摘要
随着家族上市公司的不断出现,新的“一股独大”的问题也开始显现出来。本文基于近年来家族上市公司对中小股东剥削侵害的现实,选取了我国2002—2006年沪深两市中112家家族控制的上市公司作为样本,在“双重委托代理理论”和公司治理的基本理论支撑下,对我国家族上市公司的治理结构与企业价值的关系进行了理论分析和实证研究。
理论分析发现:在家族控制的治理结构下存在双重委托代理关系,家族上市公司治理的核心更多的是家族控股大股东和广大中小股东之间的利益冲突。金字塔控制结构可以帮助家族以较低的成本获取上市公司控制权,为其侵占社会股东利益提供条件,加剧了控制权与现金流权的分离,导致了上市公司价值的降低。进而用模型论证了因控制权与现金流权相分离下诱发的家族大股东对中小股东利益的侵害及其表现形式。
实证结果显示:家族上市公司内部治理机制有待完善。我国家族上市公司的企业价值与现金流权比例显著负相关;控制权与现金流权分离程度越大,企业价值越低;流通股比例与企业价值负相关;家族董事、家族管理有利于提升企业价值;企业价值与董事会规模存在着负相关关系;独立董事与企业价值之间不存在相关关系;董事长与总经理两职状态并不是影响家族上市公司绩效的重要因素。
在上述理论和实证研究的发现的基础上,提出本文的政策建议:在中国未来的证券市场改革过程中,要健全市场监管机制和外部治理机制,加大家族违规的成本和惩处力度,压制其投机心理,保护中小股东利益;进一步完善职业经理人制度,加强和完善家族上市公司董事会治理机制,促进我国家族企业长期、健康发展。
As the appearance continually of family-controlled listed company,the new problem "one share big alone" have also begun to emerge.Based on the fact of family-controlled listed company exploited and violated the minority stockholders in recent years,this paper have selected 112 family-controlled listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges in 2002-2006 as the samples.We use the theory of dual agency relationship and the basic theories of corporate governance,carry on the theoretical analysis and demonstrate study for the relationship between the governance structure and firm value of our country.
As theoretical analysis we found that:dual agency relationship existed under the governance structure of family-controlled listed company.Family-controlled listed corporate governance core is mostly the interest conflict between family-controlled majority stockholders and spacious minority stockholders.The pyramidal controlled structure could assist family to obtain the control rights of their listed company by lower cost,what provided the condition for they encroached the benefit of social shareholder,accelerated the separation between control rights and cash flow rights,and finally deduced the company value.Then we use model to demonstrate that as the separation between control rights and cash flow rights,family-controlled majority stockholders how to encroach spacious minority stockholders' benefit and it's encroaching modality.
The result of demonstrate study showed that:family-controlled listed company interior governance mechanism waits to be perfect.There existed negative correlativity between firm value and cash flow rights proportion evidently;the more separation between control rights and cash flow rights,the more firm value would be lower.And there still existed negative correlativity between firm value and the proportion of current stock.Then we also find that family-director and family-governance could avail to enhance firm value.There existed negative correlativity between firm value and directorate scale.At last we find there was no correlativity between firm value and self-governed director;board chairman and general manager were not the important factor which could influence the performance of family-controlled listed company.
This paper try to give some proposals based on the above results of theoretical analysis and demonstrate study.In the prospective process of our security market's reforming,it is necessary to perfect the market supervise mechanism and external governance mechanism,at the same time increase the cost of family deregulation,intensify it's punishment and suppress their opportunism.Therefore it can be protect minority stockholders' benefit.Further more we suggest perfecting the system of professional manager and directorate governance mechanism of family-controlled listed company,improve and strengthen our family-controlled listed company development incessant and healthily.
引文
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