摘要
本文采用中国非金融上市公司截面数据,在控制相关变量下,应用OLS实证检验市场化程度、产品市场发育程度、金融市场发育程度、法律制度环境和政府干预程度如何影响债务期限选择。研究发现：制度因素对债务期限选择有着重要的影响。(1)市场化程度指数和公司债务期限水平显著负相关,说明市场化程度高的省份的上市公司具有显著低的债务期限水平。(2)产品市场发育程度和公司债务期限水平显著负相关,说明在产品竞争市场程度高的省份的上市公司,向投资者传递了公司治理质量高的信息,使得投资者更愿意为公司提供长期权益资金。(3)金融市场发育程度和公司债务期限水平显著负相关,说明在金融市场化程度高的省份,对银行资金管理的监管力度更大,对长期借款标准的收紧更加严格。同时,在金融市场发育程度越高的省份,金融市场的制度更加完善,长期融资的渠道更多,种类更齐全。(4)法律环境指数和公司债务期限水平显著负相关,说明公司在进行长期融资时,法律制度环境好的省份的投资者更愿意为上市公司提供长期权益资本。(5)政府干预程度和公司债务期限水平显著正相关,表明政府干预作为一种制度因素对公司的借贷行为具有重要的影响,银行更愿意将长期贷款贷给那些有着政府关系和政府背景的公司,公司也更容易通过政府干预从银行取得长期贷款。
The paper adopts cross-section data of non-financial listed companies in China, and applies OLS to empirically study how the marketization, product market development, financial market development, legal environment and governmental intervention affect the choice of debt maturity structure with related variables being controlled. The study shows that institutional factors have the important effect on the choice of debt maturity. (1)The marketization index is negatively correlated with debt maturity level. It shows that the listed companies in the provinces of high marketization index have significantly low debt maturity level. (2) The product market development is negatively correlated with debt maturity level. It shows that the companies in the provinces of high product market index transmit investors the information that the companies have high corporate governance level, so that investors are more willing to provide these companies long-term equity capital. (3)The financial market development is negatively correlated with debt maturity level. It shows that the supervision of bank capital management is better and the tightening of long-term loan standard is stricter. Meanwhile, in the provinces of high financial market index, the institution of financial market is more complete, the ways of long-term financing is more, the kinds of long-term financing is more complete. (4)The legal index is negatively correlated with debt maturity level. It shows that when companies are financing by long-term financing, the investors in the provinces of good legal environment are more willing to provide listed companies the long-term equity capital.(5)The governmental intervention is positively correlated with debt maturity level. It shows that governmental intervention as an institutional factor has important effect on the lending practices of companies. Banks prefer to lend long-term loans to the companies which have government relations and government background, and these companies are easier to get long-term loans from banks by governmental intervention.
引文
[1]Antoniou A., Guney Y., Paudyal K. The determinants of debt maturity structure: evidence from France, Germany and the UK. European Financial Management.2006,12:161～194.
[2]Arslan O., Karan M.B. Ownership and Control Structure as Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity:a panel study of an emerging market. Corporate Governance:An International Review.2006,14:312～324.
[3]Barclay M.J., Smith Jr. C.W. The maturity of corporate debt. Journal of Finance.1995,50:609～631.
[4]Barclay M.J., Marx L., Smith Jr.C.W. The joint determination of leverage and maturity. Journal of Corporate Finance.2003,9:149-167.
[5]Barnea A., Haugen R.A., Senbet L.W. A rationale for debt maturity structure and call provisions in the agency theoretic framework. Journal of Finance.1980,35:1223～1234.
[6]Booth Laurence, Varouj Aivazian, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Vojislav Maksimovic. Capital structures in developing countries. Journal of Finance.2001,56:87～130.
[7]Bradley M., Jarrell G.A., Kim E.H.On the existence of an optimal capital structure: theory and evidence. Journal of Finance.1984,39:857～880.
[8]Brick I.E., Ravid S.A. Interest rate uncertainty and the optimal debt maturity structure. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.1991,26:63～81.
[9]Brick I.E., Ravid S.A. On the relevance of debt maturity structure. Journal of Finance.1985,40:1423～1437.
[10]Daniservska P. Is debt maturity determined by asymmetric information about short-term or long-term earnings. SSRN Working Paper.2002.
[11]Datta S., Iskandar-Datta M., Raman K. Managerial stock ownership and the maturity structure of corporate debt. Journal of Finance.2005,5:2333～2350.
[12]Demirguc-Kunt A., Maksimovic V. Institutions, financial markets, and firm debt maturity. Journal of Financial Economics.1999,54:295～336.
[13]Demirguc-Kunt A., Maksimovic V. Stock market development and financing choice of firms. World Bank Economic Review.1996,10:341～369.
[14]Diamond D.W. Debt maturity and liquidity risk. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1991a,6:709～737.
[15]Diamond D.W. Monitoring and reputation:the choice between bank loans and directly place debt. Journal of Political Economy.1991b,99:689～721.
[16]Elyasiani E., Guo L., Tang L. The determinants of debt maturity at issuance:a system-based model. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting.2002,19:351～ 377.
[17]Fama E., Jensen M.C. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics.1983,26:301～325.
[18]Fan, J.P.H., Titman, S., and G. Twite, An international comparison of capital structure and debt maturity choices[R].SSRN Working Paper.2008.
[19]Flannery M. Asymmetric information and risk debt maturity structure choice. Journal of Finance.1986,41:18～38.
[20]Garcia-Teruel P.J., Martinez-Solano P. Ownership structure and debt maturity:new evidence from Spain. SSRN Working Paper.2006.
[21]Giannetti M. Do Better Institutions Mitigate Agency Problems? Evidence from Corporate Finance Choice. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.2003,38:185～212.
[22]Guedes J., Opler T. The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues. Journal of Finance.1996,51:1809～1833.
[23]Harris M., Raviv A. The theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance.1991,46:297～ 355.
[24]Hart O., Moore J. Debt and seniority:an analysis of hard claims in constraining management. American Economic Review.1995,85:567～587.
[25]Harwood E., Manzon G.B. Tax clienteles and debt maturity. Journal of the American Taxation Association.2000,22:22～39.
[26]Jarrad Harford, Kai Li, Xinlei Zhao. Corporate Boards and the Leverage and Debt Maturity Choices. SSRN Working Paper.2007.
[27]Jensen M.C. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review.1986,76:323～339.
[28]Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics.1976,3:305～360.
[29]Johnson S. A. Debt maturity and the effects of growth opportunities and liquidity risk on leverage. Review of Financial Studies.2003,16:209～236.
[30]Jun S.G., Jen F.C. Trade-off model on debt maturity structure. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting.2003,20:5～34.
[31]Kai Li, Heng Yue, Longkai Zhao. Ownership, Institutions, and Capital Structure: Evidence from China. SSRN Working Paper.2007.
[32]Kale J.R., Noe T.H. Risk debt maturity choice in a sequential equilibrium. Journal of Financial Research.1990,13:155～165.
[33]Kane A., Marcus A.J., McDonald R.L. Debt policy and the rate of return premium to leverage. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.1985,20:479～499.
[34]Khwaja, A. and A. Mian. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? rent provision in an emerging financial market [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics.2005,120:1371-1411.
[35]Kim C.S., Mauer D.C., Stohs M.H. Corporate debt maturity policy and investor tax-timing options:theory and evidence. Financial Management.1995,24:33～45.
[36]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy.1998,106:1113-1155.
[37]Lehn K., Poulsen A. Contractual resolution of bondholder-shareholder conflicts in leveraged buy-outs. Journal of Law and Economics.1991,34:645～674.
[38]Leland H.E., Toft K.B. Optimal capital structure, endogenous bankruptcy, and the term structure of credit spreads. Journal of Finance.1996,51:987～1019.
[39]Marchica M.T. On the relevance of ownership structure in determining maturity of debt. SSRN Working Paper.2006.
[40]Merton, R. C. On the Pricing of Corporate Debt:The Risk Structure of Interest Rates. Journal of Finance.1974,29:449～70.
[41]Mitchell K. The debt maturity choice:an empirical investigation. Journal of Financial Research.1993,16:309～320.
[42]Morris J.R. On corporate debt maturity strategies. Journal of Finance.1976,31:29～37.
[43]Myers S.C. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics.1977,5:147～175.
[44]Ortiz-Molina, H. and M.F. Penas. The maturity of loan commitments to small businesses: an empirical analysis.2005.
[45]Ozkan A. An empirical analysis of corporate debt maturity structure. European Financial Management.2000,6:197～212.
[46]Rajan R. Insider and Outsiders:The choice between informed and arm's-length debt. Journal of Finance.1992,47:1367～1400.
[47]Rajan R., Zingales L. What do we know about optimal capital structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance.1995,50:1421～1460.
[48]Scherr F.C., Hulburt H.M. The debt maturity structure of small firms. Financial Management.2001,30:85～111.
[49]Schiantarelli, F. and A. Sembenelli. The Maturity Structure of Debt. Policy Research Working Paper 1699.The World Bank.1997.
[50]Schiantarelli, F., and SrivastavaV. Debt maturity and firm performance:a panel study if Indian pubilc limited companies. Policy Reaearch Working Paper Work Bank.1996.
[51]Silvia Magri. Debt maturity of Italian firms. SSRN Working Paper.2006.
[52]Smith C.W., Warner J.B. On financial contracting:an analysis of bond covenants. Journal of Financial Economics.1979,7:117～161.
[53]Smith, C.W., Watts, R.L. The investment oppotunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics.1992,32:263～ 292.
[54]Stiglitz J. E., On the irrelevance of corporate financial policy. The American Review. 1974,64:851～866.
[55]Stohs M.H., Mauer D.C. The determinants of corporate debt maturity structure. Journal of Business.1996,69:279～312.
[56]Stulz R. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial Economics.1990,26,3～27.
[57]Wiggins J.B. The relation between risk and optimal debt maturity and the value of leverage. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.1990,25:377～386.
[58]Yupana W., Raja K. and Chutatong C.. Connected Lending:Thailand before the Financial Crisis.Journal of Business.2006,79:181-218.
[59]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏：中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2006年度报告[M].经济科学出版社.2007.
[60]刘轻舟,曹淮扬.地方经济发展与企业债务期限结构关系研究.财经问题研究.2008,5：125～129.
[61]齐寅峰,王曼舒,黄福广等.中国企业投融资行为研究——基于问卷调查结果的分析.
管理世界.2005,5：94～114.
[62]孙铮,刘凤委和李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的实证证据.经济研究.2005,5：52～63.
[63]肖作平,李孔.负债到期结构：理论和证据.证券市场导报.2004,3：24～29.
[64]肖作平.上市公司债务期限结构影响因素分析.证券市场导报.2005a,3：51～57.
[65]肖作平.对我国上市公司债务期限结构影响因素的分析.经济科学.2005b,3：80～89.
[66]肖作平.债务期限结构和区域因素——来自中国上市公司的经验证据..证券市场导报.2007,11：43～50.
[67]肖作平,廖理.大股东,债权人保护和公司债务期限结构选择——来自中国上市公司的实证证据.管理世界.2007,10：99～113.
[68]徐斌.地区金融发展差异与我国公司债务期限结构——来自上市公司的经验证据.金融经济.2004：71～72.
[69]袁卫秋.上市公司债务期限结构的实证研究——来自汽车制造业的证据.经济评论.2005,3：75～80.