摘要
虚拟经营是现代企业的必由之路,虚拟营销是市场营销变革的必然产物。现有的市场营销理论内涵和边界正在向虚拟营销方向拓展,且企业已经开始了虚拟营销的实践。然而,到目前为止,尚未形成虚拟营销的分支学科体系,相关的研究也刚刚开始。本文以虚拟营销组织构建及其运行管理为研究对象,运用概念模型方法、结构方程模型、羊群行为模型、牛鞭效应模型、博弈模型等研究方法,系统地研究了虚拟营销的学科基础理论、虚拟营销的基本理论框架、虚拟营销组织构建及其运行管理的基本理论与方法。旨在对虚拟营销这一新的营销学科分支进行探索性研究,为同类研究提供借鉴和参考。本文着重在以下几方面开展了研究工作:
①虚拟营销基本理论问题研究。从市场营销学科内核是“交换障碍的克服”这一认识起点出发,以现代市场营销的“价值探索——价值创造——价值传递”为主线,以虚拟经营和虚拟企业管理理论为基础,分析了“企业经营管理”与“企业营销管理”密切的内在联系,也分析了“虚拟营销”与“虚拟经营”的内在联系。给出了虚拟营销的基本概念,探讨了虚拟营销与传统营销在营销机会、营销战略、市场供应品塑造和营销方案的管理与传递四个方面区别。提出了虚拟营销的两个基本假设,指出虚拟营销的理论内核仍然是“交换障碍的克服”,虚拟营销是现代市场营销学和管理学结合的产物。在此基础上,研究并给出了虚拟营销学的基本理论框架体系。指出:虚拟营销的应用体系可以从虚拟营销组织组建、虚拟营销组织运行管理和虚拟营销组织解体管理三个阶段展开。
②虚拟营销组织的构建问题研究。从以下三方面开展了研究:
1)虚拟营销组织动态联盟的组建过程中合作伙伴的选择。首先分析了虚拟营销伙伴选择市场上如何运用联合分析法确定候选企业的属性效用值,在此基础上将候选企业进行了归类,从而进一步提出了虚拟营销合作伙伴的离散选择模型。从企业虚拟营销效用最大化出发,分析了盟主企业选择候选企业时的概率。通过虚拟营销合作伙伴的离散选择模型将企业的定性与定量属性相结合,提出了科学、合理选择虚拟营销伙伴和有效避免盟主企业选择合作伙伴时发生羊群行为的方法和思路。
2)虚拟营销组织动态联盟构建过程中合作模式的选择。研究发现:影响合作模式的主要因素有企业性质、市场份额、企业规模、管理人员文化水平、相对距离、合作成本、合作风险、企业柔性、自身物流状况、行业因素和管理职能结构。研究表明,管理人员文化水平对策略联盟式、外包加工式和插入兼容式都有显著影响,管理人员文化水平的高低会直接影响到企业合作模式的选择。企业柔性是选择虚拟营销合作模式时需要考虑的一个非常重要的因素,企业柔性的高低直接会影响到企业的选择行为。同时研究还发现,企业在选择虚拟营销合作模式时会考虑到自身物流的状况、矩阵制组织结构对大多数的虚拟营销合作模式都有正向的影响、企业选择虚拟营销合作模式时往往存在非理性的跟风行为。
3)虚拟营销组织动态联盟伙伴选择中的羊群行为研究。引入羊群行为的概念和模型,分析了虚拟营销的合作行为。发现:在只有企业虚拟营销效果不确定的情况下,盟主企业决策主体的理性不同所引发的对盟员企业选择行为特征的不同。通过建立虚拟营销合作市场交易机制、效用函数和羊群行为判别规则,证明了盟主企业选择合作伙伴的行为呈现羊群效应的特征。指出:在盟主企业完全理性的情况下,企业决策主体在伙伴选择过程中的选择行为不会出现羊群行为;而在有限理性的情况下,存在羊群行为。
③虚拟营销组织运行管理问题研究。从以下五个方面开展了研究:
1)研究了虚拟营销组织动态联盟间的收益分配问题。首先,在I类非对称信息下,利用博弈论和委托代理理论,提出了基于一次收益分配策略并综合使用激励与约束机制的二次收益分配策略。其次,研究了在II类非对称信息下,分阶段多次收益分配策略问题。
2)研究了虚拟营销组织动态联盟信任机制问题。指出信任机制是营销动态联盟成功运作的基石。认为虚拟营销动态联盟中的信任从行为层面看可以包含两层含义,一是企业间的信任,二是企业内的信任。从行为层面探讨了营销动态联盟成员间的信任关系,,分析了虚拟营销动态联盟相互信任关系的影响因素主要有合作经历、信誉、承诺、生命周期、机会主义、相互依赖性以及文化与地缘差异。提出虚拟营销动态联盟成员相互信任的产生是一种过程型机制,并给出了该过程型机制的概念框架和实现互信的两条途径:对方可信度信息的积累——信息交流与沟通、目标协调;对方可信度的增加——非正式协议、监督与控制。研究了虚拟营销信任关系保障机制及其设计思路。
3)研究了虚拟渠道管理问题。主要对虚拟营销渠道管理中的牛鞭效应进行了研究。用可变系数的ARIMA需求模型对虚拟渠道内下游零售商和上游供应商的需求信息进行预测,分析了非平稳需求状态下零售商和供应商订货水平的差异,从而证明在信息完全共享和敏捷经营的情况下,虚拟渠道运营过程中牛鞭效应的存在性。对虚拟渠道内部供应链系统上下游成员企业订货决策进行了仿真实验,发现:虚拟渠道内部的牛鞭效应与市场促销系数以及需求平滑系数存在正相关关系,同时发现虚拟渠道内部存在的反牛鞭效应现象。还分析研究了虚拟渠道内部的牛鞭效应会随着市场需求波动的加强而不断扩大,以及能够有效消除牛鞭效应现象的的条件。
4)虚拟促销问题研究。主要研究了虚拟营销中的合作广告问题。引入产品价格弹性因素和博弈论中Nash均衡的合作与非合作模型,分析了在制造商面临竞争的情况下,选择价格折扣后,制造商和零售商之间如何确定制造商和零售商的最优广告策略。对两种不同的情况进行了比较分析,确定了不同情况下应采取的最优策略。
5)虚拟营销动态联盟组织的绩效问题研究。采用实证研究的方法,分析论证了虚拟营销活动中企业间合作关系、虚拟营销、企业绩效三者之间的关系,提出了三个假设:企业合作关系对虚拟营销有显著的正向影响、企业合作关系对其绩效水平有显著的正向影响、虚拟营销对企业绩效水平有显著的正向影响。研究表明:三个假设均通过了统计显著性检验。认为:虚拟营销中企业合作关系对虚拟营销产生显著的正向影响,合作关系通过虚拟影响对企业绩效产生间接的影响,而且合作关系对企业绩效也产生直接的影响;虚拟影响对企业绩效产生显著的正向影响。
通过研究,初步构建了虚拟营销的理论框架体系,对虚拟营销组织的构建和运行管理问题进行了较系统的探索性研究。研究成果对同类研究具有一定的学术参考价值和实践指导意义。
Virtual Marketing, a product resulted from the Marketing transformation, is a must-be road for modern companies. The current theory of Marketing is, from both its content and boundary, developing toward the direction of Virtual Marketing, which is being put into practice by some enterprises. However, until now, the sub-disciplinary system is still to be built up, and the related research has just begun. The thesis, with the research objects of the composition of virtual marketing organization and by the methodology of Concept Model, Structural Equation, Herding Behavioral Model, Bullwhip Effect and Game Theory, has made a systematic research on the basic disciplinary theory of Virtual Marketing, its theoretical framework, virtual marketing organizational buildup, and the theory and methodology of virtual marketing operation and management, aiming at exploring the new sub-disciplinary of Marketing and providing the reference for the peers. The main tasks of the thesis are as follows:①Research on the basic disciplinary theory of Virtual Marketing. Beginning with the kernel of Marketing, i.e. the overcoming of exchange barriers, the thesis abides by the principle of modern marketing from value exploring through value creation to value transfer, analyzes, based on the Virtual Marketing and Virtual Enterprises management, the inherent relationship between the operation management and marketing management of enterprises, and between the virtual marketing and virtual operation. Then the Virtual Marketing is defined and the discussion is carried out about the differences between the virtual marketing and traditional marketing on marketing opportunities, marketing strategy, market supplies shape and the management and transfer of marketing.
Afterwards, two underlying assumptions of Virtual Marketing are put forward. The theoretical kernel of Virtual Marketing is identified to be still the overcoming of exchange barriers. Virtual Marketing is originated from the combination of modern Marketing and Management. Based on the research results above, the thesis studies and introduces the basic theoretical framework of Virtual Marketing, and points out that the applied system of Virtual Marketing could be unfolded into the following phases from the buildup of virtual marketing organization through its operation and management to its disorganization management.
②Research on Virtual Marketing organizational buildup. It is carried out in details as follows:
1) The selection of partners in the buildup process of virtual marketing dynamic alliance. Firstly, it is analyzed how to identify, with the method of united analysis, the attribute utilities of candidate companies in the process of virtual marketing partners’selection. The candidate companies are then classified and the Model of Discrete Selection is introduced on candidate companies. Aiming at maximizing the utility of a company’s virtual marketing, we analyze the possibilities of selection of candidate companies by the leader company. Based on the Model of Discrete Selection, the thesis combines the quantitative and qualitative measures of companies, and puts forward the scientific and reasonable method which helps select the virtual marketing partners and avoids effectively the Herding Behaviors in the selection process.
2) The selection of cooperation mode in the buildup process of virtual marketing dynamic alliance. It has been discovered that the following factors affect the cooperation mode, the nature of companies, market share, scale of companies, educational level of management, comparative distance, cooperation cost, risks incurred from cooperation, flexibility of companies, logistical status, behavioral factors and structure of management functions. The study reveals that the educational level of management has a significant effect on tactical alliance, outsourcing production and insertion compatibility and has a direct influence on the cooperation mode of companies. The flexibility of companies is another important consideration in the decision of the cooperation mode of companies. Companies will also make a consideration of logistical status. The matrix organizational structure has a positive effect on the cooperation mode of companies. Furthermore, irrational herd behavior could exist during the course of selecting the cooperation mode of virtual marketing.
3) Research on Herding Behaviors in the partners’selection process of virtual marketing dynamic alliance. Per the concepts and model of Herding Behaviors, the cooperation of virtual marketing is analyzed. The analysis discloses that the different leading member company’s rationality will lead to the different member company’s selection only under the condition of uncertainty about the effects of the company’s virtual marketing. The thesis sets up the market transaction mechanism of virtual marketing cooperation, utility function and discriminating rule of Herd Behavior, and then demonstrates the characteristic of Herd Behavior, which occurs when the leading member company selects its partner. In the condition of complete rationality owned by the leading member company, the Herd Behavior above will not occur, whereas the Herd Behavior will happen in the condition of limited rationality.
③Research on virtual marketing operation and management. It is carried out in details as follows:
1) Research on profit allocation among members in the virtual marketing dynamic alliance. For the type I dissymmetrical information, the thesis, using the game theory and the principal-agent theory, puts forward the second profit allocation strategy which is based on the first profit allocation strategy and makes comprehensive use of incentive and restraints. For the type II dissymmetrical information, multi-order profit allocation strategy is then analyzed by phases.
2) Research on mechanism of trust among members in the virtual marketing dynamic alliance. The mechanism of trust, the foundation of the successful operation of virtual marketing, can be divided into trust between companies and trust in companies from the perspective of behavior. From the angle of behavior, the trust relationship is discussed between members in the virtual marketing dynamic alliance. The main factors of trust relationship between members in the virtual marketing dynamic alliance are identified to be the history of cooperation, reputation, pledge, life cycle, opportunism, inter-independence, culture and geo-difference. The mutual trust between the members is generated by a process mechanism defined later. There are two ways to achieve the mutual trust. One is the accumulation of reliable information of the counterpart, including information exchange and communication, and objective coordination, the other is the increase of reliability of the counterpart, including informal contract, monitoring and control. The assurance mechanism of trust relationship of virtual marketing, together with the way of design, is explored.
3) Research on the management of virtual channel. This part touches the Bullwhip Effect in the management of virtual marketing channel, forecasts, through the model of ARIMA with variable coefficients, the needed information by the lower retailers and the upper suppliers in the virtual marketing channel, analyzes the difference of order quantities from retailers and suppliers in the condition of unstationary, and finally demonstrates the existence of Bullwhip Effect in the management of virtual marketing channel in the circumstances of complete information sharing and agile operation. After the simulation experience is carried out for the order decision-making from the upper and lower member companies in the internal supply chain of virtual marketing channel, it is found that the Bullwhip Effect in the virtual marketing channel has a positive relationship to market promotion coefficients and demand smoothing coefficients, and there is an anti-Bullwhip Effect in the virtual marketing channel. It is then noted that the Bullwhip Effect in the virtual marketing channel will intensify with the fluctuation of market demand. Finally, the conditions are introduced to avoid effectively the Bullwhip Effect.
4) Research on the virtual promotion. It mainly focuses the cooperative advertisement in the virtual marketing. This part, after introducing the factor of product price elasticity and the Nash Equilibria of cooperative and non-cooperative models in the Game Theory, analyzes the optimum advertisement strategy adopted by manufacturers and retailers when the manufacturers are facing competition and choose the price discount. After a trade-off, the optimum strategy is identified according to different conditions.
5) Research on performance in the virtual marketing dynamic alliance. The part analyzes, using the method of demonstration, the relationship between cooperation mode, virtual marketing and corporate performance of member companies in the virtual marketing activities and gives the three assumptions that the cooperation relationship has a significant positive effect on virtual marketing and performance, and virtual marketing has a significant positive effect on performance. The research shows that the three assumptions are statistically significant and demonstrated accordingly.
The research has formulated the theoretical framework of virtual marketing and made a comparatively systematic exploration on the buildup and management of virtual marketing organization. The findings resulted from the research are showing some meanings both academically to peers’references and practically.
引文
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