摘要
由于特殊的历史原因,中国股市在成立之初就形成了非流通股和流通股两类股票同股不同价、同股不同权的股权分置现象,股权分置的存在与隐性终极控制权效应的负面应用是我国证券市场许多不规范行为的重要症结所在。股权分置导致上市公司控制股东与中小投资者的利益不一致,加上终极控制股东对公司的控制具有隐秘性和复杂性,为其关联交易、内幕交易、利润转移、掏空上市公司资产等不规范运作提供了许多的便利,股权分置的诸多弊端导致中国资本市场的发展严重滞后于经济水平的发展,并最终导致了股权分置改革的诞生。股权分置改革对上市公司控制股东的行为、上市公司自身的行为及其公司业绩和价值、投资者的利益、投资理念和行为都会产生根本性影响,因此,股权分置改革对中国证券市场的影响是长期而深远的。
如何对股权分置改革过程中及股权分置改革后不同终极控制股东控制的上市公司的终极控制权结构、股权分置改革对价及其对公司价值和业绩的影响等问题进行理论和实证研究既是一个亟待解决的学术性课题,又是证券监管部门判别股权分置改革成效的一个实践性问题。本文的研究对于分析股权分置改革过程中控制股东和投资者的利益博弈,探讨股权分置改革对价对股权分置改革后上市公司业绩和公司价值,及其对中小投资者利益的保护状态,进而完善公司治理机制,促使上市公司注重长远发展和正常运作,具有重要的学术价值与现实意义。
本文以股权分置改革过程中和股权分置改革程序基本完成后的上市公司为研究对象,采取理论分析与实证研究相结合,以实证研究为主线的方法,运用企业治理理论、统计学、财务管理学等相关理论原理及方法对我国上市公司股权分置改革过程中的对价支付数量、类型的影响因素及对价支付数量、控制股东类型对股权分置改革后上市公司的业绩、价值和股利分配等展开研究,主要研究内容如下：
(1)针对中国上市公司股权结构传统分类方法的不足,结合中国证券市场的实际情况,对股权分置改革后中国上市公司的终极控制权和控制方式进行分类,并通过实证分析绘制出上市公司终极控制权结构图谱,在此基础上与股权分置改革前进行了比较分析；
(2)股权分置改革能否顺利进行的一个重要原因在于非流通股股东与流通股股东之间就对价支付的方式和数量能否达成一致,为此,本文研究了股权分置改革过程中对价支付类型和数量的影响因素；
(3)对上市公司终极控制股东类型、股权分置改革对价支付与上市公司绩效之间的关系进行了研究；
(4)分析了股权分置改革后上市公司现金股利分配政策及其影响因素。
Because of especial history, there is a phenomenon of the split-share structure in Chinese capital market. The split-share structure and implicit ultimate control rights are the important reason of irregularity behavior in Chinese capital market. The split-share structure resulted in the differ benefits between controlling shareholders and minority investors in listed companies. Because of the secrete character and complexity about ultimate control rights. The ultimate control rights give many advantages to ultimate control shareholders to relating exchange, low-down exchange, benefits diversion, expropriate assets of listed companies and so on. The shortcoming of split-share structure resulted in development of Chinese capital market lagged the development of economy and the split-share structure reform. The split-share structure reform bring fundamentality effects to behavior of ultimate controlling shareholders in listed companies, behavior of itself in listed companies, corporate value, benefits of investors, idea and behavior of investors, therefore, Chinese capital market will be influence by the split-share structure reform during a long time.
Such as theoretical and empirical research about the relation among corporate value, consideration, ultimate control structure at different ultimate controlling shareholder of listed companies controlled is an urgent problem of academic subjects, but also a practical problem. This study has great academic value and practical significance to the analysis of the split share reform process the interests of controlling shareholders and investors Game, the relation of consideration, the performance and corporate value, and on the protection of the interests of small investors, the state, improving corporate governance to promote long-term development of listed companies and the normal operation.
This article regards listed company in the split-share structure reform process and procedure fulfilled as the research object, combine with criterion study and empirical research method, taking empirical research as the thread, use such relevant theory and methods as corporate governance theory, statistics, accounting, financial engineering, etc. carry on research to the number and type of consideration, the relationship of type of ultimate controlling shareholders and corporate value and divided. The main research contents are as follows:
(1)Direct against the deficiency of the traditional categorised method of the ownership structure of Chinese listed company, combine the actual conditions of Chinese securities market, classify ultimate control right and control method of the Chinese listed company, and analyse through the empirical research that draws out the ultimate control right structure atlas of listed company.
(2) Whether non-circulation stock shareholder and circulation stock shareholder can reach an agreement or not, the conclusion will be an important reason that the split-share structure reform can plain sailing. So, this article study the type and quantitative of consideration in the split-share structure reform.
(3)To study the relationship of the type of ultimate controlling shareholders, the type and quantitative of consideration and corporate performance in listed companies.
(4)To analyze the policy of cash dividend and influence factor after the split-share structure reform.
引文
[1]Bai,C.E.,Liu,Q.,Lu,J.,Song,F.M.,and Zhang,J.x., Corporate Governance and Market Valuations in China, Journal of Comparative Economics 2004(32):599-616.
[2]Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. A CateringTheory of Dividends. Journal of Finance.2004,3:1125-1165.
[3]Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. Appearing and Disappearing Dividends:the Link to Catering Incentives. Journal of Financial Economics.2004,73:271～288.
[4]Baumol, W., Business Behavior, Value and Growth. MacMillan, New York.1959.
[5]Bebchuk, Lucain; Kraakman, Reinier; Triantis, George. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity:The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash Flow Rights. Working Papers -- Yale School of Management's Economics Research Network,1998,1-34.
[6]Agrawal, A. and C. R. Knoeber. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1996(3):377-397.
[7]Attig, Najah. Excess Control and the Risk of Corporate Expropriation:Canadian Evidence [J]. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences,2007.24 (2):94-106.
[8]Bae, Kee-Hong, Jun-Koo Kang and Kim Jin-MoTunneling or value-added:evidence from mergers by Korean business groups. Journal of Finance,2002,57(6):2695-2740
[9]Berle, A. and G. Means, The modern corporation and private property, MacMillan, New York, N. Y. 1932.
[10]Chen, Sheng-Syan; Ho, Kim Wai. Corporate Diversification Ownership Structure and Firm Value, International Review of Financial-Analysis,2000 (9):315-326.
[11]Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang. The Separation of Ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:81-112.
[12]Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan and L. H. P. Lang. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholders. Journal of Finance 2002.57(6):2741-2771.
[13]De Angelo,Harry and Linda De Angelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights, a Study of Public Corporation with Dual Classes of Common Stock, Journal ofFinancial Economics1985,14,33-69.
[14]Demsets, Harold. and K.Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership,Causes and Consequences, Journal of Political Economy1985,93,1155-1177.
[15]Denis,Diane K.; McConnell,John J. International Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial& Quantitative Analysis2003,38,1-36.
[16]Fama,E.and M.Jensen, Agency Problem and Residual Claims, Journal of Law and Economics, 1983,26:327-249.
[17]Faccio,Mara and Larry Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics.2002,65,365-395.
[18]Fang Huang, Jun Su, and Terence Tai-Leung Chong. Testing for Structural Change in the Nontradable Share Reform of the Chinese Stock Market. Chinese Economy,2008,41, (2):24-33.
[19]Friedman,Eric, Johnson, Simon H. and Mitton, Todd. Propping and Tunneling. NBER Working Paper No. W9949,2003
[20]Gelter, Mark:Political Power and Corporate Control:The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance. Independent Review, Summer2007,1:142-146.
[21]Gongmeng Chen; Firth, Michael; Yu Xin; Liping Xu:Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance:Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies [J]. Journal of Financial& Quantitative Analysis, Mar2008, Vol.43 Issue 1, p161-190.
[22]Gordon, Lilli A., and John Pound, Information, ownership structure, and shareholder voting, Evidence from shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals, Journal of Finance 1993,48, 697-718.
[23]Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart, The costs and benefits of ownership, A theory of vertical and lateral integration, Journal of Political Economy 1986,94,691-719.
[24]Holderness, Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan, The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations, An exploratory analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 1988,20,317-346.
[25]Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling, Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics1976,3,305-360.
[26]Jensen Michael, and Robert Rubuak, The market for corparte control:the scientific evidence, Journal of Financial Economics1983,11,5-50.
[27]Kireev, A:Raiding and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Problems of Economic Transition, 2007(8):29-45.
[28]Kole, S. Managerial ownership and firm performance:incentives or rewards?Advances in Financial Economic,1996 (2):119-49.
[29]Hanson, Robert C, Song, Moon H:Corporate Governance and Asset Sales:The Effect of Internal and External Control Mechanisms. Financial Review, Aug2006(3):361-386.
[30]Holm, Claus; Laursen, Peter Birkholm:Risk and Control Developments in Corporate Governance: changing the role of the external auditor? [J] Corporate Governance:An International Review, Mar2007(2):322-333.
[31]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Law and finance, Journal of Political Economy1998,106,1113-1155.
[32]La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A.Corporate ownership around the world [J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[33]La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Andrei,Shleifer; Vishny, Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics 2000,58,3-27.
[34]La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Andrei,Shleifer; Vishny, Investor protection and corporate valuation, Journal of Finance,2002,57,1147-1170.
[35]Lee, Chi-Wen Jevons, and Xing Xiao. Tunneling Dividend. Working Paper,2004.
[36]Lemmon, Michael L.; Lins, Karl V. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asia Financial Crisis, Journal of Finance 2003,58,1445-1468.
[37]Martin Holmen and John D. Knopf, Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers, Journal of financial and quantitative analysis2004,39,167-191.
[38]Mork R, Shleifer A,Vishny R W. Management ownership and market valuation:An empirical analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:293,315.
[39]Nenova, Tatiana. The value of corporate voting rights and control, A cross-country analysis Journal of Financial Economic 2003.68,325-351.
[40]Panayotis Kapopoulos& Sophia Lazaretou, Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: evidence from Greek firms, Corporate Governance,2007,15,144-158.
[41]Pound,J. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20,20 (1-2):237-265.
[42]Renee Adams,Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote:The Empirical Evidence, Working Paper,2007, 1-62.
[43]Shao-chi Chang; Wann-yih wu; Ying-jiuan Wong:Family control and stock market reactions to announcements of corporate venturing. Academy of Management Proceedings,2008:1-6.
[44]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94:461-488.
[45]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, A survey of corporate governance, Journal of Financ,LⅡ 1997,N0.2 737-783.
[46]Sun, Qian, Tong, Wilson H.S. China Share Issue Privatization:The Extent of its Success. Journal of Financial Economics2003,70,183-222.
[47]Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan; Horn, Laura:The Marketisation of European Corporate Control:A Critical Political Economy Perspective [J]. New Political Economy,2007(2):211-235.
[48]Xiaoyue Chen, Jeong-Bon Kim, Steven Shuye Wang, Xiaodong Xu, Firm Performance and the Ownership of the Largest Shareholder, Corporate Ownership& Control,2007,4,126-138.
[49]Xu, Xiaonian; Wang, Yan. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and corporate performance: the case of Chinese stock companies. Working Papers -- Yale School of Management's Economics Research Network,1997,1-54.
[50]Xu, Xiaonian and Wang Yan, Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies. China Economic Review 1999,10 75-98.
[51]Yoser Gadhoum, Politics and Finance:An Analysis of Ultimate Ownership and Control in Canadian and US Corporations. Part Ⅰ1. Problems and Perspectives in Management2005,3,22-33.
[52]白重恩、刘俏、陆洲、宋敏、张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,(2)：81-91.
[53]蔡宁、魏明海.“大小非”减持中的盈余管理[J].审计研究,2009(2)：42-51.
[54]陈昆玉、王跃堂.国有控股上市公司控制权转移对经营绩效的影响——来自中国A股市场的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究.2006,(9)：30-36.
[55]陈明贺.股权分置改革及股权结构对公司绩效影响的实证研究——基于面板数据的分析[J].南方经济,2007(2)：59-68.
[56]陈小悦、徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001(11)：3-11+94.
[57]陈晓、江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000(8)：28-35+80.
[58]陈信元、陈冬华、朱凯.股权结构与公司业绩：文献回顾与未来研究方向[J].中国会计与财务研究,2004(4)：1-24.
[59]陈睿.股权分置改革的市场效应研究[J].金融研究,2007(5)：35-42.
[60]曹廷求、杨秀丽、孙宇光.股权结构与公司绩效：度量方法和内生性[J].经济研究,2007,(10)：126-137.
[61]党红.关于股改前后现金股利影响因素的实证研究[J].会计研究,2008(06)：65-73+97-98.
[62]邓建平、曾勇.大股东控制和控制权私人利益研究[J].中国软科学,2004(10)：53-61.
[63]邓建平,曾勇.上市公司家族控制与股利决策研究[J].管理世界,2005(7)：139-147.
[64]丁守海.股权改革的三阶段托宾q效应[J].南开经济研究,2006(05)：74-83.
[65]丁志国、苏治.股权分置改革均衡对价[J].中国工业经济,2006(2)：115-121.
[66]董迎.上市公司治理结构建设亟待有效推进[J].中国工业经济,2000(11)：37-41.
[67]费方域.两权分离、代理问题和公司治理[J].上海经济研究,1996(8)：44-47.
[68]冯根福.双重委托代理理论：上市公司治理的另一种分析框架[J].经济研究,2004(12)：16-25.
[69]傅勇、谭松涛.股权分置改革中的机构合谋与内幕交易[J].金融研究,2008(3)：92-106.
[70]傅永昌.中国沪深权证市场实证和应用若干问题研究[D].西南交通大学博士学位论文,成都：西南交通大学,2008.
[71]“股权分置改革研究”课题组.股市公共性、股权分置改革的理论根据[J].中国工业经济,2006(4)：7-15.
[72]何浚.上市公司治理结构的实证分析[J].经济研究,1998(5)：51-58.
[73]何丹、朱建军.股权分置、控制权私人收益与控股股东融资成本[J].会计研究,2006(5)：52-59+98.
[74]何诚颖、李翔.股权分置改革、扩容预期及其市场反应的实证研究[J].金融研究,2007.(4)：161-174.
[75]华生.全流通改革几个要点的理论说明.搜狐财经,2004年5月26日.
[76]华生.总结试点经验推动股改顺利进行——股权分置改革试点的得失、启示与前景.中国证券报,2005年8月25日.
[77]黄娟娟,沈艺峰.上市公司的股利政策究竟迎合了谁的需要——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2007(8)：36-43.
[78]黄雷、淳伟德、叶勇.股权分置改革后的上市公司隐性终极控制权研究[J].改革与战略,2007(6)：67-69.
[79]敬景程.股权分置问题的制度经济学思考[J].经济评论,2005(2)：86-92.
[80]李礼、王曼舒、齐寅峰.股利政策由谁决定及其选择动因——基于中国非国有上市公司的问卷调查分析[J].金融研究,2006,(1)：74-85.
[81]李增泉、余谦、王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(1)：95-105.
[82]李冻菊.股票市场发展与经济增长的关系研究——源自计量经济学的解释[J].金融研究,2006(9)：78-83.
[83]李鑫.自由现金流、现金股利与中国上市公司过度投资[J].证券市场导报,2007(10)：55-59.
[84]廖理、沈红波、郦金梁.股权分置改革与上市公司治理的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2008(5)：101-110.
[85]廖理、张学勇.全流通纠正终极控制者利益取向的有效性——来自中国家族上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2008(8)：78-90.
[86]刘芍佳、孙霈、刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003(4)：51-62+93.
[87]刘煜辉、熊鹏.股权分置、政府管制和中国IPO抑价[J].经济研究,2005(5)：85-95.
[88]刘兴强、段希军.国有上市公司的上市模式、控制权结构与企业绩效[J].金融研究,2006(4)：46-54.
[89]刘玉敏、任广乾.股权分置改革的效率及其影响因素[J].中国工业经济,2007(7)：105-112.
[90]马曙光、黄志忠、薛云奎.股权分置—资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J].会计研究,2005(9)：46-52+98.
[91]孟焰、张秀梅.上市公司关联方交易盈余管理与关联方利益转移关系研究[J].会计研究,2006(4)：39-45+96.
[92]欧阳国欣.论国有企业治理结构的完善[J].财经科学,2003(3)：36-38.
[93]蒲自立、刘芍佳.公司控制中的董事会领导结构和公司绩效[J].管理世界,2004(9)：123-128+136.
[94]屈文洲、许年行、关家雄、吴世农.市场化、政府干预与股票流动性溢价的分配[J].经济研究,2008(4)：134-148.
[95]孙健.终极控制权与资本结构的选择——来自沪市的经验证据[J].管理科学,2008(2)：18-25.
[96]孙茂竹,王艳茄,张祥风.从博弈看上市公司股利政策的决定[J].会计研究,2006(8)：60-66.
[97]孙永祥、黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999(12)：24-31+40.
[98]苏梅、寇纪淞、陈富赞.股权分置改革中股东间博弈的实证研究[J].管理科学学报,2006(2)：58-65.
[99]沈艺峰、许琳、黄娟娟.我国股权分置中对价水平的“群聚”现象分析[J].经济研究,2006(11)：103-112.
[100]沈中华、吴孟纹.银行治理、银行失败与银行绩效：以台湾为例[J].亚太经济管理评论,2002(1)：27-46.
[101]谭松涛、傅勇.管理层激励与机构投资者持股偏好[J].中国软科学,2009(7)：114-119.
[102]唐国正、熊德华、巫和懋.股权分置改革中的投资者保护与投资者理性[J].金融研究,2005(9)：141-158.
[103]唐国正.股权二元结构下的股利政策——一种新的代理成本理论[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(5)：94-102.
[104]唐跃军、谢仍明.股份流动性——股权制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应——来自1999—2003年中国上市公司的证据[J].中国工业经济,2006(2)：122-130.
[105]王旻、扬朝军、廖士光.中国股票市场流通性价值研究——给予非流通股协议转让与限售股转让的证据[J].财经研究,2008(3)：82-95.
[106]王俊秋、张奇峰.终极控制权、现金流量权与盈余信息含量——来自家族上市公司的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2007(12)：12-18.
[107]文宗瑜.建立上市公司治理结构的权力制衡机制[J].国有资产管理,2002(9)
[108]吴超鹏、郑方镳、林周勇、李文强、吴世农.对价支付影响因素的理论和实证分析[J].经济研究,2006(8)：16-25.
[109]吴广灼.中国股权分置制度研究[D].武汉大学博士论文,2007.
[110]吴江、阮彤.股权分置结构与中国上市公司融资行为[J].金融研究,2004(6)：60-71.
[11 1]吴寿康.上市公司股权结构对企业价值的影响分析[J].证券市场导报,2007(4)：58-63.
[112]吴晓求.股权分置改革的若干理论问题——兼论全流通条件下中国资本市场的若干新变化[J].财贸经济,2006(2)：26-33+98.
[113]夏立军、方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5)：40-51.
[114]谢军.股利政策、第一大股东和公司成长性：自由现金流理论还是掏空理论[J].会计研究,2006(4)：51-57.
[115]徐莉萍、辛宇、陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006(1)：92-102.
[11 6]徐国祥,苏月中.中国股市现金股利悖论研究[J].财经研究,2005(6)：132-144.
[117]辛宇、徐莉萍.投资者保护视角下治理环境与股改对价之间的关系研究[J].经济研究,2007(9)：122-134.
[118]邢建国.治理伦理与公司治理：二维治理结构的建立[J].中国工业经济,2005(10)：60-67.
[119]许年行、吴世农.我国上市公司股权分置改革中的锚定效应研究[J].经济研究,2007(1)：115-126.
[120]阎达五、谭劲松.我国上市公司独立董事制度：缺陷与改进—一个基于制度分析的研究框架[J].会计研究,2003(11)：5-11+67.
[121]阎大颖.中国上市公司控股股东价值取向对股利政策影响的实证研究[J].南开经济研究,2004(6)：94-105.
[122]杨善林、杨模荣、姚禄仕.股权分置改革与股票市场价值相关性研究[J].会计研究,2006(12)：43-48+97.
[123]杨丹、魏韫新、叶建明.股权分置对中国资本市场实证研究的影响及模型修正[J].经济研究,2008(3)：75-88.
[124]姚颐、刘志远、王健.股权分置改革、机构投资者与投资者保护[J].金融研究,2007(11)：50-61.
[125]晏艳阳、赵大玮.我国股权分置改革中内幕交易的实证研究[J].金融研究,2006(4)：105-112.
[126]原红旗.中国上市公司股利政策分析[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004：115-121.
[127]叶祥松.上市公司国有资本股权结构和主体问题[J].经济管理,2001(1)：65-66.
[128]叶勇、胡培、黄登仕.中国上市公司终极控制权、现金流量权及其国际比较分析[J].南开管理评论,2005(3)：25-31.
[129]叶勇、刘波、黄雷.终极控制权、现金流量权与企业价值——基于隐性终极控制论的中国上市公司治理实证研究[J].管理科学学报,2007(2)：70-83.
[130]禹来.国有企业外部人控制问题[J].管理世界,2002(2)：96-103+155.
[131]张千帆、贺富强、张子刚、魏建国.小股东“搭便车”与利益受损分析[J].武汉理工大学学报,2001(4)：84-87.
[132]张建民、宁代兵、曹孟鸣.完善股权分置改革方案的方法论思考[J].经济学动态,2005(7).
[133]张建民.后股权分置时代中国股市与上市公司治理的问题与对策——对股权分置改革实践的反思[J].经济学动态,2006(6).
[134]张俊喜、王晓坤、夏乐.实证研究股权分置改革中的政策与策略[J].金融研究,2006(8)：4-22.
[135]张祥建、郭岚.资产注入、大股东寻租行为与资本配置效率[J].金融研究,2008(2)：102-116.
[136]章卫东.定向增发新股、整体上市与股票价格短期市场表现的实证研究[J].会计研究,2007(12)：65-70+99.
[137]张宗新.内幕交易行为预测：理论模型与实证分析[J].管理世界,2008(4)：31-42.
[138]赵俊强、廖十光、李湛.中国上市公司股权分置改革中的利益分配研究[J].经济研究,2006(11)：113-123.
[139]赵昌文、蒲自立、杨安华.中国上市公司控制权私有收益的度量及影响因素.中国工业经济[J].2004(6)：97-103
[140]郑振龙、王保合.股权分置改革的期权分析[J].金融研究,2006(12)：119-128.
[141]郑志刚、孙艳梅、姜德增.股权分置改革对价确定与我国上市公司治理机制有效性的检验[J].经济研究,2007(7)：97-110.
[142]郑春美、白宏磊、熊丹.股权分置改革与公司绩效研究,武汉理工大学学报[J],2007(11)：150-153.
[143]朱羿锟.公司控制权配置论：制度与效率分析[M].经济管理出版社：北京,2001.
[144]朱武祥、宋勇.股权结构与企业价值：对家电上市公司实证分析[J].经济研究,2001(12)：66-72+92.
[145]朱小平、暴冰、杨妍.股权分置改革与流动性定价问题研究[J].会计研究,2006(2)：89-94+99.
[146]朱云、吴文锋、吴冲锋.国际视角下的中国股利支付率和收益率分析[J].中国软科学,2004(11)：69-74.