Institutional investors and corporate governance.

详细信息   

• 作者：Wang ; Yong.
• 学历：Ph.D.
• 年：2010
• 导师：Mao, Connie X.,eadvisorElyasiani, Elyasecommittee memberChen, Zhaohuiecommittee member
• 毕业院校：Temple University
• Department：Business Administration
• ISBN：9781109597905
• CBH：3390527
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：680827
• Pages：168

文摘

The role of Institutional investors in alleviating the agent problem of management and its valuation effect has been studied extensively in corporate finance. We complement this stream of research by exploring managements control over institutional investors with misaligned objectives, particularly public pension fund, and the consequential valuation effect. We investigate the politic motive of public pension funds shareholder activism and its impact on the target firms operational performance, address the control of a strong management on public pension funds self-serving agenda, and finally we compare the ownership adjustment pattern of public pension funds to other institutional investors to conclude public pension funds ownership adjustment reflects their private pursuit. The first chapter explores the politic facet and performance effect of shareholder activism sponsored by public pension fund. In this study, we show that having a public pension fund as the leading sponsor of a shareholder proposal significantly improves the proposals likelihood of being accepted by the target firm. The increased acceptance rate sources from the subset of proposals addressing a social responsibility issue, and targeting firms with weak insider control. An investigation of the public pension board reveals that the boards political profile is the primary determinant of public pension funds propensity to lead a proposal, and the target firms acceptance rate. We also assess the performance impact of shareholder proposals. For target firms with strong insider control, the performance impact of accepted social responsibility proposals is significantly positive； that of governance proposals is negligible. For target firms with weak insider control, the performance impact associated with public pension funds is either negative or negligible. These results suggest that the motive driving public pension funds dominant presence in shareholder activism is not market based, but laden with purpose other than value creation. In the second chapter, we postulate that the widely documented negative valuation effect of ownership by public pension will be weak on firms with extra managerial control mechanism and/or whose managerial ownership of cash flow is high. For firms with high level managerial ownership of cash flow, management bears higher cost for a concession made with public pension funds misaligned objective. An efficient market will expect this effect and value the managerial control over public pension fund to the extent that the managements benefit is aligned with outside shareholders. Consequently, the cross section valuation difference of firms held by public pension funds can be explained by the managerial ownership of cash flow, managerial control derived from extra mechanism such as dual class share, however, has no explanative power. The last chapter investigates the link between private benefits and institutional holding change. We assume the cross section equilibrium of block holding will break when market sentiment is high. Consequently, block holder tends to shed more shares loaded with less private benefits by taking advantage of opportunities available in a high sentiment market. The empirical results support this conjecture. When the market sentiment is high, Institutional block holders tend to shed more private benefits meager dual-class share than private benefits affluent non-dual class share. This pattern does not exist when the market sentiment is low. Most importantly, public pension fund is identified as the major driver of this effect.