摘要
随着经济稳步发展,物质极大丰富,市场产品差异化明显,企业往往面向消费者提供多个质量水平具有可替代性的产品。尤其是在我国加入国际贸易组织之后,国外先进企业冲击了国内市场,如汽车、机械、电子行业。无论国内外企业,都需要对固定质量水平的产品质量进行价格合理决策,以赢得最优化的企业利润。对于企业竞争生存,适当的价格制定,是至关重要的。
现有的文献,针对以上关于产品定价的研究,往往是基于参与者是理性人的假设前提。然而,企业的决策者不是完全理性的经济人。在市场竞争中,决策者也会与竞争对手之间产生公平偏好的心理,当本企业的市场利润或市场份额低于一定程度的时候,产生嫉妒的负效用心理,从而做出不完全理性的决定。
本文在纵向差异化产品市场模型的基础上,针对企业决策者的公平偏好不完全理性心理进行定价模型研究。文章首先在第一部分建立了由一个高质量企业和一个低质量企业组成的双寡头市场,得出在完全理性时的最优定价和企业最大利润。第二部分,分别考虑了单个高质量企业和单个低质量企业具有公平偏好的市场模型,在企业的效用函数中,增加了公平感知函数,影响企业的最终决定,分析得出企业的最终定价和当时的效用函数值,并得出公平偏好心理会使本企业降价的结论。第三部分,将市场上的两个企业均设置成具有公平偏好的模型,根据参数讨论分析各个情形下,企业的最优定价。最后,运用MATLAB软件算例分析,绘图描述各模型得到的结论。
With the steady development of the economy, the substance is greatly enriched, and the differentiation in the market product is obvious. A lot of companies tend to offer more than one level of quality substitutable products to consumers. Especially, after China's entry into the World Trade Organization, foreign advanced enterprises had a tremendous impact on the domestic market, such as the automotive industry, the machine industry, and the electronics industry. In order to win the optimization of enterprise profit, both domestic and foreign enterprises need to make reasonable price decisions for the fixed quality level of product. So it is essential to make appropriate price for competitive survival.
For the above research on product pricing, the existing literature is often based on the assumption that the participant is rational. However, the company decision makers are usually not fully rational economic men. In market competition, there may be fairness preference between the rivals. When the enterprise market profits or market share below a certain level, they generate a jealous disutility of psychological and don't make entirely rational decision.
This dissertation based on the model of product vertical differentiation. We study the pricing models with considering company decision makers are fairness preferences, incompletely rational psychology. In the first part of this thesis, we assumed the duopoly market is consisted of a high-quality company and a low-quality company, and figured out optimal pricing and maximum profit under fully rational assumption. Secondly, the market model is considered as one single high-quality or one single low-quality company with fairness preference. In the utility function of the company, a fair perception function is increased to affect the final decision of the company. The final pricings of both company and the utility function are analyzed. It concludes that the fairness preference psychology will enable the company to reduce the price. Thirdly, both companies on the market are set with fairness preference in the model. The optimal pricing is discussed and analyzed according to the parameter of each case. Finally, we use the MATLAB software to analysis example and draw conclusions by describing the models.
引文
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