大股东股权质押与审计师选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
大股东股权质押后倾向于从事应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理等机会主义行为来维稳股价,缓解控制权转移风险,因而大股东股权质押可能会影响审计师选择行为。本文以我国2007-2015年A股上市公司为样本,研究大股东股权质押与审计师选择之间的关系,结果显示:(1)大股东股权质押后更可能选择低质量的审计师,从而规避高质量的外部监督,缓解控制权转移风险。(2)这种关系只存在于民营企业中,在国有企业中这种关系不存在。(3)市场化环境在大股东股权质押与审计师选择之间发挥着调节作用,在市场化程度高的地区,大股东股权质押后选择低质量审计师的动机更强。(4)大股东股权质押的公司在选择非"四大"后进行了更多的应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理。本文提出了公司代理问题与审计师选择、股权质押经济后果以及审计师选择影响因素的相关对策。
Blockholders who pledge stock rights tend to engage in opportunistic behavior such as accrued earnings management and real earnings management to stabilize the stock price and alleviate the risk of losing control rights. Therefore, stock rights pledging of blockholders may affect the auditor choice behavior. This paper investigates the relationship between stock rights pledging of blockholders and auditor choice based on A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015. We find that blockholders who pledge stock rights is more likely to choose a low-quality auditor to avoid high-quality external supervision and ease the risk of losing control rights. However, this relationship only exists in private enterprises. Marketization also plays a mediation role. In regions with high degree of marketization, the motivation for selecting low-quality auditor after pledging stock is stronger. A further study found that companies with stock rights pledging of blockholders have conducted more accrued earnings management and real earnings management after selecting non-big4, thus they have achieved the goal of avoiding high-quality supervision. This paper puts forward suggestions that are related to agency problem and auditor choice, the economic consequences of stock rights pledge and the determinants of auditor choice.
Blockholders who pledge stock rights tend to engage in opportunistic behavior such as accrued earnings management and real earnings management to stabilize the stock price and alleviate the risk of losing control rights. Therefore, stock rights pledging of blockholders may affect the auditor choice behavior. This paper investigates the relationship between stock rights pledging of blockholders and auditor choice based on A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015. We find that blockholders who pledge stock rights is more likely to choose a low-quality auditor to avoid high-quality external supervision and ease the risk of losing control rights. However, this relationship only exists in private enterprises. Marketization also plays a mediation role. In regions with high degree of marketization, the motivation for selecting low-quality auditor after pledging stock is stronger. A further study found that companies with stock rights pledging of blockholders have conducted more accrued earnings management and real earnings management after selecting non-big4, thus they have achieved the goal of avoiding high-quality supervision. This paper puts forward suggestions that are related to agency problem and auditor choice, the economic consequences of stock rights pledge and the determinants of auditor choice.
引文
[1]徐寿福,贺学会,陈晶萍.股权质押与大股东双重择时动机[J].财经研究,2016(6):74-86.
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[13]廖珂,崔宸瑜,谢德仁.控股股东股权质押与上市公司股利政策选择[J].金融研究,2018(4):172-189.
[14]何平林,辛立柱,潘哲煜,等.上市公司股票送转行为动机研究——基于股权质押融资视角的证据[J].会计研究,2018(3):57-63.
[15]王雄元,欧阳才越,史震阳.股权质押、控制权转移风险与税收规避[J].经济研究,2018(1):138-152.
[16]何威风,刘怡君,吴玉宇.大股东股权质押和企业风险承担研究[J].中国软科学,2018(5):110-122.
[17]陆正飞,祝继高,樊铮.银根紧缩、信贷歧视与民营上市公司投资者利益损失[J].金融研究,2009(8):124-136.
[18]Gong T.Dependent judiciary and unaccountable judges:Judicial corruption in contemporary China [J].China Review,2004:33-54.
[19]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[20]Chan K H,Lin K Z,Wang R R.Government ownership,accounting-based regulations,and the pursuit of favorable audit opinions:Evidence from China [J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice & Theory,2012,31(4):47-64.
[21]杜兴强,谭雪.董事会国际化与审计师选择:来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2016(3):98-104.
[22]Wang Q,Wong T J,Xia L.State ownership,the institutional environment,and auditor choice:Evidence from China [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(1):112-134.
[23]Dechow P M,Sloan R G,Sweeney A P.Detecting Earnings Management [J].The Accounting Review,1995:193-225.
[24]张兆国,刘晓霞,邢道勇.公司治理结构与盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2009(1):122-133.
[25]Cohen D A,Zarowin P.Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings [J].Journal of Accounting & Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[26]Wang K,Xiao X.Controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation:Evidence from China [J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2011,30(1):89-100.
[27]苏冬蔚,熊家财.大股东掏空与CEO薪酬契约[J].金融研究,2013(12):167-180.
[2]谢德仁,郑登津,崔宸瑜.控股股东股权质押是潜在“地雷”吗?——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究[J].管理世界,2016(3):73-85.
[3]张瑞君,徐鑫,王超恩.大股东股权质押与企业创新[J].审计与经济研究,2017,32(4):63-73.
[4]郑国坚,林东杰,林斌.大股东股权质押、占款与企业价值[J].管理科学学报,2014(9):72-87.
[5]黄志忠,韩湘云.大股东股权质押、资金侵占与盈余管理[J].当代会计评论,2014(2):19-34.
[6]李旎,郑国坚.市值管理动机下的控股股东股权质押融资与利益侵占[J].会计研究,2015(5):42-49.
[7]Hunt A K,Lulseged A.Client importance and non-Big 5 auditors’ reporting decisions [J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2007,26(2):212-248.
[8]DeAngelo L E.Auditor size and audit quality [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981,3(3):183-199.
[9]Dye R A.Auditing standards,legal liability,and auditor wealth [J].Journal of political Economy,1993,101(5):887-914.
[10]谢德仁,廖珂.控股股东股权质押与上市公司真实盈余管理[J].会计研究,2018(8):21-27.
[11]李常青,李宇坤,李茂良.控股股东股权质押与企业创新投入[J].金融研究,2018(7):143-157.
[12]黄登仕,黄禹舜,周嘉南.控股股东股权质押影响上市公司“高送转”吗?[J].管理科学学报,2018,21(12):18-36+94.
[13]廖珂,崔宸瑜,谢德仁.控股股东股权质押与上市公司股利政策选择[J].金融研究,2018(4):172-189.
[14]何平林,辛立柱,潘哲煜,等.上市公司股票送转行为动机研究——基于股权质押融资视角的证据[J].会计研究,2018(3):57-63.
[15]王雄元,欧阳才越,史震阳.股权质押、控制权转移风险与税收规避[J].经济研究,2018(1):138-152.
[16]何威风,刘怡君,吴玉宇.大股东股权质押和企业风险承担研究[J].中国软科学,2018(5):110-122.
[17]陆正飞,祝继高,樊铮.银根紧缩、信贷歧视与民营上市公司投资者利益损失[J].金融研究,2009(8):124-136.
[18]Gong T.Dependent judiciary and unaccountable judges:Judicial corruption in contemporary China [J].China Review,2004:33-54.
[19]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[20]Chan K H,Lin K Z,Wang R R.Government ownership,accounting-based regulations,and the pursuit of favorable audit opinions:Evidence from China [J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice & Theory,2012,31(4):47-64.
[21]杜兴强,谭雪.董事会国际化与审计师选择:来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2016(3):98-104.
[22]Wang Q,Wong T J,Xia L.State ownership,the institutional environment,and auditor choice:Evidence from China [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(1):112-134.
[23]Dechow P M,Sloan R G,Sweeney A P.Detecting Earnings Management [J].The Accounting Review,1995:193-225.
[24]张兆国,刘晓霞,邢道勇.公司治理结构与盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2009(1):122-133.
[25]Cohen D A,Zarowin P.Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings [J].Journal of Accounting & Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[26]Wang K,Xiao X.Controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation:Evidence from China [J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2011,30(1):89-100.
[27]苏冬蔚,熊家财.大股东掏空与CEO薪酬契约[J].金融研究,2013(12):167-180.