摘要
中小企业对一国经济社会发展有重大影响,融资问题一直是制约其发展的重要因素。在世界范围内,商业银行是中小企业融资的主要渠道,但是单个银行由于能力和资源禀赋方面的制约,往往不能顺利地开展中小企业业务,需要与其它机构开展合作。以商业银行为主线,对应造成中小企业融资难的原因,中小企业融资中涉及的机构合作主要包括商业银行之间的信息共享,商业银行和担保机构之间的风险分担,商业银行和股权投资机构的合作。多个机构同时参与融资往往会产生比较复杂的利益协调,论文通过建立信息经济学的分析框架,分析中小企业融资中机构之间的合作机制。
在商业银行之间的信息共享机制研究中,建立两个银行两阶段融资的模型,根据第一阶段企业还款情况以及银行搜集的软信息,把企业分为三类,然后按照银行搜集软信息能力的强弱,把模型的情景分为四种,分析不同情境下银行与各类企业的借贷关系在信息共享前后的变化。研究表明银行及竞争对手搜集软信息的能力,银行及竞争对手的市场份额都会影响到银行参与信息共享的收益,具体的影响情况与优质企业占总体企业的比例以及优质企业的成功概率有关。在信息共享机制中,需要防范银行说谎的可能性。
银行和担保机构的风险分担机制研究表明,担保机构的调研能力对担保机构的存在性有重要意义。对担保机构的激励与约束通过担保费率实现,由于实践中担保费率相对较低,不会触及上限导致担保机构的搭便车行为,担保费率的下限由担保机构及银行调研能力等因素决定。对银行的激励与约束通过担保比例来实现,一方面担保比例要满足银行的要求,另一方面担保比例不能导致银行放松贷前审查,均衡的担保比例与银行的调研能力正相关,与担保机构的调研能力反相关,与银行调研企业的成本反相关。
商业银行和股权投资机构合作机制的研究表明,相关机构在不同合作模式中发挥的作用有所不同,整体上包括提供信息、扩大资金规模、风险分担、制度通道、提升企业价值等功能,其中价值提升是商业银行和股权投资机构合作的主要效果。以桥隧模式为例,分别从参与机构和企业的角度分析企业价值提升的过程。
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a significant role on a country's economic and social development, while the financing problem has always been an important factor restricting the development of them. Commercial banks constitute the main financing channel for SMEs in the worldwide, but individual bank, which often cannot carry out business smoothly due to the constraints of capacity and resource endowments, needs to cooperate with other institutions. With the commercial bank as the main line, cooperations between institutions mainly include:sharing information between commercial banks, allocation of risks between banks and guarantee institutions, cooperations between commercial banks and equity investment institutions, corresponding to the reasons causing financing difficulty of SMEs. Multiple institutions' participation in the financing activities simultaneously tends to generate complex interests coordination mechanism, this article tries to study the cooperation mechanism between the institutions in the SMEs financing activities through the establishment of the an analytical framework of information economics.
In the study of information-sharing mechanism between commercial banks, this article builds a two-bank-two-stage financing model, which classifies the enterprises into three groups according to their repayments in the first stage, and then divides the model scene into four categories according to the ability of banks to collect the soft information to analyze the changes of the lending relation between the bank and different types of enterprise before and after the information is shared under different circumstance. It shows that both of the ability of the bank itself as well as its competitors to collect soft information, and the market shares of the bank itself and the competitors will affect the bank's profit of participation in the information sharing. This effect is connected with the proportion of high-grade enterprises and the success probability of high-grade enterprises. Banks probably lie in the information sharing mechanism.
The study of allocation of risk between commercial banks and guarantee agencies shows that the ability to screen the enterprise of the guarantee institution is crucial for its existence. The incentive and restriction of the guarantee institutions are realized by the rate of credit guarantee fee, which is relatively low in practice, thus will not touch the upper limit that promotes free-riding behavior of the guarantee institution. The lower limit of the guarantee fee is decided by the ability to screen the enterprise of the guarantee institution and the bank. The incentive and restriction of banks are achieved by the guarantee ratio. On the one hand, the ratio must satisfy the bank, on the other hand, the ratio must not result to the bank loosening the investigation before lending. The equilibrium rate has positive correlation with the screening capacity of banks, a negative correlation with the screening capacity of guarantee institutions, and a negative correlation with the collecting information cost of banks.
The study of cooperation between commercial banks and equity investment institutions shows the related institutions play different roles in different financing modes.The functions generally include information-giving, overcoming capital constraints, risk sharing, institutional channel, promoting enterprises value and so forth. And the last one is the main effect. Taking bridge mode for example, this article analyzes the value upgrading process from the standpoint of the participating institutions and enterprises.
引文
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① 肖红叶,高级微观经济学[M],北京：中国金融出版社,2003年：317-319
① 本章内容主要来自作者发表的论文：张旭东,基于合约理论的银行与担保机构信息沟通机制研究[J].统计与决策,2013(005)：67-69.
① 数据来自中国银行业监督管理委员会：http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/index.html
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