摘要
随着全球经济一体化的不断深入和技术的不断进步,企业的新产品生命周期不断缩短,而消费者的期望不断升高,企业面临的竞争也日益激烈,为了有效应对激烈的市场环境,越来越多的企业采用供应链管理的思想来经营企业,市场竞争也由企业之间的竞争逐渐转变为企业所处的供应链之间的竞争。供应链作为一个复杂的系统,其节点企业和设施工厂在地理上布局非常分散,很多情况下可能分布于全球。突发事件一旦发生,轻则减少供应链的利润,重则使供应链完全瘫痪。随着各类突发事件造成供应链中断或崩溃的案例不断涌现,人们对供应链上突发事件的管理日益重视。但是,目前从供应链的角度对突发事件管理进行研究还处于一个起步阶段,研究成果较少,很多工作尚待开展,学术理论界对供应链突发事件管理研究的滞后与供应链实业界面临突发事件越来越严重的挑战构成了一对现实矛盾。因此,从供应链的角度研究突发事件的各种机理和应对策略具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
本文综合运用系统科学、运筹学、管理科学、经济学等学科的理论与方法,从供应链的角度,对突发事件的机理以及突发事件下供应链渠道博弈问题进行了研究。具体来讲,本论文的研究工作主要有如下几个方面：
(1)论文根据系统论的思想对供应链突发事件的概念进行了定义,分析了供应链突发事件的特性,并从突发事件的来源、发展阶段、影响的正负面性、影响范围和是否可防可控等维度对供应链突发事件进行了分类,从产品供应和需求的角度研究了突发事件对供应链的影响和可能产生的后果,并对突发事件下供应链的博弈情形进行了分析,根据突发事件发生的生命周期,给出了突发事件下供应链的应急管理策略。
(2)论文探讨了突发事件造成确定型需求扰动且扰动信息对称时,二级供应链的渠道博弈与协调问题。论文首先给出了常规情形下供应链在各种决策模式下的最优决策结果。其次,研究了突发事件造成需求扰动时集中化决策供应链的最优应对措施。然后,在分散化决策下,研究供应商支配的Stackelberg博弈、零售商支配的Stackelberg博弈和Nash博弈等三种不同的决策模式时,供应链各成员在突发事件下的最优决策,并对所得结果进行了比较分析。最后,论文给出了两种能使突发事件下供应链达到完美协调的契约机制。
(3)论文对突发事件造成确定型需求扰动信息不对称,即零售商拥有全部市场扰动信息,而供应商只能获得部分市场扰动信息时供应链的最优应对问题进行了研究,论文详细分析了供应商对突发事件的三种不同反应：供应商不对突发事件予以反应、供应商接受零售商报告的需求扰动信息、供应商自己估计需求扰动信息时供应链各成员的最优决策。
(4)论文研究了突发事件造成随机型需求扰动下供应链的渠道博弈问题。首先分析了集中化决策下供应链对随机型需求扰动的最优应对策略。然后,论文在随机型需求扰动信息对称的假设下,研究发现常规情形时供应商支配供应链下的协调契约不能使需求扰动后的供应链达到协调,通过重新设计契约,论文给出了能使随机型需求扰动下供应链达到协调的契约机制。最后,当突发事件造成的随机型需求扰动信息不对称时,论文设计了一组能使需求扰动后供应链达到混同均衡的契约组合。
With the constant deepened trend of economic globalization and the continuous progress of technology, the product life cycle is becoming shorter and shorter, the expectation of consumers to products and service is getting higher and higher, therefore, enterprises have to face the day by day intensified competition. In order to cope with such fierce market environment, more and more enterprisers take the ideas of supply chain to run their companies, and the market competition between companies becomes the competition between the supply chains. As a complex system, the layout of the companies and their facilities in the supply chain is scattered everywhere, even globally dispersed. Hence, once emergency comes about, the result will range from the decrease of supply chain benefit to complete paralysis of the supply chain. On the account of the increasing cases that emergencies cause supply chain break down, enterprisers begin to pay more emphasis on the supply chain management. However, currently the research about emergency management from the point of supply chain is still in its infancy, there are less achievements and more undeveloped work, such lagging research leads to the relationship with the need from the enterprises on the supply chain becomes realistic contradiction. Thus, the research of mechanisms and strategies of emergencies from the angle of supply chain must be of theoretical and practical significance.
This paper integrates the theory and methods of systems science, operational research, management science, and economics to conduct research about the emergency mechanisms and game problem of supply chain under emergency, which includes four parts in details as below:
This paper, in terms of system theory, defines the supply chain emergency, analyzes the characteristics of supply chain emergency, and categorizes supply chain emergences by cause, stage, positive or negative effect, range of effect, and whether to be controllable and preventive; it also predicts the possible influence and consequence caused by emergencies from the angle of product supply and demand, analyzes the game situation of supply chain under emergency, presents the emergency management strategies of supply chain under emergency.
This paper discusses the channel game and coordination of two stage supply chain when emergency brings about certain demand disruption and symmetric disruption information. Firstly, the optimal decision of supply chain under all different decision models in the regular situation is given. Secondly, the optimal strategies of centralized decision-making supply chain when emergency brings about demand disruption are come up with. Then, on the basis of decentralized decision-making, this paper probes into the Stackelberg game dominated by suppliers, the Stackelberg game controlled by retailers and Nash game, the optimal strategy of each member on the supply chain and compares and analyzes the results. Finally, it presents two contract mechanisms which could make the supply chain under emergency completely coordinated.
This paper discusses the optimal strategy of supply chain when emergency causes asymmetric certain demand information, that is retailers acquire all of the market information, and suppliers get partly. It analyzes in detail three responses suppliers give to the emergency, namely, no reaction taken by suppliers; accepting the information informed by retailers; estimating the optimal strategies of each member on the supply chain with demand disruption.
This paper researches the channel game of supply chain with random demand disruption caused by emergency. Firstly, it analyzes the optimal strategy to random demand disruption under centralized decision. Then it hypothesizes random demand disruption information is symmetric and finds out that the coordination contract of supply chain dominated by suppliers, in the regular situation, fails to coordinate the supply chain with demand disruption, and by redesigning the contract, a new contract mechanism capable of directing to coordinate the supply chain is derived. Finally, a pooling equilibrium of the supply chain with demand disruption information asymmetry under emergency is gotten by devising the combination of contracts.
引文
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