美国社会性管制的经济学分析
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摘要
美国是世界上社会性管制最为完善的国家。经过了一百多年的发展,美国形成了先进的社会性管制理论、完善的法律法规体系以及严格的标准体系,为保障美国民众生命与健康做出了卓越的贡献。与美国相比,中国社会性管制处于较低层次的发展水平。为此,研究美国社会性管制的演进与现状,分析美国社会性管制的成本与收益,对中国社会性管制的发展与完善有着重要的理论和现实意义。本文首先对社会性管制的相关理论进行梳理,并利用经济学模型对社会性管制进行理论分析,对不同的管制方法进行比较。在此基础上,本文分别从社会性管制的演进和社会性管制成本收益分析两个角度对美国社会性管制进行全面系统的研究。通过研究美国社会性管制的运行制度,探讨美国社会性管制高效运行的原因,分析美国社会性管制制度的演进过程中的经验教训,为我国社会性管制的完善提供有益的借鉴和启示。
Social regulation is a new research field which began in 1970s. It is important to reduce the risk of environment, safety, health, and protect people’s life. After a hundred years of development, America has constructed the strictest social regulation system. China’s social regulation system has no agency which could assort with others regulatory agencies. There are disadvantage and problems in the environmental regulation, product safety regulation and labor safety regulation. After studying American social regulation system and discussing its high efficiency, this dissertation analyzes the evolution of social regulation in America. It is important to improve social regulation in China.
The first chapter is the summary of the theory. Although the research of social regulation has continued for years, the theory of social regulation develops slower than other field of regulatory economics. There is no systemic theory of social regulation. This dissertation tries to summarize the related theory about the reasons of social regulation, the methods of social regulation and the performance evaluation of social regulation. The public interest theory of regulation and the interest group theory of regulation could explain the reasons of social regulation. If we regard consumer as a group, the public interest theory of regulation is a special example of the interest group theory of regulation. After 1970, social regulation is the equilibrium of the games between the group of consumer, producer and the government. The theory of incentive regulation and the deregulation provided a reference to social regulation.
Although scholars have proved that the market-based environmental regulation mechanism is more efficient than“command-control approach”, but its effect is limited in practice. The theory of regulatory cost-benefit analysis is the method to evaluate the performance of social regulation. In recent years, the empirical analysis shows that social regulation of the U.S. is efficient.
The second chapter is the economics analysis of social regulation. This chapter builds the economic model so as to discuss the necessity of social regulation and compare to the implementary methods. In theory, the economic incentives method in environmental regulation is more effective than the traditional“command-control” method. But the economic incentives method is affected by the factors of institution, economy and so on. It is the complement of“command-control”method but not the substitute. In safety and health regulation, the market could not solve the information asymmetry of the credence goods. So it is necessary to rely on government regulation. Through promulgating information, setting standard and punishing the criminal, government could reduce the information asymmetry in market.
The third chapter is the evolution of social regulation in America. America has constructed the strictest social regulation system, but America has also experienced failure and frustration in the development process. From the pure food and drug act of 1906, every social regulation is the result of conflict between interest groups. In early 20th century, the producer interest group was in dominant. Social regulation was mainly protected the interests of producers. With the economic development and improving the quality of residents, the consumer interest group was in dominant and became the major force to promote the development of social regulation. The environment movement and labor movement in 1960s were led to the climax of social regulation in 1970s. After 1970, Consumer interest group has always been dominant, which result in the trend of social regulation gradual strengthening. However, too much regulation increased the cost of producer and decreased the welfare of whole society. America established an integrated regulatory cost-benefit analysis system in 1990s. The system proved that the social regulation in U.S. was necessary and efficient. In this period, economic incentive method was used in social regulation.
After a hundred years of development, social regulation in America has been improved and became a system. OMB is the core agency and the major administer agencies are USDA, EPA, OSHA and so on. Economic incentive method is the complement of“command-control”method.
The forth chapter is America’s social regulation cost-benefit analysis. This chapter researches America’s social regulation cost-benefit analysis from three aspects. First, this text researches the history of regulatory cost-benefit analysis system and its operating mechanism. It is good to improve China’s regulatory cost-benefit analysis system. Second, this dissertation divide social regulation cost into government regulatory cost, compliance cost, social welfare cost, indirect cost, transfer cost, and divide social regulation benefit into benefits directly traded in markets, benefits indirectly traded in markets, benefits not traded in markets. Then it reviews the evaluating method correspond to each kinds of cost and benefit, so as to built a integrate assessment system. Third, it analyzes the last fifteen years social regulation in the U.S. This text discusses the impact on state and local government, small business, wage, and economy growth. The result shows that social regulations in U.S. effectively reduce the risk about environment, safety and health, and increase the welfare of society.
The fifth chapter is the reference and elicitation of America’s social regulation to China. This chapter introduces the actuality of social regulation in China. Modern social regulation emerged behind the“reform and open”in China. After 30 years of development, it initially builds a complete system of social regulation. But China does not have specified conception about regulatory cost-benefit analysis, nor having a core agency which is responsible for coordinating all the supervising agencies. In environmental regulation, product safety regulation, and labor safety regulation, there are many defects and shortcomings in legal system, standard system and agency system. There are several measures that could improve the social regulation system in China, such as building more comprehensive legal system, stricter standard system, more flexible agency system, and implement regulatory cost-benefit analysis.
Social regulation is a new research field which began in 1970s. It is important to reduce the risk of environment, safety, health, and protect people’s life. After a hundred years of development, America has constructed the strictest social regulation system. China’s social regulation system has no agency which could assort with others regulatory agencies. There are disadvantage and problems in the environmental regulation, product safety regulation and labor safety regulation. After studying American social regulation system and discussing its high efficiency, this dissertation analyzes the evolution of social regulation in America. It is important to improve social regulation in China.
The first chapter is the summary of the theory. Although the research of social regulation has continued for years, the theory of social regulation develops slower than other field of regulatory economics. There is no systemic theory of social regulation. This dissertation tries to summarize the related theory about the reasons of social regulation, the methods of social regulation and the performance evaluation of social regulation. The public interest theory of regulation and the interest group theory of regulation could explain the reasons of social regulation. If we regard consumer as a group, the public interest theory of regulation is a special example of the interest group theory of regulation. After 1970, social regulation is the equilibrium of the games between the group of consumer, producer and the government. The theory of incentive regulation and the deregulation provided a reference to social regulation.
Although scholars have proved that the market-based environmental regulation mechanism is more efficient than“command-control approach”, but its effect is limited in practice. The theory of regulatory cost-benefit analysis is the method to evaluate the performance of social regulation. In recent years, the empirical analysis shows that social regulation of the U.S. is efficient.
The second chapter is the economics analysis of social regulation. This chapter builds the economic model so as to discuss the necessity of social regulation and compare to the implementary methods. In theory, the economic incentives method in environmental regulation is more effective than the traditional“command-control” method. But the economic incentives method is affected by the factors of institution, economy and so on. It is the complement of“command-control”method but not the substitute. In safety and health regulation, the market could not solve the information asymmetry of the credence goods. So it is necessary to rely on government regulation. Through promulgating information, setting standard and punishing the criminal, government could reduce the information asymmetry in market.
The third chapter is the evolution of social regulation in America. America has constructed the strictest social regulation system, but America has also experienced failure and frustration in the development process. From the pure food and drug act of 1906, every social regulation is the result of conflict between interest groups. In early 20th century, the producer interest group was in dominant. Social regulation was mainly protected the interests of producers. With the economic development and improving the quality of residents, the consumer interest group was in dominant and became the major force to promote the development of social regulation. The environment movement and labor movement in 1960s were led to the climax of social regulation in 1970s. After 1970, Consumer interest group has always been dominant, which result in the trend of social regulation gradual strengthening. However, too much regulation increased the cost of producer and decreased the welfare of whole society. America established an integrated regulatory cost-benefit analysis system in 1990s. The system proved that the social regulation in U.S. was necessary and efficient. In this period, economic incentive method was used in social regulation.
After a hundred years of development, social regulation in America has been improved and became a system. OMB is the core agency and the major administer agencies are USDA, EPA, OSHA and so on. Economic incentive method is the complement of“command-control”method.
The forth chapter is America’s social regulation cost-benefit analysis. This chapter researches America’s social regulation cost-benefit analysis from three aspects. First, this text researches the history of regulatory cost-benefit analysis system and its operating mechanism. It is good to improve China’s regulatory cost-benefit analysis system. Second, this dissertation divide social regulation cost into government regulatory cost, compliance cost, social welfare cost, indirect cost, transfer cost, and divide social regulation benefit into benefits directly traded in markets, benefits indirectly traded in markets, benefits not traded in markets. Then it reviews the evaluating method correspond to each kinds of cost and benefit, so as to built a integrate assessment system. Third, it analyzes the last fifteen years social regulation in the U.S. This text discusses the impact on state and local government, small business, wage, and economy growth. The result shows that social regulations in U.S. effectively reduce the risk about environment, safety and health, and increase the welfare of society.
The fifth chapter is the reference and elicitation of America’s social regulation to China. This chapter introduces the actuality of social regulation in China. Modern social regulation emerged behind the“reform and open”in China. After 30 years of development, it initially builds a complete system of social regulation. But China does not have specified conception about regulatory cost-benefit analysis, nor having a core agency which is responsible for coordinating all the supervising agencies. In environmental regulation, product safety regulation, and labor safety regulation, there are many defects and shortcomings in legal system, standard system and agency system. There are several measures that could improve the social regulation system in China, such as building more comprehensive legal system, stricter standard system, more flexible agency system, and implement regulatory cost-benefit analysis.
引文
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