摘要
近年来,诸多研究发现世界范围内多数公司股权结构较为集中,大小股东间的代理冲突逐步取代股东-经理人间的代理冲突,成为公司治理研究的焦点问题。控制权与所有权的分离,使控股股东有动机和能力利用其对公司的控制权攫取控制权私有收益,受该动机驱使,控股股东基于自身利益最大化而非企业价值最大化做出决策。因此,控股股东对控制权私有收益的追求以及控制权私有收益对公司财务政策尤其是非效率投资行为的影响,越来越受到国内外学者的关注。研究控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占及其对非效率投资行为的影响,对于现阶段我国公司治理制度的完善、公司治理结构的优化配置和中小股东权益的保护,都具有重要的理论和实践意义。本文将研究的目标定位于我国转型经济的特定背景,通过对控制权私有收益形成机理的进一步分析,探讨大股东控制下控制权私有收益对公司投资决策的影响机理。
本文在我国上市公司特有的股权结构安排和控制权配置格局下,借鉴国内外最新研究成果,以大小股东间利益冲突导致的控制权私有收益攫取动机为切入点,委托代理理论、信息不对称理论以及控制权理论作为理论分析依据,并将公司治理对控制权私有收益与投资关系的影响纳入分析框架,综合运用规范研究与实证研究相结合、定性研究和定量研究相结合以及比较分析的方法,探讨不同成长性、不同股权性质上市公司中控制权私有收益对投资的影响以及公司治理在控制权私有收益影响非效率投资过程中的作用。主要得出以下五方面的研究结论。
一是控制权与现金流权的分离、经理人的合谋寻租、法律法规的不健全以及信息不对称使控股股东具有侵占中小股东利益攫取控制权私有收益的动机及可能性,受该动机驱使,大股东可能会选择非效率投资；二是通过构建“控股股东收入模型”发现：不存在控制权私有收益时,企业最佳投资规模与其持有的现金流权比例和控制权比例无关；受控制权私有收益驱动下的大股东倾向于选择过度投资行为；控股股东持有的现金流权比例越低、对投资者保护程度越差、控制权私有收益的攫取成本越低,大股东攫取的控制权私有收益越多,越易进行过度投资行为。三是按照成长性高低对控制权私有收益与企业投资支出关系的实证检验结果表明：上市公司成长性与投资支出显著正相关,且与高成长性上市公司相比,控制权私有收益与投资支出之间的正相关关系在低成长性上市公司中更加显著。四是将上述样本按不同股权性质进行分组,实证检验结果表明：在国有上市公司中,控制权私有收益与投资支出显著正相关,而在非国有上市公司中,控制权私有收益与投资支出正相关但不显著,说明较非国有上市公司,国有上市公司倾向于过度投资。五是我国上市公司公司治理因素、控制权私有收益与企业非效率投资行为关系的实证结果表明：第一大股东持股比例的增加加剧了上市公司的非效率投资行为及控制权私有收益对非效率投资行为的影响；股权制衡能有效抑制企业的过度投资行为,缓解控制权私有收益对过度投资行为的影响,但对投资不足的影响不显著；董事长和总经理的分离虽然在一定程度上可以缓解企业的过度投资和投资不足但效果不显著；独立董事的引入能有效缓解企业的过度投资及控制权私有收益对过度投资的影响；监事会规模的扩大在抑制控制权私有收益对投资不足的影响效果较显著,但在过度投资没有发挥有效作用；高管薪酬与上市公司的非效率投资行为没有显著的相关性,但高管薪酬的增加,能有效抑制控制权私有收益对投资不足的影响。实证结果还表明：大股东占款与企业过度投资不显著正相关,但与投资不足则在1%水平上显著正相关；企业的现金流权与过度投资显著负相关；控制权与现金流权的分离程度与企业的过度投资显著正相关。
本研究主要有以下三方面的创新：
首先,考虑到我国集中股权结构普遍存在,大小股东间代理冲突引起控股股东侵占中小股东利益会导致企业投资决策的变化,本文将控制权私有收益对企业投资行为的影响置于一个利益相关者框架里进行探讨。借鉴前人的投资模型,构建控股股东收入模型,研究控股股东基于控制权私有收益的企业投资决策变化,结果表明控股股东在控制权私有收益驱动下会选择非效率投资行为,从新的视角说明和解释了我国目前非效率投资行为的形成机理,揭示了我国上市公司投资效率低下的真实原因,丰富了相关研究。
其次,成长性作为衡量企业未来价值的一项重要指标,其高低对资金的需求不同,进而影响到企业的投资规模,控股股东为了长期攫取控制权私有收益也会考虑企业的成长性。本文尝试从公司成长性的视角,考虑不同成长性下控制权私有收益对企业投资行为的影响。对公司成长性的计量,采用净利润增长率、每股收益增长率、营业收入增长率、净资产增长率、市净率和托宾Q值六个指标通过主成分分析法计算综合得分来进行衡量,克服了传统研究中利用单一指标衡量企业成长性带来较大误差的不足,为客观评价公司的成长性提供了重要依据。实证结果表明与高成长性上市公司相比,控制权私有收益对企业投资支出的影响在低成长性上市公司中更加显著。
最后,在借鉴国内外研究成果的基础上,分析控制权私有收益与企业投资行为关系时,引入公司治理变量,建立了一个由信息不对称和代理冲突驱动的企业非效率投资行为分析框架,对公司治理、控制权私有收益和企业投资行为三者间的关联性进行全面系统的理论分析,利用中国上市公司的数据实证检验了股权结构、董事会、监事会及高管薪酬对企业非效率投资行为及控制权私有收益与企业非效率投资行为关系的影响,并结合中国上市公司公司治理的现状对实证结果进行了解释和说明,有针对性的提出一系列完善公司内部和外部治理结构、保护中小股东利益、抑制企业非效率投资行为、提高资金配置效率的政策建议。
Recent studies have found that most companies in the world have a concentrated ownership structure, and the agency conflict between controlling Shareholders and minority Shareholders has replaced the owner-manager conflict and become the focus of corporate governance researches. The separation between corporate control rights and ownership incentivizes the controlling Shareholders to make decisions and take actions that will maximize his own benefits rather than the value of the whole corporate. Therefore, the controlling Shareholder's pursuit of private benefits of control, and the private benefits of control' impacts on the corporate financial policies, especially non-efficient investment, has drawn increasing attention of the researchers both domestically and overseas. The study of control Shareholder's invasion to minority Shareholders' benefits and the impact on non-efficient investment has both theoretical and practical value for the improvement and optimization of corporate governance structure, as well as the protection for minority Shareholders' benefits. This research explores the mechanism of the private benefits of control' impact on corporate investment decisions under the control of Shareholder, by deep analysis on the forming mechanism of private benefits of control in the special context of economic transition in China.
On the basis of the particular ownership structure and corporate control arrangement of China's listed companies, this paper studies the impact of private benefits of control on investment behaviors and the role of corporate governance factors in the process in which private benefits influence the investment behaviors. The analysis in this research focuses on the incentive of private benefits of control caused by the conflict between controlling and minority Shareholders, based on the agency theory, asymmetric information theory and corporate control theory are the basis for this research through the theoretical empirical methodologies, quantitative and qualitative methodologies, comparative methodologies.
There are five main conclusions. First, the separation between control right and cash right, the managers' rent-seeking, underdeveloped laws and regulations, and asymmetric information provide the incentive and possibility for the controlling Shareholders to invade the minority Shareholders' benefits. Motivated by this incentive, the controlling Shareholders tend to choose non-efficient investment. Secondly, the following conclusion is drawn by the controlling Shareholder Income Model. Without private benefits of control, there is no correlation between a corporate's optimal investment scale and the cash flow right and control right; controlling Shareholders tend to conduct over investment behaviors, with the motivation of private benefits of control. With a lower cash flow right by the controlling Shareholders, poorer protection to investors and lower cost of gaining private benefits of control, the controlling Shareholders will achieve more private benefits of control and have a higher tendency for over investment behaviors. Thirdly, empirical study of the relationship between private benefits of control and corporate investment in different level of growth shows the following conclusion. Growth of the listed companies is significantly correlated with investment; The significance of the correlation between private benefits of control and investment is higher in low growth companies, compared to high growth companies. Fourthly, by grouping the sample by ownership, the empirical study shows the result as follows. Among state owned listed companies, private benefits of control is significantly positively correlated with investments, while in non-state owned listed companies, private benefits of control are positively correlated with investment, but not significantly, which indicates that state owned listed companies have a higher tendency for over investment, compared to non-state owned listed companies. Fifthly, the empirical study on the relationship between corporate governance, private benefits of control and non-efficient investments reveals the following conclusions. The increase of the biggest Shareholder's Share strengthens the impact of private benefits of control on non-efficient investments; a balanced ownership is effective in curbing over investments and mitigating the private benefits of control' impacts on over-investment, but does not have a significant influence on under-investments; independent directors can relieve the corporate's over-investment and the private benefits of control' impact on over-investment; the expansion of supervision board is effective in curbing the influence of control private benefits on under-investments, but is not effective on over-investments; the salary of the managers has no significant correlation with non-efficient investments, but the increase of managers' salaries can curb the impact of private benefits of control on under-investments. Empirical studies also show the following:occupying funds by controlling Shareholders has no significant positive correlation with over-investments, but is positively correlated with under-investments; the cash right is significantly negatively correlated with over-investments; the separation between control right and cash right has a significant positive correlation with over-investments.
Three innovations are presented in this paper:
First, due to the prevalence of central ownership in China, the agency conflict between controlling Shareholders and minority Shareholders will cause the controlling Shareholders' invasion into the minority Shareholders' benefits and thus change the corporate's investment decisions, thus this research explores the impact of private benefits of control on investment behaviors within the framework of benefit-related parties. Based on the researches of abroad and China, the Controlling Shareholders' Income Model is constructed to study the relationship between investment behaviors and the private benefits of control. The result shows that controlling Shareholders will tend to choose non-efficient investments under the motivation of private benefits of control, which explains the forming mechanism of non-efficient investments in China reveals the reasons for the low efficiency of investments and enriches related studies.
Secondly, the growth of a corporate, which is a key indicator for the future value, determines the corporate's demand for capital, and thus impacts the investment scale. The controlling Shareholders will also consider growth in order to gain long term private benefits of control. This research analyzes the impact of private benefits of control on investment behaviors under different level of growth. To quantify the growth of a company, principal component analysis is adopted to combine six key indicators, which eliminates the weakness of using one single indicator to measure a company's growth in traditional researches, and provides a basis for the objective evaluation of a company. Empirical studies show that the impact of private benefits of control on investments is more significant in lower growth companies than in higher growth companies.
Finally, based on the researches of China and abroad, corporate governance is applied on analyzing the relationship between private benefits of control and investment behaviors, and an analysis framework of non-efficient investment behaviors driven by asymmetric information and agency conflict is constructed. This research also comprehensively analyzes the role of corporate governance on relationships between private benefits of control and investments, and empirically tests the influence of ownership structure, independent director, supervision board and managers'salary on non-efficient investments, and the relationship between private benefits of control and non-efficient investments, by using the data of China's listed companies. Besides, this research also explains the results of the empirical studies, and provides suggestions to improve corporate governance structure, protect minority Shareholders'benefits, curb non-efficient investments and improve efficiency of capital collation.
引文
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