基于成本—收益的长三角地方政府的区域合作行为机制案例分析
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摘要
在全球化和区域一体化背景下,区域合作已成为各地区应对全球化、增强竞争力的重要手段,政府又在促进区域合作中扮演着至关重要的角色。本文以博弈论和政府行为理论为基础,结合利益相关者和成本收益分析法,提出共享型、损益型、比较利益型三种地方政府合作模式及其成本—收益分析框架,并据此考察中国区域合作典范长三角地区的旅游、交通、环境三个关键领域的合作博弈案例,深入阐释基于成本—收益的政府不同合作模式的合作动力、行为及其策略等,使之丰富区域一体化和城市政府合作等研究,也为进一步推动长三角一体化提供科学参考。
Under the background of globalization and regional integration, regional cooperation is viewed as a crucial approach to dealing with various challenges in the context of globalization, and likewise as a prerequisite for maintaining the cities' comparative advantages as well as competitiveness. Although different actors involving private enterprises, research agencies and other organizations have jointly participated in the regional organization, and local governments have played dominant roles in the cross-border cooperation by controlling the majority of social resources and assuming the responsibility of managing the economic activities within their jurisdictional areas. By applying the cost-benefit analysis based on the game theory and governmental behavior theory, this paper attempts to put forward three models of intergovernmental cooperation and builds a new theoretical framework to explain how the mutual gains and costs of the cooperative efforts drive the governmental behavior. Then, by focusing on the Yangtze River Delta(YRD) region, three typical cases of cooperation events,the YRD accessible travel circle(Changsanjiao wuzhang'ai lyuyouquan), Shanghai-JiangsuZhejiang-Anhui expressway(shensuzhewan gaosu gonglu) and the management of JiangsuZhejiang transboundary water pollution are selected to examine the three models of intergovernmental cooperation, namely, win-win model, comparative interest model, and winlose model. This paper explains different types of cost-benefit, cooperation powers, and behavioral strategies under different cooperation modes. Through tracing the process of cooperation formation and investigating intergovernmental interaction, this paper argues that the cooperative gains and costs significantly influence the governmental behavior, and further shape different models of intergovernmental cooperation. Based on the empirical analysis, this paper suggests that cooperative mechanism including mutual trust mechanism, dialogue and consultation mechanisms, benefit-sharing mechanisms, as well as supervision mechanism should be formed in the further promotion of regional cooperation in the Yangtze River Delta.
Under the background of globalization and regional integration, regional cooperation is viewed as a crucial approach to dealing with various challenges in the context of globalization, and likewise as a prerequisite for maintaining the cities' comparative advantages as well as competitiveness. Although different actors involving private enterprises, research agencies and other organizations have jointly participated in the regional organization, and local governments have played dominant roles in the cross-border cooperation by controlling the majority of social resources and assuming the responsibility of managing the economic activities within their jurisdictional areas. By applying the cost-benefit analysis based on the game theory and governmental behavior theory, this paper attempts to put forward three models of intergovernmental cooperation and builds a new theoretical framework to explain how the mutual gains and costs of the cooperative efforts drive the governmental behavior. Then, by focusing on the Yangtze River Delta(YRD) region, three typical cases of cooperation events,the YRD accessible travel circle(Changsanjiao wuzhang'ai lyuyouquan), Shanghai-JiangsuZhejiang-Anhui expressway(shensuzhewan gaosu gonglu) and the management of JiangsuZhejiang transboundary water pollution are selected to examine the three models of intergovernmental cooperation, namely, win-win model, comparative interest model, and winlose model. This paper explains different types of cost-benefit, cooperation powers, and behavioral strategies under different cooperation modes. Through tracing the process of cooperation formation and investigating intergovernmental interaction, this paper argues that the cooperative gains and costs significantly influence the governmental behavior, and further shape different models of intergovernmental cooperation. Based on the empirical analysis, this paper suggests that cooperative mechanism including mutual trust mechanism, dialogue and consultation mechanisms, benefit-sharing mechanisms, as well as supervision mechanism should be formed in the further promotion of regional cooperation in the Yangtze River Delta.
引文
[1] Gordon V. Partners or competitors? Perceptions of regional economic development cooperation in Illinois. Economic Development Quarterly, 2007, 21(1):60-78.
[2] Lee Y, Lee I W, Feiock R C. Interorganizational collaboration networks in economic development policy:An exponential random graph model analysis. Policy Studies Journal, 2012, 40:547-573.
[3] Agranoff R, McGuire M. Collaborative Public Management:New Strategies for Local Governments. Washington DC:Georgetown University Press, 2004:124-145.
[4] Sun Yazhong. Intergovernmental Competition Theory. Nanjing:Nanjing University Publishing House, 2011:249-264.[孙亚忠.政府竞争论.南京:南京大学出版社, 2011:249-264.]
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[9] Mandell M P. Intergovernmental management in interorganizational networks:A revised perspective. International Journal of Public Administration, 1988, 11(4):393-416.
[10] Lowndes V, Skelcher C. The dynamics of multi-organizational partnerships:An analysis of changing modes of governance. Public Administration, 1998, 76(2):313-333.
[11] Heeg S, Klagge B, Ossenbruugge J. Metropolitan cooperation in Europe:Theoretical issues and perspectives for urban networking. European Planning Studies, 2003, 11(2):139-153.
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[13] Foster K A, Barnes W R. Reframing regional governance for research and practice. Urban Affairs Review, 2012, 48(2):272-283.
[14] Kokx A, Van Kempen R. Dutch urban governance:Multi-level or multi-scalar? European urban and Regional Studies,2010, 17(4):355-369.
[15] Brenner N. Decoding the newest"metropolitan regionalism"in the USA:A critical overview. Cities, 2002, 19(1):3-21.
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[17] Olson M. The Logic of Collective Action. Shanghai:Joint Publishing, 1995:4-17.[曼瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑.上海:三联书店, 1995:4-17.]
[18] Li Ping, Chen Na. An explanation of the integration of regional economy from the point of neo-institutional economics.Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition), 2005, 7(2):72-76.[李平,陈娜.区域经济一体化的新制度经济学解释.哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2005, 7(2):72-76.]
[19] Feiock R C. Metropolitan governance and institutional collective action. Urban Affairs Review, 2009, 44(3):356-377.
[20] Feiock R C. The Institutional collective action framework. Policy Studies Journal, 2013, 41:397-425.
[21] Chen Wen, Wang Jue. Assessment and measurement of spatial integration in Changjiang River Delta. Scientia Geographica Sinica, 2013, 33(8):902-908.[陈雯,王珏.长江三角洲空间一体化发展格局的初步测度.地理科学,2013, 33(8):902-908.]
[22] Luo Xiaolong. Inter-city Cooperation and Governance in the Yangtze River Delta Region. Beijing:The Coomercial Press, 2011:182-188.[罗小龙.长江三角洲地区的城市合作与管治.北京:商务印书馆, 2011:182-188.]
[23] Williamson O E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting. New York:Free Press, 1985.
[24] Liu Chao. Regional cooperation:The consensus to solve marginalization[D]. Xi'an:Northwest University, 2010.[刘超.区域间政府合作:应对边缘化的共识[D].西安:西北大学, 2010.]
[25] Qu Zili. Endogenous transaction cost and regional economic integration. Nankai Economic Studies, 2003(2):67-70.[屈子力.内生交易费用与区域经济一体化.南开经济研究, 2003(2):67-70.]
[26] Wu Chaoyang. Analysis on regional economic integration in the perspective of organization economics and China's strategy choice[D]. Nanchang:Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2005.[吴朝阳.区域经济一体化的组织经济学分析:兼论中国的策略选择[D].南昌:江西财经大学, 2005.]
[27] Docherty I, Gulliver S, Drake P. Exploring the potential benefits of city collaboration. Regional Studies, 2004, 38(4):445-456.
[28] National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2004 China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing:China Statistics Press, 2005.[国家统计局. 2004年中国统计年鉴.北京:中国统计出版社, 2005.]
[29] Chen Wen, Wang Jue, Gao Jinlong. Tourism cooperation among governments in the metropolitan region and the integration mechanisms:Evidence from the Yangtze River Delta, China. Tropical Geography, 2017, 37(6):784-791.[陈雯,王珏,高金龙.城市群区域一体化与旅游共享合作机制:长三角的经验借鉴.热带地理, 2017, 37(6):784-791.]
[30] Hayek F A. Deng Zhenglai, trans. The Constitution of Liberty. Beijing:SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:108-142.[弗里德里希·冯·哈耶克.邓正来,译.自由秩序原理.北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店, 1997:108-142.]
(1)20世纪90年代起,盛泽的印染业空前发展,废水涌入河道,致使嘉兴北部王江泾镇的渔民遭受到巨大的损失。1995年,200多名渔民挑着死鱼闯进盛泽镇政府,爆发了“臭鱼堵门”事件。
[2] Lee Y, Lee I W, Feiock R C. Interorganizational collaboration networks in economic development policy:An exponential random graph model analysis. Policy Studies Journal, 2012, 40:547-573.
[3] Agranoff R, McGuire M. Collaborative Public Management:New Strategies for Local Governments. Washington DC:Georgetown University Press, 2004:124-145.
[4] Sun Yazhong. Intergovernmental Competition Theory. Nanjing:Nanjing University Publishing House, 2011:249-264.[孙亚忠.政府竞争论.南京:南京大学出版社, 2011:249-264.]
[5] Huang Luntao. Study on the benefit-sharing mechanism in the local government cooperation[D]. Hangzhou:Zhejiang University, 2012.[黄伦涛.地方政府合作中的利益共享机制研究[D].杭州:浙江大学, 2012.]
[6] Xu J, Yeh A G O. Interjurisdictional cooperation through bargaining:The case of the Guangzhou-Zhuhai Railway in the Pearl River Delta, China. The China Quarterly, 2013, 213:130-151.
[7] Agranoff R. Directions in intergovernmental management. International Journal of Public Administration, 1988, 11(4):357-391.
[8] Agranoff R, McGuire M. Another look at bargaining and negotiating in intergovernmental management. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2004, 14(4):495-512.
[9] Mandell M P. Intergovernmental management in interorganizational networks:A revised perspective. International Journal of Public Administration, 1988, 11(4):393-416.
[10] Lowndes V, Skelcher C. The dynamics of multi-organizational partnerships:An analysis of changing modes of governance. Public Administration, 1998, 76(2):313-333.
[11] Heeg S, Klagge B, Ossenbruugge J. Metropolitan cooperation in Europe:Theoretical issues and perspectives for urban networking. European Planning Studies, 2003, 11(2):139-153.
[12] Jessop B. The regulation approach, governance and post-fordism:Alternative perspectives on economic and political change? International Journal of Human Resource Management, 1995, 24(3):307-333.
[13] Foster K A, Barnes W R. Reframing regional governance for research and practice. Urban Affairs Review, 2012, 48(2):272-283.
[14] Kokx A, Van Kempen R. Dutch urban governance:Multi-level or multi-scalar? European urban and Regional Studies,2010, 17(4):355-369.
[15] Brenner N. Decoding the newest"metropolitan regionalism"in the USA:A critical overview. Cities, 2002, 19(1):3-21.
[16] Feiock R C. Metropolitan Governance:Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation. Washington DC:Georgetown University Press, 2004:45-102.
[17] Olson M. The Logic of Collective Action. Shanghai:Joint Publishing, 1995:4-17.[曼瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑.上海:三联书店, 1995:4-17.]
[18] Li Ping, Chen Na. An explanation of the integration of regional economy from the point of neo-institutional economics.Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition), 2005, 7(2):72-76.[李平,陈娜.区域经济一体化的新制度经济学解释.哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2005, 7(2):72-76.]
[19] Feiock R C. Metropolitan governance and institutional collective action. Urban Affairs Review, 2009, 44(3):356-377.
[20] Feiock R C. The Institutional collective action framework. Policy Studies Journal, 2013, 41:397-425.
[21] Chen Wen, Wang Jue. Assessment and measurement of spatial integration in Changjiang River Delta. Scientia Geographica Sinica, 2013, 33(8):902-908.[陈雯,王珏.长江三角洲空间一体化发展格局的初步测度.地理科学,2013, 33(8):902-908.]
[22] Luo Xiaolong. Inter-city Cooperation and Governance in the Yangtze River Delta Region. Beijing:The Coomercial Press, 2011:182-188.[罗小龙.长江三角洲地区的城市合作与管治.北京:商务印书馆, 2011:182-188.]
[23] Williamson O E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting. New York:Free Press, 1985.
[24] Liu Chao. Regional cooperation:The consensus to solve marginalization[D]. Xi'an:Northwest University, 2010.[刘超.区域间政府合作:应对边缘化的共识[D].西安:西北大学, 2010.]
[25] Qu Zili. Endogenous transaction cost and regional economic integration. Nankai Economic Studies, 2003(2):67-70.[屈子力.内生交易费用与区域经济一体化.南开经济研究, 2003(2):67-70.]
[26] Wu Chaoyang. Analysis on regional economic integration in the perspective of organization economics and China's strategy choice[D]. Nanchang:Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2005.[吴朝阳.区域经济一体化的组织经济学分析:兼论中国的策略选择[D].南昌:江西财经大学, 2005.]
[27] Docherty I, Gulliver S, Drake P. Exploring the potential benefits of city collaboration. Regional Studies, 2004, 38(4):445-456.
[28] National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2004 China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing:China Statistics Press, 2005.[国家统计局. 2004年中国统计年鉴.北京:中国统计出版社, 2005.]
[29] Chen Wen, Wang Jue, Gao Jinlong. Tourism cooperation among governments in the metropolitan region and the integration mechanisms:Evidence from the Yangtze River Delta, China. Tropical Geography, 2017, 37(6):784-791.[陈雯,王珏,高金龙.城市群区域一体化与旅游共享合作机制:长三角的经验借鉴.热带地理, 2017, 37(6):784-791.]
[30] Hayek F A. Deng Zhenglai, trans. The Constitution of Liberty. Beijing:SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:108-142.[弗里德里希·冯·哈耶克.邓正来,译.自由秩序原理.北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店, 1997:108-142.]
(1)20世纪90年代起,盛泽的印染业空前发展,废水涌入河道,致使嘉兴北部王江泾镇的渔民遭受到巨大的损失。1995年,200多名渔民挑着死鱼闯进盛泽镇政府,爆发了“臭鱼堵门”事件。
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