摘要
董事会作为连接股东与经理层的“中枢”机构,是公司的终极控制者和最终决策者,董事会是公司治理的核心。各个国家的立法以及各种机构的规则和指引等都把建设一个高效的董事会作为公司治理的终极目标。我国上市公司董事会治理合规性明显改善,但却有效性偏低,这一不争的事实迫切需要理论和实践界将董事会制度改革的出发点转移至提升董事会治理绩效,而不仅是合规性建设。董事会特征是治理绩效的关键影响因素,董事会特征通过影响董事会履行职能的行为而影响治理绩效,因此,以董事会治理绩效为导向,研究如何配置董事会特征能够保障董事会有效履行职能而达到应有的效果,对于提升董事会治理绩效具有重要意义。创业板聚集了高技术、高成长性、年轻的创业型公司,是提升我国自主创新能力的重要力量。与大型成熟上市公司相比,这类公司委托代理问题较低、资源稀缺、内外部环境高度不确定,董事会更有动机和能力履行职能,因此,董事会治理绩效的影响因素具有特殊性。相关文献虽已取得较丰富的研究成果,但实证研究中多以公司绩效代替治理绩效,未建立治理绩效的测量指标,从而缩小了治理绩效的外延,甚至造成概念的混淆；大多遵循“董事会特征→绩效”的逻辑范式,而忽视了董事会行为的中介效应,造成研究结论多种多样甚至相互矛盾；多基于线性视角研究变量之间的关系,而未关注更符合实际的非线性关系；多以大型成熟上市公司为样本,而对创业型企业的研究较为稀缺。鉴于此,本文基于创业企业董事会特点,立足于董事会治理绩效,在建立董事会治理绩效测量指标的基础上,从非线性视角出发,研究董事会特征如何通过影响董事会履行职能的行为而影响治理绩效,以期对董事会治理绩效的影响因素这一科学问题进行探索。
董事会通过履行职能的治理行为而达成治理绩效。董事会行为是指董事会履职能、实现治理目标的过程。结合股东至上主义、利益相关者理论和组织控制理论,创业板上市公司的治理目标是通过公司创新实现股东为主导的核心利益相关者利益最大化。基于资源依赖理论、管家理论和委托代理理论,董事会是通过行战略和监督职能而实现公司治理目标。据此,董事会行为可相应划分为战略为(包括资源提供和战略参与)和监督行为。不同情境下的董事会监督和战略行为水平是权变的,创业板上市公司董事会可能更加经常的深入到经营层面进行监督,但对经理层机会主义行为,特别是公司合规和财务审计的监督水平较低；资源提供行为水平更高,战略参与行为更加积极,且范围不仅涉及战略层面而是深入至管理边界之内,从而使创业板上市公司的董事会与战略、管理的交互融合性较强。
董事会治理绩效是董事会通过战略行为与监督行为,履行战略与监督职能而达到的治理效果。基于董事会战略行为和监督行为,治理绩效可以分为战略行为绩效和监督行为绩效两个维度。战略行为绩效指董事会通过战略行为履行其战略职能取得的效果,具体指标至少包括组织创新、股东财富、社会责任、规避破产风险等。监督行为绩效是指董事会实施对经理层的监督与控制行为所产生的治理效果,具体指标至少包括代理成本与效率、信息披露质量、规避违规等。
借鉴产业组织理论的SCP范式,董事会特征对治理绩效的影响并非简单而直接,而是通过董事会行为的传递,对治理绩效产生影响。董事会特征如董事会结构、人口学属性和人力资本的制度设计影响董事会履行职能的动机和能力,从而影响董事会战略行为和监督行为强度。进一步的,董事会通过资源提供行为和战略参与行为,影响公司创新、股东财富、社会责任以及破产风险规避等战略行为绩效；董事会通过监督行为,影响代理成本、改善信息披露质量和规避违规等监督行为绩效。董事会特征对治理绩效的影响存在双路径：“董事会特征→战略行为→战略行为绩效”和“董事会特征→监督行为→监督行为绩效”。
从非线性视角出发,基于创业板上市公司的特点,对董事会特征对行为的影响、行为对治理绩效的影响以及董事会行为在董事会特征与治理绩效之间的中介效应提出研究假设。以董事会治理绩效指标作为被解释变量、董事会特征指标作为解释变量、董事会行为指标作为中介变量,以2009-2011年我国509家创业板上市公司为研究样本,运用非线性的中介效应检验方法,对研究假设进行实证检验。
由于董事会特征对行为、董事会行为对治理绩效的影响并非直线而是非线性的,因此,董事会行为的中介效应并非常数,而是随董事会特征的不同取值而发生动态变化,即存在董事会特征通过行为对治理绩效产生的瞬间间接效应。采用Hayes and Preacher(2010)提出的检验非线性中介效应的科学方法,对董事会行为的非线性中介效应进行检验。该方法用于检验X→M→Y中,解释变量X对中介变量M存在非线性影响并且(或)M对被解释变量Y存在非线性影响时,X通过M对Y产生的瞬间间接效应。数据运行采用的统计软件为MEDCURVE for SPSS,使用OLS回归对董事会特征对董事会行为的影响以及董事会行为对治理绩效影响的系数进行估计,并执行bootstrapping以获取置信区间,用来检验董事会特征通过行为对治理绩效产生的瞬间间接效应的显著性。
通过对我国创业板上市公司的样本进行实证检验,得到以下重要结论：第一,创业板上市公司董事会特征对董事会行为具有显著影响,不同特征对董事会行为的影响可能是非线性或线性。董事会结构对董事会行为的影响方面,董事会规模与董事会行为之间呈负向的对数曲线关系；独立董事比例、董事股权激励与董事会行为之间均呈U型关系。董事会人口学属性对董事会行为的影响方面,女性董事比例与董事会行为正相关；董事平均年龄与董事会行为之间呈负向的对数曲线关系；董事平均学历对董事会行为没有影响。在董事会人力资本对董事会行为影响方面,风险投资董事比例与董事会行为之间呈负相关关系；创始人董事比例特别是创始人内部董事比例与董事会行为呈正相关关系,而创始人外部董事与董事会行为不相关；董事平均任期与董事会行为之间呈正相关关系。
第二,创业板上市公司董事会行为对战略行为绩效和监督行为绩效的影响有所差异。董事会行为与R&D投入、净资产收益率、托宾Q值、总资产增长率、破产风险等战略行为绩效各指标存在正向的对数曲线关系,这说明随着董事会行为的强化,董事会治理的战略行为绩效得以提高,但是由于董事会过度履行战略职能负效应的抵减作用,战略行为绩效提高的速度将越来越缓慢。董事会行为与监督行为绩效指标中的代理效率以及第一类代理成本之间存在正向的对数曲线关系,说明随着董事会行为的强化,代理效率得以提升且提升的速度逐渐变缓；随着董事会行为的强化,第一类代理成本得以降低且降低的速度逐渐变缓。然而,然而,董事会行为与第二类代理成本、信息披露质量等监督行为绩效指标不存在相关性。这说明创业类企业的董事会行为主要体现于提供资源和战略参与的战略行为,而监督行为相对弱化。验证了董事会与经理层的合作关系模型,表明资源依赖理论和管家理论更适用于作为创业型企业情境董事会治理的理论依据。
第三,董事会行为在董事会特征与战略行为绩效之间起重要的非线性中介效应。董事会结构各指标、董事会人口学属性中的女性董事比例与董事平均年龄以及人力资本各指标通过董事会行为的中介作用,而对战略行为绩效以及代理效率、第一类代理成本的监督行为绩效指标产生影响。由于某些董事会特征指标与行为之间存在U型或对数曲线关系,董事会行为与战略行为绩效及代理效率、第一类代理成本之间存在对数曲线关系,因此,董事会行为在董事会特征与治理绩效之间的中介效应并不是固定的常数,而是随董事会特征变量的不同取值而发生动态变化,即董事会特征通过行为对治理绩效的影响存在瞬间间接效应。董事会行为在董事会特征与代理成本、信息披露等监督行为绩效之间不存在中介效应。同时发现,不同董事会特征对不同治理绩效指标的影响路径存在差异,如果忽视董事会行为的中介效应直接研究董事会特征与绩效的关系将得到不稳定甚至是错误的研究结论。
本文对于已有研究具有如下贡献：(1)建立“董事会特征→战略行为→战略行为绩效”和“董事会特征→监督行为→监督行为绩效”的双路径模型,深化了“结构→行为→绩效”的研究范式,丰富了董事会治理研究框架体系。(2)构建董事会治理绩效的测量指标,有助于从董事会履行职能的效果角度,为董事会有效性的实证研究提供理论依据。(3)将非线性中介效应检验方法首次应用于董事会治理的研究中,验证了董事会特征通过行为对治理绩效动态的瞬间间接效应,突破了以往研究的线性逻辑,完善了董事会研究的实证检验方法。(4)挖掘了创业型企业情境下董事会特征、行为对治理绩效影响路径的特殊性,丰富了创业企业公司治理的理论研究、以及权变理论在董事会治理研究中的运用。
Board of directors as the connection institutions between shareholders and managers, is both the ultimate controllers and the final decision makers of the company, therefore, the board of directors is the core of corporate governance. According to the legislation and rules of the various countries and institutions, it is the ultimate goal of corporate governance to construct an efficient board. The facts that the compliance of board governance has been improved significantly in China's listed company but the efficiency is still low force us to transfer the starting point of board reform from the compliance to improving the performance of board governance. Board characteristics is one of the most important determinants of governance performance. Board characteristics influence governance performance through the behaviors of performing their functions. Therefore, it is significant for improving board governance performance to put the board governance performance as the guidance and study how configure the structure to guarantee that the board performs effectively. The GEM on which the high technology, high growth, young start-ups are listed is important strength of our country's independent innovation. Compared with the mature large listed companies, these companies have some characteristics, such as lower principal-agent problem, resource scarcity, highly uncertain internal and external environment, and the board of directors has more motivation and ability to perform their functions. As a result, the influence factors of board governance performance are special. There are still some limits in relavent literatures. First, Governance performance is substituted by corporate performance and the measures of governance performance are not established in the current empirical studies which shinks the extension of governance performance and mixes the concept of corporate performance and governance performance. Second, Most of empirical studies of board governance follow the logic of "board characteristics→performance" and ignore the mediat effect of board behavior, which lead to the mixed research results. Third, most empirical studies focus on the relationship of variables from the point of view of linear but not nonlinear. Fourth, the studies of board governance of entrepreneurial enterprise are scarce. In this paper, based on the board characteristic of GEM companies, the board governance performance index of the listed GEM companies is first established and how the board characteristics impact the governance performance through the behaviors of performing their functions is studied from the point of view of nonlinear and therefore the determinants of board governance performance is studied.
The board of directors achieves governance performance by governance behaviors of performing functions. Board behavior refers to the process of directors performing their functions and implementation of governance objectives. Combined with shareholder primacy theory, stakeholder theory and organizational control theory, the GEM listed company governance goal is to maximize the shareholder-oriented core stakeholders'interests through company innovation. Based on resource dependence theory, stewardship theory and agent theory, the board of directors realizes the goal of corporate governance by performing the strategy and supervision function. The board behavior can correspondingly be divided into strategic behavior (including provision of resources and strategic participation) and supervision behavior. Considering board supervision and strategic behavior is contingent, the board of the GEM listed companies may be more involved into the operating level to supervise, but the opportunism behavior of the executive, especially the level of financial disclosure supervision is low. The level of provision resources behavior is higher and strategy behavior is more positive and is not only involved in strategic level but also deep into management boundary, so that the integration of participation in strategy and management of board in the GEM listed companies is stronger.
Board governance performance is the effect of board carrying on strategic and supervision behavior to perform function and the board governance performance eventually embodies in the realization degree of the governance goal. Based on strategic and supervision behavior, the board governance performance can be divided into strategic behavior performance and supervision behavior performance. Strategic behavior performance refers to the effect of board strategic behavior to perform strategic function. The board strategic behavior performance indicators include at least the organizational innovation, shareholder wealth, social responsibility, bankruptcy risk avoidance etc. Supervision behavior performance refers to the effect of the board's monitor and control behavior on managers, whose indicators include at least the agency cost and efficiency, and the quality of information disclosure, violations avoidance, etc.
According to the SCP paradigm of industrial organization theory, the influence of board characteristics on governance performance is not a simple and direct, but through the board behavior. The board characteristics such as structure, demographic characteristics and human capital influence the motivation and ability of board performing functions, and thus affect the strength of the board's strategy and supervision behavior. Further, the board of directors affects the strategy behavior performance—company innovation, shareholders wealth, social responsibility and bankruptcy risk avoidance through behaviors of resources provision and strategic participation; By means of the board supervision behavior, supervision behavior performance such as agency cost declination, improvement in quality of information disclosure, and violations avoidance is affected. There are double paths that board characteristics impact governance performance:"the board characteristics→strategic behavior→strategic behavior performance" and " the board characteristics→supervision behavior→supervision behavior performance".
From the nonlinear view, based on the characteristics of the GEM listed companies, research hypotheses about board characteristics influence board behavior, behavior impact governance performance and board behavior mediates the relationship between board characteristics and governance performance are put forward in this paper. Usin board governance performance indicators as dependent variable, board characteristics as independent variable, board behavior index as a mediation variable,509GEM listed companies in China for the three-year period of2009-2011as research samples, using nonlinear mediation effect method, the above research hypotheses are tested.
Because both the effect of board characteristics on behavior and behavior on governance performance are not linear but nonlinear, the mediation effect of board behavior is not constant, but varies with different values of board characteristic, that is, board characteristics generate an instantaneous indirect effect on governance performance through behavior. The latest scientific method to test nonlinear mediation effect which is put forward to by Hayes and Preacher (2010) is used to estimate indirect effects in an X→M→Y causal system that allow the relationships between causal agents and outcomes to be nonlinear. MEDCURVE for SPSS statistical software is used for data operation. Sepcifically, OLS regression is used for estimate the coefficients of board characteristics influencing the board behavior and board behavior impacting governance performance; bootstrapping is performed for confidence interval and the significance of instantaneous indirect effect of board characteristics on governance performance through behavior is tested.
Using the sample of GEM listed companies in China, this paper draws the following conclusions through empirical research:first, board characteristics of the GEM listed companies have a significant effect on board behavior; the influence of different characteristics on board behavior may be nonlinear or linear. The influences of board structure on board behavior are as follows:the relationship between the size of the board of directors and board behavior is a negatively logarithmic curve, the relationships between proportions of independent director, director equity incentive and board behavior are U-shape relationship. The influences of board demographic characteristics on board behavior are as follows:the proportion of women directors positively relates to board behavior, average age of directors shows a negative logarithm curve relationship with board behavior, the average education degree has no effect on board behavior. In terms of human capital of board effect on the board behavior, proportion of venture capital directors is negatively related to board behavior; proportion of founder directors especially the ratio of internal founder director is positively related to board behavior, but outside founder directors is not related to board behavior; the relationship between average tenure of board and board behavior is positive.
Second, board behavior of GEM listed companies has different effects on strategic behavior performance and supervision behavior performance. The relationship between board behavior and each strategy behavior performance—R&D investment, ROE, Tobin Q, growth rate of total assets, bankruptcy risk is a positive logarithmic curve, which shows that with the increase of board behavior strengthens, the board strategic behavior performance has improved; however, with the deduction of negative effects of board excessively performs strategic function, the rate of increase of strategic behavior performance will be more and more slowly. The relationship between board behavior and agent efficiency and the first type agency cost is a positive logarithmic curve, which shows that with the increase of board behavior strengthens, agent efficiency has improved and the speed of improvement is gradually slow, and the first type agency cost has reduced and the speed is slow. However, the board behavior and the supervision behavior performance indexes such as the second type agency cost and the quality of information disclosure has no correlation. The above conclusions show that board behavior in the entrepreneurial enterprises mainly manifests in providing resources and strategies involvement; but the supervision behavior is weak, which provides the support to the cooperation model between board of directors and managers.
Third, board behavior nonlinearly mediates the relationship between board characteristics and strategic behavior performance. Board structure, the proportion of women directors and average age of directors as well as various indicators of human capital have a significant effect on strategic behavior performance and parts of supervision behavior performance indicators such as agency efficiency, the first type agent cost. Because the relationship between some board characteristics and behavior is the U-shape or logarithmic curve, meanwhile, the relationship between board behavior and strategic behavior performance, agent efficiency, the first type agent cost is a logarithmic curve relationship, the mediation effect of board behavior between board characteristics and governance performance is not a fixed, but varies with the different values of board characteristics, that is, the instantaneous indirect effect of board characters on governance performance through behavior exists. Board behavior is not the mediator between board characteristics and supervision behavior performance indexes such as agency cost, information disclosure, etc. These conclusions suggest that we will make unstable and even wrong conlusions if we ignore the mediator variable and directly studying the relationship between board characteristics and performance in board governance empirical research.
This paper has the following contributions:(1) the establishment of double path model of "board characteristics→strategic behavior→strategic behavior performance" and "board characteristics→supervision behavior→supervision behavior performance" deepens the SCP paradigm and enriches the research framework of board governance;(2) the establishment of measurement indicators of board governance performance is helpful to provide theoretical support for measuring the board effectiveness from the view of the performing effect of board functions;(3) the method to test nonlinear mediation effect which Hayes and Preacher come up with in2010is firstly used in the study of board governance to test instantaneous indirect effect of board characteristics on governance performance through behavior. It establishes nonlinear logic which is different from previous research of linear logic and improve the empirical methods in the board governance research;(4) the study of the distinctiveness of the influence path of board characteristics on governance performance through behavior in the context of entrepreneurial enterprises enriches the literature of corporate governance in entrepreneurial enterprises, as well as contingency thought in use of board governance.
引文
① 谢永珍、赵琳和王维祝(2013)对此进行了详细的论述。见谢永珍，赵琳，王维祝.治理行为、治理绩效：内涵、传导机理与测量[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2013,(6)：80-94。
① 资源配置的可逆性假设是指现在的收益配置不影响未来的资源配置；个体性假设是指每个经济参与者以其认为适当的方式开发和利用生产资源,而与经济体中其他个体的决定和行动无关；最优性假设是指在一定的市场和技术约束条件下对不同经济结果进行选择见奥沙利文玛丽.公司治理百年——美国和德国公司治理演变[M].北京：人民邮电出版社.2007.
① 累积性是指生产质量更高而成本更低产品的学习是通过累积过程而形成。集体性是指集体学习过程中,个人学习受他人学习的影响,并能合称为一个新的、集体性的知识。不确定性是指创新活动的企业因学习过程可能未取得成功或无法取得竞争优势而难以获得回报,因而面临着生产与竞争的不确定性。见奥沙利文玛丽.公司治理百年——美国和德国公司治理演变[M].北京：人民邮电出版社,2007.
② 开发性,即毫无顾忌的将资源投入到收入部确定的投资项目中去；组织性,即收入是通过人力和物质资源的整合而产生；战略性,即资源的配置要能克服市场和技术的条件限制。见奥沙利文玛丽.公司治理百年—-美国和德国公司治理演变[M].北京：人民邮电出版社，2007.
③ Pugliese, Bezemer and Zattoni (2009)在 "Boards of Directors" Contribution to Strategy:A Literature Review and Research Agenda"一文中对相关文献作了具体综述。
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