摘要
银行业在一国经济中处于基础性地位,其经营绩效关系整个国家宏观经济的健康发展。在中国,银行业占据了90%以上的金融资产,满足了各类企业80%以上的融资需求,银行业还承担了大部分的改革成本,其改革发展是中国经济体制改革中最为重要的部分。然而,根据WTO对我国金融市场开放的要求,同时我国利率形成机制也逐步市场化,作为我国金融业和经济核心的银行业,正面临着日益激烈和严酷的竞争,这种竞争的实质是现代银行制度的竞争。银行公司治理机制是现代银行制度的核心,其优劣程度直接决定了银行的竞争力。良好的公司治理结构是商业银行获得持续竞争力的根本,伴随着金融体制改革尤其是银行改革的不断深入,治理结构的优化已成为提升银行竞争力的必由之路。基于此,本文对上市银行治理结构和经营绩效之间的关系进行了规范研究和实证研究,这对于全面认识我国上市银行的公司治理情况,完善上市银行的治理结构,提升我国银行的竞争力具有重要的理论和实践意义。
目前在银行公司治理领域,相关研究很多,但是国内学术界的研究更多的是理论推演,基于数据的实证分析较少。本人认为可能是因为我国商业银行数据披露不够充分。近年来国内商业银行陆续上市,银行信息披露越来越充分,这就为实证研究提供了可能。另外在理论研究方面,国内学者对银行经营绩效的衡量大多还是采用单一的财务指标,然而绩效是一个综合体现,本人认为仅用财务指标是不全面的。本文从体现银行的盈利性、流动性和安全性出发运用主成分分析得出了银行的综合绩效。结合公司治理理论和国内外学者的研究成果从股权结构、董事会、监事会和高管激励四个方面提出理论假设,建立多元回归模型对研究假设进行检验,结果发现：股权集中度、董事会规模和监事会规模与经营绩效之间存在U型关系；股权制衡度、高管激励与经营绩效正相关；董事会会议次数与经营绩效负相关；监事会会议次数、独立董事比例与经营绩效之间的关系不明确。
本文的创新在于运用面板数据,在较长的时间内对已上市的银行的相关数据进行了收集整理,并且用主成分分析法构建了银行综合绩效指标,比较全面的反应了银行的综合经营能力。本研究尚存的问题是没有考虑上市银行治理的外部环境,有关独立董事比例以及监事会会议次数与绩效之间的关系都没有得出确切结论,在今后的学习和工作中还要进一步研究思考这一问题。
The banking industry whose performance will influence the healthy development of the macroeconomic has a foundational position in a country's economy. It accounted for more than 90% of the financial assets, and met for more than 80% of the financing need of all kinds of enterprise, it also assumed most of the cost of the reform, its development is the most important part of the Chinese economic reform. However, according to the requirements of financial industry openness by WTO, meanwhile, Chinese interest formation mechanism is gradually becoming market-oriented. Under this condition, banks, as the core of financial industry and Chinese economy, are facing more and more furious and fierce competition, whose essential is the competition of modern banking system. Commercial banking corporate governance system is the core of modem banking system, it decides the competitive ability of banks. A favorable corporate governance structure is the foundation for a bank to gain sustained competitiveness. As financial system reform going deeper and deeper, the perfection of governance structure is the only way of promoting competitive ability of banks. Based on these, this paper analyzes the relationship between the corporate governance structure and their performance of listed banks in China by normative and empirical study. This is of great theory and practice importance to know the corporate governance situation and improve the corporate governance structure of commercial banks in China.
At present there had a lot of related research on the field of corporate governance of the banks, but many of them were based on the theory deduction. In my opinion the reason of the problem is that the commercial banks in China exposed limited data. With the commercial banks were listed one after another, the banks exposed more and more data, which provided the possibility for the empirical study. In the field of theory research, most Chinese scholar prefer the financial indicator to measure the performance, however, the performance is a comprehensive expression. This paper considered the profitability, liquidity and safety of the banks comprehensively, obtained the comprehensive performance by the method of the principal component analysis. Based on the theory of the corporate governance and the research of scholars it proposed several theoretical hypotheses on the aspects of ownership structure, the director board and supervisors board, top managers encouragement, and verified these hypotheses by establish multiple linear regression model. The empirical study indicated that:there is a "U" relation between ownership concentration, scale of director board, scale of supervisors board and the performance; and there is a positive relation between ownership restriction, the encouragement of top management and the performance; there is a negative relation between the frequency of board of directors' conference and performance; in addition, the relation between the independence of board of directors, frequency of board of supervisor's conference and performance is not clear. The innovation of this paper lying in collecting the relevant data of 14 listed banks in a long period by the method of panel data, considered the profitability, liquidity and safety of the banks comprehensively, obtained the comprehensive performance by the method of the principal component analysis, which reflected the comprehensive viability of the banks. Then, the remaining problems in this paper is that not considering the external environment of the listed banks, and the relation between the independence of board of directors, frequency of board of supervisor's conference and performance is not clear. We should study this issue in the future.
引文
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①杨琼,宋谨,国有商业银行中委托代理关系的研究分析[J],当代经济,2006(9),65-66页.
②吴敬琏,建立有效的公司治理结构[J].天津社会科学,1996(5),23-26页.
③王斌,股权结构论[M],中国财政经济出版社,2001,23-34页.
①孙敬水，独立董事制度-公司治理的创新与革命[M],安徽大学出版社,2003,26页.
① Berle, Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan[M], Near York.1932. page 4.
② MC Jensen, WH Meckling, Theory of Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976, page 305.
①Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, "Large shareholders and corporate control" [J], Journal of political Economy,1986(84), page 461-488.
①Agrawal, Mandelker, Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers:The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments[J], The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1990(25), page 143-161.
①Joseph P. H. Fan, T. J. Wong, Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia[J], Journal of Accounting and Economics,33(3),2005, page 401-425.
Giuliano lannotta, Giacomo Nocera, Ownership structure, risk and performance in the European banking industry[J], Journal of Banking and Finance,31 (7),2007, page 2127-2149.
Jacelly Cespedes, Maximiliano Gonzalez, Ownership and capital structure in Latin America[J], Journal of Business Research,63(3),2010, page 248-254.
④贺家铁,陈春晖,上市公司股权结构、高管层激励组合与公司绩效的实证研究[J],湖南大学学报,2005(11),55-59页.
⑤王丽,章锦涛,股权结构与中国股份制商业银行绩效的实证研究[J],生产力研究,2005(10),76-78页.
①Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting fights:Financing Policies and the Market for corporate control[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20), page 25-54.
②Yan-Leung Cheung, Ownership concentration, firm performance, and dividend policy in Hong Kong[J], Journal of Empirical Finance,12(4),2005, page 511-532.
①Abeyratna Gunasekarage, The influence of the degree of state ownership and the ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese companies[J], Research in international Business and Finance,2007(21), page 379-395.
②金雪飞,许敏,房地产类上市公司股权结构与经营绩效关系的实证研究[J],经济师,2005(3)，117-119页.
③孙永祥,黄祖辉，上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J],经济研究,1999(23),35-39页.
①李维安,李汉军,股权结构、高管持股与公司绩效——来自民营上市公司的数据[J],南开管理评论,2006(05),4-10页.
②王学工,刘人怀,我国企业集团的股权结构与企业绩效关系研究[J],工业技术经济,2009,28(1),141-144页.
①蔡吉甫,杨智杰,内部人持股与公司治理效率关系研究[J],当代经济管理,2005(8),142-146页.
② Pfeffer J.Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors:the Organization and its Enviroment[J], Administrative Science Quarterly,1972(12), page 218-228
②Mohamed Belkhir.Board of Directors'Size and Performance in the Banking Industry.forthcoming in the International[J], Journal of Managerial Finance,2008, page 1-24.
① Lipton,Lorsch.A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance[J]. Business Lawyer,1992(48), page 59-77.
② Yermack,D.Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1996(40), page 185-211.
③ Pablo de Andres, Corporate Boards in OECD Countries:size, composition, functioning and effectiveness[J], Corporate Governance:An International Review,13(2),2005, Page 197
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