Judicial decision making under changing legal standards: The case of dismissal arbitration

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• 作者：Benoit Pierre Freyens^a ; ^b ; ^c ; ^{ben.freyens@canberra.edu.au} ; Xiaodong Gong^b ; ^{xiaodong.gong@canberra.edu.au}
• 关键词：J52 ; K31 ; K41
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：133
• 期：Complete
• 页码：108-126
• 全文大小：1060 K
• 卷排序：133

文摘

Governments seek to control judicial decision making in dismissal disputes. This may be achieved through two channels: nomination bias and legal reforms. Hypothesis is tested using a panel of 81 judges and 2223 unfair dismissal verdicts. Both channels have strong predictive effects on courts’ decisions. The two channels reinforce or offset one another depending on context.