摘要
税收作为财政要素之一,是现代政府进行社会管理的重要政策工具。税收不仅能够为政府筹集财政资金,而且能够发挥一定的经济调节作用。基于税收功能的角度,本文可以将税收政策目标分为“组织收入”与“调节经济”这两大类。在“调节经济”这一目标下,进一步细化为“效率”、“公平”、“行为调节”这三种经济调节目标。根据经济学理论,税收能够对经济个体产生激励或者抑制效应,从而改变经济个体的经济行为选择。不可忽视的是,尽管税收能够在“组织收入”和“调节经济”方面发挥重要作用,其扭曲性却不可避免。当经济运行遇到困难时,盲目寄希望于通过税收的经济调节功能达到既定的政策目标,很可能产生事与愿违的结果。首先,不能不考虑税收扭曲性所带来的效率损失；其次,在不完美的市场环境中,税收效应所产生的政策效果也可能并不显著。此外,政府往往以调节经济作为开征新税或者提高税率的理由,但实施中的税收政策很可能只发挥了组织收入的职能,具有敛财之嫌。
本文以传统税收归宿理论与行为经济学理论为基础,对政府的税收目标权衡问题进行了讨论。本文从理论基础、理论分析、实证检验和政策建议这四个层面出发,深入探讨了税收实际效果与政策初衷之间产生偏差的主要原因、政府应如何有效制定税收政策目标、以及未来税制改革方向这三个核心议题。
全文共分为八章。第一章为导论,介绍本文的现实背景和研究意义,研究的创新点与难点。第二章对税收归宿理论的基本发展脉络进行梳理,借鉴实验经济学的最新研究成果,对税收归宿理论与现实之间的偏差做出了解释。作为全文的理论根基,第二章还着重归纳了典型税种归宿的实证检验结论、以及针对税收理论研究的前提假设条件所做的实证检验结果,并且提炼出税收对经济增长、公平分配以及行为调节的典型效应。
第三章以经济和政治这两个视角作为切入点,讨论了政府在“组织收入”与“调节经济”这两个税收目标之间的权衡行为。税收工具的效率性和目标性之间存在着重要的取舍关系,这与税收目标的设定密切相关。从我国现实来看,税收并非经济调节的万能工具。从根源上来讲,双重目标下的政府税收决策、税收目标错位对调节效果的影响、心理因素对税收效应的影响以及非完全竞争市场约束等诸多现实因素,都可能引发税收的“调节性扭曲”。有别于传统概念中的税收超额负担,税收“调节性扭曲”主要体现在税收目标错位造成的效率缺失。
第四章在税收行为学的理论基础上,提出了“税收显示效应”的概念。本文将“税收显示效应”定义为：产生于税收政策与纳税人之间的、通过经济个体的心理性偏好路径进而传导到经济个体行为决策的税收效应。当税收显示效应不显著时,会直接抑制纳税人对税负变动的实际感知度,从而制约税收政策的经济调节效果。当税收显示效应显著时,则有助于发挥税收政策的经济调节作用。税收显示效应与价格的税收弹性,共同作用于税收对经济个体的传导机制,从而影响实际的税收效果。
第五章构建理论模型,对税收和管制这两种政策工具的组合效应进行了数理推导。结论表明,政府的最优政策组合,将取决于政府在税收的“组织收入”与“经济调节”这两个目标之间的权衡。在此理论分析基础上,第五章以我国楼市调控为例讨论了最优政策工具组合问题。核心结论为：面对商品房市场中存在的房价过高、投机行为旺盛等问题,政府必须在组织收入和经济调节这两项税收目标中进行选择其一作为核心目标。如果政府以调节经济为核心目标,那么“减税、加强限购管制、加强限价管制”是最有效的政策组合。如果政府以组织收入为核心目标,最优的政策组合应为“增税、放松限购管制、加强限价管制”。
由于微观数据的缺失,第六章对税收效应的实证检验侧重于双重税收竞争环境下的税收宏观效应。实证结果表明,从税收宏观效应的角度来看,我国税收政策的效率损失是较为显著的,且税收调节收入分配的作用空间较为有限。
第七章从民主税制的角度出发,以消费税为例讨论了税收民主性问题,并且尝试性地探讨了政治选举对税收制度的作用影响。最后,基于我国当前税收改革的背景和有效税制理论,本文对我国“十二五”税制改革提出了相关的政策建议。第八章为结语。
本文的创新之处在于,第一,立足于税收目标权衡的角度,本文对税收政策实际效果与税制设计初衷之间的偏离提供了有力解释。当政府采用税收作为政策工具时,政府在组织收入和调节经济这两个税收目标之间的权衡,将直接影响税收政策的实际效果。本文创造性地指出：税收的效率性与目标性之间存在重要的取舍关系；税收的组织收入目标与经济调节目标很可能无法同时实现,政府在这两项税收目标之间的取舍,关乎税收政策自身的有效性。
第二,本文借鉴了实验经济学、行为经济学的最新研究成果,创造性地将心理学因素作为解释税收政策效果的一个重要原因,创新性地提出“税收显示效应”这一概念用以解释税收调节效果出现偏差的情形,并且将行为经济学的研究成果纳入到税制设计过程中。
第三,本文创造性地拓展了关于税收与管制的理论模型,对从量税、从价税、数量管制、价格管制这四种政策工具进行了对比,提出了不同税收目标权衡下的最优政策组合,并且为我国楼市调控政策选择提供了理论依据。
As one of the fiscal elements, taxation is an important policy tool of modern government social management. Taxation is not only able to raise financial revenue for the government, but also can play a role of economic regulation. In the perspective of function, we can divide the tax policy's targets into revenue organization and economic regulation. The latter target concludes three aspects as efficiency, equity and behavior guidance. According to the economics of taxation, tax incentive or inhibitory effect can influence the economic choice, thus changing the economic agents'behaviors. But what cannot be ignored is that, despite the taxation's roles of revenue organization and economic regulation, the tax distortions are inevitable.
When the economic operation faces some difficulties, the government usually hopes to meet the policy objectives through the tax's economic adjustment function. But the results may be undesirable. First, the loss of efficiency brought by the tax distortions cannot be ignored. Secondly, in the imperfect market environment, the tax effect is likely to be not significant. The government tends to take the tax's economic adjustment function as the reasons for regulating economy. Unfortunately, the effect of tax policy is always ambiguous. These policies are likely to have only the revenue organization function.
Based on the traditional economics of taxation and the economics of behavior, this paper discusses the tradeoffs between the above-mentioned taxation targets. Under the four perspectives of theoretical basis, theoretical analysis, empirical test and policy advice, this paper explores the major causes of the deviation between the theory and practice of tax incidence, in which way the government should formulate the taxation policy targets and the future reform on tax system.
This paper concludes eight chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two is the literature review, learning from the latest research results of experimental economics to explain the deviation between the tax incidence theory and reality. As the theoretical foundation, the second chapter also summarized the empirical incidence results of the typical taxes, as well as the examinations on the assumptions of these empirical tests. This chapter extracts the typical effects of taxations on the economic growth, equitable income distribution and behavior regulation.
In the perspective of both economics and politics, chapter three discusses the tax targets tradeoffs between the revenue organization and economic regulation. There are important tradeoff relationships between the efficiency of the tax instrument and its objectives, which are closely related with the government targets. Therefore, the tradeoffs of the tax targets can influence the actual effect of tax policy. Viewed from the reality, taxes are not universal tool for economic adjustment. The causes of tax distortions conclude the dual goals of government decision-making, tax targets dislocation effect, the impact of psychological factors on the tax effects as well as non-perfectly competitive market. This paper defines a conception of "tax regulatory distortions". Different from the traditional concept of tax excess burden, regulatory distortions primarily arise from the process of economic regulation with tax policies.
Based on the theory of tax behavior, chapter four puts forward the concept of "tax presentation effect". This effect is similar to the tax salience effect, but the difference is that the former is defined as the effect arisen between the tax policy and taxpayers, and it will be influenced by psychological factors. When the effect is not significant, it will generate less incentive on the agents, which will restrain the results of tax policies. And when the effect is sufficiently significant, it will improve the results. Both the tax presentation effect and tax elasticity can. affect the results of tax policies.
Chapter five builds some theoretical models in order to analyze the combined policy effects of taxes, quantity regulation and price regulation. The conclusions show that the optimal policy combination will depend on the government's tax targets tradeoffs between revenue organization and economic regulation. On the basis of this theoretical analysis, this paper discusses China's real estate market regulation. The paper points out that in order to control the excess prices of the real estate market, the government should choose only either of the tax targets as the core goal. If the government takes the economic regulation as the core goal, then the optimal polices should be "less taxes, more rigorous quantity regulation and more rigorous price regulation". If the government takes revenue organization as the core goal, it should be "more taxes, less rigorous quantity regulation and more rigorous price regulation".
Due to the lack of micro-data, chapter six tests the taxation's macroeconomic effects under double tax competition environment. The empirical results show that the coefficient of macro-taxation on the economic growth is significant and the taxation's role of adjusting the income redistribution is limited.
Taken consumption tax as an example, chapter seven discusses the issues of tax democracy and the effects from political elections on the design of the tax system. Based on the background of the current China's tax reform and on the effective tax perspective, this chapter provides some policy advices for the China's tax system reform during the Twelve-Five plan period. And chapter night is the conclusion.
The innovation of this paper contains three aspects. Firstly, based on point of the tax targets tradeoffs, this paper explains the deviation between the actual tax effects and the designed targets. The tradeoffs will influence the final results of tax policies. This paper creatively points out that tradeoffs exist between the efficiency and objective of the tax. It may be difficult to reach both the efficiency and objective. The government's tradeoff decision on this will directly affect the efficiency of the tax policies.
Second, this paper adds psychological factors into the explanations of tax policy's actual results and the design of tax system, which is learning from the latest research results of experimental economics, behavioral economics and creatively defining a concept of "tax presentation effect".
Third, this paper creatively extends the theoretical model of taxation and regulation. On the contrast of specific tax, ad valorem tax, quantity regulation and price regulation, this paper derives the optimal policy options. Under different tax targets tradeoffs, this paper provides a theoretical basis for regulation policies on China's real estate market.
引文
3 黄有光.所有税收都造成扭曲?文汇报,2011年3月7日第014版
4 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B.V., 2002.1789-1790
5 税收LSE原则有时也被称为“道尔顿法则”(Dalton's Law),或者“归宿无关性”(Invariance of Incidence Proposition).
6 Kerschbamer R, Kirchsteiger G. Theoretically Robust but Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence. Economic Theory,2000,16 (3),719-734
Borck R et al. Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets. Southern Economic Journal,2002,68 (3),672-682
8 Borck R et al. Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets. Southern Economic Journal,2002,68 (3),672-682
9 Kerschbamer R, Kirchsteiger G. Theoretically Robust but Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence. Economic Theory,2000,16 (3),719-734
10 Kerschbamer R, Kirchsteiger G. Theoretically Robust but Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence. Economic Theory,2000,16 (3),719-734
11 Kerschbamer R, Kirchsteiger G. Theoretically Robust but Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence. Economic Theory,2000,16 (3),719-734
12 Kerschbamer R, Kirchsteiger G. Theoretically Robust but Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence. Economic Theory,2000,16 (3),719-734
13 Kerschbamer R, Kirchsteiger G. Theoretically Robust but Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence. Economic Theory,2000,16 (3),719-734
14 Ruffle B J. Tax and Subsidy Incidence Equivalence Theories:Experimental Evidence from Competitive Markets. Journal of Public Economics,2005
15 Borck R et al. Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets. Southern Economic Journal,2002,68 (3),672-682
16 Kachelmeier S J, Limberg S T. Schadewald M S. Experimental evidence of market reactions to new consumption taxes. Contemporary Accounting Research,1994,10:505-45
17 Kerschbamer R. Kirchsteiger G. Theoretically Robust but Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence. Economic Theory,2000,16 (3),719-734
18 Borck R et al. Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets. Southern Economic Journal,2002,68 (3),672-682
19 Borck R et al. Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets. Southern Economic Journal,2002,68 (3),672-682
20 Borck R et al. Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets. Southern Economic Journal,2002,68 (3),672-682
21 Carroll R., J. Yinger. Is the property tax a benefit tax? The case of rental housing. National Tax Journal, 1994,47:295-316
22 Krzyzaniak M., R. A. Musgrave. The Shifting of the Corporation Income Tax. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press,1963
23 Jane G. Gravelle, Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Corporate tax incidence and inefficiency when corporate and noncorporate goods are close substitutes. Economic Inquiry,1993,10:501-516
24 Ebrill, Liam P, David G. Hartman. On the Incidence and Excess Burden of the Corporation Income Tax. Public Finance,1982,37 (1):48-58
25 罗良文,阐大学.公共经济学的新贡献——2009年度克拉克奖获得者伊曼纽尔·塞斯的学术贡献.上海经济研究,2009(7)：105-111
26 萧艳汾.增值税税负转嫁的代数模型研究.税务研究,2008(2)：83-85
27 萧艳汾.增值税税负转嫁的代数模型研究.税务研究,2008(2)：83-85
28 张阳.中国税负归宿的一般均衡分析与动态研究.北京：中国税务出版社,2007
29 宋春平.中国企业所得税总税负归宿的一般均衡分析.数量经济技术经济研究,2011(2)：89-98
30 宋春平.中国企业所得税总税负归宿的一般均衡分析.数量经济技术经济研究,2011(2)：89-98
31 王智波.房产税资本化的归宿——兼论上海房产税试点“新老划断”的理论依据.改革,2011(3)：154-157
32 王智波.房产税资本化的归宿——兼论上海房产税试点“新老划断”的理论依据.改革,2011(3)：154-157
33 平新乔等.增值税与营业税的福利效应研究.经济研究,2009,(9)：66-80
34 徐利.中国税收可计算一般均衡模型研究——兼论增值税转型改革对中国经济的影响.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2010
35 饶呈祥.基于可计算一般均衡模型的我国成品油税费改革经济效应研究：[博士学位论文].西安：西安交通大学管理科学与工程专业,2009
36 陈烨等.增值税转型对就业负面影响的CGE模拟分析.经济研究,2010(9)：29-42
37 陈烨等.增值税转型对就业负面影响的CGE模拟分析.经济研究,2010(9)：29-42
38 徐晓亮.资源税改革中的税率选择：一个资源CGE模型的分析.上海财经大学学报,2011(2)：82-89
39 徐晓亮.资源税改革中的税率选择：一个资源CGE模型的分析.上海财经大学学报,2011(2)：82-89
40 欧阳华生等.我国税制超额负担定量研究——基于CGE模型框架的分析.财贸经济,2010(1)：63-67
41 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V., 2002
42 Fuchs V. R., A. B. Krueger, J. M. Poterba. Economists'views about parameters, values, and policies: survey results in labor and public economics. Journal of Economic Literature 1998,36:1387-1425
43 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V., 2002
44 Poterba J. Retail price reactions to changes in state and local sales taxes. National Tax Journal,1996.49: 165-176
45 Besley T. J., H. S. Rosen. Sales taxes and prices:an empirical analysis. National Tax Journal,1999, 52:157-178
46 Fuchs V. R., A. B. Krueger, J. M. Poterba. Economists'views about parameters, values, and policies: survey results in labor and public economics. Journal of Economic Literature 1998,36:1387-1425
47 Tetsugen Haruyama, Jun-ichi Itaya. Do Distortionary Taxes Always Harm Growth?. Journal of economics. 2006,87 (2):99-126
48 Lin H. C.,Russo B. A Taxation Policy Toward Capital, Technology and Long-run Growth. Journal of Macroeconomics,1999,21:463-491
49 李绍荣,耿莹.中国的税收结构、经济增长与收入分配.经济研究,2005(5)：118-126
50 李涛,黄纯纯,周业安.税收、税收竞争与中国经济增长.世界经济,2011(4)：23-41
51 刘宝如.中国转型期税收与经济增长问题研究：[博士学位论文].大连：东北财经大学,2010
52 刘宝如.中国转型期税收与经济增长问题研究：[博士学位论文].大连：东北财经大学,2010
53 刘宝如.中国转型期税收与经济增长问题研究：[博士学位论文].大连：东北财经大学,2010
53 刘宝如.中国转型期税收与经济增长问题研究：[博士学位论文].大连：东北财经大学,2010
54 汤玉刚,苑程浩.不完全税权、政府竞争与税收增长.经济学(季刊),2010,10：33-50
56 金戈.经济增长中的最优税收与公共支出结构.经济研究,2010(11)：35-47
57 金戈.经济增长中的最优税收与公共支出结构.经济研究,2010(11)：35-47
58 严成樑,龚六堂.我国税收的经济增长效应与社会福利损失分析.经济科学,2010(2)：69-79
59 严成樑,龚六堂.我国税收的经济增长效应与社会福利损失分析.经济科学,2010(2)：69-79
60 严成樑,龚六堂.税收政策对经济增长影响的定量评价.世界经济,2012(4)：41-61
61 严成樑,龚六堂.税收政策对经济增长影响的定量评价.世界经济,2012(4)：41-61
62 严成樑,龚六堂.税收政策对经济增长影响的定量评价.世界经济,2012(4)：41-61
63 Borys Grochulski. Distortionary Taxation for Efficient Redistribution. Economic Quarterly,2009,95:235-267
64 Borys Grochulski.Distortionary Taxation for Efficient Redistribution.Economic Quarterly,2009,95:235-267
65 Maria Cornachione Kula, Daniel L. Millimet(2010), Income Inequality, Taxation, and Growth. International Atlantic Economic Society, Atl Econ J,2010,38:417-428
66 Pechman J A, Okner B A. Who Bears the Tax Burden?. Washington DC:Brookings Institution Press.1974
67 Pechman J A. Who Paid the Taxes:1966-85?. Washington DC:Brookings Institution Press,1985
68 Browning E K. Pechman's tax incidence study:a note on the data. American Economic Review,1986,76: 1214-1218
69 Pechman J A. Pechman's tax incidence study:a response. American Economic Review,1987,77:232- 234
70 Musgrave R A. Case K E. Leonard H. The distribution of fiscal burdens and benefits. Public Finance Quarterly,1974,2:259-311
71 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B.V., 2002.1819
72 Browning E K, Johnson W R. The Distribution of the Tax Burden. Washington DC:American Enterprise Institute,1979
73 Davies J B, Hilaire F S, Whalley J. Some calculations of lifetime tax incidence. American Economic Review, 1984,74:633-649
74 Poterba J. Lifetime incidence and the distributional burden of excise taxes. American Economic Review,1989, 79:325-330
75 Slemrod J B. Taxation and inequality:a time-exposure perspective. Tax Policy and the Economy,1992,6: 105-127
76 LyonA B, Schwab R M. Consumption taxes in a life-cycle framework:are sin taxes regressive?. Review of Economics and Statistics,1995,77:389-406
77 聂海峰,岳希明.间接税归宿对城乡居民收入分配影响研究.经济学(季刊),2012,10：287-312
78 刘丽.个人所得税制累进性与社会收入分配.上海：立信会计出版社,2011
79 刘丽.个人所得税制累进性与社会收入分配.上海：立信会计出版社,2011
80 刘丽.个人所得税制累进性与社会收入分配.上海：立信会计出版社,2011
81 万莹.个人所得税对收入分配的影响：由税收累进性和平均税率观察.改革,2011(3)：53-60
82 万莹.个人所得税对收入分配的影响：由税收累进性和平均税率观察.改革,2011(3)：53-60
83 高松等.烟草需求、烟草税及其在中国的影响：基于烟草成瘾模型的经验研究.世界经济,2010(10)：98-119
84 http://szs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201102/t20110201_436195.html
85 先福军.新疆油气资源税改革效应分析.税务研究,2010(12)：26-30
86 肖俊极,孙洁.消费税和燃油税的有效性比较分析.经济学(季刊),2012(7)：1345-1364
7 Partha Dasgupta. Public Sector Pricing Rules. Economic and Political Weekly,1971,6:381-386
88 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V. 2002
89 何茵,沈明高.政府收入、税收结构与中国经济增长.金融研究.2009(9)：14-25
90 Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel, Jane G. Gravelle. The encyclopedia of taxation & tax policy. Second edition. Washington D.C.:The urban institute press,2005.ⅹⅲ-ⅹⅴ
91 http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n11897098/11897240.html
92 Benoit S Y Crutzen & Nicolas Sahuguet. Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation.Journal of Economic Theory,2009,144(1):264-279
93 王文静.有效税制视角：对税收“纠偏性”的再认识.现代财经,2011(11)：53-61
94 王文静.有效税制视角：对税收“纠偏性”的再认识.现代财经,2011(11)：53-61
95 http://env.people.com.cn/GB/13834489.html
97 寇红.专家视点：“十二五”时期税制改革改什么？.中国税务报,2010年10月20日第008版
96 http://szs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201102/t20110201_436195.html
98 http://www.cqagri.gov.cn/detail.asp?pubID=248157
98 向楠.高端白酒涨价92.9%的人认为与公款吃喝有关.中国青年报,2011年02月22日第07版
100 寇红.专家视点：“十二五”时期税制改革改什么？.中国税务报,2010年10月20日第008版
101 岳树民.中国税制.北京：北京大学出版社,2010
102 中共中央十六届三中全会通过的《完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》提出以下税制改革指导原则：简化税制、扩大税基、降低税率、加强征管。
103 清末,王韬曾以英国财政为具体事例揭示资产阶级财税制度的优越性：“其所抽虽若繁琐,而每岁量出
106 陈斌.中国烟草行业税收政策研究：[硕士学位论文].上海：复旦大学,2011
107 Ruffle B J. Tax and Subsidy Incidence Equivalence Theories:Experimental Evidence from Competitive Markets. Journal of Public Economics,2005
108 Ruffle B J. Tax and Subsidy Incidence Equivalence Theories:Experimental Evidence from Competitive Markets. Journal of Public Economics,2005
109 Salanie B. The economics of taxation.London:The MIT press,2002.2-4
110 Salanie B. The economics of taxation. London:The MIT press,2002.2-4
111 Salanie B. The economics of taxation. London:The MIT press,2002.2-4
112 黄天华.中国税收制度史.上海：华东师大出版社,2007
113 黄天华.中国税收制度史.上海：华东师大出版社,2007
114 黄天华.中国税收制度史.上海：华东师大出版社,2007
115 黄天华.中国税收制度史.上海：华东师大出版社,2007
116 黄天华.中国税收制度史.上海：华东师大出版社,2007
7 王文静.有效税制视角：对税收“纠偏性”的再认识.现代财经,2011(11)：53-61
8 傅道鹏.有效税制理论与我国税制改革.财政研究,1999(5)：26-28
119 Goldin J, Homonoff T. Smoke Gets in Your Eyes:Cigarette Tax Salience and Regressivity. Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper NO.561,December 2010
120 Riedl A. Behavioral and Experimental Economics Can Inform Public Policy:Some Thoughts. CESIFO Working Paper NO.2902, December 2009
121 Kind H J.Koethenbuerger M, Schjelderup G. Taxation in two-sided markets. CESIFO Working Paper. NO. 1871,December 2006
122 阿兰·J·奥尔巴克,马丁·费尔德斯坦主编.公共经济学手册(第1卷).匡小平,黄毅译.郭庆旺校译.北京：经济科学出版社,2005.60-62
123 Jones R W. The structure of simple general equilibrium models. Journal of Political Economy,1965,73: 557-572
124 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002.1794-1797
125 Auerbach A J. Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002.1798-1799
126 Auerbach A J & Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002.1800-1812
127 Auerbach A J,Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002.1807-1808
128 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002.1810-1811
129 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002.1823-1824
130 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002.1823
131 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002.1824-1826
132 Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002.1828
133 Dixit A K, Stiglitz J E. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity. American Economic Review,1977,67:297-308
134 Kaplow L.The theory of taxation and public economics. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2008.53-57
135 Kaplow L.The theory of taxation and public economics. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2008.58-63
136 Kaplow L.The theory of taxation and public economics. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2008.54
137 Kaplow L. The theory of taxation and public economics.Princeton:Princeton University Press,2008.67
138 Kaplow L. The theory of taxation and public economics. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2008.66-68
139 Kaplow L. The theory of taxation and public economics. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2008.66-68
140 Raj Chetty, Adam Looney,Kory Kroft. Salience and taxation:theory and evidence. The American Economic Review,2009,99:1145-1177
141 Raj Chetty. Adam Looney, Kory Kroft. Salience and taxation:theory and evidence. The American Economic Review,2009,99:1145-1177
142 Raj Chetty,Adam Looney, Kory Kroft. Salience and taxation:theory and evidence. The American Economic Review,2009,99:1145-1177
143 Kahneman D. Tversky A. Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. Econometrica,1979,47: 363-391
144 Morwitz V G, Greenleaf E A, Johnson E J. Divide and Prosper:Consumers'Reactions to Partitioned Prices. Journal of Marketing Research,1998,35:453-463
145 Krishna A, Slemrod J. Behavioral public finance:tax design as price presentation. International Tax and Public Finance,2003,10:189-203
146 Krishna A, Slemrod J. Behavioral public finance:tax design as price presentation. International Tax and Public Finance,2003,10:189-203
147 Krishna A, Slemrod J. Behavioral public finance:tax design as price presentation. International Tax and Public Finance,2003,10:189-203
148 Gourville J T. Pennies-a-Day; The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction Evaluation. Journal of Consumer Research,1998,24:395-408
149 Thaler R H. Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. Marketing Science,1985,4:199-214
150 Gourville J T. Pennies-a-Day:The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction Evaluation. Journal of Consumer Research,1998,24:395-408
151 Hotz W J, Scholz J K. The Earned Income Tax Credit. NBER Working paper, No.8078, January 2001
152 Hotz W J, Scholz J K. The Earned Income Tax Credit. NBER Working paper, No.8078, January 2001
153 Gourville J T. Pennies-a-Day:The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction Evaluation. Journal of Consumer Research,1998,24:395-408
154 Krishna A, Johar G V. Consumer Perception of Deals:Biasing Effects of Varying Deal Prices. Journal of Experimental Psychology Applied,1996,2(3):187-206
155 Morwitz V G, Greenleaf E A & Johnson E J. Divide and Prosper:Consumers'Reactions to Partitioned Prices. Journal of Marketing Research,1998,35:453-463 156 Krishna A, Slemrod J. Behavioral public finance:tax design as price presentation. International Tax and Public Finance,2003,10:189-203
157 Mela C F, Gupta S, Lehmann D R. The Long-Term impact of Advertising and Promotion on Consumer Brand Choice. Journal of Marketing Research,1997,34:248-261
158 Krishna A, Briesch R, Lehmann D, Yuan H. A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Price Presentation on Deal Evaluation. Journal of Retailing,2002,78 (2):101-118
159 Darke P R, Freedman J L. Deciding Whether to Seek a Bargain:Effects of both Amount and Percentage Off. Journal of Applied Psychology,1993,78 (6):960-965
160 Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. Econometrica,1979,47: 363-391
161 Hite P A, Roberts M. An Experimental Evaluation of Taxpayer Judgments on Rate Structure in the Individual Income Tax System. Journal of the American Taxation Association,1991,13:47-63
162 罗良文,阚大学.公共经济学的新贡献——2009年度克拉克奖获得者伊曼纽尔·塞斯的学术贡献.上海经济研究,2009(7)：105-111
163 Saze E, Chetty R. Teaching the Tax Code:Earnings Responses to an Experiment with EITC Recipients. NBER Working Paper, No.14836,2009
164 Tyran J R, Sausgruber R. On fiscal illusion. September 2000,下载自谷歌学术
165 伯纳德·萨拉尼著.税收经济学.陈新平,王瑞泽,陈宝明,周宗华译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005.173-174
166 Brennan G & Buchanan. Towards a tax constitution for Leviathan. Journal of public economics,1977,8: 255-273
167 Borys Grochulski. Distortionary Taxation for Efficient Redistribution. Economic Quarterly,2009,95:235-267
168 Benoit S Y Crutzen, Nicolas Sahuguet. Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation. Journal of Economic Theory,2009,144(1):264-279
169 Ramon J. Torregrosa. Macroeconomic effects of an indirect tax substitution. Journal of Economics.2008, 94:199-221
170 Philipp J. H. Schroder. Allan S(?)rensen. Ad valorem versus unit taxes:monopolistic competition. heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations. Journal of Economics.2010.101:247-265
171 Louis Kaplow. Steven Shavell. On the superiority of corrective taxes to quantity regulation. American Law and Economics Review.2002.4:17
172 Wojciech Kopczuk. A note on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities. Economics Letters,2003, 80:81-86
173 这里个人所得税的税收楔子指的是,企业雇佣劳动者的成本与劳动者实际所得工资之间的差额比率。
174 Benjamin Schoefer. Regulation and taxation:A complementarity.Journal of Comparative Economics,2010. 38:381-394
175 Benjamin Schoefer. Regulation and taxation:A complementarity.Journal of Comparative Economics,2010, 38:381-394
176 Benjamin Schoefer. Regulation and taxation:A complementarity.Journal of Comparative Economics,2010, 38:381-394
185 马恩涛.国外税收竞争理论的最新发展：一个文献综述.山东经济,2011(4)：106-111
186 彼得·A.戴蒙德著.税收、不完全市场和社会保障.王丹枫译.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2011
187 彼得·A.戴蒙德著.税收、不完全市场和社会保障.王丹枫译.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2011
188 彼得·A.戴蒙德著.税收、不完全市场和社会保障.王丹枫译.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2011
189 Stigler G J. The tenable range of functions of local government. In U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Ed.), Federal expenditure policy for economic growth and stability,1957,213-219. Washington D.C.
190 Feld LP. Tax competition and income redistribution:An empirical analysis for Switzerland. Public Choice, 2000,105,125-164
191 Pauly M V. Income redistribution as a local public good. Journal of Public Economics,1973,2:35-58
192 Wildasin D E. Income redistribution in a common labor market. American Economic Review,1991,81: 757-774
193 伯纳德·萨拉尼著.税收经济学.陈新平,王瑞泽,陈宝明,周宗华译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005.173-174
194 刘丽.个人所得税制累进性与社会收入分配.上海：立信会计出版社,2011.4-12
195 哈耶克.自由秩序原理.中文第一版.上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店,1997
196 金子宏.日本税法原理.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1988
197 刘丽.个人所得税制累进性与社会收入分配.上海：立信会计出版社,2011
198 Musgrave R A, Thin T. Income tax progress,1929-1948. Journal of political economy,1948,56:498- 514
199 http://www.bjnews.com.cn/opinion/2013/03/10/252083.html
200 邓子基.应该修改和完善中国的消费税制.经济研究,1997(2)：52-55
201 龚辉文.消费税征收范围的国际比较与启示.涉外税务,2010(5)：22-25
202 邓子基.应该修改和完善中国的消费税制.经济研究,1997(2)：52-55
203 邢丽.关于消费税几个热点问题的探讨.中国财经信息资料,2011(26)：24-26
204 William F. Shughat Ⅱ. Taxing choice:the predatory politics of fiscal discrimination. Oakland:The Independent Institute,1997
205 William F. Shughat Ⅱ. Taxing choice:the predatory politics of fiscal discrimination. Oakland:The Independent Institute,1997
206 Helene Ehrhart. Elections and the structure of taxation in developing countries. Public Choice,2011,11
207 Helene Ehrhart. Elections and the structure of taxation in developing countries. Public Choice,2011,11
208 Alesina A. Roubini N. Political cycles in OECD economies. Review of Economic Studies,1992,59:663-688
209 Grier K. US presidential elections and real GDP growth,1961-2004. Public Choice,2008,135:337-352
210 Rogoff K. Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review,1990,80(1):21-36
211 Drazen A., Eslava M. Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending:theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics.2010,92 (1):39-52
212 Baunsgaard T., Keen M. Tax revenue and (or?) trade liberalization. Journal of Public Economics,2010, 94:563-577
213 Dreher A. Schneider F. Corruption and the shadow economy:an empirical analysis. Public Choice,2010, 144 (1-2):215-238
214 Bird R., Zolt E..Redistribution via taxation:the limited role of the personal income tax in developing countries. UCLA Law Review,2005,52 (6):1627-1696
Drazen A., Eslava M. Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending:theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics.2010,92 (1):39-52
218 傅道鹏.有效税制理论与我国税制改革.财政研究,1999(5)：26-28
221 刘生旺.论OECD国家税收改革成效及其政策有效性.现代财经,2010(5)：31-36
[1]阿兰小奥尔巴克,马丁·费尔德斯坦主编.公共经济学手册(第1卷).匡小平,黄毅译.郭庆旺校译.北京：经济科学出版社,2005.60-62
[2]阿马蒂亚·森.以自由看待发展.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002
[3]阿特金森,斯蒂格利茨著.公共经济学.蔡江南、许斌、邹华明译.上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994
[4]爱伦·鲁宾.公共预算中的政治：收入与支出,借贷与平衡(第四版).北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001
[5]奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑.上海：上海三联书店,1995
[6]彼得·M·杰克逊.公共经济部门经济学前沿.北京：中国税务出版社,2000
[7]彼得·A.戴蒙德著.税收、不完全市场和社会保障.王丹枫译.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2011
[8]伯纳德·萨拉尼著.税收经济学.陈新平,王瑞泽,陈宝明,周宗华译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005.173-174
[9]布坎南.民主过程中的财政.上海：上海三联书店,1992
[10]布坎南.宪政经济学.北京：中国社会科学出版社,2004
[11]陈斌.中国烟草行业税收政策研究：[硕士学位论文],上海：复旦大学,2011
[12]陈烨等.增值税转型对就业负面影响的CGE模拟分析.经济研究,2010(9)：29-42
[13]程贵孙,陈宏民,孙武军.双边市场视角下的平台企业行为的研究.经济理论与经济管理,2006(9)：55-65
[14]丹尼斯C·缪勒.公共选择理论.北京：中国社会科学出版,1999
[15]邓子基.应该修改和完善中国的消费税制.经济研究,1997(2)：52-55
[16]傅道鹏.有效税制理论与我国税制改革.财政研究,1999(5)：26-28
[17]高培勇.从“放权让利”到“公共财政”：中国税制改革30年.广东商学院学报,2008(5)：14-18
[18]高松等.烟草需求、烟草税及其在中国的影响：基于烟草成瘾模型的经验研究.世界经济,2010(10)：98-119
[19]龚辉文.消费税征收范围的国际比较与启示.涉外税务,2010(5)：22-25
[20]哈维·罗森.财政学.北京：中国人民大学出版社.2000
[21]哈耶克.自由秩序原理.中文第一版.上海：生活·读书·新知三联书店,1997
[22]郝春虹.多元目标约束下的中国税制优化研究——理论与实证.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2005
[23]何茵,沈明高.政府收入、税收结构与中国经济增长.金融研究.2009(9)：14-25
[24]黄天华.中国税收制度史.上海：华东师大出版社,2007
[25]纪汉霖.双边市场定价方式的模型研究.产业经济研究,2006(4)：11-20
[26]贾康,程瑜.论“十二五”时期的税制改革——兼谈对结构性减税与结构性增税的认 识.税务研究,2011(1)：3-8
[27]金戈.经济增长中的最优税收与公共支出结构.经济研究,2010(11)：35-47
[28]金子宏.日本税法原理.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1988
[29]李绍荣,耿莹.中国的税收结构、经济增长与收入分配.经济研究,2005(5)：118-126
[30]李思.“十二五”时期我国税制改革原则思辨,税务研究,2010(10)：37-42
[31]李涛,黄纯纯,周业安.税收、税收竞争与中国经济增长.世界经济,2011(4)：23-41
[32]刘宝如.中国转型期税收与经济增长问题研究：[博士学位论文].大连：东北财经大学,2010
[33]刘丽.个人所得税制累进性与社会收入分配.上海：立信会计出版社,2011
[34]刘生旺.论OECD国家税收改革成效及其政策有效性.现代财经,2010(5)：31-36
[35]罗良文,阚大学.公共经济学的新贡献——2009年度克拉克奖获得者伊曼纽尔·塞斯的学术贡献.上海经济研究,2009(7)：105-111
[36]马恩涛.国外税收竞争理论的最新发展：一个文献综述.山东经济,2011(4)：106-111
[37]马海涛,肖鹏.中国税制改革30年回顾与展望.税务研究.2008(7)：27-30
[38]孟德斯鸠.论法的精神.北京：商务印书馆,1982
[39]聂海峰,岳希明.间接税归宿对城乡居民收入分配影响研究.经济学(季刊),2012(10)：287-312
[40]欧阳华生等.我国税制超额负担定量研究——基于CGE模型框架的分析.财贸经济,2010(1)：63-67
[41]平新乔等.增值税与营业税的福利效应研究.经济研究,2009(9)：66-80
[42]曲振涛,周正,周方召.网络外部性下的电子商务平台竞争与规制——基于双边市场理论的研究.中国工业经济,2010(4)：120-129
[43]饶呈祥.基于可计算一般均衡模型的我国成品油税费改革经济效应研究：[博士学位论文].西安：西安交通大学,2009
[44]尚秀芬,陈宏民.双边市场特征的企业竞争策略与规制研究综述.产业经济研究,2009(4)：89-94
[45]斯蒂格利茨著.政府为什么干预经济——政府在市场经济中的角色.郑秉文译.北京：中国物资出版社,1998
[46]宋春平.中国企业所得税总税负归宿的一般均衡分析.数量经济技术经济研究,2011(2)：89-98
[47]汤玉刚,苑程浩.不完全税权、政府竞争与税收增长.经济学(季刊),2010(10)：33-50
[48]万莹.个人所得税对收入分配的影响：由税收累进性和平均税率观察.改革,2011(3)：53-60
[49]王宏涛,陆伟刚.基于双边市场理论的互联网定价模式与反垄断问题研究.华东经济管理,2012(6)：69-74
[50]王文静.有效税制视角：对税收“纠偏性”的再认识.现代财经,2011(11)：53-61
[51]王文静.双边市场的特殊性及政府反垄断规制研究.现代管理科学,2013(2)：57-59
[52]王智波.房产税资本化的归宿——兼论上海房产税试点“新老划断”的理论依据.改革,2011(3)：154-157
[53]先福军.新疆油气资源税改革效应分析.税务研究,2010(12)：26-30
[54]萧艳汾.增值税税负转嫁的代数模型研究.税务研究,2008(2)：83-85
[55]肖俊极,孙洁.消费税和燃油税的有效性比较分析.经济学(季刊),2012(7)：1345-1364
[56]邢丽.关于消费税几个热点问题的探讨.中国财经信息资料,2011(26)：24-26
[57]熊艳.产业组织的双边市场理论—一个文献综述.中南财经政法大学学报,2010(4)：49-55
[58]徐利.中国税收可计算一般均衡模型研究——兼论增值税转型改革对中国经济的影响.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2010
[59]徐晓亮.资源税改革中的税率选择：一个资源CGE模型的分析.上海财经大学学报,2011(2)：82-89
[60]严成樑,龚六堂.税收政策对经济增长影响的定量评价.世界经济,2012(4)：41-61
[61]严成樑,龚六堂.我国税收的经济增长效应与社会福利损失分析.经济科学,2010(2)：69-79
[62]杨冬梅.双边市场：企业竞争策略性行为的新视角.管理评论,2006(9)：40-49
[63]杨虹.中国税制,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2010
[64]岳树民,刘方.新形势下的结构性减税与税制改革,税务研究.2011(1)：28-32
[65]岳树民.中国税制.北京：北京大学出版社,2010
[66]岳中刚.双边市场的定价策略及反垄断问题研究.财经问题研究,2006(8)：30-35
[67]詹姆斯·M·布坎南.民主过程中的财政.上海：上海三联书店,1992
[68]张阳.中国税负归宿的一般均衡分析与动态研究.北京：中国税务出版社,2007：4-5
[69]Alesina A. Roubini N. Political cycles in OECD economies. Review of Economic Studies, 1992,59:663-688
[70]Auerbach A J,Feldstein M. Handbook of public economics. Amsterdam:Elsevier,1987
[71]Auerbach A J, Feldstein M. Handbook of Public Economics. Volume 4. Amsterdam:Elsevier Science B. V.,2002
[72]Baunsgaard T., Keen M. Tax revenue and (or?) trade liberalization. Journal of Public Economics,2010,94:563-577
[73]Benjamin Schoefer. Regulation and taxation:A complementarity. Journal of Comparative Economics,2010,38:381-394
[74]Benoit S Y Crutzen, Nicolas Sahuguet. Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation. Journal of Economic Theory,2009.144 (1):264-279
[75]Berthold U. Wigger. Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Black Markets. Journal Economics,2002,75:239-254
[76]Besley T. J., H. S. Rosen. Sales taxes and prices:an empirical analysis. National Tax Journal,1999,52:157-178
[77]Bird R., Zolt E.. Redistribution via taxation:the limited role of the personal income tax in developing countries. UCLA Law Review,2005,52 (6):1627-1696
[78]Bo Sandermann Rasmussen. Efficiency Wages and the Long-Run Incidence of Progressive Taxation. Journal of Economics,2002,76 (2):155-175
[79]Borck R et al. Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets. Southern Economic Journal,2002,68 (3),672-682
[80]Borys Grochulski. Distortionary Taxation for Efficient Redistribution. Economic Quarterly, 2009,95:235-267
[81]Bradley J. Ruffle. Tax and Subsidy Incidence Equivalence Theories:Experimental Evidence from Competitive Markets. Journal of Public Economics,2005
[82]Brennan G & Buchanan. Towards a tax constitution for Leviathan. Journal of public economics,1977,8:255-273
[83]Browning E K, Johnson W R. The Distribution of the Tax Burden. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute,1979
[84]Browning E K. Pechman's tax incidence study:a note on the data. American Economic Review,1986,76:1214-1218
[85]Carroll R., J.Yinger.Is the property tax a benefit tax? The case of rental housing. National Tax Journal,1994,47:295-316
[86]Carolyn Webber, Arron Wildavasky. A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World. Simon & Schuster,1986
[87]Darke P R, Freedman J L. Deciding Whether to Seek a Bargain:Effects of both Amount and Percentage Off. Journal of Applied Psychology,1993,78 (6):960-965
[88]David S. Evans. The Antitrust Economics of Multi-sided Markets. Yale Journal on Regulation,2003,20:325-381
[89]Davies J B, Hilaire F S, Whalley J. Some calculations of lifetime tax incidence. American Economic Review,1984,74:633-649
[90]Dieter Bos. Income Taxation, Public Sector Pricing and Redistribution. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics,1984,86 (2):166-183
[91]Dixit A K, Stiglitz J E. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity. American Economic Review,1977,67:297-308
[92]Drazen A., Eslava M. Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending:theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics.2010,92 (1):39-52
[93]Dreher A. Schneider F. Corruption and the shadow economy:an empirical analysis. Public Choice,2010,144 (1-2):215-238
[94]E. G. Weyl. A price theory of multi-sided platforms. American Economic Review.2010, 100:1642-1672
[95]Feld L P. Tax competition and income redistribution:An empirical analysis for Switzerland. Public Choice,2000,105,125-164
[96]Fuchs V. R., A. B. Krueger, J. M. Poterba. Economists' views about parameters, values, and policies:survey results in labor and public economics. Journal of Economic Literature 1998,36:1387-1425
[97]Goldin J, Homonoff T. Smoke Gets in Your Eyes:Cigarette Tax Salience and Regressivity. Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper NO.561, December 2010
[98]Gourville J T. Pennies-a-Day:The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction Evaluation. Journal of Consumer Research,1998,24:395-408
[99]Grier K. US presidential elections and real GDP growth,1961-2004. Public Choice,2008, 135:337-352
[100]Hans Wijkander. Equity and Efficiency in Public Sector Pricing:A Case for Stochastic Rationing. Econometrica,1988,56 (6):1455-1465
[101]Helene Ehrhart. Elections and the structure of taxation in developing countries. Public Choice,2011,11
[102]Hiroaki Ino, Toshihiro Matsumura. What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets?. Journal of Economics,2010,101:213-230
[103]Hite P A, Roberts M. An Experimental Evaluation of Taxpayer Judgments on Rate Structure in the Individual Income Tax System. Journal of the American Taxation Association,1991,13: 47-63
[104]Hotz W J, Scholz J K. The Earned Income Tax Credit. NBER Working paper, No.8078, January 2001
[105]J. Wright. One-sided Logic in Two-sided Markets. Review of Network Economics,2004, 3 (1):44-64
[106]James M. Buchanan. A Public Choice Approach to Public Utility Pricing. Public Choice, 1968,5:1-17
[107]Jane G. Gravelle, Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Corporate tax incidence and inefficiency when corporate and noncorporate goods are close substitutes. Economic Inquiry,1993,10:501-516
[108]Jonathan Haughton, Nguyen The Quan and Nguyen Hoang Bao. Tax Incidence in Vietnam. Asian Economic Journal,2006,20 (2):217-239
[109]Jones L E, Manuelli R, Rossi P E. On the Optimal Taxation of Capital Income. Journal of Economic Theory,1993,11:88-113
[110]Jones R W. The structure of simple general equilibrium models. Journal of Political Economy,1965,73:557-572
[111]J(?)rgen Juel Andersen. Costs of taxation and the size of government. Public Choice,2011, 3
[112]Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel, Jane G. Gravelle. The encyclopedia of taxation & tax policy, Second edition. Washington D. C.:The urban institute press,2005. xiii-xv
[113]Judd K L L. Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model. Journal of Public economics,1985,10:54-90
[114]Kachelmeier S J, Limberg S T, Schadewald M S. Experimental evidence of market reactions to new consumption taxes. Contemporary Accounting Research,1994,10:505-45
[115]Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. Econometrica,1979,47:363-391
[116]Kaplow L. The theory of taxation and public economics. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2008.53-68
[117]Kerschbamer R & Kirchsteiger G. Theoretically Robust but Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence. Economic Theory,2000,16(3),719-734
[118]Keshab Bhattarai, John Whalley. The role of labour demand elasticities in tax incidence analysis with heterogeneous labour. Empirical Economics,1999,24:599-619
[119]Kind H J, Koethenbuerger M, Schjelderup G. Taxation in two-sided markets. CESIFO Working Paper. NO.1871, December 2006
[120]Krishna A, Johar G V. Consumer Perception of Deals:Biasing Effects of Varying Deal Prices. Journal of Experimental Psychology Applied,1996,2(3):187-206
[121]Krishna A, Slemrod J. Behavioral public finance:tax design as price presentation. International Tax and Public Finance,2003,10:189-203
[122]Krishna A, Briesch R, Lehmann D & Yuan H. A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Price Presentation on Deal Evaluation. Journal of Retailing,2002,78 (2):101-118
[123]Leslie J. Reinhorn. Optimal taxation with monopolistic competition. Int Tax Public Finance,2011,6
[124]Lin H. C., Russo B. A Taxation Policy Toward Capital, Technology and Long-run Growth. Journal of Macroeconomics,1999,21:463-491
[125]Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell. On the superiority of corrective taxes to quantity regulation.American Law and Economics Review,2002,4:1-17
[126]Lyon A B, Schwab R M. Consumption taxes in a life-cycle framework:are sin taxes regressive?. Review of Economics and Statistics,1995,77:389-406
[127]Magnus Jonsson, Paul Klein. Taxdistortions in Sweden and the United States. European Economic Review,2003,47:711-729
[128]Magnus Jonsson.The welfare cost of imperfect competition and distortionary taxation. Review of Economic Dynamics,2007,10:576-594
[129]Maria Cornachione Kula, Daniel L. Millimet. Income Inequality, Taxation, and Growth, International Atlantic Economic Society, At Econ J,2010,38:417-428
[130]Mark Armstrong. Competition in Two-sided Markets. RAND Journal of Economics,2006, 37 (3):668-691
[131]Mela C F, Gupta S & Lehmann D R. The Long-Term Impact of Advertising and Promotion on Consumer Brand Choice. Journal of Marketing Research,1997,34:248-261
[132]Morwitz V G, Greenleaf E A & Johnson E J. Divide and Prosper:Consumers'Reactions to Partitioned Prices. Journal of Marketing Research,1998,35:453-463
[133]Musgrave R A, Thin T. Income tax progress,1929-1948. Journal of political economy, 1948,56:498-514
[134]Musgrave R A, Case K E, Leonard H. The distribution of fiscal burdens and benefits. Public Finance Quarterly,1974,2:259-311
[135]Musgrave R. The theory of public finance. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
[136]Pauly M V. Income redistribution as a local public good. Journal of Public Economics, 1973,2:35-58
[137]Partha Dasgupta. Public Sector Pricing Rules. Economic and Political Weekly,1971,6: 381-386
[138]Pechman J A, Okner B A. Who Bears the Tax Burden?. Washington DC:Brookings Institution Press,1974
[139]Pechman J A. Pechman's tax incidence study:a response. American Economic Review, 1987,77:232-234
[140]Pechman J A. Who Paid the Taxes:1966-85?. Washington DC:Brookings Institution Press, 1985
[141]Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees. Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production Efficiency. The American Economic Review,1971,61 (1):8-27
[142]Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees. Optimal Taxation and Public Production II:Tax Rules. The American Economic Review,1971,61 (3):261-278
[143]Philipp Doerrenberg,Andreas Peichl. Progressive taxation and tax morale. Public Choice, 2011,8
[144]Philipp J. H. Schroder, Allan S(?)rensen. Ad valorem versus unit taxes:monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations. Journal of Economics,2010, 101:247-265
[145]Poterba J. Lifetime incidence and the distributional burden of excise taxes. American Economic Review,1989,79:325-330
[146]Poterba J. Retail price reactions to changes in state and local sales taxes. National Tax Journal,1996,49:165-176
[147]Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, Kory Kroft. Salience and taxation:theory and evidence. The American Economic Review,2009,99:1145-1177
[148]Ramon J. Torregrosa. Macroeconomic effects of an indirect tax substitution. Journal of Economics,2008,94:199-221
[149]Ramsay F.. A Contribution To The Theory Of Taxation. Economic Journal,1927,37: 47-61
[150]Riedl A, Tyran J R. Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets. August 2003
[151]Riedl A. Behavioral and Experimental Economics Can Inform Public Policy:Some Thoughts. CESIFO Working Paper NO.2902, December 2009
[152]Rochet J. C.. J. Tirole. Platform Competition in Two-sided Market. Journal of European Economic Association,2003,1 (4):990-1029
[153]Rogoff K. Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review,1990,80 (1):21-36
[154]Ruffle B J. Tax and Subsidy Incidence Equivalence Theories:Experimental Evidence from Competitive Markets. Journal of Public Economics,2005
[155]Salanie B. The economics of taxation. London:The MIT press,2002.2-4
[156]Saze E, Chetty R. Teaching the Tax Code:Earnings Responses to an Experiment with EITC Recipients. NBER Working Paper, No.14836,2009
[157]Slemrod J B. Taxation and inequality:a time-exposure perspective. Tax Policy and the Economy,1992,6:105-127
[158]Stigler G J. The tenable range of functions of local government. In U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Ed.), Federal expenditure policy for economic growth and stability,1957, 213-219. Washington D. C.
[159]Susanne Droge, Philipp J. H. Schroder. The welfare comparison of corrective ad valorem and unit taxes under monopolistic competition. Int Tax Public Finance,2009,16:163-175
[160]Tetsugen Haruyama, Jun-ichi Itaya. Do Distortionary Taxes Always Harm Growth?. Journal of economics,2006,87 (2):99-126
[161]Thaler R H. Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. Marketing Science,1985,4:199-214
[162]Thomas M. Selden, Didem M. Bernard. Tax Incidence and Net Benefits in the Market for Employment-Related Health Insurance:Sensitivity of Estimates to the Incidence of Employer Costs. International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics,2004,4 (2):167-192
[163]Wildasin D E. Income redistribution in a common labor market. American Economic Review,1991,81:757-774
[164]William F. Shughat Ⅱ. Taxing choice:the predatory politics of fiscal discrimination. Oakland:The Independent Institute,1997
[165]Wittman Donald. Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results. Journal of Political Economy,1989,10:1395-1424
[166]Wojciech Kopczuk. A note on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities. Economics Letters,2003,80:81-86