摘要
西方发达国家在20世纪70年代之前,对航空、电信、电力、铁路、邮政等传统自然垄断行业实施了政府管制或国家所有制,其目的是试图解决“马歇尔冲突”所带来的困扰,即在享受规模经济收益的同时,又能有效地避免或降低垄断所带来的诸多弊端。从中国经济转型30年的实践来看,垄断行业的改革进展缓慢。铁路、电力、民航、通讯、公共事业等这些关系国计民生的基础行业的垄断,不仅不利于国家经济的发展,同时也带来垄断行业产品定价长期背离价值,强化行业保护、排斥市场竞争等负面作用。这些行业打破垄断的路在何方,如果改革,改革后市场竞争格局将会如何。
针对上面的问题,本文首先运用博弈论、产业经济学等理论重点分析了从完全垄断到寡头垄断下厂商的市场行为,从而得出了不同情景下厂商的竞争均衡得一般性模型和结论。均衡结果不仅可以为政府宏观政策的制定提供一定的参考,而且对于处于相应情景的厂商竞争提供实践借鉴。在一般性模型的基础上,结合电信行业的特点,讨论了我国电信行业改革前后的竞争均衡。本文整体上分为四个部分：
第一部分重点介绍了当市场上存在一家垄断厂商,即市场结构为完全垄断时厂商的市场行为。首先对完全垄断下市场结构进行了分析,研究了完全垄断市场的特征、短期均衡和长期均衡以及市场绩效和社会福利；然后从垄断厂商角度,区分单种产品和多种产品两种情形进行研究,并且在对单种产品研究中,进一步区分市场完全覆盖和市场部分覆盖进行了分析；在对多种产品研究中,区分是否考虑消费者消费参数进行了分析。最后,研究了完全垄断厂商的市场歧视定价。
第二部分重点介绍了市场上出现两个垄断厂商下市场竞争,分别讨论了成本不对称下以及产品差异化下的竞争均衡。研究表明在成本不对称下,尽管领先者具有“先天性”的先动优势,但跟随者也可以通过“后天性”的先发制人来减少领先者的约束,获得自身利润最大化。进一步,得到差异化能抵消领先者的“先动优势”,尤其是当差异化达到一定程度,跟随者的产量和利润将会超过领先者。从而得出市场竞争最终的均衡是先动产量决策和后动差异化共同作用的结果。然后,对产品差异化模型进行扩展,采用纵向差异化来讨论,即当产品的差异化由产品质量来衡量时,得出边际成本越低,产品质量越好,进行先动决策的厂商的均衡产量和均衡利润最高的结论。
第三部分重点介绍了市场上出现三家垄断厂商下的市场竞争问题。重点研究了两个问题：一是潜在进入厂商的进入与在位厂商阻止进入问题。研究了市场上存在两个垄断厂商和一个潜在进入厂商下的进入与阻止进入的博弈。在研究中区分两个在位厂商是否同时决策建立了两个模型,研究得出在完全信息下,每个厂商为了追求自身利益最大化,都会考虑潜在进入对于双方利润的影响,领先厂商并不会夸大对其自身的负面影响,从而不会产生“搭便车”现象,也不会出现一家厂商负担全部阻止进入投入的现象。
二是研究了市场上存在三家垄断厂商竞争的情形。在三家垄断厂商的竞争中,讨论了成本不对称下以及产品差异化下的三个厂商的竞争。对于每个情形按照决策先后的不同以及差异化决策可以有很多情形,本章重点建立了S-S模型、S-C模型和S-M模型,并通过算例对各种情形下的竞争均衡进行比较。研究表明在不同情形下厂商决策的先后以及差异化程度影响着最终均衡结果,厂商的均衡结果是由第一阶段产量决策的先后和第二阶段差异化程度共同作用的结果,从而使三家厂商出现了此消彼长,在不同产品、不同地理领域、不同子品牌、不同时段表现出不同的市场占有率,市场均衡将表现出不同的状态。因此,在三寡头市场,领先厂商不一定永远处处领先,跟随厂商不一定时时处处跟随。
第四部分是电信市场实证分析。对中国电信行业,结合电信行业自身的特点,通过2002年中国联通CDMA和中国移动的GPRS为例定性分析了第四章中双寡头垄断市场竞争规律。然后,进一步以中国移动和中国联通1999年-2007年的数据为基础,分析两家垄断运营商的竞争均衡,得出了中国移动和中国联通的竞争均衡,从而验证了第四章分析结论；最后通过第五章中有关三家垄断厂商的竞争分析,结合电信行业特点,引用2008年-2009年数据预测改革后三家全业务运营商3G之间的未来竞争均衡。
Before the 1970s,the western developed countries implement government regulation or state ownership on traditionally natural monopoly industries like aviation, telecommunication, electric power, railway, and postal, trying to solve the trouble of "Marshall conflict", which means their purpose is enjoying the benefit of scale economy, while avoiding or reducing the drawbacks of monopoly. From the practice of China's economic transformation of 30 years, the reform of monopoly industries are slowly to progress. In fact, the monopoly of these basic industries such as railroad, electric power, civil aviation, and communication, which related to people's livelihood, is not only unfavorable to the national economy development, but also bring some negative effects to this industry. Where is the way to break monopoly for these industries? Which market competition pattern will be presented after the reform?
According to the above problems, this paper analyzed the market behavior from complete monopoly to oligarchic monopoly by using game theory and industrial economics theory, thus obtained different Competitve equilibrium under different situation. The equilibrium results can not only provides some reference for government to make macroeconomic policy, but also provides practical reference for manufacturers. This whole is divided into four parts:
The first part focuses on market behavior of manufacturers when its market structure is completely monopoly, which means there is only one monopoly firm in the market. Firstly, the author analyzed the market structure under completely monopoly, and studied the characteristics of completely monopoly market, short-term equilibrium, long-term equilibrium, market performance and social welfare. And then the author studied it on single products and multiple products condition from the perspective of monopoly firms. Besides, in single products research, the author further distinguished market completely coverage and market segment coverage, and in the multiple products research distinguished the author distinguished weather take the consumer spending parameter into consideration. At last, the author studied the market price discrimination of completely monopoly manufacturers.
The second part mainly introduces market competition of two monopoly firms, and discussed Competitive market under cost asymmetry and product differentiation. The results show that under cost asymmetry, although the leaders have the first-mover advantage of "inherent", the followers can also reduce the constraints of leaders to attain their own maximum by its "acquired" pre-emptive. Furthermore, the product differentiation can offset the first-mover advantage of the leaders, especially when the product differentiation up to a certain extent, the followers' output and profit will exceed the leaders. Thus, it can be drawn that the final equilibrium of market competition is interacted by first-mover output decision-making and the late-mover differentiation. Then, expanding the product differentiation model, adopting vertical differentiation to discuss, namely, when product quality is measured by product differentiation, the conclusion is the marginal cost is lower, the product quality is better, the firms who make a first move strategy would win highest equilibrium output and profits.
The third part mainly introduced market competition of three monopoly firms. It focuses on two questions:first questions are the potential entrant access to market and incumbent firms want to prevent its entry at the same time. The author researched the Game of entry and prevent when market exist two monopoly firms and one potential entrant. In research, the author established two models to distinguish whether two incumbent firms make decision at the same time. The results show that each manufacturer will consider the impact of access for both profits. Leading manufacturers will not exaggerate the negative influence on their own. So it won't produce "free-rider" phenomenon, and also won't appear to the phenomenon that only one manufacturer to stop into potential entrant.
Second, the author studied market competition of three monopoly firms. In three monopolistic competitions, the author discussed its competition under cost asymmetry and product differentiation. For each case, it can be divided into many situations by different decision order and differentiated decision-making. This chapter established S-S model, S-C model and S-M model, and compared all kinds of competitive equilibrium through an example. The results show that the final equilibrium results were impacted by manufacturers' decision order and the degree of differentiation under different situation. The equilibrium results of manufacturers are interacted by output decision-making order in first stage and differentiation degree in second stage. Then, the three firms have emerged the shift. The market equilibrium shows different status because these three firms show different state of market share in different products, different geographical area, different brand, and different time. Therefore, in three oligopoly market, the leaders does not lead forever, the followers does not necessarily follow at all time.
The fourth part is positive. As the case of Chinese telecommunication industry, quoted the relevant data in 1999-2007, the author verified the relevant conclusions of chapter four through the competition between China mobile and China Unicom before the reform mobile communications market in 2008, and predicted that the competition equilibrium among three full-service operators in 3G after reform,quoted the relevant data in 2008-2009, by the competition analysis of three monopoly firms in chapter 5.
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