摘要
二十世纪九十年代以来,中央银行业务发展的一个重要趋势就是从隐秘操作逐渐走向开放和透明。新西兰、英国、挪威、美国和欧盟等国家和地区在提高了货币政策透明度后都获得了比较理想的政策调控效果,通货膨胀水平和经济发展态势表现良好。近年来,我国货币当局也采取一定的措施提高透明度,除定期公布货币政策委员会决策声明、货币政策执行报告和金融统计资料外,中国人民银行官员还多次发表引导性、探测性的讲话,透露一些有关中国未来利率政策的线索。货币政策操作从不透明走向一定程度的透明不仅体现了我国宏观调控理念的进步,而且也符合中央银行体制的发展潮流。然而,我国正处于经济转轨的特殊时期,在提高透明度的过程中还面临着许多制度和经济方面的障碍,制约了我国透明操作效果的发挥。因此,为了给我国国民经济的稳定发展提供良好稳定的货币金融环境,如何引入货币政策透明度的操作思路,改进我国货币政策操作方式提高政策绩效具有极为重要的现实意义。
本文把提高货币政策透明度的研究放在预期管理的大框架下考虑,研究内容主要集中在以下几方面:一是回顾货币政策透明度发展概况,研究中央银行信息沟通引导公众预期的理论基础;二是比较分析发达国家提高货币政策透明度的方式和效果,并以此为基础,总结实施透明度的条件,构建中央银行信息沟通引导市场预期的政策框架;三是运用中国的数据和拓展的选美竞赛博弈模型验证框架,评价我国货币政策透明度的状况及中国人民银行信息沟通的政策效果。在此基础上,对下一步我国提高透明度的渐进过程归纳总结。全文共分为八章,内容安排如下:
第一章绪论,主要介绍本文的研究背景,说明本文的研究意义、研究思路、文献综述及主要的创新。
第二章研究货币政策透明度的起源、涵义和发展。伴随着中央银行独立性的增强和越来越多的国家实施通货膨胀目标制,货币政策透明度的内涵不断拓展与深化。最新的货币政策透明度理论发展与实践经验均表明:世界各国的央行都非常重视预期,中央银行有效的信息沟通是引导和利用市场预期最重要的手段。
第三章对信息沟通提高货币政策操作效果的相关基础理论进行了具体的阐释。货币政策主要不是通过利率渠道,而是预期渠道进行传导的,信息沟通有助于控制和稳定公众的通胀预期,从而影响利率的期限结构。理性预期理论是预期形成的标准理论,但是其结论的得出基于严格的假设条件。事实上,信息沟通可以引导多重均衡,降低因学习过程引发的不确定性,令市场结果收敛到理性预期均衡点。
第四章分析发达国家提高透明度的操作方式和效果。本文通过比较美国、欧盟和英国货币政策透明度状况和央行选择的信息沟通策略,总结出不存在适合所有央行的唯一最佳的信息沟通模式。美联储主要的信息沟通方式是政策声明和国会证词;欧洲央行是介绍性声明和月度公报;英国央行是通货膨胀报告和会议纪要。尽管信息沟通模式不同,但提高透明操作的政策效果相近。透明度提高后,金融市场预测未来货币政策决策的能力和货币当局通过资产定价影响金融市场的能力都有所增强。
第五章构建了中央银行信息沟通政策的基本框架,包括信息源、信息内容、信息渠道、目标群体和反馈机制五个要素。各国央行提高透明度的过程正是这五个要素不断完善的过程。不同类型的货币政策委员会根据社会各个领域沟通群体的需要选择适合不同目标群体的信息内容和沟通方式引导市场预期。金融市场十分关注央行公布的政策声明措辞,声明中有关政策决策和未来经济展望的信息内容是引导市场预期的重要因素。本文分别应用泰勒规则公式和预期假说分析政策声明影响市场预期的运作机制。
第六章提出货币政策透明度适度论,对中央银行目标函数、威胁金融体系稳定的信息、货币政策委员会内部讨论和货币政策路径等内容是否应该公布,以及透明的程度等矛盾还较为突出。中央银行很难在实际操作中找到确切的平衡点使得透明度达到最优,需要将理论与经验相结合,不断权衡各种透明度措施对政策有效性的影响,以求达到最佳的货币政策效果。
第七章讨论了我国提高货币政策透明度的进程、采用的衡量方法以及实施信息沟通货币政策的制度条件。中国人民银行的操作思路逐渐从超出公众预期以期产生政策冲击效果向加强对话与交流,引导并利用公众预期方向转变。对中央银行提高透明度效果的评价从两个层面进行,一是指标法衡量中央银行为提高透明度所作出的努力,二是时间序列法检验公众是否理解了央行的政策意图。实证结果显示中国人民银行信息沟通在引导公众预期方面的作用有限。基于上述检验结果,本文拓展了凯恩斯选美竞赛博弈模型,解释信息沟通效果不佳的原因。考虑到受中国人民银行的独立性不高,可供选择的政策操作工具有限以及短期内无法建立通货膨胀目标制框架等因素影响,近期通过对货币政策框架进行根本性变革来提高透明度的做法不太现实,我国提高货币政策透明度是一个渐进的过程。
第八章归纳本文研究的主要结论,并对本文的不足提出未来的研究方向。
本题目在国内货币政策研究领域尚属前沿,国内学者对透明度的研究只是关注如何理解透明度以及探讨透明度与责任性和有效性之间的关系,对于如何实施透明度以及中央银行信息沟通这种新型的货币政策调控模式还鲜有人提及。国外大多数文献的研究重点在于某一特定国家央行的信息沟通与金融市场反应之间的关系。本文则试图在这些研究的基础上着眼于挖掘不同国家提高透明度操作的一些内在的、规律性的东西,从而为我国货币当局在政策操作时有所借鉴。基于此,本文的创新之处在于:
其一,系统地研究中央银行信息沟通货币政策的运行机制,提出不同于传统的通过政策决策行动调控经济的操作思路,分层次探讨影响信息沟通效果的信息源、信息内容、沟通渠道、目标群体和反馈机制等关键要素,抽象出基于透明操作提高货币政策效果的操作框架;
其二,借鉴和分析国内外研究者的研究方法,选取中国的数据检验我国央行提高货币政策透明度的操作效果。拓展了选美竞赛博弈模型,除了考虑中央银行公共信息精确度的影响因素外,引入市场反应因素,客观评价中国人民银行信息沟通的政策效果,提出当前中国人民银行既“透明”又“出其不意”的做法可能会持续一段时间,提高货币政策透明度是一个动态的渐进过程;
其三,以国外成熟市场的信息沟通货币政策为标尺,结合现阶段我国经济发展的实际情况以及货币政策操作的演变规律,提出符合我国国情的提高货币政策透明度的操作思路,研究结果对我国政策制定、政策取向具有建设性意义。
Since the 1990s, mystery and surprise of central bank operation has given to transparency and openness. Many countries have got good policy effects after improving monetary policy transperancy. In recent years, China’s financial authorities have taken measures to enhance the transparency. From opaque to a certain degree of transparency not only embodies the progress of concept of macro-economic control, but also meets the trend of the central bank system. With the trend of marketization of our economy, the improving policy performance based on increasing transparency is more and more prominent. However, China is now in the special period of economic transition. Many aspects of system and economic obstacles restricted the effects of transparency. Still there are lots of problems about how to communicate. This paper started from the study of transparency concept, comparativly analyzed the manners and effectiveness of transparency in the developed countries, contructed the policy framework of central bank communication that shaped public expectations, applied China’s data and model to test our communication effects, then get the suggestions about improving transparency in China.
In order to analyze the problem, this paper is constituted by 3 parts. The main structure and viewpoint is as follows:
Chapter 1 is the introduction of the whole paper. The research background, research literaturea are explained, and the significance, methodology and main innovations of this paper are also introduced.
Chapter 2 summaries the historical evolution and inherent characteristics of monetary policy transparency.Along with the central bank independence and inflation targeting, monetary policy transparency have been constantly expanded and deepened. According to the current theoretical and empirical researches, countries around the world have attached great importance to the public expectations. Central bank communication is one of the most important means to guide expectation.
Chapter 3 interprets the theoretical basis of communication improving monetary policy effects. Monetary policy is transimissed through expectation channel, not interest rate channel. Communication will help control inflation and stabilize the public expectations, thus affecting the term structure of interest rates. Besides, communication can coordinate multiple equilibrium and reduce the uncertainty caused by learning process, making market resuls converge to rational expectations equilibrium.
Chapter 4 analyzes the modes and effects of transparency operation in the developed countries and summarizes the characteristics of communication policy. Despite the different modes of communication, but the operation effects improving transparency are similar. The abilities of financial markets forcasting the future monetary policy decision-making and monetary authorities influencing asset pricing have been enhanced.
Chapter 5 constructs the basic framework of central bank communication, including source of information, information contents, information channels, target groups and feedback mechanism. Different types of Monetray Policy Committee select information contents and communication modes according to various needs of social groups. Financial market is concerned about the wording of policy statement very much. Taylor rule formula and expected hypothesis are applied to analyze the operation mechanism of policy statement affecting market expectations.
Chapter 6 discusses the problems of moderate monetary policy transparency. The auguments about whether or not central bank should disclose the monetary policy objective function, the threat to financial stability, the internal discussion among Monetray Policy Committee and future policy path have never stopped. It is very difficult for central bank to find the exact point of balance so that transparency can be achieved optimal. The optimal design of central bank communication is still in study.
Chapter 7 focuses on the process of China’s monetary policy transparency and the methods People’s Bank of China (PBC) used to measure. The manner of monetary policy operation is gradually from impacting on the market by surprise to guiding and managing market expectation by comminication. There are two ways to measure China’s monetary policy transparency, indicators and time sequence test. It comes to conclusion that the influence of PBC communication on shaping the public expectartions is limited. Based on the test results, this paper expanded the Keynesian beauty contest model to explain the reasons for poor performance. Taking into account lower PBC independence, the choice of policy tools are limited and inflation targeting has not been established. It is a dynamic evolutionary process for enhancing monetray policy transparency.
Chapter 8 is the conclusion of this paper.
There are very limited literatures about how to implement transparency and central bank communication in domestic research. And in other countries, the related studies pay more attentions on relationship of the communication and the public expectation in a given country. But in this paper, some inherent laws in monetary policy operation with improving transparency will be provided, and take it into account, there are some possible innovations such as:
Firstly, on the basis of systemic studies on the mechanism of central bank communication monetary policy, it suggests that communication is different from traditional operation through policy action. It discusses many key elements influencing communication effects, including source, content, channel, target groups and feedback mechanism. And it abstracts the operation framework of improving monetary policy effects based on enhancing transparency.
Secondly, it analyzes various research methods and selects China’s data to test PBC communication effects. Beauty contest model also be expanded. Besides the precision of public information, market reaction factor is also considered. It suggests that both transparent and surprise operation is likely to continue to for some time in China, improving monetary policy is a dynamic evolutionary process.
Thirdly, to use the successful practice in developed countries for reference and to combine China’s actual economic development at this stage, it suggests the transparency manner of monetary policy operation in line with China’s actual condition. The job of this paper will be beneficial to guide the practical operation of monetray policy in our country.
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