摘要
目前接近于完全竞争的海南香蕉产业市场结构及其所导致的单个香蕉生产经营者被动的价格接受行为,使海南香蕉产业的市场绩效总体并不高。一方面,海南香蕉产业呈现的小规模分散经营生产,香蕉从生产到销售,均存在参与个体与组织众多,但层次低、规模小、离散型差,组织化程度低。另一方面,香蕉生产经营者获取信息能力弱,对市场信号反应不灵敏,市场价格往往波动剧烈。鲜果出售作为蕉农收入的主要来源,市场价格成为影响农民收入的重要因素。针对目前我国大多数鲜活农产品供大于求的现状,如何在农产品交易市场的讨价还价博弈中提高农户的利益分配额,解决农户增收难问题,成为国内众多学者研究的焦点。
本文正是在这样的背景下关注农产品市场中农户对收购商的讨价还价能力。基于前人的研究,本文将讨价还价能力划分为固有讨价还价能力和实际讨价还价能力,重点从以下三个方面的问题研究给予关注：一是构建理论模型解读农户对收购商的讨价还价能力：二是归纳分析农户的固有讨价还价能力受到哪些关键的环境变量和参与者个人特征变量的影响；三是关注固有讨价还价能力向实际讨价还价能力的转化,识别哪些重要因素起到怎样的调节作用。
通过借鉴国内外相关领域的研究成果,本文提出了农产品市场中农户对收购商的讨价还价能力的理论模型,选取了农户战略导向、生产者个体特征、信息化水平、组织化水平、产品关键竞争力、及可替代资源可得性这6个重要的变量。关于这六个重要变量对农户讨价还价能力的影响提出假设,然后对农户讨价还价能力以及识别的六个关键变量的刻画指标进行设计,最终形成调查问卷。通过问卷调查,用SPSS19.0软件进行数据处理,主要包括问卷可靠性分析,因子分析,方差分析以及回归分析。
研究结果显示,农户信息化水平、组织化水平和农户关键竞争力对农户固有讨价还价能力具有显著的正向影响；可替代资源认知对于农户固有讨价还价转化为实际讨价还价能力具有明显的调节作用。可替代资源认知的调节作用表现为正向,农户对可替代资源的认知度越高,实际讨价还价能力越倾向于由固有讨价还价能力决定。
最后,本文对实证研究分析的结果作出了相关理论解释,并针对如何提高农户讨价还价能力问题,提出了一些建议与措施。由于本文对农产品市场中影响农户讨价还价能力影响因素的实证研究属于探索性研究,指标体系不够完善,存在错漏的地方；但本文所利用的讨价还价能力及其影响因素的指标体系,为将来关于农产品市场中的讨价还价能力问题的进一步研究具有参考性的意义。
For the present, due to the market structure of Hainan banana industry which is nearly close to complete competition and the price accept behaviour passively conducted by single banana production operators, the overall market performance of Hainan banana industry is not high. On one hand, from banana manufacturing to sale, Hainan banana industry adopts scattering management production in small scale, during which numerous individuals and organizations are involved but in low level, small scale, low lever discrete and low degree of organization. On the other hand, banana production operators are very slow to market signals for deafing to the newly market information, whereas market prices are extremely volatile. Because fresh fruit is farmers' main source of income, so market price has become an important factor influencing farmers' income. Based on the current situation that growing over supply in fresh agricultural products, many scholars have paid more attention to how to improve the farmers' interests distribution and how to solve the problem of farmers' low income in the process of bargaining.
The paper concerns with the bargaining power in the agricultural products market between farmers and buyers. Based on the former researches, the study has divided the bargaining power into two categories, which are Inherent Bargaining Power and Actual Bargaining Power, with its focus on three aspects:constructing a theoretic model to analyze the bargaining power between farmers and buyers; disclosing the important environmental and personal factors that could influence the inherent bargaining power and finding out the moderating effect of the alternative resources in the transformation process from inherent bargaining power into actual bargaining power.
By borrowing relevant ideas from home and abroad, this paper puts forward a theoretic model on the bargaining power in the agricultural products market between farmers and buyers. The theoretic model takes six important variables:farmers' strategic orientation, producers' individual characteristics, informationization level, organizations level, crucial competitive power of product, and alternative resources availability. Based on the variables, this paper puts forward the hypothesis on the effects to bargaining power of farmers. According to these factors, the author designs a questionnaire. After the investigation, with the conduction of the SPSS19.0software, the data is conducted through the reliability analysis, the factor analysis, the variance analysis and regression analysis.
The reserch results indicates that farmers' informational level, organizational level and crucial competitive power have a significant positive influence on farmers' inherent bargaining power, while the alternative availability has a significant moderating effect on the tranformation of the inherent bargaining power to actual bargaining power. For its positive feature, the higher perception of framers to alternative resources are apt to the fact that the actual bargaining power is determined by inherent bargaining power.
Finally, this paper carries out the theoretical explanation on the result of this empirical research, and provides some suggestions and measures on how to improve the farmers' bargaining power. Since it is the exploratory step to research on the factors affecting the farmers' bargaining power in agricultural markets, along with the imperfect index system, this paper has some shortcomings. It still has innovative meaning to the future research for reference.
引文
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