摘要
电力是国民经济持续发展的重要能源保证。1997年以来,电力行业逐步进行了旨在引入市场竞争的体制改革,逐步实现了发电企业与电网公司之间的“厂网分离”。近几年,发电厂竞相增加装机容量,电力有过剩趋势。2003年12月,成立了五大发电集团,分割了全国的电力网络,开始逐步实行“竞价上网”改革,在发电侧引入竞争。因此,电力市场改革的第一步是“厂网分离、竞价上网”。竞价上网试运行期采纳单一买方模式。如果单一买方模式正式运行,势必会对发电侧带来深刻影响,这种影响又会不可避免地波及到上游煤炭市场。眼下,煤炭的市场价格完全放开,电煤价格一直猛涨,激化了煤炭、电力企业之间的矛盾。未来“厂网分离、竞价上网”后,发电厂必须独自承担煤炭价格上涨的成本。因此,发电厂肯定要寻找降低成本的出路。
本文认为,要制定合理的电力竞价上网的运行方案,必须准确把握中国发电侧竞价上网对煤电产业链上下游的整体影响。本文就发电侧竞价上网的背景、煤电矛盾的来龙去脉以及竞价上网对煤电纵向关系的影响进行准确分析,得到发电侧竞价上网对煤电纵向关系影响的基本预测,并根据发电厂的私人激励,提出煤电纵向一体化的政策建议。
本文对发电侧竞价上网背景下的煤电纵向一体化及其社会效应进行了系统研究。运用现代产业组织和博弈论研究方法,在市场结构——市场行为——市场绩效研究范式基础上构建起一个完整的理论框架,并建立博弈模型展开研究。按照市场结构——市场行为——市场绩效范式,本文首先考察了在发电侧竞价上网、煤炭价格上涨这两个主要因素作用下,基于厂商私人激励的煤电纵向关系安排,认为发电企业有后向一体化的激励;接着研究了煤电后向一体化是否引起下游的电力报价合谋;之后借鉴电力竞价上网与煤电纵向关系的国际经验,与中国情况进行了简单的比较。在此基础上,提出基于发电侧竞价上网的煤电纵向一体化政策建议。
本文的主要结论如下:
首先,电力竞价上网激励发电企业降低成本、改进效率。其中一种途径是发电厂的后向一体化。对于发电厂来说,存在后向一体化的激励。纵向一体化出现的前提如果是发电厂和一个合意的煤炭企业一体化,消除了双重加价的非效率;一体化企业的电厂利用供应有保障的低价煤发电,降低了发电的边际成本,提高了市场竞争能力。本文认为,纵向一体化具有竞争效应,或者效率效应,电力上网报价最终可能会降低。后向一体化也会使得社会福利增加。
其次,纵向一体化引起的下游价格共谋。
关系专用性投资的影响导致纵向一体化存在下游的价格共谋效应。
下游的竞争对手会选择向纵向一体化企业买煤,煤电纵向一体化企业的最优煤炭价格高于其边际成本,也高于竞争对手的边际成本。
煤电一体化企业的边际成本最低,照道理讲应降低电价。但由于煤电纵向一体化企业以较高价格给发电部分的竞争对手供煤,如果电价降低,受成本影响,下游竞争对手无法降价,电力需求量减少,投入品煤炭需求量势必跟着下降,将会影响到一体化企业在煤炭部分的利润。因此,一体化企业不会降低电价。而且,由于担心一体化企业降低电价,这反过来也促使下游竞争对手选择向一体化企业买煤。当存在其它转换成本很低的交易方式情况下,煤电纵向一体化不会有利于下游价格的共谋,从而也不会违反国家加强发电业务竞争性的政策,有助于发电侧引入竞争,推动竞价上网。
进一步,独占契约的效率效应。独立的煤炭、电力企业应用独占契约,不会引起下游价格共谋。发电企业若想保证煤炭供应,应接受煤炭企业的独占契约。但缔结这样契约的后果是煤炭批发价格直接等于其生产成本,按照煤炭需求量越来越大的中国市场现状,煤炭企业可能并不乐意提供这种契约。本文认为,在二部收费的独占契约中规定一笔小于零的转移支付,这意味着发电企业要花钱购买这份独占契约。这样不仅可以保证煤炭供应,还可以降低成本。
最后,实行相应的煤电政策。通过法律形式鼓励纵向一体化,并且辅之以相关的政策措施和政策环境。
Electricity is the guarantee for the continuous development of the national economy.Since 1997,electricity sector has been reformed for market competition step by step,to realizing the separation between power plant and electricity networks. In recent years,power plants compete to increase generation volume,and the product of electricity has intended to be oversupplied.In Dec.2003,China established the biggest 5 generator group,separating the electricity networks of all of our country, complementing the strategy of "bidding for accessing to networks",which is the first step of the reform.The first run of bidding for accessing to networks is the sole buyer stage,which will affect the power industry and coal and electricity industry chain.
Nowadays,the price of coal market has been deregulated,and get rising all the time,which reinforce the contradiction of coal and electricity industry.After the separation between power plant and electricity networks,and bidding for accessing to networks,power plants have to undertaken the cost themselves resulting from the rising coal price,because the final electricity price always is regulated.So,the power plants need to find a method to decrease coal cost.
This article argued that if china plans to bidding for accessing to networks effectively,it should identify the total effect of bidding for accessing to networks on upstream and downstream industry.It would analyse correctly the background of bidding for accessing to networks,the history of coal and electricity conflict,and the effect of bidding for accessing to networks on coal and electricity vertical relationship, obtaining the anticipation of the effect,and according to the private motivation, putting forward the suggestion of coal-electricity vertical integration.
This article had a systematic research about coal and electricity vertical integration and its social effect.Using the modern industry organization theory and game theory method,and on the basis of s-c-p paradigm,it built a complete theoretic frame and several game theory models to conduct analysis.In regard of s-c-p paradigm,it firstly studied the coal-electricity vertical relationship arrangement on the basis of enterprises private motivation,under the effect of two main factors:bidding for accessing to networks and increasing coal pricing,arguing that power plants have the incentive to merger upstream coal enterprises;then it studied whether vertical integration would induce the price collusion between downstream power plants. Afterthat it consulted the international experiences about bidding for accessing to networks and coal-electricity vertical relationship,and contrasted with China's conditions.On the basis of research above,this article puts forward several policy suggestions.
The paper was arranged as below:
In the first place,bidding for accessing to networks encourages power plants to reduce costs,increasing efficiency.One of methods to decreasing cost is that power plant merges upstream coal business.In fact,as for power plants,there is the motivation to be a merger.If vertical integration requires that power plants should merge with desired enterprises,vertical integrator could improve the efficiency because of high-efficiency upstream part.The downstream part of vertical integration could take use of enough cheap coal to generate electricity,which would reduce marginal cost and would increase the competitive advantage.From the point of the paper,vertical integration has the competitive effect,and the price of electricity would get down,which benefits the total society.
In the second place,vertical integration facilitates the price collusion of downsteam generation industry because of the factor of relationship-specific investment.The rival of downstream would buy coal from vertical integration enterprises,and the price of coal is higher than its marginal cost,and than the marginal cost of rival of upstream.
When there are some other transaction methods to transfer,coal-electricity integration would not facilitate the price collusion.Meanwhile,it will encourage competition among generators.
Furthermore,the effective efficiency of exclusive contract was studied. Independent coal and power enterprises apply exclusive contract,which has no price collusion effect.If power plants want to guarantee the supply of coal,they should accept the contract.However,the outcome of the contract is that the wholesale price of coal is equal to coal production marginal cost.Coal enterprises are reluctant to provide the contract to downstream enterprises,because of rising coal price and coal's high demand.This article argued that if the transfer payment in the contract would be lower than zero,which means that power plants should buy the contract.Thus,coal enterprises are willing to provide the contract.
Lastly,China should enact law to encourage coal-electricity vertical integration, at the same time,improve related policy and policy environment.
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