终极所有权结构、制度环境与融资结构动态调整
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摘要
自改革开放以来,民营经济有了飞速发展,近年来,其对技术创新、GDP增长和就业的贡献都远远超过了国有企业。对于国有企业而言,尽管2003年国有资产管理委员会(国资委)的成立部分程度上解决了出资人问题,然而,由于国有企业的终极控制股东国资委并不是最终的委托人,尽管其掌握企业的实际控制权,但却并不拥有合法的剩余索取权。这种剩余索取权和控制权的不匹配,不仅会导致国企低下的经营效率,而且会因为国企高管在职期间创新收益权和创新控制权的严重分离,而导致国企严重的创新效率损失(吴延兵,2012)。而民营企业的终极控制股东不仅掌握着实际控制权,而且拥有合法的剩余索取权,因此能保障企业具有较高的经营效率和创新效率。在进行技术和机制创新时,民营企业的终极控制股东可以通过股权激励、期权激励和延期奖金机制等形式让渡部分所有权给管理者,通过鼓励管理者积极创新而享受创新的收益。因此对民营企业终极所有权结构的研究更具有现实意义。
民营企业终极控制股东的剩余索取权(现金流权)与控制权既有一致性,又并非完全一致。现金流权与控制权的一致性会增强终极控制股东与外部投资者(中小股东和债权人)之间的利益协同效应,使代理问题得到缓和,从而提升企业价值。而现金流权与控制权的偏离却是形成终极控制股东与外部投资者之间利益冲突的根源,它会增强终极控制股东的掠夺激励,使代理成本上升,企业价值下降。先前的研究主要从静态视角研究终极所有权结构与融资结构选择之间关系(肖作平,2011；肖作平,2012；肖作平和廖理,2012)。然而,公司融资结构决策本质上是-个动态过程,只有动态分析才能反映融资决策的动态调整过程,先前的研究无法真正理清终极所有权结构与融资结构动态调整之间的关系。因此,开展终极所有权结构与民营企业融资结构动态调整(包括目标融资结构和调整速度)之间关系的研究具有重要的理论和实践意义。
近年来,制度环境在融资结构选择中的作用日益受到学术界的广泛关注。许多跨国研究揭示了特定国家制度环境对融资结构选择的影响(Raj an和Zingales,1995; Demirguc-Kunt和Maksimovic,1998,1999).然而,将在发达国家的制度环境下开发的融资结构理论直接应用到我国的民营企业身上,很可能会“药不对症”。正如Barclay和Smith(1999)所指出的,在融资结构研究领域,最重要的便是结合公司融资的制度环境,提出更符合现实的假设,设计出更为有效的实证模型,从而找到驱动企业融资决策的核心要素。我国正处于经济转轨时期,存在着特殊的制度背景。如股权结构较为独特,投资者法律保护不健全,市场发育不完善,政府干预较为严重,金融发展水平较为落后等。在我国,各个省份、自治区和直辖市(统称为地区)在地方政府管制、政府对企业的干预信用文化、产品和要素市场的发育程度、金融发展水平以及法律制度环境等方面存在相当大的差异(樊纲等,2012)。这为研究制度环境和融资结构选择之间的关系提供了难得的机会。近年来,政府相关部门积极发展公司债、企业债等债务融资工具,这为研究融资结构问题提供了条件,尤其是债务期限结构问题。且在我国特有的制度背景下,存在许多与融资相关的问题,如终极控制股东往往会根据自身利益调整公司融资政策以增强其壕沟效应,掠夺外部投资者财富和获取控制权私有收益等,从而影响企业的目标融资结构决策和调整融资结构的交易费用(即调整成本)。因此,理清终极所有权结构、制度环境与融资结构动态调整(目标融资结构和调整速度)之间关系具有重要的学术价值。
综观现有文献,目前尚未出现把终极所有权结构和制度环境两者结合起来研究企业融资结构动态调整问题的文献。因此,本研究将为融资结构研究提供有益的开拓和补充。本文在对融资结构的理论文献和实证文献进行相关梳理的基础上,以动态权衡理论为蓝本,结合我国的制度环境,构建融资结构动态调整模型,深入分析了终极控制股东和外部投资者之间的代理冲突,以及制度因素对目标融资结构和调整成本的影响。
全文共分六章。第一章引言,论述选题背景及意义、主要内容及研究框架、研究方法以及关键术语的界定。第二章文献综述,主要分为四个部分：一,资本结构的理论文献综述；二,资本结构的实证文献综述；三,债务期限结构的理论文献综述；四,债务期限结构的实证文献综述。第三章民营上市公司的融资制度环境分析,分别对资本市场的融资制度、银行信贷的融资制度、投资者保护和区域市场化进程等进行了进行深入分析。第四章终极所有权结构、制度环境对目标资本结构和调整速度的影响。第五章终极所有权结构、制度环境对目标债务期限结构和调整速度的影响。第六章结论和展望,总结研究结论,提出政策建议,分析本研究的局限性,并对未来研究进行展望。本文的主要研究结论如下：
(1)我国民营上市公司终极控制股东的现金流权和控制权的偏离程度(两权偏离度)越高,企业所在区域的市场化程度越高,企业制定的目标债务水平会越高,且好的制度环境会削弱两权偏离度与目标资本结构之间的正相关关系。
(2)终极控制股东的现金流权越大,企业资本结构的调整速度会越快；金字塔层数和两权偏离度越高,资本结构的调整速度会越慢；在市场化进程更高的地区,企业调整资本结构的成本越低,调整速度会越快。
(3)在未考虑目标债务期限结构对目标资本结构的内生依赖时,终极控制股东的两权偏离度越高,企业的目标债务期限水平越低；当考虑内生依赖时,两权偏离度与目标债务期限水平的负相关关系不再显著,而目标资本结构与目标债务期限结构显著正相关。无论是否考虑这种内生依赖,在制度环境更好的地区,企业会选择更低的目标债务期限水平。
(4)无论是否考虑目标债务期限结构对目标资本结构的内生依赖,两权偏离度、制度环境均与债务期限结构调整速度显著正相关。
Since reform and opening up, private economy has made rapid development. In recent years, the contributions of private economy to technology innovation, GDP growth and employment are far more than state-owned enterprises (SOE). For stae-owned enterprises, despite the establishment of State Assets Management Committee (SAMC) partly solves the problem of sponsor. However, because ultimate controlling shareholder (SAMC) of SOE is not the ultimate principals, so it does not have a legitimate residual claim although it has own effective control. The mismatch between residual claim and control right will not only lead to low operating efficiency, but also result in the serious loss of innovation efficiency because of the serious separation between innovation usufruct and control right of innovation during executives of SOE are in office (Wu,2012). For private enterprises, ultimate controlling shareholders not only grasp the actual control right, but also have the legitimate residual claim. So the higher operating efficnecy and innovation efficiency can be guaranteed. During the period of innovation, ultimate controlling shareholders of private enterprises may assign partial ownership to the executives through equity incentives, option incentives and deferred bonus incentive mechanisms, which will make them to enjoy innovation benefits by encouraging the executives to innovate positively. Therefore, the research of ultimate ownership structure in private enterprises has stronger practical significance than that of SOE.
The residual cliam (cash flow rights) of ultimate controlling shareholder is consistent with control rights in private enterprises partly, but not exactly the same. The consistence between cash flow rights and control rights will enhance the synergy effect between ultimate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and the agency problems are eased, thereby increasing corporate value. And the separation of control rights from cash flow rights is the origin which gives rise to the interest conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholders and external investors. It will enhance the plunder incentive of ultimate controlling shareholders, thereby prompting agency cost and decreasing corporate value. Meanwhile, previous studies mainly analyze the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and financing structure choices from static prospective (Xiao,2011; Xiao,2012; Xiao and Liao,2012). However, the financing structure decisions is essentially a dynamic process, only dynamic analysis can reflect the dynamic adjustment process of financing decisions. While previous researches can't clarify out the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and financing structure dynamic adjustment. Therefore, carrying out analyzing the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and corporate financing structure dynamic adjustment (including target financing structure and adjustment speed) has important theoretical and practical significance, especially for private listed companies.
In recent year, the researches how institutional environment affects corporate financing structure choices attract the broad concerns in academic community. Many multinational studies reveals the impact of the particular institutional environment on corporate financing structure choices (Rajan and Zingales,1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic,1998,1999). However, applying the financing structure theories that are developed in developed institutional system to private enterprises directly may be not appropriate. As Barclay and Smith (1999) mentioned, in the financing structure field, the most important things are presenting the presumptions which is close to the reality and designing the efficient empirical model, thereby finding the core elements drive corporate financing decisions combined with the corporate financing institutional eniroment. Now, China is in a period of economic transition, there is a specil system background. Such as unique ownership structure, poor investor protection, imperfect market, serious government intervention, and backward financial development level. In China, there are considerable differences in local government regulation, government intervention in business credit culture, product and factor market, financial development level and legal institutional environment in various provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (collectively referred to as region). These will provide the scare opportunity to investigate the relationship between institutional environment and corporate financing choices. In recent years, the relevant government sections have actively developed debt financing instruments, including corporate bond and enterprise bond, which provide the research condition for financing structure problem, especially debt maturity structure issues. And in the special institutional environment in China, there are many problems associated with corporate financing, such as ultimate controlling shareholders will adjust corporate financing policy to enhance entrenchment effect based on self-interest, plundering the wealth of external investors and acquiring private control benefits, thereby influencing target financing structure decisions and transaction cost in adjusting financing structure (adjustment cost). Therefore, clarying out the relationship among ultimate ownership structure, institutional environment and corporate financing dynamic adjustment (target financing structure and adjustment speed) has important academic value.
Overviewing the existing literature, there are not any literatures which analyze corporate financing structure dynamic adjustment through the combination of ultimate ownership structure with institutional environment by now. Therefore, this study will provide the useful extension and complement to financing structure research. Based on the relevant carding of theoretical and empirical literature about financing structure, in the guidance of dynamic tradeoff theory, this dissertation firstly constructs the financing structure dynamic adjustment model combined with the institutional environment in China, then analyzes deeply the impact of agency conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholders and external investors and institutional environment on target financing structure and adjustment speed. Specifically, this dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter1, introduction. This chapter discusses the research background, research significance, the main contents, framework, and research method. The definition of key terms is also given. Chapter2, review of financing structure literature. This chapter is divided into four parts:The first part, capital structure theoretical literature review; The second part, capital structure empirical literature review; The third part, debt maturity structure theoretical literature review; The forth part, debt maturity structure empirical literature review. Chapter3, analysis of the financing system of capital market, financing system of bank loan, investor protection and process of marketlization in depth. Chapter4, analysis of how ultimate ownership structure and institutional environment affect capital structure dynamic adjustment. Chapter5, analysis of how ultimate ownership structure and institutional environment affect debt maturity structure dynamic adjustment. Chapter6, conclusions and prospects. Based on the empirical analysis, this chapter summarizes the main conclusions, and refines the innovations, then presents policy recommendations in terms of relevant research findings, lastly analyzes the limitation in this paper and future prospects.
The main conclusions are as follows:
(1) For Chinese private listed companies, the higher of separation between cash flow rights and control rights (the separation) of ultimate controlling shareholder, the higher marketization degree of the area which the company locate, the target debt level will be higher. And good institutional environment will weaken the positive correlation between the separation and target capital structure.
(2) The higher the ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow rights, capital structure adjustment speed will be faster; The higher pyramid layers and the separation of the ultimate controlling shareholder, capital structure adjustment speed will be slower; In the regions which have higher marketization process, the adjustment cost will be lower, thus generates faster adjustment speed.
(3) When the endogenous dependency of target debt maturity on capital structure is not considered, the higher the separation, the target debt maturity level will be lower. When the endogenous depency is considered, the negative correlation between the separation and target debt maturity level is not significant. Wheterhe or not considering the endogenous dependency, in the area which have better institutional environment, lower debt maturity level will be chosen.
(4) Whether or not considering the endogenous dependency, the separation and institutional environment are positively correlated with adjustment speed of capital structure.
民营企业终极控制股东的剩余索取权(现金流权)与控制权既有一致性,又并非完全一致。现金流权与控制权的一致性会增强终极控制股东与外部投资者(中小股东和债权人)之间的利益协同效应,使代理问题得到缓和,从而提升企业价值。而现金流权与控制权的偏离却是形成终极控制股东与外部投资者之间利益冲突的根源,它会增强终极控制股东的掠夺激励,使代理成本上升,企业价值下降。先前的研究主要从静态视角研究终极所有权结构与融资结构选择之间关系(肖作平,2011；肖作平,2012；肖作平和廖理,2012)。然而,公司融资结构决策本质上是-个动态过程,只有动态分析才能反映融资决策的动态调整过程,先前的研究无法真正理清终极所有权结构与融资结构动态调整之间的关系。因此,开展终极所有权结构与民营企业融资结构动态调整(包括目标融资结构和调整速度)之间关系的研究具有重要的理论和实践意义。
近年来,制度环境在融资结构选择中的作用日益受到学术界的广泛关注。许多跨国研究揭示了特定国家制度环境对融资结构选择的影响(Raj an和Zingales,1995; Demirguc-Kunt和Maksimovic,1998,1999).然而,将在发达国家的制度环境下开发的融资结构理论直接应用到我国的民营企业身上,很可能会“药不对症”。正如Barclay和Smith(1999)所指出的,在融资结构研究领域,最重要的便是结合公司融资的制度环境,提出更符合现实的假设,设计出更为有效的实证模型,从而找到驱动企业融资决策的核心要素。我国正处于经济转轨时期,存在着特殊的制度背景。如股权结构较为独特,投资者法律保护不健全,市场发育不完善,政府干预较为严重,金融发展水平较为落后等。在我国,各个省份、自治区和直辖市(统称为地区)在地方政府管制、政府对企业的干预信用文化、产品和要素市场的发育程度、金融发展水平以及法律制度环境等方面存在相当大的差异(樊纲等,2012)。这为研究制度环境和融资结构选择之间的关系提供了难得的机会。近年来,政府相关部门积极发展公司债、企业债等债务融资工具,这为研究融资结构问题提供了条件,尤其是债务期限结构问题。且在我国特有的制度背景下,存在许多与融资相关的问题,如终极控制股东往往会根据自身利益调整公司融资政策以增强其壕沟效应,掠夺外部投资者财富和获取控制权私有收益等,从而影响企业的目标融资结构决策和调整融资结构的交易费用(即调整成本)。因此,理清终极所有权结构、制度环境与融资结构动态调整(目标融资结构和调整速度)之间关系具有重要的学术价值。
综观现有文献,目前尚未出现把终极所有权结构和制度环境两者结合起来研究企业融资结构动态调整问题的文献。因此,本研究将为融资结构研究提供有益的开拓和补充。本文在对融资结构的理论文献和实证文献进行相关梳理的基础上,以动态权衡理论为蓝本,结合我国的制度环境,构建融资结构动态调整模型,深入分析了终极控制股东和外部投资者之间的代理冲突,以及制度因素对目标融资结构和调整成本的影响。
全文共分六章。第一章引言,论述选题背景及意义、主要内容及研究框架、研究方法以及关键术语的界定。第二章文献综述,主要分为四个部分：一,资本结构的理论文献综述；二,资本结构的实证文献综述；三,债务期限结构的理论文献综述；四,债务期限结构的实证文献综述。第三章民营上市公司的融资制度环境分析,分别对资本市场的融资制度、银行信贷的融资制度、投资者保护和区域市场化进程等进行了进行深入分析。第四章终极所有权结构、制度环境对目标资本结构和调整速度的影响。第五章终极所有权结构、制度环境对目标债务期限结构和调整速度的影响。第六章结论和展望,总结研究结论,提出政策建议,分析本研究的局限性,并对未来研究进行展望。本文的主要研究结论如下：
(1)我国民营上市公司终极控制股东的现金流权和控制权的偏离程度(两权偏离度)越高,企业所在区域的市场化程度越高,企业制定的目标债务水平会越高,且好的制度环境会削弱两权偏离度与目标资本结构之间的正相关关系。
(2)终极控制股东的现金流权越大,企业资本结构的调整速度会越快；金字塔层数和两权偏离度越高,资本结构的调整速度会越慢；在市场化进程更高的地区,企业调整资本结构的成本越低,调整速度会越快。
(3)在未考虑目标债务期限结构对目标资本结构的内生依赖时,终极控制股东的两权偏离度越高,企业的目标债务期限水平越低；当考虑内生依赖时,两权偏离度与目标债务期限水平的负相关关系不再显著,而目标资本结构与目标债务期限结构显著正相关。无论是否考虑这种内生依赖,在制度环境更好的地区,企业会选择更低的目标债务期限水平。
(4)无论是否考虑目标债务期限结构对目标资本结构的内生依赖,两权偏离度、制度环境均与债务期限结构调整速度显著正相关。
Since reform and opening up, private economy has made rapid development. In recent years, the contributions of private economy to technology innovation, GDP growth and employment are far more than state-owned enterprises (SOE). For stae-owned enterprises, despite the establishment of State Assets Management Committee (SAMC) partly solves the problem of sponsor. However, because ultimate controlling shareholder (SAMC) of SOE is not the ultimate principals, so it does not have a legitimate residual claim although it has own effective control. The mismatch between residual claim and control right will not only lead to low operating efficiency, but also result in the serious loss of innovation efficiency because of the serious separation between innovation usufruct and control right of innovation during executives of SOE are in office (Wu,2012). For private enterprises, ultimate controlling shareholders not only grasp the actual control right, but also have the legitimate residual claim. So the higher operating efficnecy and innovation efficiency can be guaranteed. During the period of innovation, ultimate controlling shareholders of private enterprises may assign partial ownership to the executives through equity incentives, option incentives and deferred bonus incentive mechanisms, which will make them to enjoy innovation benefits by encouraging the executives to innovate positively. Therefore, the research of ultimate ownership structure in private enterprises has stronger practical significance than that of SOE.
The residual cliam (cash flow rights) of ultimate controlling shareholder is consistent with control rights in private enterprises partly, but not exactly the same. The consistence between cash flow rights and control rights will enhance the synergy effect between ultimate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and the agency problems are eased, thereby increasing corporate value. And the separation of control rights from cash flow rights is the origin which gives rise to the interest conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholders and external investors. It will enhance the plunder incentive of ultimate controlling shareholders, thereby prompting agency cost and decreasing corporate value. Meanwhile, previous studies mainly analyze the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and financing structure choices from static prospective (Xiao,2011; Xiao,2012; Xiao and Liao,2012). However, the financing structure decisions is essentially a dynamic process, only dynamic analysis can reflect the dynamic adjustment process of financing decisions. While previous researches can't clarify out the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and financing structure dynamic adjustment. Therefore, carrying out analyzing the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and corporate financing structure dynamic adjustment (including target financing structure and adjustment speed) has important theoretical and practical significance, especially for private listed companies.
In recent year, the researches how institutional environment affects corporate financing structure choices attract the broad concerns in academic community. Many multinational studies reveals the impact of the particular institutional environment on corporate financing structure choices (Rajan and Zingales,1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic,1998,1999). However, applying the financing structure theories that are developed in developed institutional system to private enterprises directly may be not appropriate. As Barclay and Smith (1999) mentioned, in the financing structure field, the most important things are presenting the presumptions which is close to the reality and designing the efficient empirical model, thereby finding the core elements drive corporate financing decisions combined with the corporate financing institutional eniroment. Now, China is in a period of economic transition, there is a specil system background. Such as unique ownership structure, poor investor protection, imperfect market, serious government intervention, and backward financial development level. In China, there are considerable differences in local government regulation, government intervention in business credit culture, product and factor market, financial development level and legal institutional environment in various provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (collectively referred to as region). These will provide the scare opportunity to investigate the relationship between institutional environment and corporate financing choices. In recent years, the relevant government sections have actively developed debt financing instruments, including corporate bond and enterprise bond, which provide the research condition for financing structure problem, especially debt maturity structure issues. And in the special institutional environment in China, there are many problems associated with corporate financing, such as ultimate controlling shareholders will adjust corporate financing policy to enhance entrenchment effect based on self-interest, plundering the wealth of external investors and acquiring private control benefits, thereby influencing target financing structure decisions and transaction cost in adjusting financing structure (adjustment cost). Therefore, clarying out the relationship among ultimate ownership structure, institutional environment and corporate financing dynamic adjustment (target financing structure and adjustment speed) has important academic value.
Overviewing the existing literature, there are not any literatures which analyze corporate financing structure dynamic adjustment through the combination of ultimate ownership structure with institutional environment by now. Therefore, this study will provide the useful extension and complement to financing structure research. Based on the relevant carding of theoretical and empirical literature about financing structure, in the guidance of dynamic tradeoff theory, this dissertation firstly constructs the financing structure dynamic adjustment model combined with the institutional environment in China, then analyzes deeply the impact of agency conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholders and external investors and institutional environment on target financing structure and adjustment speed. Specifically, this dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter1, introduction. This chapter discusses the research background, research significance, the main contents, framework, and research method. The definition of key terms is also given. Chapter2, review of financing structure literature. This chapter is divided into four parts:The first part, capital structure theoretical literature review; The second part, capital structure empirical literature review; The third part, debt maturity structure theoretical literature review; The forth part, debt maturity structure empirical literature review. Chapter3, analysis of the financing system of capital market, financing system of bank loan, investor protection and process of marketlization in depth. Chapter4, analysis of how ultimate ownership structure and institutional environment affect capital structure dynamic adjustment. Chapter5, analysis of how ultimate ownership structure and institutional environment affect debt maturity structure dynamic adjustment. Chapter6, conclusions and prospects. Based on the empirical analysis, this chapter summarizes the main conclusions, and refines the innovations, then presents policy recommendations in terms of relevant research findings, lastly analyzes the limitation in this paper and future prospects.
The main conclusions are as follows:
(1) For Chinese private listed companies, the higher of separation between cash flow rights and control rights (the separation) of ultimate controlling shareholder, the higher marketization degree of the area which the company locate, the target debt level will be higher. And good institutional environment will weaken the positive correlation between the separation and target capital structure.
(2) The higher the ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow rights, capital structure adjustment speed will be faster; The higher pyramid layers and the separation of the ultimate controlling shareholder, capital structure adjustment speed will be slower; In the regions which have higher marketization process, the adjustment cost will be lower, thus generates faster adjustment speed.
(3) When the endogenous dependency of target debt maturity on capital structure is not considered, the higher the separation, the target debt maturity level will be lower. When the endogenous depency is considered, the negative correlation between the separation and target debt maturity level is not significant. Wheterhe or not considering the endogenous dependency, in the area which have better institutional environment, lower debt maturity level will be chosen.
(4) Whether or not considering the endogenous dependency, the separation and institutional environment are positively correlated with adjustment speed of capital structure.
引文
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