摘要
最近几年风险投资在中国蓬勃发展。出于分散投资风险、增加价值溢出的动因，越来越多的风险投资机构选择联合风险投资进行投资，联合风险投资也成为学者们关注的重点。虽然学者们大多认同联合风险投资能够增加风险项目的成功概率，但联合风险投资是一个涉及到多层面的活动，对于联合风险投资如何有效运作，如何有效缓解由于信息不对称和委托代理关系而产生的行为问题，仍有待于做进一步研究。在此背景下，对联合风险投资的运行和管理机制进行探索研究，能够对中国的风险投资产业的发展和联合风险投资理论提供补充和完善。
本文基于风险投资理论和战略联盟理论等相关领域的国内外文献回顾，构建了风险投资机构的特征，联合风险投资合作伙伴的行为和联合风险投资的联盟稳定性之间关系的理论模型，并利用205份调查问卷，运用结构方程模型和因子分析法对本文假设的理论模型做了实证检验。随后针对联合风险投资联盟的行为治理，本文又引入动态演化博弈分析理论，构建了复制动态方程模型，对联合风险投资联盟的行为策略进行了研究。本文研究得出了如下主要的研究结论：
一是风险投资机构的特征对联合风险投资的联盟稳定性的影响。研究发现风险投资机构的声誉和相容性特征能够促进联合风险投资的联盟稳定性。
二是联合风险投资成员的行为关系对联合风险投资的联盟稳定性的影响。本文研究发现由于信息不对称和委托代理关系而产生的逆向选择行为和道德风险行为对联合风险投资的联盟稳定性的影响并不相同，其中道德风险行为会对联盟的稳定性产生消极的影响，而逆向选择行为从长期来看，并不会对联盟稳定性产生消极的影响。此外，风险投资机构的履约行为能够积极的促进双方合作，对联合风险投资的联盟稳定性有积极的影响。
三是风险投资机构的特征因素对联合风险投资联盟的行为关系的影响。本文研究发现风险投资机构的声誉和相容性特征能够有效的降低联合风险投资联盟合作过程中的逆向选择行为和道德风险行为的发生概率，并且能够促进双方积极履约行为的发生。
四是联合风险投资联盟的行为治理机制。本文研究发现风险投资机构采取积极合作策略时的管理付出成本，联合风险投资联盟的奖惩力度，联合风险投资的声誉损失效应对联合风险投资成员的行为策略产生影响，也进而影响到了联合风险投资的联盟稳定性。
本文的研究贡献和创新点主要体现在三个方面：
一是本文拓展了学者们对风险投资的研究，学者们侧重于研究风险投资者-风险投资家-风险企业家之间的双重委托代理关系问题，而本文则对风险投资家之间由于信息不对称和委托代理关系而产生的联合投资行为问题进行了研究探索，有助于丰富和完善风险投资理论的发展。
二是本文研究对联合风险投资的行为策略博弈和行为治理机制进行了研究，研究发现风险投资机构的积极管理的付出成本，奖惩力度和声誉损失效应都能够影响到风险投资机构的行为策略博弈，并由此提出了三种模式的监督机制，这也能够对中国风险投资市场的实践提供一定的指导意义。
三是本文在研究方法上引入了动态演化博弈法和复制动态方程模型，对联合风险投资的行为策略进行分析，从方法论上对风险投资理论做了补充和完善。
本文的研究框架主要安排如下：第一章绪论提出本文的研究背景和意义，并对本文研究的整体框架和技术路线作介绍说明；第二章文献回顾主要对国内外学者们关于风险投资、联合风险投资和战略联盟研究的相关文献进行回顾，由此寻找本文研究切入点。第三章是模型构建。对本文的假设理论模型进行构建并提出相应的理论假设。第四章研究设计对本文所使用调查问卷的设计过程，以及问卷收集过程作了介绍说明。第五章实证分析，主要是对所回收的有效调查问卷的样本数据进行检验分析，并对检验结果进行了分析解释。第六章是对联合风险投资的行为治理机制的研究，主要通过动态演化博弈理论，构建复制动态方程模型，对风险投资机构的行为策略博弈进行分析，并提出相应的治理机制建议。第七章结论是对本文研究的总结，并针对本文研究的局限性提出未来的继续研究方向。
In recent years, venture capital activity in China is flourishing. For the purpose ofdisperse investment risks, increase assets overflowing, and promote the venture capitalproject values, more and more venture capital choose the syndication form. Venturecapital syndication has become a focus of the scholars. Although most scholars in thefield of venture capital research agree that the venture capital syndication can increasethe probability of the success of the venture capital project, syndication activityinvolves more than one level and factor, how to operate the syndication and how toresolve the problem caused by information asymmetry and principal-agent relationneed further study. Under this circumstance, the exploring and research on theoperating mechanism and administration mechanism of ventural capital syndicationcould work as a complement and reference to the sustained growth of Chinese venturecapital industry and development and perfection of the venture capital syndicationtheory.
Based on the literature review of relative documents in the field of venture capitaland strategic alliance theory, this paper built a theoretical model of the relationshipamong characteristics of venture capital corporate, actions of venture capitalsyndication and the stability of venture capital syndication. Then made an empiricaltest to the assumed theoretical model with the employment of statistical and researchmethods including structural equation modeling and factor analysis to analyze205valid questionnaires. After this, this paper study the behavioral strategies ofsyndication by the theory of dynamic evolution game and replicated dynamic equationmodel aim to resolve the administrative mechanism of ventue capital syndication. Themain research conclusions are as follows:
First is the effect of characteristics of venture capitalists on the stability of venturecapital syndication. The empirical study of this paper found that the reputation and thecompatibility of venture capitalists could promote the stability of venture capitalsyndication.
Second is the effect of actions of venture capitalist on the stability of venturecapital syndication. The empirical study of this paper found that the effect of adverse selection and moral hazard which affected by information asymmetry andprincipal-agent relation on the stability of venture capital syndication is in differentpaths, among which moral hazard action can negatively affect the stability of venturecapital syndication, while adverse selection can not negatively affect the long-termstability of syndication. Furthermore, fulfill the contract positively can promote thecooperation and the stability of venture capital syndication.
Third is the effect of characteristics of venture capitalists on the action of venturecapital syndication. The empirical study of this paper found that the reputation and thecompatibility of venture capitalists could reduce the probability of adverse selectionand moral hazard, and also increase the probability to meet the obligations.
Fourth is the administrative mechanism on venture capital syndication. The studyfound the management costs of positive cooperation strategy, rewards and punishments,and reputation effects could affect the behavioral strategy of venture capitalists, andthen affect the stability of venture capital syndication.
The research contributions and innovations of this paper embodied in three mainaspects:
First, this paper expands the research on venture capital. Scholars concentrate onthe study of double principal-agent theory problems among venture investors, venturecapitalists and venture entrepreneurs. This paper concentrate on the behaviors amongthe venture capitalists which affect by the information asymmetry and principal-agentproblems, the conclusions could complement and perfect the theory about venturecapital.
Second, this paper studies the behavioral game theory and administrativemechanism of venture capital syndication. The research found that the managementcosts of positive cooperation strategy, rewards and punishments, and reputation effectscould affect the behavioral strategy of venture capitalists, and then advise supervisorymechanism on the practice of syndication.
Third, this paper use dynamic evolution game theory and replicated dynamicequation model to study the behavioral strategy in venture capital syndication, thiscould complent and perfect the venture capital syndication theory in reseach methods.
Research frame work of this paper goes as follows: chapter I is the overview section of this paper which put forward the research background,significance andtheoretical basis, and describe the overall framework and technology roadmap of thispaper; chapter II is the literature review section which review the relative literature ofdomestic and foreign scholars on venture capital, syndication and strategy alliances;chapter III is construct model and propose hypothesis; chapter IV is the researchdesign part which design and collect the questionnaire based on mature scale havingbeen used by foreign scholars, the sample data has been collected by issuingquestionnaires; chapter V is empirical analysis part which analyze and test the sampledata of the collected questionnaires, and then interpret the statistical data analysisresult; chapter VI is the study on the administrative mechanism of syndication; chapterVII is the conclusion part which conclude the research and put forward the researchorientation in the future according to the limitations of this paper.
引文
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