Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China

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• 作者：Binzhen Wu ; ^{wubzh@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn" class="auth_mail} ; Xiaohan Zhong
• 关键词：C78 ; D61 ; D78 ; I28
• 刊名：Games and Economic Behavior
• 出版年：March, 2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：84
• 期：Complete
• 页码：196-215
• 全文大小：327 K

文摘

We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre-exam submission asks students to submit college preferences before entrance exam scores are known, whereas post-score (post-exam) submission removes (reduces) score uncertainties. Theoretical analyses show that although mechanisms with post-score submission or SD matching are ex-post fair and efficient, they are not so ex-ante. Instead, the mechanism with pre-exam submission and BOS matching can be more fair and efficient ex-ante. These hypotheses are supported by empirical test on data from a top school at a top-ranked Chinese university with identification based on temporal and provincial changes. We find that although students admitted under the pre-exam BOS mechanism have lower college entrance exam scores than students admitted through other mechanisms on average, they exhibit similar or even better college academic performance.