摘要
众所周知,中小企业在经济社会发展过程中起着举足轻重的作用,无论是在就业、GDP增长、出口创汇还是在上缴税收中,中小企业所占份额都绝对大。然而,中小企业融资难问题的由来已久,得到社会各界的普遍关注,信用担保机构的建设正是解决中小企业融资难问题的有效措施之一。从理论上讲,信用担保机构的发展面临“两个维度”的问题,研究这“两个维度”的问题,将有利于解释信用担保机构发展中的各种现象,厘清信用担保机构可持续商业化运作的思路。
理论界最常研究的是担保机构的风险分散问题,这也是关系到担保机构能否生存下去的关键问题,但担保机构的有效运行并不止涉及风险分散这一个问题。第3章结合数理模型和动态博弈分析方法,研究了信息不对称视角下担保机构的信用增级机理、风险分散机理和成本分担机理,探讨了三个机理之间的关系。认为三个机理虽相对独立但不能完全割裂开,既有区别又互相联系,是在不完全信息条件下,围绕担保机构功能发挥、生存、发展进行运作的有机统一体。当一个担保合同以较低成本恰当地分散了风险,使担保机构获得了较大的收益,将增强其对受保企业的信用增级能力。而增信能力提高后,又将有利于担保机构开展品种多样的担保活动,提升其分散风险的空间,促进形成更有利的成本分担机理,从而诱导出一种正反馈机制,共同推动担保机构健康发展。第3章的内容也是对信用担保机构运行机制的基础理论分析。
信用担保机构的建设对中小企业从而对经济发展到底有无作用,作用有多大,这涉及到担保计划(机构)的附加性问题。国外学者对信用担保计划附加性有争议的研究很早就开始了,有的认为附加性很明显,有的认为附加性并不明显,还有的认为存在负面影响,至今仍没有取得一致的结论,而国内这方面的研究还处于起步阶段。第4章以浙江省为例,通过对浙江省中小企业和信用担保机构进行问卷调查和统计分析,用两阶段过程估计信用担保金融附加性在95%置信区间为51.9±7.0%。并使用经典的面板回归法,发现信用担保具有经济附加性,信用担保贷款在总贷款中的比例每提高一个百分点,单位贷款产出将增长2.09个百分点。这也是对信用担保机构信用增级结果的实证检验。
风险是影响信用担保机构运行效率的关键因素,且风险来源是多方面的。那么,影响信用担保机构运行效率的总体风险水平如何?哪些是相对重要的影响因素?第5章通过对浙江省信用担保机构、中介机构、政府部门和专家进行问卷调查,用经济周期波动、政府直接干预、技术创新冲击等21个因素指标构成指标体系,运用层次分析法(AHP)和主成分分析法,找出风险评估体系的权重系数,验证了我们的核心假设——来自担保机构内部的风险因素是影响担保机构运行效率的最重要因素,并对当前影响担保机构运行效率的风险水平进行总体评估。结果表明：如果以参数[13579]来标度风险水平,且9表示风险水平很高,那么风险评估值为6.96,意味着影响当前浙江省信用担保机构运行效率的风险水平总体上比较高；其中影响信用担保机构运行效率权重最大的前五个因素是来自担保机构的管理水平不高、内控制度不健全和专业人才缺乏,以及来自法律制度层面的信用体系不健全、咨询评估等中介机构不健全。这些因素与分散受保企业信用风险能力的建设密切相关。通过进一步对分散受保企业信用风险的创新路径进行分析,得出了有效分散受保企业信用风险的7点启示。第5章的内容也是对信用担保机构风险分散结果的实证研究。
从上述研究可知,中小企业的发展亟需信用担保机构,担保的附加性很显著,但其运行风险较大,风险与收益不匹配,如何突破?第6章在总结比较浙江省几个新型担保模式的基础上,提出了运行转化效应理论,并详细分析了桥隧模式、行业担保、抱团增信、路衢模式等新型担保模式中的担保合同性质、担保贷款期限和规模、担保产品特性、财政资金使用方式和风险特性等因素发生转化后,对担保机构运行实绩产生的影响。通过新型模式与传统模式的对比分析,发现存在运行转化效应。认为通过运行模式创新使政府公信力与担保机构创造力有机结合,努力改善担保机构的市场地位并增强其主动性,不断减少信息不对称程度,不断提高担保机构的自生能力,是改善担保机构运行实绩的关键。第6章是对信用担保机构实践经验的总结和提炼,也是对运行转化效应的理论研究。
不同信用担保机构类型的运行效率如何、主要影响因素有哪些,以及转化效应如何,是关系到信用担保机构可持续发展的重要问题。国内在这方面的研究文献很少。第7章先以浙江省306家中小企业信用担保机构为研究对象,实证分析了实收资本、主营业务、合作银行、担保机构承担风险、担保对象中小企业占比等因素对政策性、商业性、互助性等三类担保机构运行效率的影响方向和程度,探讨了三类担保机构运行效率的差异性,并实证分析了担保机构运行的转化效应。结果表明：政策性、商业性、互助性等类型担保机构的运行效率有显著差异,影响因素也不尽相同；政策性担保机构的运行模式相对比较成熟；担保机构总体来说还处于发展的初级阶段,担保业务亟待创新；担保机构风险总体处于可控状态。然后,运用DEA法分析担保机构运行效率,发现政策性、商业性、互助性担保机构的OTE、PTE、SE在相同和不同的产出项下均有显著差异。最后,通过专家问卷调查并结合政策性、商业性和互助性担保机构的典型案例分析,证实了担保机构运行转化效应的确存在,三类典型担保机构的运行效率存在显著差异。
It is well known that SMEs play an important role in the economic and social development. Whether in employment, GDP growth, export or in paid taxes, the share of SMEs is absolutely large, However, the question of financing difficulties of SMEs is long-standing, which receives the general concern of all sectors of society, and the construction of credit guarantee institutions for SMEs is one of effective measures to solve the problem of financing difficulties of SMEs. In theory, the development of credit guarantee institutions face the issue of two dimensions. To study this "two dimensions" problem will help explain a variety of phenomena in the development of credit guarantee institutions, and straighten out a sustainable commercial operation pathway for credit guarantee institutions.
What is most studied by theorists is about the risk diversification issue of security agencies which is related to the key issue to survive for security organization, but the effective functioning of security agencies is not involved in this question of risk spreading. In chapter 3, combined with mathematical models and dynamic game analysis methods, we study the credit enhancement mechanism, the risk spreading mechanism and the cost-sharing mechanism of guarantee institutions from the perspective of the information asymmetry, and discuss the relationship among the three mechanisms. We consider that the three mechanisms can not be completely separated although they being relatively independent, and they are both distinct and interrelated, being an organic unity of the operation around the security agencies functioning, survival, development under the conditions of imperfect information. When a contract of guarantee spreads the risk properly at a lower cost, the security agencies will obtain a larger income, and improve its capability of credit enhancement for insured corporate. After that, it is in turn conducive to develop broad range of security activities for the security agencies, to enhance the space for risk diversification, promoting the formation of a more favorable cost-sharing mechanism, and thus induce a positive feedback mechanism, and jointly promote the health development of the security agencies. The content of chapter 3 is also about basic theory analysis on operating mechanism of credit guarantee institutions.
whether in the end is there a role for the construction of credit guarantee institutions to SMEs and thus to economic development, and how much is this role, which involves the additionality problem of guarantee schemes (agencies). The controversial research for foreign scholars on the credit guarantee schemes started very early, and some believed that the additionality is clear, some believed that the additionality is not obvious, and some perceived that the additionality has a negative impact,which still do not make the same conclusion, while the domestic research in this area is still in its early stages. In chapter 4, taking zhejiang province as an example, by conducting a questionnaire survey and statistical analysis on small and medium enterprises and credit guarantee institutions in zhejiang province, we estimated the financial additionality of credit guarantee as 51.9±7.0% with 95% confidence using a two-stage process, and using the classic panel regression method, found that credit guarantees have an economic additionality, that is,which the proportion of credit guarantee loans in total loans is increased by one percentage point will make each unit of lending output increase by 2.09 percentage points. It is also an empirical research attached to the credit enhancement result of credit guarantee agencies.
Risk is a key factor of affecting the operational efficiency of credit guarantee agencies, and its source is multifaceted. Then, what is the overall risk level of affecting the operational efficiency of credit guarantee institutions? What are the relative importance of factors? In chapter 5,we conduct a questionnaire survey through the credit guarantee institutions in zhejiang province, intermediary agencies, government departments and experts, and by using 21 factors such as the business cycle fluctuation, direct government intervention, technical innovation shock to constitute a evaluation system, by using analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and principal component analysis approach, we find out a series of weight coefficients for the evaluation system, then validate the correctness of the core assumption-the risk factors from the guarantee institutions themselves being the most important ones affecting the operational efficiency of these agencies,and conduct an overall assessment on the risk level of affacting the current operational efficiency of the security agencies. The results show that:If we use the parameters [13579] to scale the level of risk, of which 9 indicates the risk being very high, then the overall risk assessment value being 6.96 means that the overall risk level of affecting the operational efficiency of the security sectors in zhejiang province is relatively high at present. Which the greatest weight five factors of affecting the operational efficiency of credit guarantee institutions are from the management level of guarantee agencies being not high, internal control system being not perfect, and the lack of professionals, as well as from the credit system being not perfect, consultations and evaluations and other intermediary institutions being not perfect in the legal system. These factors are closely related to the capacity of dispersing the credit risk from insuranced companies. Further analysis of the innovation pathes dispersing the insured corporate credit risk, the 7 inspirations effectively dispersing the credit risk by the insuranced company are got.The content of chapter 5 is also an empirical researche on the risk spreading situation of credit guarantee institutions.
We can see from the previous study that credit guarantee institutions are demanded urgently for the development of SMEs, and the additionality of guarantees is very significant, but their relatively high operating risk lead to their risk and benefits not matching, how to break this state? In chapter 6, on the basis of summarizing and comparing a few new security models in zhejiang province, we put forward the transformation effect theory, and explicitly analyzed the impact on operating performance of guarantee agencies after the nature of the guarantee contract, secured loan duration and size, guarantee product feature, using approach of fiscal funds, risk characteristics and other factors have been transformed in the new patterns of guarantee models such as Qiao Sui model, industry guarantee, organizing a group of guarantee institutions to increase credit and Lu Qu model. Through the new model compared with the traditional mode, the running transformation effect is found.The paper considers that they are the keys to improve the operating performance of guarantee agencies to combine the government's public credibility with the creative force of guarantee agencies by innovating operating models, to strively improve the security agencies' market positions and enhance their initiatives, to continuously reduce the degree of information asymmetry,to continuously improve the guarantee agencies'viability. The content of chapter 6 is about the summarized and refined for the practice and experience of credit guarantee institutions, but also a theoretical research on the running transformation effects.
How is the operating efficiency of different types of credit guarantee agencies,and what are the main factors influencing the efficiency, and how is the running transformation effect, which are important issues related to the credit guarantee institutions for sustainable development. Domestic research literature in this area is very little. In chapter 7, firstly,taking 306 SME credit guarantee institutions of zhejiang province as the object of studying, we empirically analyse the influence orientation and extent of the operating efficiency of policy, commercial, mutual aid types of guarantee agencies made by the reality capital size, the main business share, the human resources,the number of cooperative banks, the proportion of risk taken by guarantee institutions,the proportion of small and medium-sized in all guaranted objects and other factors, and discuss the differences in operating efficiency of these three types of guarantee agencies, and empiricaly analyse the running transformation effect of security agencies. The results showed that:operating efficiencies of policy, commercial, mutual aid and other types of security agencies are significantly different, and their influencing factors are not the same; the operating mode of policy guarantee agencies is relatively mature; guarantee agencies are still in the primary stage of development in the whole, and the guarantee business needs innovation; the overall risk of guarantee agencies is under control. Secondly, by using DEA to analyse the efficiency of security agencies, we find that OTE, PTE, SE of the policy, commercial, mutual guarantee institutions are significantly different whether in different outputs or under the same outputs. Thirdly, by combining the expert questionnaire survey and typical case analysis of policy-oriented, commercial and mutual aid of guarantee agencies,we confirm that the operational transformation effect of a security agency does exist, and the efficiency of three representatives of various guarantee organizations are significantly different.
引文
1引自《国家经济贸易委员会关于建立中小企业信用担保体系试点的指导意见》(国经贸中小企业[1999]540号)。
2巴劲松(2007)认为,一个维度是担保机构为中小企业融资从而为经济发展提供的支持,是政府关注的担保机构的公共效应问题,另一个维度是基础,是担保机构作为一个独立的市场主体的利益诉求问题和可持续发展问题。
3有不少学者通过构建数理模型,证实了中小企业信用担保机构对于解决金融机构和中小企业信息不对称方面的作用。蓝虹、穆争社(2004)认为,借助抵押担保的信号传递和信息甄别功能,能够使企业和银行间的非对称信息转变为对称信息,改变博弈结果,走出融资过程中的“囚徒困境”。李朗、杨明(2005)通过构建一个银行信息下的贷款决策模型,发现随着银行与企业之间的信息不对称程度越大,越多的企业将得到信用担保机构的担保贷款。但只有中小企业提供了足额的担保品以后,信用担保机构才有现实意义(付俊红、赵红,2004),而且信用担保机构在部分解决银企之间信息不对称的同时,自身与银企之间又产生了新的不对称信息(卞亦文,王有森,2009),需通过担保比例和反担保的适当组合来减少中小企业信贷市场上的逆向选择和道德风险的影响(杨胜刚、胡海波,2006)。
4有学者从专业分工的角度出发,认为中小企业信用担保机构是现代金融市场分工细化的产物,因此对改进中小企业信贷融资市场的结构和效率是有利的(陈乃醒,2002)。还有学者运用博弈论原理,对商业银行、信用担保机构和中小企业在中小企业申请信用贷款过程中的博弈行为进行分析,认为结果应是三方共赢的局面(聂建平,2004)。
5 Allam Riding等(2007)认为,附加性指信用担保计划为那些不能得到贷款的企业提供担保融资的程度,为与经济上的附加性相区别,本文将信用担保计划在信贷市场方面的附加性定义为金融上的附加性。
6 Ben R.Craig等(2007)认为,如果SBA的担保贷款确实减少了小企业贷款时的信贷配给,则在SBA活动和经济增长的衡量之间应该有一个关系,本文将这种关系定义为经济上的附加性。
7龚瑜谨、韩刚(2006)指出了两类替代问题,一类是发生贷款方式的替代,另一类是岱款人之间的替代：贡献模糊指国家宏观政策、宏观经济形势、金融体制变革等因素都有可能有利干银行净增中小企业贷款.且这些贡献因素的界限十分模糊,从而导致中小企业信用担保计划收益被高估。
8表示偏导数。
9表示偏导数。
10表示偏导数。
11张世伟、万相昱、曲洋(2009)认为,预期工资率可以理解为就业概率与就业条件下工资率两部分的乘积。
12顾海峰(2009)构建了与本文不同的数理模型,发现银行分担的风险越大,要求贷款项目的成功率越高。
13梅强、秦默等(2008)从中小企业、信用担保机构和再担保机构三个角度展开研究,结论是再担保能够减轻逆向选择的程度。
14杨胜刚、胡海波(2006),付俊文、赵红(2006)分别从信息经济学角度,通过数理建模分析了反担保对解决逆向选择、道德风险的重要性。
15两者的含义已在第2章中有表述。
16由省信用担保行业协会通过全省11个市较大规模的担保机构,向与该担保机构有过联系的中小企业发放问卷调查表,分申请担保获得担保、申请担保未获得担保等几种类型,担保机构负责收集企业问卷并寄回行业协会。
17为使转换后的判断矩阵仍满足互反性要求,我们选用了几何平均,权重都为1／n(其中n为群组数),因为用于计算的专家问卷都已通过效度检验。
18需要注意的是,二阶矩阵不需要检验一致性,这里CR值非常接近于0。
19由金雪军、陈杭生(2007)首次提出,并由中新力合担保公司率先付诸实践,其他担保公司跟进模仿。
20担保机构与新型运行模式之间不是一一对应关系,相对来说,商业性担保机构运用新型模式的动力更强一些,政府性担保机构根据各自的定位有所选择,互助性担保机构因主要为会员服务,创新的空间较小。
22该模式由浙江省中小企业局为提高中小企业信用担保机构的增信能力,联合国家开发银行浙江省分行、省信用担保行业协会,于2007年首创成功,并在全省推广
23该模式由金雪军、陈杭生(2009)首次提出,作者结合中新力合、信林担保、金桥担保等机构的创新实践进行分析。
24风投公司作为劣后收益人,在购买劣后收益权的同时,与“企业池”中的企业分别签订一份协议,当风险触发时,风投公司对企业池中的任何企业在增资过程中都拥有一定比例的优先选择权。
25引自《国家经济贸易委员会关于建立中小企业信用担保体系试点的指导意见》(国经贸中小企业[1999]540号)。
26同6。
27对小型担保公司而言,因本身信用有限,银行无法与其合作,其生存主要依赖于民间融资业务,扰乱了信用担保市场。为规范融资性担保行为,促进融资性担保行业健康发展,2010年3月,经国务院批准,银监会等七部门联合发布了《融资性担保公司管理暂行办法》。
28这是在浙江省中小企业局实行备案管理的全部担保机构。事实上,由于当时担保机构实行登记制,在工商部门登记注有“担保”字号的企业超过2000家,大部分企业很少开展融资性担保业务,为了生存,以做民间融资业务的居多。较大规模的担保机构为了和银行开展合作,都到管理部门进行了备案。
29这些担保机构从杭州、宁波、温州、嘉兴、湖州等市随机抽取,这五个市的担保机构数量占全省的70%以上,他们的效率高低能够代表全省的整体水平。
30包括省级政府部门10份,高校4份,中介机构12份(其中商业银行一级分行10份,信托公司2份),担保机构14份,创投机构3份。
31选择典型担保机构的标准主要有三条：一是成立时间在5年以上；二是在发展过程中不同程度地应用了各种创新担保模式；三是经营稳健,风险防范措施基本到位。
32因2007年信林担保公司亏损,所以其自身收益效率指标空缺。
35如可尝试由政府部门牵头组建一个产权清晰、运作规范、整合各类资源的信用担保平台(王勇、何国华,2007),目的在于建立一个风险控制机制和信用征信体系,充分发挥政府的公信力,搭建促进担保机构信用建设的信用联盟,通过信用联盟中较强的同行压力、同盟压力的互动,增强对担保机构信用的硬约束,提高担保机构的信用水平,进而增强银行对担保机构的认同感,为中小企业担保贷款中的信用增级创造条件。
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