Making room for rules

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• 作者：Adam Cureton (1)
  
  1. University of Tennessee ; 808 McClung Tower ; Knoxville ; TN ; 37996 ; USA
  
• 关键词：Kantian ethics ; Rule ; utilitarianism ; Rules
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：March 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：172
• 期：3
• 页码：737-759
• 全文大小：236 KB
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• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy
  Logic
  Epistemology
  Philosophy of Mind
  Philosophy of Religion
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0883

文摘

Kantian moral theories must explain how their most basic moral values of dignity and autonomy should be interpreted and applied to human conditions. One place Kantians should look for inspiration is, surprisingly, the utilitarian tradition and its emphasis on generally accepted, informally enforced, publicly known moral rules of the sort that help us give assurances, coordinate our behavior, and overcome weak wills. Kantians have tended to ignore utilitarian discussions of such rules mostly because they regard basic moral principles as a priori requirements that cannot be tailored to human foibles and limitations. I argue that Kantian moral theories should incorporate public moral rules as mid-level moral requirements for embodied and socially embedded human agents. I explain how certain specific moral judgments about how we ought to act are justified by public moral rules, which are themselves justified by more fundamental moral requirements.