜抵制IAEA核查时,叶利钦和克林顿联合发表声明要求朝鲜遵守核不扩散条约的承诺。俄罗斯向朝鲜施加压力,引致《劳动新闻》发表评论来批评俄罗斯的政策,“我们不能接受俄罗斯像美国的盟国一样来窒息朝鲜”。See Kongdan Oh and Ralph C.Hassig,North Korea Through the Looking Glass,Brookings Institution Press,Washington,D.C.,p.155.
169 Ibid.,p.157.
170 See Robert A.Manning,"United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare,"in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,p.66.
171 这一点用传统的政治语汇就是边缘政策(brinkmanship)。
172 Scott Snyder,"North Korean Crises and American Choices:Managing U.S.Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," in Wonmo Dong ed.,The Two Koreas and the United States:Issues of Peace,Security,and Economic Cooperation,M.E.Sharpe,New York and London,p.239.
173 Robert A.Manning,"United States-No.rth Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare," in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,p.73.
174 Scott Snyder,"North Korean Crises and American Choices:Managing U.S.Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," in Wonmo Dong ed.,The Two Koreas and the United States:Issues of Peace,Security,and Economic Cooperation,M.E.Sharpe,New York and London,pp.241-242.
175 See Leon V.Sigal,"North,On Hold...Again," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,May/June 2001,pp.34-37.
176 "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and The Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Geneva,October 21,1994,available at www.Kedo.org/pdfs/Agreed Framework.pdf
177 Robert A.Manning,"United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare," in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,pp.74-76.
178 Center for Nonproliferation Studies,North Korea Special Collection,"Uncovering The Truth About North Korea's Alleged Underground Nuclear Facility:The Kumchang-ri Controversy,"http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/uncover.htm
179 王晴:“朝鲜允诺弃核交换100万吨重油援助”,《第一财经日报》,2007年2月14日。
180 Kyung-Ae Park,"North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relmions,"in Kyunz-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Securit Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.92.
181 "North Korea Asks for US1 Billion tO halt Missile Sales,"Channel News Asia.12 July 2000;Ranian Roy,"U.S.,North Korea Near Wrap-Up of Missile TaIks,"Associated Press,12 July 2000.
182 在1993年“美朝联合声明”中,美朝双方达成三条原则:保证避免威胁和使用武力,包括核武器:不干涉他国内政;对和平实现统一的支持。这三条原则都是倾向于朝鲜利益的。See Robert A.Manning.“United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare tO Workfare,”in Samuel S.Kim and Tai Hwan Lee,ed.,North Korea and Northeast Asia,Rowman&Littlefield PubIishers,p.73.
183 Robert A.Manning,"United States-North Korean Relations:From Welfare to Workfare," p.72.
184 Ibid.,p.74.
185 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton and Oxford:Princeton University Press,2002,p.258.
186 Hans Kristensen,"Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella," Section 3,"The Battle over Okinawa," http://www.nautilus.org/archives//library/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-3.html
187 Memorandum of Conversation ofBrent Scowcroft,Richard Sneider,William Gleysteen,September 15,1976,declassified 1995,in Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.73.
188 "Drive of Nuclear Armament," Korea Today,No.4,Juche 94,2005,p.41.
1 Dong Struck,"South Korean Stresses Alliance and Dismisses Differences with U.S." The Washington Post,April 11,2003,p.A21.
2 Seongwhun Cheon,"Nuclear-Armed North Korea and South Korea's Strategic Countermeasures," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅥ,No.2,Fall 2004,p.59.
3 2006年11月初,在汉城的一个招商引资会上,卢武铉发表言论:“朝鲜核试验导致安全威胁增大是事实,但是不应该夸大这个问题。……。我认为,在目前的情况下,朝鲜核试验没有打破朝鲜半岛的军事平衡。”参见[韩]郑然旭:“卢武铉:北韩核试验没有打破南北军事均衡”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月3日。
4 在之后的新闻发布会上,大国家党发言人罗卿瑷批评到:“朝鲜核试验几乎让国民夜不能寐,但他却说核不算什么,这真令人感到怀疑,他到底是不是对韩国安全负责任的国军统帅。”参见尹钟求,张康明:“总统,您真的了解核武器的意义吗?”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月4日。
5 韩国学者千祥勋在这里引用基辛格的话来证明美国延伸威慑的可信度不高。基辛格认为,“一旦苏联用直接的核报复来威胁美国,美国发动全面核战争来保护欧洲的承诺注定要失去意义。”See Henry Kissinger,"Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance,"Survival,Vol.24,1982,p.195,quoted from Se00gwhun Cheon,"Nuclear-Armed North Korea and South Korea's.Strategic Countermeasures,"The Korean Journal of Defense Analvsis,Vol.ⅩⅥ,No.2,Fall 2004,p.56.
6 Seongwhun Cheon,"Nuclear-Armed North Korea and South Korea's Strategic Countermeasures," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅥ,No.2,Fall 2004,p.57.
7[韩]尹相虎,“军事当局:北韩拥有的钚能制造6、7个核武器”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月26日。
8[韩]“北韩核武器瞄准的是韩国”,《东亚日报》(中文版)社论,2006年10月25日。
9[韩]河泰元,“阳光政策被指造成南韩社会左倾化”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年2月6日。
10 斯科特·赛根(Scott D.Sagan)对这种核扩散的链式反应有详细的描述。See Scott D.Sagan,“Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?Three Models in Search of a Bomb,”International Security,Vol.21,No.3,1996-1997 Winter,pp.58-59.
11 IAEA对利比亚核发展的评估是,利比亚尚处于核武器发展的早期阶段,距离制造出核武器至少还需3到7年。See James Goodby,et al.,Cooperative ThreatReduction for a New Era,Defense and Technology Papers 4,Washington:National Defense University,Center for Technology and National Security Policy,p.34.
12 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.64.
13 IAEA,"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,"GOV/2004/84,11 November 2004,available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/south_korea.html
14 Mark Hibbs,"77%U-235 Was Peak Enrichment Reported to IAEA by South Korea,"NuclearFuel,Vol.29,No.30,September 27,2004,pp.7-8;Mark Gorwitz,"The South Korean Laser Isotope Separation Experience," ISIS Online,October 5,2004,< http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/sklisword2.html>.
15 "Truth behind S.Korea's Development of Nukes Disclosed," Korean Central News Agency,Pyongyang,October 23,2004,available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2004/200410/news10/25.htm
16 James Risen,"South Korea Seen Trying to Extend Range of Missile," New York Times,November 14,1999.
17 Mark Wade,"South Korea,"Astronautix.com,available at http://www.astronautix.com/country/korsouth.htm
18 Nuclear Threat Initiative,South Korea Profile,"Nuclear Chronology:1992-2003",available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3117.html
19 Jungmin Kang,Peter Hayes,Li Bin,Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter,"South Korea's nuclear surprise," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol.61,No.1(January/February 2005),p.46
20 Peter Hayes,"The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue," in Andrew Mack ed.,Asian Flashpoint:Security and the Korean Peninsula,Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd,p.68.
21 John H.Large,"The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia," Greenpeace International,Large & Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.1,available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/Development-of-NW-in-NEAsia
22 Sook-Jong Lee,"Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol.ⅩⅦ,No.1,Spring 2005,pp.87-88.
23[韩]李明键,郑然旭:“卢武铉:北韩关于安保威胁的主战过于夸张”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月12日。
24[韩]李明键,董正民:“政府对北政策又回到原点”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月13日。
25[韩]尹相虎:“韩美就2012年移交作战权达成协议”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年2月26日。
26 在2007年2月24日美韩正式达成协议之后,韩国的前国防部长、联合参谋部部长、各军队负责人等70多名预备役将军举行会晤,发表对政府的抗议声明。前国防部长李钟九说:“军队元老全部反对,250万国民签署反对声明,但现政权仍然强行收回战时指挥权,我对此感到十分愤怒。”参见[韩]尹相虎:“预备役将军团体:收回作战指挥权的决定操之过急”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年2月27日。
27 朴庸玉在2007年3月延世大学召开的国际会议上发表的这番讲话。参见[韩]金昇炼,李基洪:“国际会议与会者共商北核问题”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年3月28日。
28 "Japan May 'Go Nuclear,' Paper Says," Japan Times,August 11,1993,p.4.
29 John H.Large,"The Actual and Potential Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology in the Area of North East Asia," Greenpeace International,Large & Associates:London,May 2,2005,p.1,available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/Development-of-NW-in-NEAsia
30 Howard W.French,"Koizumi Aide Hints at Change to No Nuclear Policy," New York Times,June 4,2002,p.10.
31 “韩国应为东北亚的核武器竞赛做准备”,《中央日报》,2006年9月6日,载至《星岛环球网》,available at http://www.singtaonet.com/pol_op/t20060907_323092.html
32 "South Korea studies options in case Japan develops nukes," Agence France-Presse,October 19,2006,available at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_Rebuffs_Talk Of_More_Detailed_Nuclear_Umbrella_For_South_Korea_999.html
33 See Alexander Wendt,"Constructing International Politics," International Security,Vol.20,No.1,Summer 1995,p.73.
34 L.Gordon Flake,"North Korea's Security Strategies and Initiatives Toward South Korea,"Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,p.50.
35 朝鲜核试验后,卢武铉先是表示要重新审议之前的对朝政策。但至2006年11月初,六方会谈重启的消息传出之后,韩国政府又基本转向原先的“对北包容政策”,积极准备对朝开展援助。[韩]郑然旭,尹相虎:“卢武铉:将分析核试验对收回作战权问题的影响”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月11日;
[韩]文炳基:“政府欲重新开展对北援助遭到各界批评”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月3日。
36[韩]尹相虎:“卢武铉拟制定北韩版马歇尔计划”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年2月17日。
37[韩]郑旭然,李明键,文炳基:“卢武铉:韩国若想生存,既要亲美也要亲北”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年3月27日。
38 T.V.Paul,Power versus Prudence:Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons,Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press,2000,p.111.
39 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.84.
40 Norman Levin,The Shape of Korea's Future:South Korea Attitudes Toward Unification and Long-Term Security Issues,Santa Monica:Rand,1999,p.23.
41 Cheon Seongwhun,Toward Greater Transparency in Non-Nuclear Policy:A Case of South Korea,The Korea Institute for National Unification,2005,p.85.
42 日本前首相细川护熙曾表示:“只要美国不希望看到日本退出NPT并发展自己的核威慑力量,美国就应该强化同日本的结盟联系并继续向日本提供核保护伞”。See Morihiro Hosokawa,“Are U.S.Troopsn Japan Needed?Reforming the Alliance,''Foreign Affairs,Vol.77,No.4,July/August 1998,p.5.朝鲜核试验后,日本外相麻生的言论和赖斯访日后麻生话语的转向,也可以看出美国的延伸威慑对日本核选择的重要约束作用。参见“麻生讲话令人惊讶,赖斯猛压日本核冲动”,《环球时报》,2006年10月21日。
43[韩]朴民赫:“前总统金泳三采访录”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年10月12日。
44 Jim Mannion,"US Rebuffs Talk Of More Detailed Nuclear Umbrella For South Korea,"Agence France-Presse,Oct 19,2006.
45 Kim Ji-hyun,"Defense Ministry under fire for overstating term 'extended deterrence'," Korea Herald,October 26,2006,available at http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2006/10/26/200610260045.asp
46 Selig S.Harrison,Korean Endgame:A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement,Princeton University Press:Princeton and Oxford,2002,p.249.
47 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.69.
48 Paul Shin,"U.S.Said to Stop South Korea's Nuke Bomb Plans," The Washington Times,March 29,1994;"Seoul Planned Nuclear Weapons Until 1991," Jane's Defense Weekly,2 April 1994,p.1.
49 Jungmin Kang and H.A.Feiveson,"South Korea's Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2001,pp.72-73.
50 参见[韩]吴源哲:《朴正熙和卡特的搏斗》,《新东亚》,1994年11月,第430页。
51 See Kumao Kaneko,Atsuyuki Suzuki,Jor-Shan Choi,Edward Fei,"Energy and Security in Northeast Asia:Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation," IGCC Policy Papers,University of California,Multi-Campus Reserch Unit,Appendix 2:Peaceful Use of Plutonium in Japan,available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=igcc
52 “麻生讲话令人惊讶 赖斯猛压日本核冲动”,《环球时报》,2006年10月21日。
53 Lee Seung-woo,"Lee Hoi-Chang,We need to consider developing nuclear weapons,"Joongang Ilbo,19 October 2006(in Korean),quoted from International Crisis Group Policy Briefing,"North Korea's Nuclear Test:The Fallout," Asian Briefing No.56,Seoul/Brussels,November 13,2006.
54 "Statement by the Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test," October 16,2006,http://www.dni.gov/announcements/20061016_release.pdf.
55 Jungmin Kang and Peter Hayes,"Technical Analysis of the DPRK Nuclear Test,"Policy Forum Online 06-89A,The Nautilus Institute,October 20th,2006,available at http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0689HayesKang.html
56 在朝鲜核试验后的韩国全国主要指挥官会议上,韩国国防部给出这样的评估数字。[韩] 尹相虎:“军事当局:北韩拥有的钚能制造6、7个核武器”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月26日。
57 塞格福雷德·海克认为,到2006年10月,朝鲜的钚拥有量为40-50千克。See Siegfried S.Hecker,"Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,"Stanford University,Center for International Security and Cooperation,November 15,2006,p.8.
58 International Institute for Strategic Studies,North Korea's Weapons Programmes:A Net Assessment,London:IISS,2004,p.46.
59 参见[韩]尹相虎:“军事当局:北韩拥有的钚能制造6、7个核武器”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月26日;
[韩]“北韩核武器瞄准的是韩国”,《东亚日报》(中文版)社论,2006年10月25日。
60 这样的国家(或者地区)可能还有很多,如澳大利亚、印尼、荷兰、挪威、罗马尼亚、南斯拉夫等,但关于它们核武器发展的公开资料非常少,因此,在谈论时把这些案例排除在外。
61 "Egypt's Mubarak Says Egypt Can Join Nuclear Club,"' Reuters,October 5,1998.
62 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.69.
63 Cheon Seongwhun,Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea,Korea Institute for National Unification,2006,p.41.
64 T.V.Paul,Power versus Prudence:Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons,Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press,2000,p.111.
65 See Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.86,p.89.
66 T.V.Paul,Power versus Prudence:Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons,Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press,2000,p.97.
67 Ibid.,p.115,p.116.
68 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.64.
69 "South Africa to Abandon Missile Launching Programme," Agence France Presse,June 30,1993.
70 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.84.
71 Seung-Young Kim,"Security,Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles:The South Korean Case,1970-82," Diplomacy & Statecraft,Vol.12,No.4,December 2001,p.69.
72 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.64.
73 Gilbert J.Brown,"From Nuclear Swords to Nuclear Plowshares," Washington Post,September 1,1992,A17;Theodor Galdi,The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement,Congressional Research Service,94-985-F,Washington,D.C.:Government Printing Office,December 6,1994,pp.1-6.
74 Ariel E.Levite,"Never Say Never Again:Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security,Vol.27,No.3,Winter 2002/03,p.78.
75 这一点可以从巴西与美国交易的例子中找到佐证。1976年福特政府与巴西达成秘密交易。巴西放弃其在1975年与联邦德国达成的购买后处理设施的合同。作为交换,美国向巴西提供安全保证和5千万美元的军售贷款。然而,当卡特政府即将执政时,这一交易泄漏至美国的媒体。结果是,巴西退出了1976年秘密协议,又转向发展核武器的立场。See Graham Hovey,"Carter Writes to Leader of Brazil," New York Times,March 31,1977,p.2;Hobart Rowen,"U.S.Shifted on Bonn-Brazil Nuclear Deal," Washington Post,May 9,1977,A10.
76 日本NHK电视台在10月22日报道说,北韩外务省第一副相姜锡柱在2006年11月22日表示:“我们怎么能放弃核武器?难道我们是为了放弃而制造它的吗?”参见[韩]郑权铉:“北韩第一副相姜锡柱:核武器不是为了放弃而制造的”,《朝鲜日报》(中文版),2006年11月23日。
77 参见沈丁立:“朝鲜弃核和拥核,哪个更安全?”《东方早报》,2006年12月21日。
[韩]河宗大:“中国专家:北韩决不会弃核,六方会谈前路茫茫,”《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年11月3日。
78 Nicholas Eberstadt,"North Korea's Weaons Quest," The National Interest,Summer 2005,p.50.
79 乔纳森·保拉克(Jonathan D.Pollack)使用象征性核能力和可操作性核威慑能力这两个概念来描述朝鲜未来的核发展。See Jonathan D.Pollack,"North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015:Three Scenarios,''Asia Policy,Number 3,January 2007,PP.106-107.
80[韩]董正民:“韩国曾拒绝美国提供核保护伞”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2006年10月17日。
1 王传剑:“从‘双重遏制'到‘双重规制'--战后美韩军事同盟的历史考察”,《美国研究》,2002年第2期,第31-46页。
2 Sook-Jong Lee,"Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol..ⅩⅦ,No.1,Spring 2005,p.90.
3 李华:“继承还是超越--论冷战后驻韩美军调整”,载《美国研究》,2004年第1期,第99-100页。
4 吴心伯:《太平洋上不太平-后冷战时代的美国亚太安全战略》,复旦大学出版社,2006年版,第144页。
5 Larry A Niksch,"Korea:U.S.-Korea Relations Issues for Congress," June 16,2005.available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67839.pdf
6 杨红梅:“美韩同盟调整的动力、现状与前景”,《现代国际关系》,2005年第8期,第22页。
7 参见汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略-以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,.2007年,第224页。
8 Donald Stone Macdonald,US-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance,The Twenty-Year Re.cord:An Interpretive Summary of Archives of the US Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965,Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1992,pp.18-20.
9 Ibid.
10 Victor D.Cha,"America and South Korea:The Ambivalent Alliance?" Current History,September 2003,pp.280-282.
11 Ibid.,p.280.
12 汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略--以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年,第238页。
13 Sook-Jong Lee,"Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol..ⅩⅦ,No.1,Spring 2005,p.85.
14 汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略-以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年,第246页。
15 See Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,May 14,2003.转引自汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略-以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年,第246页。
16 扎勒米·哈利勒扎德等:《美国与亚洲:美国新战略和兵力态势》,新华出版社2001年版,第45-46页。
17[韩]朴民赫:“前总统金泳三采访录”,《东亚日报》(中文版),2007年10月12日。
18 希罗多德:《历史》,商务印书馆,1962年版,第683-687页。
19 陈文兵,“古希腊国际体系中的城邦反霸同盟外交”,《东北师大学报》(哲学社会科学版),1999年第5期,第21-23页。
20 翟东升:“罗马扩张中的同盟战略”,《IT经理世界》,2004年第9期,第111页。
21 迟海波:“试论美国与北约盟国在‘多边核力量'计划上的分歧”,《长春师范学院学报》,2004年第2期,第17-19页。
22[美]迈克尔·格林,帕特里克·克罗宁主编:《美日联盟:过去、现在与将来》,华宏勋等译,新华出版社,2000年版,第359页。
23 师哲:《在历史巨人身边》,中央文献研究室,1991年版,第572-573页。
24 牛军:“毛泽东与中苏同盟破裂的缘起(1957-1959)”,《国际政治研究》,2001年第2期,第54-56页。
25 Stephen Van Evera,"Primed for Peace:Europe After the Cold War," International Security,Vol.15,No.3,1990,pp.5-8.
26 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第106页。
27 参见汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略--以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年,第184页。
28 参见迈克尔·阿马斯科特:《朋友还是对手--前美国驻日大使说日本》,于铁军等译,新 华出版社1998年版,第252页。
29 沈志华:“中苏同盟破裂的原因和结果”,《中共党史研究》,2007年第2期,第31页。
30 牛军:“毛泽东与中苏同盟破裂的缘起(1957-1959)”,《国际政治研究》,2001年第2期,第56-57页。
31 李越然:《外交舞台上的新中国领袖》,外语教学与研究出版社,1994年版,第160-164页。
32 赵青海:“‘四国同盟':构想与现实”,《国际问题研究》,2007年第6期,第28-32页。
33 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第106页。
34 Paul Cornish,Partnership in Crisis:The US,Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO,London:The Royal Institute of International Affairs,1997,p.31.
35 Ibid.,p.37.
36 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第106-107页。
37 刘星:“试论日美同盟的生命力”,《世界经济与政治》,2007年第6期,第45页。
38 严圣禾:“日美同盟:一场不散的宴席?”,《南风窗》,2005年8月下,第79页。
39 参见冯昭奎、林昶:《中日关系报告》,北京:时事出版社,第257页。
40 邵迪:“帝国之梦的幻灭历程”,《河北理工大学学报》,2007年11月,第31页。
41 《毛泽东文集》第8卷,人民出版社,1999年,第19-21页。
42 V.Zubok and C.Pleshakov,Inside the Kremlin's Cold War." From Stalin to Khrushev,Boston:Harvard University Press,1996,p.223.
43 孙鸿,于海:“北约扩大的原因、性质及走向”,《河北师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),2006年第6期,第18页。
44 Stephen M.Walt,"Alliances in Theory and Practice:What Lies Ahead?" Journal of International Affairs,Vol.43,No.1,Summer/Fall 1989,pp.8-9.
45 Glenn Snyder,"Alliance Theory:A Neorealism First Cut," Journal of International Affairs,Vol.44,No.1,Spring/Summer1990,p.121.
46 Kenneth Waltz,"The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security,Vol.18,No.2,1993,pp.75-76.
47 Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf,"Neorealism,Neoliberal Institutionalism,and the Future of NATO," Security Studies,Vol.3,No.1,1993,pp.21-25.
48 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第84页。
49 Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane,"Why Does NATO Persist? An Institutionalist Approach," Working Paper,Center for International Affairs,Harvard University,pp.56-61.
50 钟振明:“冷战后北约何以继续存在”,《国际政治科学》,2005年第4期,第87页。
51 约翰·米尔斯海默:《大国政治的悲剧》,王义桅,唐小松译,上海人民出版社,2003年版,第536页。
52 上引书,第538页。
53 上引书,第538页。
54 Robert Art,"Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO",Political Science Quarterly,Vol.111,NO.1,Spring 1996,pp.11-27.
55 孙鸿,于海:“北约扩大的原因、性质及走向”,《河北师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),2006年第6期,第18页。
56[美]兹比格纽·布热津斯基:《大棋局--美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》,中国国际问题研究所译,上海人民出版社,1998年版,第47页。
57 卞学光、丁诗传:“象征性抵制与策略性表示加入--普京对俄罗斯与北约关系的新政策”,《国际论坛》,2004年第1期,第31-32页。
58 张玉国:“同盟困境与美日同盟--日本的同盟政策分析”,《日本学论坛》,2004年第1 期,第32页。
59 刘江永:《跨世纪的日本政治、经济、外交新趋势》,时事出版社,1996年版,第38页。
60 张大林:“日美同盟向何处去”,《国际问题研究》,1996年第1期,第29页。
61 上引书,第29页。
62 Arms Control Work,"Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty," available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/749/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-npt
63 参见第二章。
64 1972年3月,朝鲜外交部发言人在谈话中指出:“朝鲜与美国和日本实现关系正常化的时机已经到来。”美国国务卿基辛格此时也表示:“我们盼望将在数年内显著地促进与中共和朝鲜的关系。”See Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Paaerson,eds.Korean-American Relations (1866-1997),Albany,NY:State University of New York Press,1999,p.110.
65 1972年,在几名美国记者和哈佛大学教授库恩(Jerome A.Cohen)访问朝鲜之后,更多的美国学者(特别是朝鲜裔学者)访问朝鲜。朝鲜进一步进行与美国建立官方联系的尝试。1974年3月,朝鲜最高人民会议发出致美国国会的公开信,建议朝美之间签订和平条约以代替朝鲜停战协定。美国虽然没有对此做出直接反应,但助理国务卿菲利浦·哈比伯(Phillip Habib)在1974年11月发表谈话指出,如果苏联和中国承认韩国,美国也将承认朝鲜。See Donald S.Zagoria and Young Kun Kim,"North Korea and the Major Powers,"Asian Survey,Vol.15,No.12,December 1975,p.1024,p.1034.
66 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.56.
67 Donald S.Zagoria and Young Kun Kim,"North Korea and the Major Powers," Asian Survey,Vol.15,No.12,December 1975,p.1024,p.1034.
68 Peter Hayes,Pacific Powderkeg:American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea,Lanham,Md.:Lexington Books,1991,p.56.
69 Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson,eds.Korean-American Relations(1866-1997),Albany,NY:State University of New York Press,1999,pp.116-117.
70 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,p.90.
71 Ibid.
72 Don Oberdorfer,The Two Koreans:A Contemporary History,Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1997,pp.75-76.
73 "Detailed Report Says US Ruptured Denuclearization Process," Korean Central News Agency,May 12,2003,FBiS Translated Text,available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk051203.html
74 参见第二章的分析。
75 C.Kenneth Quinones,"South Korea's Approaches to North Korea:A Glacial Process," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim ed.,Korean Security Dynamics in Transition,PALGRAVE,New York,2001,pp.31-33.
76 陈峰君,王传剑:《亚太大国与朝鲜半岛》,北京大学出版社,2002年版,第80页。
77 从1997年底开始,朝鲜抱怨美国没有充分执行框架协议,朝鲜援引三个理由:美国没有逐步取消经济制裁的努力,美国推迟提供重油和推迟进行轻水反应堆的建设。See David G.Brown,"North Korea in 1998:A Year of Foreboding Developments,"Asian Survey,Vol.39,No.1,Jan.-Feb.1999,p.130.
78 Ibid.
79 Samuel S.Kim,"North Korea in 2000,Surviving through High Hopes of Summit Diplomacy,"Asian Survey,Vol.41,No.1,Jan.-Feb.2001,p.24.
80 起初,金泳三政府不愿意接受朝美的直接协商,但由于问题的紧迫和美国的压力,韩国勉 强默认美朝的直接会谈。在美朝谈判顺利进行之后,韩国开始对自己被边缘化的事实感到迷惑,对美朝会谈表现出不满,并主张放弃之前的“先朝美接触,后南北对话”政策,提出“同时并进”。在南北对话不能实现之后,韩国开始向美国施加压力,要求美国在谈判中反映韩国的立场,把南北经济合作与核问题的解决联系起来。参见韩献栋:“同盟政治的安全困境--连累抛弃模型的解释力及其局限”,《国际论坛》,2006年第9期,第22页。
81 韩国对1994年框架协议的批评主要集中在三点:首先,韩国认为框架协议并没有要求朝鲜彻底公布其过去的核活动,朝鲜的模糊核地位无疑对韩国意味着核威胁。美朝谈判的美方首席谈判代表罗伯特·格鲁奇(Robert Galluci)在1994年向韩国保证说,美国将把朝鲜过去核行为的百分之百透明化,但事实上,框架协议并没有做到这一点。其次,框架协议中美国向朝鲜提供消极安全保障,这是与美国向韩国的安全承诺相冲突的。韩国担心,框架协议表露出的信号是,美韩同盟针对朝鲜的“二对一”结构将转换为美国平衡朝鲜和韩国的“一对二”结构。而且,美国政府在1994年急于与朝鲜达成协议,主要是美国考虑到中期选举的结果和希望推动NPT的延长。在韩国看来,这明显是美国为了自身利益而不考虑盟国利益。See Taewoo Kim,"North Korea-US nuclear rapprochement:the South Korean dilemma,"Third World Quarterly,Vol.16,No.4,1995,p.669.
82 韩献栋:“同盟政治的安全困境--连累抛弃模型的解释力及其局限”,《国际论坛》,2006年第9期,第22页。
83 1995年的《东亚安全战略报告》,明确表示冷战后继续在东亚维持10万美军的重要性。
84 David H.Satterwhite,"North Korea in 1996:Belligerence Subsiding,Hunger Worsens," Asian Survey,Vol.37,No.1,January 1997,pp.17-18.
85 “已支一透镜演习”在1995-1998年采取电脑模拟加小规模实战演习的形式进行,当时被称为世界上规模最大的电脑模拟战争演习。See Eugene D.Santarelli,“Air Component Support to Joint Exercises,''JFQ,Autumn/winter 1997-98,pp.71-75.“鹞鹰”演习的规模是全部驻韩美军,几十万韩军以及部分美国增援部队,也被认为是当时同盟间最大规模的实兵演习。See Global Security,Foal Eagle,available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/foal-eagle.htm
86 “阿尔索伊”是一种联合战时增援演习,其内容是:一旦朝鲜半岛爆发战争,从朝鲜半岛以外赶来增援的美军立即对韩国军队进行接收(reception)、集结(staging)、前运(onward-movement)和整合(integration)。这四项演习内容的英文缩略语RSOI的汉语音译就是“阿尔索伊”。
87 “阿尔索伊”演习开始于1994年,开始主要是计算机模拟指挥所和小规模实兵演习为主,但从2001年开始,本来是配角的实兵演习变成主角,参与人数从原先的数千人,增加到2001年的1万人,再增加到2002年的70万人。参见李京进,马晓莉:“美韩军演大起底”,《环球军事》,2002年第7期,第16-17页。
88 李敏全,刘忠杰:“耐人寻味的美韩‘阿尔索伊'军事演习”,《现代军事》,2004年6月,第28-30页。
89 李京进,马晓莉:“美韩军演大起底”,《环球军事》,2002年第7期,第16页。
90 陈列兢,“破译50年来最大规模的美韩联合军事演习”,《国际展望》,2002年4月,总第441期,第17页。
91 江山:“俄罗斯以军事演习还击北约东扩”,《现代军事》,2004年6月,第25页。
92 上引文,第27页。
93 洪建军:“北约东扩的影响”,《现代国际关系》,2004年第4期,第37-38页。
94 王占清、钱洪亭:“俄战略轰炸机重新抵近北约大门”,《环球军事》,2007年第9期,第12-13页。
95 徐万胜:“论日美同盟与中日关系”,《国际问题研究》,2006年第4期,第52页。
96 杨伯江:“强化日美同盟:日本面向21世纪的战略起跳板?”,《现代国际关系》,1999年第6期,第27页。
97[德]杜浩著:《冷战后中日安全关系》,中译本,世界知识出版社,2004年版,第171页。
98 徐万胜:“论日美同盟与中日关系”,《国际问题研究》,2006年第4期,第52页。
99 Jane M.O.Sharp,"After Reykjavik:Arms Control and the Allies," International Affairs,Vol.63,No.2,Spring 1987,pp.241-242.
100 安·安·葛罗米柯主编:《苏联对外政策史》(下),人民大学出版社,1989年版,第639页。
101 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第215-231页。
102 Jane M.O.Sharp,"After Reykjavik:Arms Control and the Allies," International Affairs,Vol.63,No.2,Spring 1987,pp.245-246.
103 Ibid.,19.246.
104 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第226页。
105 上引书,第255页。
106 Jane M.O.Sharp,"After Reykjavik:Arms Control and the Allies," International Affairs,Vol.63,No.2,Spring 1987,p.247.
107 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第296页。
108 许海云:“北约扩张的历史与现实分析”,《中国人民大学学报》,2007年第3期,第107页。
109 罗志刚:“浅析中东欧国家加入北约对俄罗斯的影响”,《国际观察》,2007年第2期,第10页。
110 许海云:“北约扩张的历史与现实分析”,《中国人民大学学报》,2007年第3期,第107页。
111 刘华兰:“新世纪俄罗斯与北约关系发展研究”,湘潭大学硕士论文,2005年5月,第8页。
112 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第371页。
113 刘华兰:“新世纪俄罗斯与北约关系发展研究”,湘潭大学硕士论文,2005年5月,第10页。
114 肖月,朱立群主编:《简明国际关系史(1945-2002)》,世界知识出版社,2003年版,第371页。。
115 畅征:“‘北约'东扩与美俄关系”,《领导科学》,2007年第16期,第51页。
116 李兴:“北约欧美双东扩:俄罗斯不同对策及其原因分析”,《俄罗斯中亚东欧研究》,2005年第2期,第59-60页。
117 畅征:“‘北约'东扩与美俄关系”,《领导科学》,2007年第16期,第51页。
118 上引文,第51页。
119 “紧绷的北约与俄罗斯关系”,2007年12月10日,新华网,http://zjc.zjol.com.cn/05zjc/system/2007/12/10/009039023.shtml
120 ”这些指标的提出受到格伦·施奈德的同盟困境分析的启发。格伦·施奈德提出,影响同盟困境中结盟方行为的因素包括:对盟友的相对依赖性、盟国的战略价值、联盟盟约的清晰度、结盟方的利益相互分享的程度、结盟方最近的行为记录五个因素。本研究在选取同盟稳定状态的影响因素和衡量指标时,对施奈德的分析进行了批判性的吸收。See Glenn H.Snyder,“The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,''World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,pp.471-475.
121 Glenn H.Snyder,"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics,Vol.36,No.4,July 1984,p.473.
122 Robert Keohane,"Alliance,Threats and the Use of Neorealism," International Security,Summer 1988,Vol.13,No.1,pp.174-175.
123 肯尼思·沃尔兹和斯蒂芬·沃尔特坚持认为这一点。See Kenneth N.Waltz,“Structural Realism after the Cold War,”International Security,Summer 2000,Vol.25,No.1,pp.5-41;Stephen M.Malt,“Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,”Survival,Spring 1997,Vol.39,No.1,pp.166-167.
124 朝鲜战争的过程可以充分说明这一点。
125 二战结束初期,美国政府内部对朝鲜半岛的价值产生严重分歧,美国国务院认为,支持一个非共产主义的政权是有意义的。而美国军方则认为,韩国在未来远东对抗中微不足道,而且是一个军事包袱。到1950年美国国务卿艾奇逊发表“西太平洋环形防线”时,朝鲜半岛被排除在美国划定的防线之外。这条防线从阿留申群岛开始到日本列岛,然后通过琉球群岛延至菲律宾。
126 Steven Hugh Lee,The Origins of the Cold War in Asia,Columbia:Columbia University Press,1995,p.281.
127 汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略-以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,复旦大学博士论文,2005年4月,第137页。
128 该条约第三条规定,“每一方都承认:在太平洋地区对缔约国任何一方的武装进攻,无论是对目前在各该方管辖下的领土的进攻,或是对以后经缔约国一方承认合法地置于另一方管辖下的领土的直攻,都是危及它自己的和平与安全,并宣布,它将按照它的宪法程序采取行动以对付共同的危险。”上引书,第206页。
129 上引书,第138页。这一事例发生在1968年,应该属于上一阶段。但是这一事例所表现出现的特征是属于这一阶段的。因此,本研究在分析时把它放在这里讨论。
130 这两个事件的发生时间都是1978年底,而且反映的特征与1979-1991年这一时间段的特征非常一致,因此,本文将这两个事件都归于这一时间段讨论。
131 "U.S.Said to Seek Regional Role for Forces in Korea," JoongAng Daily,October 10,2003,available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200310/10/200310100004305439900090209021.html.
132 Sook-Jong Lee,"Allying with the United States:Changing South Korean Attitudes," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,Vol..ⅩⅦ,No.1,Spring 2005,pp.86-89.
133 陈乐民:《战后英国外交史》,世界知识出版社,1994年版,第141页。
134 张颖:“‘闪电'导弹危机与美英核‘特殊关系'”,《世界历史》,2007年第2期,第125-128页。
135 冯梁:《英美特殊关系:文化基础与历史演变》,《欧洲》,2002年第4期,第83页。
136 赵怀普:“从‘特殊关系'走向‘正常关系'--战后美欧关系纵论”,《国际论坛》,2006年第2期,第45页。
137 1967年底,英国被迫做出从苏伊士运河以东撤离的决定,这表明“英国在这个关键地区的影响几乎消失了”。参见巴蒂斯特·迪罗塞尔:《外交史1919-1978》(下册),上海译文出版,1982年版,第211页。
138 冯梁:“英美特殊关系:文化基础与历史演变”,《欧洲》,2002年第4期,第85页。
139 罗会钧:“冷战后的英美‘特殊关系'”,《外交学院学报》,2003年第2期,第37页。
140 彭俊:“里根政府与英阿马岛战争”,《贵州师范大学学报》(社会科学版),2004年第4期,第27页。
141 赵怀普:“美英特殊关系与国际秩序”,《美国研究》,2004年第4期,第75页。
142 周锡生:“克林顿修补美欧关系”,《嘹望新闻周刊》,1995年第51期,第40页。
143 转引自罗会钧:“冷战后的英美‘特殊关系'”,《外交学院学报》,2003年第2期,第37页。
144 崔洪建:“从反恐合作看英美特殊关系”,《国际问题研究》,2003年第1期,第36-40页。
145 罗会钧:“冷战后的英美‘特殊关系'”,《外交学院学报》,2003年第2期,第37页。
146 一位法国学者写到,“戴高乐的法国国际利益观和他的对外政策议程在其卸任后许多年 里继续决定着法国政府的优先考虑。……这意味着直到20世纪80年代中期,法国的对外政策议程一直为需要维持与联邦德国的特殊关系、发挥全球作用和保持对美独立的愿望所主导。”转引自刘得手:“法美分歧原因的历史考察”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第6期,第24—25页。
147 杨小梅:“戴高乐抗美独立的外交实践”,《沈阳教育学院学报》,2001年12月,第30页。
148 布赖恩·克罗泽:《戴高乐传(下)》,中译本,商务印书馆,1978年版,第690页。
149 1991年前南危机爆发后,英法在危机处理中无所作为。而只有美国率领北约介入,才逆转了升级中的波斯尼亚冲突,在1995年达成代顿协议。刘得手:“法美分歧原因的历史考察”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第6期,第26-27页。
150 周国栋:“法国重返北约有期”,《国际展望》,1996年13期,第5-6页。
151 苏惠民:“美英VS法德:西方联盟分裂?”,《世界知识》,2003年第6期,第29页。
152 刘得手:“法美分歧原因的历史考察”,《欧洲研究》,2004年第6期,第29页。
153 刘馗:“联邦德国阿登纳时期对美政策述评”,《湖北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2007年第4期,第90页。
154 周红:“‘两极格局'时期的德美关系”,《理论学习》,2006年第9期,第50页。
155 上引文,第50页。
156 朱忠武:《联邦德国总理科尔》,四川人民出版社,1997年版,第310页。
157 杨洁勉等:《国际恐怖主义与当代国际关系》,贵州人民出版社,2002年,第286页。
158 徐万胜:“论日美同盟的转变:从‘冷战后'到‘9·11后'”,《国际论坛》,2005年第6期,第7页。
159 汪伟民:“持久的不均衡:战后美日、美韩联盟比较研究”,《史学集刊》,2006年第5期,第52页。
160 徐万胜:“论日美同盟的转变:从‘冷战后'到‘9·11后'”,《国际论坛》,2005年第6期,第7页。
161 刘星:“试论日美同盟的生命力”,《世界经济与政治》,2007年第6期,第40页。
162 徐万胜:“论日美同盟的转变:从‘冷战后'到‘9·11后'”,《国际论坛》,2005年第6期,第8页。
163 刘星:“试论日美同盟的生命力”,《世界经济与政治》,2007年第6期,第41页。
1 Yoo Young Ock,"Pyongyang's Efforts to Improve Relations with Washington and Tokyo and Seoul's Position,"(韩)民族统一院:《关于朝鲜半岛统一问题的资料汇编》(英文版),1995年10月31日。转引自汪伟民:《联盟理论与美国的联盟战略--以美日、美韩联盟研究为例》,世界知识出版社,2007年版,第236页。
2 我国青年学者孙德刚在研究中使用“准联盟”这一词来指称“非正式同盟”。本文不太赞同这一提法。因为“准”的含义是“准备,或者下一步将如何”,所以“准联盟”从字面来理解则是下一步将会成为正式同盟,但现在还不是。但他分析时提到的很多“准联盟”,如上世纪60年代的埃及和印度与苏联的“准联盟”,战后以色列与美国的“准联盟”,上世纪七八十年代中国同美国的“准联盟”,这些后来都没有发展为正式同盟。所以,本文认为,更加准确的提法应该是“非正式同盟”。参见孙德刚:“准联盟:中国的战略选择”,《社会观察》,2006年第7期,第28-29页。
3 一些观察家将上合组织看成北约的制衡力量,把上合组织的联合军演看成军事同盟的前奏。但我国官方和主流学界都公开不谈这一点。参见洪源:“上合组织军演并非军事同盟前奏”,《国际展望》,2007年第16期,第10-11页。
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美国军控与裁军署(Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)http://www.acda.gov/
美国国防情报局(Defense Intelligence Agency)http://www.dia.mil/
美国国家安全局(National Security Agency)http://www.nsa.gov:8080/
美国国家安全委员会(National Security Council)http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html
美国核管理委员会(Nuclear Regulatory Commission) http://www.nrc.gov/
美国国务院军品管制局(Office of Defense Trade Controls,DTC)http://www.pmdtc.org/
驻韩美军司令部(US Forces Korea)http://www.korea.army.mil/
韩国外交通商部(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade)http://www.mofat.go.kr/mofat/index.iso
韩国统一部(Ministry of Unification)http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp
韩国工业贸易与能源部(Ministry of Commerce,Industry,and Energy)http://www.mocie.go.kr/index2.html
韩国科技部(Ministry of Science and Technology)http://www.most.go.kr/
韩国防务安全司令部(Defense Security Command)http://www.dsc.or.kr/
韩国国防部防务发展局(Agency for Defense Development)http://addwww.kreonet.re.kr/
韩国防务分析研究院(Korea Institute for Defense Analysis)http://www.kida.re.kr/english2005/
韩国原子能研究所(Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute)http://www.kaeri.re.kr/engnew/
韩国外交安保研究院(Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security,IFANS)http://www.ifans.go.kr/ie/index.jsp
韩国国家统一研究院(Korea Institute for National Unification,KINU)http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/
韩国电力公司(Korea Electric Power Corp.,KEPCO)http://www.kepco.co.kr/eng/
国际原子能机构:朝鲜专题(International Atomic Energy Agency:In Focus:IAEA and DPRK)http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/
朝鲜半岛能源开发机构(Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization,KEDO)http://www.kedo.org/
韩国联合通讯社(Yonhap News Agency)中英韩日四种语言http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/
《朝鲜日报》(Chosun Ilbo)中英韩日四种语言http://www.chosun.com/
《中央日报》(JongAng Daily)韩文和英文 http://www.joins.com/
《东亚日报》(Dong-A ILbo)中英韩日四种语言http://www.donga.com/
韩国国家广播公司(Korean Broadcasting Service)韩英文http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/
《韩国日报》(Hankook Ilbo)韩文http://www.hankooki.com/
《韩国时报》(Korea Times)英文http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/index.asp
《韩国先驱报》(Korea Herald)英文http://koreaherald.co.kr/
京乡新闻(Kyung Hyang Daily News)韩文http://www.khan.co.kr/
The People's Korea,(英文版)http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/
Korean Central New Agency of DPRK KCNA,(英文版)http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm
联合国新闻中心:朝鲜(UN News Centre:Democratic People's Republic of Korea)http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=69&Body=Korea&Body1=d emocratic
英国广播公司:朝鲜(BBC News Country Profile:North Korea)http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_rofiles/1131421.stm
美国有线新闻电视网:朝鲜核危机(CNN Special Report:North Korea Nuclear Tension)http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/nkorea/
世界新闻回顾:朝鲜核武器(World Press Review:North Korea Nuclear Weapons )http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/904.cfm
雅虎新闻:朝鲜(Yahoo! News Full Coverage:North Korea)http://story.news.yahoo.corn/fc?cid=34&tmpl=fc&in=World&cat=North_Korea
美国民意调查机构皮尤研究中心:国际公众对朝鲜的关注(Pew Research Center:International Public Concern About North Korea)http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=67
美国公共电视网前线栏目:金的核赌博(PBS Frontline:Kim's Nuclear Gamble)http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/
美国公共电视网的在线新闻一小时:朝鲜核危机(PBS Online NewsHour:North Korea:Nuclear Standoff)http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/northkorea/
英国《卫报》:朝鲜和韩国(Guardian Unlimited Special Report:North and South Korea)http://www.guardian.co.uk/korea/0,2759,331519,00.html
美国军控协会:朝鲜(Arms Control Association:Country Resources)http://www.armscontrol.org/country/northkorea/
美国防务信息中心:朝鲜核武器(Center for Defense Information:Fact Sheet:North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program)http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/nk-fact-sheet.cfm
美国蒙特雷国际问题研究不扩散研究中心:朝鲜特辑(Center for Nonproliferation Studies:North Korea Special Collection)http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/
美国科学家联盟:朝鲜特殊武器(Federation of American Scientists:North Korea Special Weapons Guide)http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/index.html
美国科学联盟:韩国特殊武器(Federation of American Scientists:South Korea Special Weapons)http://www.fas.org/news/skorea/index.html
斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所:韩国概况(SIPRI:South Korea Country Profile)http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/cnsc3kos.html
卡耐基国际和平基金会:朝鲜(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:North Korea)http://www.camegieendowment.org/npp/index.cfm?fa=view&nppID=1000090
美国鹦鹉螺研究所:朝鲜概况(The Nautilus Institute:DPRK Briefing Book)http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/aboutDPRK/index.html
美国布鲁金斯学会:朝鲜半岛(The Brookings Institution:Korea)http://www.brook.edu/fp/research/projects/korea/korea.htm
全球安全组织:朝鲜危机(GlobalSeeurity.org:Korea Crisis)http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-crisis.htm
全球安全组织:韩国特殊武器(GlobalSecurity.org:South Korea Special Weapons)http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rok/index.html
美国科学与国际安全研究所:朝鲜(Institute for Science and International Security:North Korea)http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/index.html
美国乔治·华盛顿大学的国家安全档案:朝鲜与核武器(National Security Archive:North Korea and Nuclear Weapons:The Declassified U.S.Record)http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/
美国核威胁倡议组织:韩国概览(Nuclear Threat Initiative:South Korea Profile)http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/3045_3046.html
美国核威胁倡议组织:朝鲜概况(Nuclear Threat Initiative:Nouth Korea Profile)http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/index.html
Koreascope,(韩国对朝鲜生活的描述和透视)英文http://www.koreascope.com/
North Korea Zone(关于朝鲜信息的交流和讨论网页)英文http://www.nkzone.org/nkzone/