摘要
Despite national conservation policies, international agreements and public support related to wetlands, a wide range of agricultural development and public works projects have resulted in the over-exploitation and degradation of wetlands during the past decades in China. The phenomenon of “the tragedy of the commons-in Chinese wetland conservation is recognized as an incentive problem provoked by a multi-stakeholder situation. This paper examines the governance of China’s wetlands and its hierarchical and functional–behavioral characteristics within the context of resource management. The results show that the administrative system in China wetland management depends on resource element-oriented legislation, in that various agencies managing different resources place various demands on wetland resources. This paper analyzes the responsibilities and incentives of various government administrators and other stakeholders as well as their behavioral logic and why such a multi-stakeholder mode fails to provide adequate wetland conservation. Using Heilongjiang Province as an example, it explains the conflicts between stakeholders within both the legislative system and those who administer wetland management. In addition, it suggests improvements, especially in the form of an integrated management system with an appropriate and unified system of administration.