摘要
BOT模式在国内外基础设施建设的应用愈加广泛,同时也暴露出越来越多的问题。究其原因,可以归结为BOT项目本身的长期性、环境的不确定性和干系人众多。很多学者试图通过优化BOT项目特许权协议的合约安排改善项目绩效,英国、法国等国家相继编制出相关行业BOT项目特许权协议的合同范本。与此同时,特许期作为特许权协议合约安排的关键要素之一,其两类基本形式——固定特许期和弹性特许期日益成为研究的热点,本研究首次在合约安排的整体框架内对两种特许期形式进行比较研究,有助于充分认识这两种机制下合约安排的异同,从而为根据项目特征、环境特征和干系人特征选择适当的特许期形式提供理论基础。
本文的比较研究部分,首先通过文献调查,归纳出两种特许期形式的基本特征;其次,借助合约分析的基础理论——委托代理理论和交易费用理论,以交易费用作为特许期形式的比较基准。考虑到特许期机制与合约安排的关系,着重分析了特许期形式与定价、调价、风险、担保、保险、特许权期限的终止、不可预见事件与提前终止等合约安排要素的影响关系;之后,从风险分配、合约弹性、干系人利益权衡三个方面,对固定特许期和弹性特许期进行了定性比较,得到以下结论:(1)在风险分担方面,对于整体风险较小、收益较稳定的项目,传统的固定特许期机制可以满足要求;对于风险水平较高、收益受需求量影响明显的项目,采用弹性特许期机制能够有效的规避特许期预测风险,同时节约政府的担保费用;对于风险很高的项目,有政府补贴机制和自动调价机制的固定特许期再次体现出优势;(2)在合约弹性方面,价格弹性较特许期弹性更为“及时”,更有利于短期内的资金安排;特许期弹性则可以在发生提前终止、重新招标等重大变化时体现出操作上的便捷性;(3)在干系人利益权衡方面,追求持续稳定回报的投资人更倾向支持固定特许期机制。
As an innovated project delivery system, BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) has been widely used in infrastructure development home and abroad. However, more and more troubles with the implementation of such a delivery system haunted both the public and private sectors. Problems are rooted in the features of the project: the intertemporal nature, the uncertainty of the external environment and the competing objectives of various stakeholders. Researchers attempted to improve the project performance through adjusting the contract arrangement of BOT concession agreement. The standard contracts have been drafted in several countries, including Britain, France, etc. Meanwhile, the concession period, as a key component of contract agreement, has been a rising research topic. Its two forms, flexible period and fixed period, can be broadly deemed as two contract arrangements. The comparative study on concession period alternatives would be helpful to recognize the similarities and differences of the two forms of contract management; further, the research findings are expected to make contributions to decision-making for selection of concession period forms in BOT infrastructure projects.
For the main part of this thesis, the basic features of the two forms of concession period are firstly obtained through literature review. Then, based on the Principal-Agent theory and Transaction Cost theory, the criteria for comparison is established. Using these theories, the relationship between concession period and other components, such as price, risks, bonding mechanism, insurance and termination, are analyzed. The qualitative comparison is conducted from the perspectives of risk allocation, contract flexibility and interests of stakeholders. For the risk allocation, the suitability of the concession period alternatives is determined by the project safety; for the contract flexibility, fixed period is better in short-term funding while the flexible one reduces more transaction cost in early termination and rebidding; for the interest of stakeholders, the fixed one are more satisfactory with investors.
引文
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