摘要
电力工业市场化改革的主要特点就是将电力系统的发、输、配、售电分离，分别对其采取不同的管理方式。在输、配电环节，由于其自然垄断的特点仍然需要管制，但随着对传统投资回报率管制模式弊端认识的逐步加深和管制经济学理论的发展，一种被称为基于绩效的管制模式(Performance Based Regulation，简写为PBR)已被引入到电力工业的管制，并在很多国家逐步得到广泛应用。在配电公司中采用基于绩效的管制可以刺激其提高运营效率和降低电价。然而，如果PBR机制设计不当则有可能会对供电可靠性产生负面影响，为此，在针对配电公司设计PBR机制时，需要计及对供电可靠性的要求。因此如何设置适当的PBR奖惩机制既能有效降低电网公司的服务成本，又能保证电网公司的供电可靠性是一个值得研究的问题。另一方面，在引入市场自由竞争的发电环节，为了限制发电公司滥用市场势力和降低输电公司的财政风险，在国际和国内目前运行的电力市场中，特别在那些单一购买者模式的市场中，大都设置了允许的发电公司报价上限。但如何设置一个合理的报价上限目前仍没有系统的理论和方法。也有不少人反对设置报价上限，认为设置报价上限会打击发电投资，最终导致发电容量不足，影响电力系统的供电稳定性。那么，报价上限究竟会对发电投资产生什么样的影响呢?本论文针对上述几个方面的问题进行了研究，取得了一定的研究成果。
(1)分析了应用于配电公司的带奖惩机制的PBR管制模式；并以在配电系统中实施具有奖惩机制的PBR管制模式相关的成本最小为目标，所要求的可靠性水平为约束，建立了这种管制模式最优参数设置问题的数学模型，并采用了遗传算法求解。
(2)对在零售电价固定的单一购买者模式的电力市场中，如何设置允许的发电公司的报价上限问题做了些初步的研究工作。从监管机构的立场出发，以保证电网公司的收支平衡为目标，基于事后分析法，以历史数据为基础，提出了确定报价上限的一种启发式方法。
(3)在假定投资者进行发电投资时所面对的不确定性因素主要来自于负荷增长的前提下，针对采用单一能量市场的电力市场以及包含能量市场和装机容量市场的电力市场这两种模式，研究了价格上限对投资基荷机组和峰荷机组的影响。并用算例说明了所提出方法的基本特征。
(4)基于期权博弈理论，构造了电力市场环境下发电投资决策的一种新的方法框架。在假定发电投资者进行投资决策时所面对的不确定性因素主要来自于负荷增长同时考虑了其他发电投资者投资行为的情况下，发展了基于期权博弈理论的发电投资的数学模型和求解方法。在此基础上，分析了允许的发电公司报价上限对发电投资决策的影响。
最后对论文中所作的研究工作进行了简要总结，并指出了在这一领域有待进一步深入研究的问题。
Power industry restructuring divided the traditional vertically integrated power industry into four sectors, namely generation, transmission, distribution and retail. In different sectors. different regulation methods could be employed. Distribution/transmission networks, still being natural monopoly, will continue being regulated. However, with the development of regulation economics and the wide recognition of inherent drawbacks of the traditional rate-of-return (ROR) regulation or cost-of-service (COS) regulation. new regulation regimes called performance-based regulation (PBR) has been applied widely into the power industry. The employment of PBR in distribution systems could provide some incentives for improving operating efficiency and reducing electricity prices. However, if the PBR mechanism is not properly designed, the enforcement of the PBR may have a negative effect on the supply reliability. Thus, when designing PBR mechanisms for distribution systems, the effects on supply reliability should be considered. The method of setting proper reward/penalty structures for PBR to reduce the service cost of distribution companies efficiently as well as to guarantee the supply reliability is still a valuable problem for research. On the other hand, the price cap is widely enforced in many operating electricity markets worldwide, especially in those markets employing the well-known single-buyer model with retail electricity prices fixed, in order to limit the exercising of market power by generation companies and also to reduce the financial risks of transmission companies. On the other hand, the specification of the price cap is opposed by many scholars worldwide as it is thought that the price cap could provide negative effect on inducing generation investment. and result in generation capacity insufficiency and unreliable power supply. Up to now. there are only a few publications regarding the setting up of the rational price cap for the generation side. Detailed quantitative analysis on the effect of the price cap on the generation investment is still very demanding. In this thesis, the above mentioned problems are investigated and some significant results obtained.
The pattern of PBR with reward/penalty structures is first analyzed and a mathematical model for optimally setting the parameters of the PBR with a reward/penalty structure presented, with the minimization of the costs associated with the enforcement of the PBR as the objective and the required reliability level for the distribution system operation as the constraint. The well-known genetic algorithm is employed for solving the optimization problem.
Secondly, the problem of determining an adequate price-cap for generation companies in the single-buyer market with retail electricity prices fixed is investigated. From the standpoint of the regulatory organization, a heuristic method is proposed following the ex post approach.
Thirdly, upon the assumption that the load growth is the major source of uncertainty, the effects of the price-caps on the base-load unit investment and peak-load unit investment are examined, for the energy-only electricity market and the one which includes the energy market and installed capacity market. A sample example is served for demonstrating the essential features of the presented approach.
Fourthly, upon the assumption that load growth is the major source of uncertainty, a new methodological framework for generation investment decision-making is presented based on the option-game approach, with competition for generation investment from other investors taken into account. A mathematical model is built and a solving approach developed for this problem. A sample example is served for demonstrating the essential features of the presented model and approach, and the effects of price-cap on generation investment then examined in a quantitative manner.
Lastly, conclusions are made based on the research outcomes, and directions for future research indicated.
引文
1) 周浩，文福拴，张富强等．电力市场风险管理——建模分析与预防策略．杭州：浙江大学出版社，2006．
2) Kenneth E. Train. Optimal Regulation. Cambridge: The MIT Press 1992.
3) Arango H, Abreu J P G, Guimaraes C A M, et al, Regulation of Supply Quality in Open Electricity Markets. In: Proceedings of Ninth International Conference on Harmonics and Quality of Power. Orlando (USA): Oct. 2000. 185～188.
4) Gomez T, Rivier J. Distribution and Power Quality Regulation under Electricity Competition-A Comparative Study. In: Proceedings of Ninth International Conference on Harmonics and Quality of Power. Orlando (USA): Oct. 2000. 462～468.
5) Rivier, J. Gomez T. A Conceptual Framework for Power Quality Regulation. In: Proceedings of Ninth International Conference on Harmonics and Quality of Power. Orlando (USA): Oct. 2000.469～474.
6) Roman J, Gomez T, Munoz A. Regulation of Distribution Market Business. IEEE Trans on Power Delivery, 1999, 14(2): 662～669.
7) Gomez T. Incentive Regulation for Distribution Companies under Electricity Competition. Available at: http://www.iit.upco.es/docs/99TGSR04.pdf.
8) 文福拴．David A K．加州电力市场失败的教训．电力系统自动化．2001，25(5)：1～5．
9) 文福拴，吴复立，倪以信．电力市场环境下的发电容量充裕性问题．电力系统自动化．2002，26(19)：16～22．
10) Jeffrey G H. Carey J M. Price Caps and Investment: Long-Run Effects in the Electric Generation Industry. Energy Policy. 29(7). 2001:545～552
11) Wu F F, Wen Fu-shuan, Duan Gang. Generation Planning and Investment under Deregulated Environment: Comparison of USA and China. In: Proceedings of IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, Vol 2. Denver (USA): Jun. 2004, 1324～1328.
12) Bell M. Performance-based Regulation: a View from the Other Side of the Pond. The Electricity Journal, 2002, 15(1): 1～8
13) Laffont J J, Tirole J. A Theory of Incentive in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993
14) Joskow P L. Regulatory Failure, Regulatory: Reform, and Structural Change in the Electrical Power Industry. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 1989, 125～199
15)Bergeron.D. Resource Adequacy in Competitive Markets: a Regulator's Perspective. In: Proceedings of IEEE 2001 Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting, Vol.1. Columbus (USA): Feb. 2001. 21-24.
16) Korilis Y A, Orda A. Incentive Compatible Pricing Strategies for QoS Routing. In: Proceedings of Eighteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. New York (USA): 1999. 891 - 899
17)Comnes G A. Stoft S, Greene N, Hill L J. Performance-Based Ratemaking for Electric Utilities: Review of Plans and Analysis of Economic and Resource Planning Issues (Volume I). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, LBL-37577. November. 1995
18) David EMS, Johannes P P. Hanser P. et al. The State of Performance-Based Regulation in the US Electric Utility Industry. The Electricity Journal, 2001. 14(8): 71-79.
19) Kip V W. Vernon J M. Economics of Regulation and Antitrust. Cambridge: MIT press, 2000.
20)Joskow P L, Schmalenses R. Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities. Yale Journal on Regulation, 1986, 12(4): 1-49
21)Rudnick H. Donoso J A. Integration of Price Cap and Yardstick Competition Schemes in Electrical Distribution Regulation. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2000, 15(3): 1428-1433
22)Dismukes D E, Ostrover S A. Discussion on "Integration of Price Cap and Yardstick Competition Schemes in Electrical Distribution Regulation". IEEE Trans on Power Systems. 2001. 16(4): 940 -942
23)Yatchew A. Incentive Regulation of Distribution Utilities Using Yardstick Competition. The Electricity Journal. 2001. 14(1): 56-60
24)Reiter H L, Cook C. Rate Design. Yardstick Regulation. and Franchise Competition: an Integrated Approach to Improving the Efficiency of 21st Century Electric Distribution. The Electricity Journal. 1999. 12(7): 94-106
25)Marangon L J W, Noronha J C C. Arango H. Distribution Pricing Based on Yardstick Regulation. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2002. 17(1): 198-204
26) Acton J. Vogelsang I. Introduction. Rand Journal of Economics, 1989, 20(3): 369-372
27) Lowry M N, Kaufmann L. Price Cap Designer's Handbook. Available at: http://www.eei.org/edg/dist/state_reg/p_cap_hndbk.pdf
28) The Regulatory Assistance Project: Performance-based Regulation for Distribution Utilities. Dec. 2000. Available at: http://www.rapmaine.org/PBRfinal.pdf
29) Rossi M A. On the Regulatory Application of Efficiency Measures. Available at: http://www.aaep.org.ar/espa/anales/pdf_00/rossi_ruzzier.pdf
30) Bishop S, McSorly C. Regulating Electricity Markets: Experience from the United Kingdom. The Electricity Journal, 2001.14(10): 81～86
31) 王俊豪．英国政府管制体制改革研究．上海：上海三联书店，1998．
32) Strbac G, Allan R N. Performance Regulation of Distribution Systems Using Reference Networks. IEE Power Engineering Journal, 2001, 15(6): 295～303.
33) Dobbs R, Elson M. Regulating Utilities: Have We Got the Formula Right? Available at:http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com
34) Peltzman S. The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 1989, Vol. 1989: 1～41.
35) Davis R. Acting on Performance-Based Regulation. The Electricity Journal, 2000, 13(4): 13～23.
36) Stoft S. Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity. New York: Wiley-IEEE Press, 2002.
37) D. U. Noel. Price caps and the error in X-factor calculations. Information Economics and Policy, 2000, 12(4): 329～339.
38) D. Parker. Price cap regulation,profitability and returns to investors in the UK regulated industries. Utilities Policy, 1997.6(4): 303～315.
39) 李灿，龚乐年．宋燕敏，等．电力市场中现货电价的分析．电力系统及其自动化学报，2001．13(6)：67～70．
40) Botterud A. Ilic M D. Optimal Investments in Power Generation Under Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making. IEEE Transactions on Power systems. 2005.20(1): 254～263.
41) Kagiannas A G, Askounis D T. Psarras J. Power Generation Planning: a Survey from Monopoly to Competition. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems, 2004.26(6): 413～421
42) 王勇．电力市场环境下发电投资决策与容量充裕性问题的研究．博士学位论文，杭州：浙江大学，2005
43) Jia N X, Yokoyama R, Zhou Y C. Advanced DP Based Method for Power Expansion Planning in the Deregulated Marked. In: IEEE Power Tech Proceedings. Vol 1. Porto(Portugal): Sept. 2001.
44) Lin W M. Zhan T S, Tsay M T et al. The Generation Expansion Planning of the Utility in a Deregulated Environment. In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Electric Utility Deregulation. Restructuring and Power Technologies, Vol 2. Hong Kong (China): April, 2004: 702～707.
45) Park J B, Kim J H. Lee K Y. Generation Expansion Planning in a Competitive Environment Using a Genetic Algorithm. In: Proceedings of IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, Vol 3. Chicago(USA): 2002.1169～1172
46) 赵新宇，王锡凡，陈皓勇．火电厂投资风险决策的模型与整体框架．中国电机工程学报．2004，24(8)：7～11．
47) 赵新宇，王锡凡，陈皓勇．火电厂投资风险决策的算法和灵敏度分析．中国电机工程学报，2004，24(10)：15～20
48) Prina J. Investment Decision Making in a Deregulated Electric Industry Using Stochastic Dominance. In: Proceedings of 2000 IEEE Engineering Management Society. Albuquerque(USA): Aug. 2000. 546～551.
49) 吉兴全，文福拴．实物期权方法在电力系统中的应用．电力系统自动化，2005，29(22)：6～13．
50) Yamamoto Y. Tezuka T. Optimal Investment in Power Plant under Price Uncertainty. In: Proceedings of the 41st SICE Annual Conference. Vol 2. Osaka(Japan): Aug. 2002. 1302～1305.
51) 李开海．王旭．蒋燕．期权理论在电源规划投资模型中的应用．现代电力．2003．20(3)：129～132
52) 吉兴全．文福拴．发电投资的实物期权决策方法．电力系统自动化，2005，29(11)：1～5．
53) Teiserg E O.An Option valuation Analysis of Investment Choices by a Regulated Firm.Management Science.1994,40(4):535-548.
54) Murto P. Competitive Equilibrium and Investments in a Growing Market: the Choice between Small-and Large-Scale Electricity Production. Available at: http://www.cam.au.uk.
55) Gollier C, Proult D, Thais F et al. Choice of Nuclear Powed Investments under Price Uncertainty: Valuing Modularity. Available at: http://www.cam.ac.uk
56) Min K J, Wang C H. Generation Planning for Inter-related Generation Units: a Real Options Approach: In: Proceedings of IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting. Vol 4. Seattle(Washington USA): 2000, 2261-2265
57) Wang C H.. Generation Planning for Electric Power Utilities under Market Uncertainties: A Real Options Approach [D]. lowa: lowa State University. 2001.
58) 王勇，文福拴．钟志勇，等．基于实物期权理论的发电投资决策和容量充裕性评估．电力系统自动化，2005，29(19)：1～9．
59) 李开海．郭耀煌，蒋燕．电源投资觇模选择权的实物期权方法．电力系统自动化，2006．30(23)：48～52．
60) 迪克西特 平迪克．不确定条件下的投资．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2002
61) Pierre-Olivier P, Pauli M. An Oligopolistic Investment Model of the Finnish Electricity Market. Annals of Operations Research, 2003, 121 (1): 123～148.
62) Pierre-Olivier P. Electricity Market Reforms: Institutional Developments. Investment Dynamics and Game Modeling [D]. Victoria: University of Victoria. 2001.
63) Centeno E. Reneses J, Garcia R et al. Long-term Market Equilibrium Modeling for Generation Expansion Planning. In: IEEE Power Tech Conference Proceedings, vol 1. Bologna (Italy): June 2003.
64) Chuang A S, Wu F, Varaiya P. A Game-Theoretic Model for Generation Expansion Planning: Problern Formulation and Numerical Comparisons. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2001, 16(4): 885～891.
65) 安瑛晖，张维．期权博弈理论的方法模型分析与发展．管理科学学报，2005，4(1)：38～44
66) Kulatilaka N, Perotti E. Stratetic growth options. Management Science[J]. 1998. 44(8), 1021～1031.
67) Smit H. Ankum L. A real options and game-theoretic approach to corporate investment strategy under competition, Financial Management, 1993, 22(3):241～250.
68) Grenadier S. The strategic exercise of options: development cascades and overbuilding in real estate market, Journal of Finance, 1996, 51 (5), 1653～1679
69) 欧阳建涛．刘晓君．房地产企业投资决策的期权博弈分析．工业技术经济，2006，25(4)：84-87
70) 熊凌云．我国电厂投资的进入时机与区位选择的博弈分析．长沙：中南大学，2004．
1. TRAIN K E. Optimal Regulation. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992
2．许诺，颜汉荣，文福拴，等．基于绩效的管制模式及其应用．电力系统自动化，2003，27(5)：13-19．
3．林海峰，周浩．基于绩效的电力企业价格管制．电网技术，2004，28(10)：28-33
4．张宗益，杨世兴，李豫湘．电力产业激励性管制机制．重庆大学学报，2002．25(11)：1-4
5. BROWN R E, BURKE J J. Managing the Risk of Performance Based Rates. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2000, 15 (2): 893-898
6. SOLVER T. SODER L. Comparison of Incentives for Distribution System Reliability in Performance-Based Regulations. In: Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Conference on Electric Utility Deregulation. Restructuring and Power Technologies (DRPT). Hong Kong: April 2004. Vol.2:485-490
7. GOMEZ T, RIVIER J. Distribution and Power Quality Regulation under Electricity Competition-a Comparative Study. In: Proceedings of Ninth International Conference on Harmonics and Quality of Power. Orlando (USA): October 2000. Vol.2:462-468
8. RIVIER J, GOMEZ T. A Conceptual Framework for Power Quality Regulation. In: Proceedings of Ninth International Conference on Harmonics and Quality of Power. Orlando (USA): October 2000. Vol.2:469-474
9. BILLINTON R, PAN Z. Incorporating Reliability Index Probability Distribution in Performance Based Regulation. In: Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical & Computer Engineering. May, 2002, Vol. 1: 12-17, Manitoba. Canada
10. BILLINTON R, PAN Z. Incorporating Reliability Index Probability Distributions in Financial Risk Assessment with Performance Based Regulation. Electric Power Components and Systems, 2005,33(6): 685-697
11. BILLINTON R, PAN Z. Historic Performance-Based Distribution System Risk Assessment. IEEE Trans on Power Delivery, 2004, 19 (4): 1759-1765
12. 郭永基．电力系统可靠性分析．北京：清华大学出版社，2002
1. 文福拴，Dayi d A K．加州电力市场失败的教训1．电力系统自动化 2001，25(5)：1～5
2. 文福拴，吴复立．倪以信．电力市场坏境下的发电容量充裕性问题电力系统自动化2002．26(19)：16～22
3. Stoft S. Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity. New York: Wilev-IEEE Press, 2002
4. D. U. Noel. Price caps and the error in X-factor calculations. Information Economics and Policy, 2000,12(4): 329-339.
5. D. Parker. Price cap regulation, profitability and returns to investors in the UK regulated industries. UtilitiesPolicy, 1997, 6 (4): 303-315
6. 李灿，龚乐年，宋燕敏，等．电力市场中现货电价的分析．电力系统及其自动化学报，2001，13(6)：67-70
7. 周浩 文福拴 张富强 等《电力市场风险管理——建模分析与预防策略》杭州：浙江大学出版社2006
1. 文福拴，吴复立，倪以信．电力市场环境下的发电容量充裕性问题．电力系统自动化，2002，26(19)：16～22
2. Jeffrey G H, Carey J M. Price Caps and Investment: Long-Run Effects in the Electric Generation Industry. Energy Policy, 2001, 29 (7): 545～552
3. Audun Botterud, Marija D. Ilic. Optimal Investments in Power Generation Under Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making, IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2005, 20(1):254～263
4. 王勇．电力市场环境下发电投资决策与容量充裕性问题的研究．博士学位论文，杭州：浙江大学，2005
5. 周浩．电力市场电价金融风险研究．博士学位论文，杭州：浙江大学，2004
6. 鲁顺，李灿，魏庆海等．纽约电力市场探析．电网技术．2004，28(17)：62～66
1．王成山，王赛一．市场条件下电力系统规划工作的探讨．电力系统自动化，2005，29(9)：82-56．
2．王勇．电力市场环境下发电投资决策与容量充裕性问题的研究：[D]．杭州：浙江大学，2005．
3. Jeffrey G H, Carey J M. Price Caps and Investment: Long-Run Effects in the Electric Generation Industry. Energy Policy. 2001.29 (7): 545 - 552.
4．吉兴全，文福拴．发电投资的实物期权决策方法，电力系统自动化，2005,29(11)：1-5．
5．王勇，文福拴，钟志勇，黄杰波．基于实物期权理论的发电投资决策和容量充裕性评估．电力系统自动化，2005，29(19)：1-8．
6. Botterud A, Ilic M D. Optimal Investments in Power Generation Under Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2005, 20 (1): 254-263.
7．藏宝锋，胡汉辉，王建兴．电力市场条件下的发电投资均衡．电力系统自动化，2006．30(2)：41-44．
8．迪克西特，平迪克．不确定条件下的投资．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2002．
9．孟力，孙威．关于竞争条件下发电企业期权博弈投资策略研究．当代经济管理，2005，27(3)：130-133．
10．熊凌云．我国电厂投资的进入时机与区位选择的博弈分析：[D]．长沙：中南大学，2004．
11．文福拴，吴复立，倪以信．电力市场环境下的发电容量充裕性问题．电力系统自动化，2002，26(19)：16～22．
12．安瑛晖，张维．期权博弈理论的方法模型分析与发展．管理科学学报，2005，4(1)：38-44．
13．吉兴全，文福拴．实物期权方法及其在电力系统中的应用．电力系统自动化，2005，29(22)：6-13．
14．赵新宇，王锡凡，陈皓勇．火电厂投资风险决策的模型与整体框架．中国电机工程学报，2004，24(8)：7-11．
15．高强．期权博弈理论在企业项目投资中的应用：[D]．南京：南京航空航天大学．2003．