用户名: 密码: 验证码:
Ignorance at Risk: Interaction at the Epistemic Boundary of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme
详细信息    查看全文
  • 作者:David R. Gibson
  • 刊名:Qualitative Sociology
  • 出版年:2016
  • 出版时间:September 2016
  • 年:2016
  • 卷:39
  • 期:3
  • 页码:221-246
  • 全文大小:2,582 KB
  • 刊物类别:Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
  • 刊物主题:Social Sciences
    Sociology
    Social Sciences
    Cross Cultural Psychology
    Interdisciplinary Studies
    Personality and Social Psychology
  • 出版者:Springer Netherlands
  • ISSN:1573-7837
  • 卷排序:39
文摘
Most long-lived organizational deceptions require the cooperation of outsiders who are close enough to the deception to suspect it, yet deliberately limit their knowledge so as to maintain plausible deniability. The interaction of such “proximate outsiders” with insiders—those who are fully “in the know”—can be a delicate affair, yet its careful management is essential to the survival of the deception. I analyze a phone conversation between Ponzi schemer Bernard Madoff and executives at Fairfield Greenwich, the investment firm that funneled him the most money, in which they discussed an impending SEC examination. First I examine Madoff’s attempts to cajole the executives into affirming (to Madoff and eventually to the SEC) that their hands-off approach to his operation was unremarkable. Next I consider two instances in which Madoff floundered in his explanations, repeatedly aborting and restarting sentences as he attempted to explain the inexplicable and reconcile the irreconcilable. Finally, I analyze Madoff’s handling of two of the executives’ more intrusive questions, and the part that each side played in the resulting non-answer. The three parts of the analysis illustrate what I argue are recurring and generalizable challenges of interaction at the epistemic boundary, associated with coaching, reconciling, and answering.KeywordsSecrecyDeceptionPonzi schemesBernard MadoffBoundariesConversation analysisSocial epistemics

© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号

地址:北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编:100083

电话:办公室:(+86 10)66554848;文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新:66554700