Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information

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• 作者：Ori Haimanko ; Atsushi Kajii
• 关键词：Incomplete information ; Robustness ; Bayesian Nash equilibrium ; \(\varepsilon \) ; equilibrium ; Upper hemicontinuity ; Zero ; sum games
• 刊名：International Journal of Game Theory
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：November 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：45
• 期：4
• 页码：839-857
• 全文大小：
• 刊物主题：Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Operation Research/Decision Theory;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-1270
• 卷排序：45

文摘

We relax the Kajii and Morris (Econometrica 65:1283–1309, 1997a) notion of equilibrium robustness by allowing approximate equilibria in close incomplete information games. The new notion is termed “approximate robustness”. The approximately robust equilibrium correspondence turns out to be upper hemicontinuous, unlike the (exactly) robust equilibrium correspondence. As a corollary of the upper hemicontinuity, it is shown that approximately robust equilibria exist in all two-player zero-sum games and all two-player two-strategy games, whereas (exactly) robust equilibria may fail to exist for some games in these categories.