摘要
进入二十世纪以来,现代企业制度的一个最重要的特征就是所有权与控制权的分离。本质上讲,所有权与控制权的分离的同时,伴随着委托代理关系的建立。由于委托人与目标人目标的不同,双方信息的不对称,委托代理关系中固有的存在着逆向选择与道德风险等问题。为了降低委托代理问题给股东利益带来的损害,公司控制权市场逐渐发展起来。通过分析发现,公司控制权市场,在公司治理中占据重要地位,有着重要作用,公司控制权市场是改善公司治理结构的途径之一。管理层利用其控制权使获取比公平谈判下更为有利的薪酬安排,而且导致薪酬安排与业绩的关联度不高,弱化了薪酬的激励作用。管理层往往会使用各种反并购措施的应用以保护管理层的利益不受损害,这很大程度上又削弱了公司控制权市场的作用。并且发现控制权市场交易往往会改变目标公司管理层结构,进而削弱管理层的控制权,改善公司的治理效力。
在控制权市场的框架下,要解决现代企业中存在的问题,除了使用作为外部机制的控制权配置市场以外,还要考虑内部机制的管理层激励制度,对激励机制的设计,可以使得管理层与股东的利益一定程度上相一致。早期对薪酬机制的研究主要涉及到现金和红利对业绩的影响,现在随着股权激励计划被越来越多的公司采纳,股权激励方案对业绩的影响也开始受到关注。
本文通过对国内外现有研究成果进行梳理,在此基础上详细考察企业管理实践中,与其企业长期利益以及控制权市场相关的内部治理机制尤其是各项激励制度,并建立模型,分析企业内部的长期利益的激励机制与控制权市场的兼容性,并通过企业层面的数据进行分析。从而提高控制权市场的有效性,更好的发挥控制权市场对企业管理层业绩的评价作用,提高我国企业的经营效率。
One of the most important characters of the modern enterprise system is the abruption of ownership and mastery. And the abruption always comes with the establishing of mandate relationship. Because of the different goals between the client and target man, the asymmetry information, there are problems exist in procuratorial relationship, such as indirect selecting and moral risk. In order to reduce the lost caused by these problems, market for corporate control must be developed. It plays key role in the management of enterprise. It also helps to improve the structure of company. Managers use their power to have more payment, which has weakened the incentive system. They also take reverse merger to protect their benefits, which has also weakened the function of market for corporate control. Controlling the market dealing can change the structure of managing level, cripple their power, and then ameliorate the power of controlling.
To solve the problems in enterprises, besides using the controlling power allocating market, incentive system for managers also needs to be made use of. The design of incentive system can be fit with the benefits of shareholders and managers. Unlike the old remuneration system which is mainly about the influence of cash and benefits on achievement, the influence of stock-based incentive program has become more and more important.
By studying the results from both domestic and foreign companies, investigating internal management system of corporations, especially the incentive system, enterprises can build model, analyze the compatibility of incentive system and data from the inside of company. All above are to advance the effectiveness of the market for corporate control, create a better evaluation system and raise the business efficiency.
引文
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