LeChatelier-Samuelson principle in games and pass-through of shocks

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Alexei Alexandrov^a ; ^{alexei01@gmail.com} ; Ö ; zlem Bedre-Defolie^b ; ^{ozlem.bedre@esmt.org}
• 关键词：C72 ; D43 ; D11
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：March 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：168
• 期：Complete
• 页码：44-54
• 全文大小：270 K
• 卷排序：168

文摘

The LeChatelier–Samuelson principle states that, as a reaction to a shock, an agent's short-run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long-run adjustment (when the agent can also adjust other related actions). We extend the principle to strategic environments where the long-run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies. We show that the principle holds for supermodular games (strategic complements) satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide sufficient conditions for the principle to hold in games of strategic substitutes/heterogeneity. We discuss the principle's implications for cost pass-through of multiproduct firms.