摘要
随着人类文明的进步,人们环境意识逐渐提高,人们已经开始意识到以牺牲环境和资源高消耗的经济增长方式将会反过来制约人们对高质量的生活的追求。因而,提高资源利用效率,减少环境污染成为了经济增长方式转变的重要方向。正是在这样背景下,政府出台了一系列的循环经济相关宏观政策以支持循环经济产业的发展。而再生资源产业作为循环经济产业的核心所在,对于节约资源、缓解资源短缺矛盾、减轻环境承载压力具有重要意义。本文所关注的正是再生资源中的废旧物资回收环节,研究核心在于探讨如何从产业链中合作协调机制设计着手提高废旧物资回收效率。
为此,论文针对2011年实施的《废弃电器电子产品回收处理管理条例》提出了一些具体问题：废旧电器电子产品回收经营者是否有激励为电器电子产品使用者提供方便、快捷的服务?考虑电器电子产品回收经营者的非理性特征时该怎样激励电器电子产品回收经营者?国家为什么要鼓励回收再制造产业链建立长期合作关系?怎么样的机制才能保证长期合作关系?为了解决上述问题,本文在“非理性特征”的背景下,对上述提出的具体问题进行了进一步提炼,按照层层递进的关系,提出了具体待解决的科学问题：(1)以线性分成契约为例,探讨在完全理性下回收＼再制造合作协调机制如何设计?当传统线性分成契约的形式发生改变时,即采取固定收益比例下补贴机制形式,比起传统线性分成契约效果如何?(2)当回收商存在公平偏好时,如何设计合作协调机制?回收商的公平偏好是如何影响合作协调机制的,又如何影响参与主体的努力水平的?当回收商之间存在竞争时候,这种公平偏好的作用又是怎样的?(3)考虑回收商对公平的理解存在差异性,这种差异性表现在回收商的公平敏感性系数不同,此时又如何设计合作协调机制?回收商对公平理解的差异性是如何作用于再制造商的契约设计的?(4)当回收商和再制造商具有长远考虑非理性特征时,如何设计合作协调机制?这种协调机制是否合理?
论文首先对本论文的研究对象——回收物流的概念进行界定,并对其特点和流程类型进行了分析；同时对论文所涉及的相关理论方法进行了介绍,并对回收物流管理从废旧产品运作管理、逆向物流、回收＼再制造协调与博弈三块进行了文献综述。在文献综述的基础上,一一解决上述提炼出的科学问题,综合探讨在非理性特征的框架下回收＼再制造逆向供应链中的合作协调机制设计问题。
首先,在完全理性的框架下探讨了单个再制造商和单个回收商构成的二级逆向供应链中再制造商如何通过协调机制来提高回收商废旧产品回收努力水平。在研究中主要探讨了传统线性分成契约和改进线性分成契约两种协调机制在回收商成本类型为对称信息和不对称信息的情形下的具体契约形式,并对两种契约进行了性质比较和数值仿真分析。研究表明：在成本类型为对称信息时,改进线性分成契约和传统线性分成契约都能够激励回收商实现最优努力水平,但前者比起后者具备更好的可操作性；但在成本类型为不对称信息时,两者能够对回收商的激励效果是相同的,但改进线性分成契约成立的条件更苛刻些。
其次,在回收商具有公平偏好这一非理性特征下探讨了再制造商如何通过激励机制设计来激励回收商实施更多的努力进行回收。为此分别构建了单一回收商考虑公平偏好的道德风险模型和和竞争性回收商考虑公平偏好的道德风险模型。研究表明：单一回收商情形时,由于回收商是风险中性的,即使在努力水平不可观察时,最优努力水平仍然可以被实施,公平偏好的存在只改变了再制造商制定的加盟金额度,这种加盟金额度随着回收商对公平的重视程度增加而减少；竞争回收商情形时,由于回收商之间的公平比较存在,再制造商会优先考虑消除回收商之间的公平比较,并指出无论在努力水平可观察还是努力水平不可观察下,再制造商皆可以用一种基于期望回收量的补贴契约来消除回收商与回收商之间的公平比较带来的效用损失,此时回收商与再制造商之间的公平比较则对最优努力水平和契约结构皆产生影响。
再次,在之前基础上进一步考虑回收商对公平理解的差异性,探讨此时再制造商如何激励回收商实施更多努力进行回收。为此,构建了糅合公平敏感性的具有公平偏好效用损失函数的道德风险模型。研究表明：在完全信息且给定参数下,再制造商只需给予回收商固定支付,且固定支付是随着回收商的公平敏感系数增加而减少的,且无论对于哪种类型的回收商,再制造商都会通过调节给予回收商的固定支付进而来确保存在一种对回收商不利的不公平状态；而在回收商努力水平不可观察情形及给定参数下,再制造商的策略如下：在回收商低公平敏感系数时,会调节固定支付进而确保一种对回收商不利的不公平状态,但当回收商公平敏感系数一定大时,再制造商会调节固定支付消除不公平。
最后,论文探讨了长远考虑这一非理性特征下再制造商和回收商之间长期合作关系是以怎样的协调机制存在以及这种协调机制存在的合理性。为此,论文在双边道德风险模型下比较了正式契约和关系契约,指出了最优关系契约适用条件。研究表明：长远考虑这一非理性特征是最优关系契约得以实现回收商再制造协调的关键所在,也论证了最优关系契约的系统收益优于正式契约,进而解释这种协调机制存在的合理性。
With the progress of human civilization, people'environmental consciousness gradually improve, and people have realized that the economic growth way based on resource consumption and environmental pollution will prevent the pursuit of high quality of life. Therefore, improving the efficiency of resource utilization and reducing environmental pollution had been the important direction of the economic development. In this context, the government had published a series of macroeconomic policies about circular economy to support the development of circular economy industry. And the renewable resources industry, as the core of circular economy industry, is of significance in relieving the shortage of resources and reducing environmental load pressure. The paper pays attention on waste materials recycling in resources regeneration and the core in our research is to discuss how to improve the efficiency of waste materials recycling through the coordination mechanism in recycling and remanufacturing industrial chain.
For this purpose, the paper put forward some specific questions in view of "Regulations on Recycling and Disposal of Waste Electric and Electronic Products" enfored in2011:Whether the recyclers of waste electric and electronic products have motivation to provide a convenient recycling service for the users of waste electric and electronic products? How to motivate the recycers to make mor efforts in recycling when the recycers have some irrational characteristics? Why the government encourages the members in recycling and remanufacturing industrial chain to establish a long-term cooperation relationship? In order to solve the above questions, the paper refined the specific questions under irrational characteristics and put forward the following scientific issues to be resolved according to the hierarchical relationship:(1) Take the linear shared contract as example, how to design the coordinaton mechanism in recycling and remanufacturing in perfectly rational environment? Comparing with the traditional linear shared contract, how about the subsidy mechanism based on the linear shared contract?(2) How to design the coordinaton mechanism when the recyclers have fairness preference? How the fairness preference act on the the coordinaton mechanism and the effort level of recyclers?(3) How to design the coordination mechanism when the recyclers have different understanding on the fairness, which can be described as fairness sensitivity? And how the fairness sensitivity act on the coordination mechanism?(4) How to design the coordination mechanism when the remanufacturer has long-term consideration? How to explain the reasonableness for the coordination mechanism?
Before sovling the above scientific issues, the paper demarcated the research object "recycling logistics" and analyzed its characteristics and process types; at the same time, the paper introduced the relevant theorial method and gave literature reviews to recycling logistics management from Operation management of end-of-life products, Reverse logistics management and Coordination and game in recycling and remanufacturing. Then the pape solved the above scientific issues one by one.
Firstly, the paper studied how to improve the effort level of recycers through coordination mechanism in the reverse supply chain consisting of one remanufacturer and one recycler in a completely rational framework. In the study, we dicussed and compared the specific form of coordination mechanism respectively based on the traditional linear sharing contract and the improved linear sharing contract when the cost type information is symmetric or asymmetric. The study shows that: when the cost type information is symmetric, both the contracts can motivate recyclers to achieve the optimal level, but the improved linear sharing contract has better oprability; when the cost type information is asymmetric, the outcome of two contracts is the same while the improved linear sharing contract needs more conditions.
Secondly, we discussed how the remanufacturer motivate recyclers pay mote efforts to recycle through incentive mechanism design when recyclers have fairness preference. To study it, we established two moral hazard models:one considerd a single recycler with fairness preference, the othe one considerd competing recyclers with fairness preference. The study shows that: when there is only one recycler, due to the risk-neutral characteristic, the optimal effort level can be carried out, even when the effort level is unobserved, and the existence of fairness preference only changes the franchise fee constituted by the remanufacturer, which decrease along with recyclers'increasing fairness emphasis; when there are two competing recyclers, the remanufacturer would give priority to eliminate the fair comparison between two recyclers by a subsidy contract based on total expected recycling quantity no matter that the effort level is observable or unobservable, and the existence of fairness preference can affect the optimal effort level and the contract structure.
Thirdly, we discussed how the remanufacturer motivate recyclers pay more efforts to recycle when considering the different understanding of fairness based on the previous study. To study it, we established a moral hazard model with utility loss function about fairness preferences mixed with fair sensitivity. The study shows that: in the case of perfect information and given parameters, the remanufacturer just give a fixed fee to recyclers which decrease along with recyclers' increasing fairness sensitivity, and the remanufacturer would adjust the fixed fee to ensure a disadvantageous fair state for recyclers no matter what kind of recyclers; in the case of imperfect information and given parameters, the remanufacturer would adjust the fixed fee to ensure a disadvantageous fair state for recyclers when recyclers have low fairness sensitivity and adjust the fixed fee to eliminate inequity when the fairness sensitivity is large enough.
Finally, the paper discussed the coordination mechanisim in remanufacturers and recyclers' long-term cooperation when they have the irrational characteristic about long-term consideration. To study it, we compared the relational contract and formal contract in the bilateral moral hazard model. The study shows that long-term consideration is the core for coordination using the optimal relational contract; we also demonstrated the system gains from the optimal relational contract is superior to the formal contract to explain the existence of this coordination mechanism.
引文
① 相关数据来源于：再生资源行业后发先至可创万亿产值[N],2012-09-11,前瞻网www.qianzhan.com
② 相关数据来源于：中国统计年鉴(2003-2011)
① 相关数据来源于：中国统计年鉴(2003-2011)
② 相关资料来源于：中华人民共和国国务院令(第551号),2011年1月1日起施行。http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-03/04/content_1250844.htm
① 对于该效用函数在这不具体叙述,可参考Charness and Rabin (2002)
① 1995-2005期间相关文献更详细数据请参考Rubio et al(2008).
① 管理科学与运筹学(MS/OR)国际期刊排名可参考Journal Citation Reports (JCR2013)的 Article Influence Score, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_3f6976a901018yj7.html.
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