股权激励能提高上市公司信息透明度吗?——基于未来盈余反应系数的分析
|
摘要
本文利用实施股权激励的沪深A股上市公司2006—2016年的数据,采用未来盈余反应系数(FERC)衡量公司信息透明度,研究管理层股权激励对公司信息透明度的影响,以及不同所有权性质下这一影响的差异,并进一步探讨上述关系的作用路径。研究发现,随着管理层股权激励薪酬比重的提高,FERC得到了加强,说明股权激励有助于提高公司信息透明度,并且这种作用主要存在于非国有企业中,在国有企业中表现并不明显;上述结论在控制内生性后仍然成立。作用路径分析发现,增加管理层股权激励薪酬比重可以降低应计盈余管理程度,并提高管理层自愿性业绩预测的披露倾向、频率、精度和准确度,说明股权激励主要通过促使管理层向投资者提供更高质量的会计盈余或自愿披露更多而又可靠的私有信息来提高公司信息透明度。本文拓展了股权激励治理效应的研究,同时,研究结论对于提高公司信息透明度和国有企业高管股权激励市场化改革均具有重要的参考价值。
On 31 st of December 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) released the "Regulation of Equity Incentive Plans(trial)", permitting firms to grant executive equity incentives. Since then, equity incentive plans have been rapidly implemented among Chinese listed firms. There are two conflicting views on the effects of managerial equity incentives: alignment and rent-extraction. The former suggests that managers' equity incentives better aligns their interest with the interests of shareholders, whereas the latter argues that equity incentives can induce managers to pursue their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. The existing literature provide mixed evidence on the association between managerial equity incentives and various aspects of financial reporting quality as well as voluntary disclosure. The incentive alignment hypothesis indicates that equity incentives can not only improve the firms' reported earnings quality, but also encourage managers to voluntarily provide additional information to the market. In contrast, the rent-extraction hypothesis suggests that equity incentives can induce managers to manipulate their firms' earnings and voluntary disclosure in order to maximize their own benefit. This paper aims to offer an analysis and discussion of whether the information provided by equity-compensated managers improves Chinese firms' information transparency. We particularly focus on how a managerial equity incentives affect the availability of firm-specific information to those market participants outside the publicly-traded firms, which measured by the future earnings response coefficient(i.e. FERC). When equity incentive motivates managers to provide higher quality earnings or voluntarily disclose more private information, it will improve firms' information transparency because investors can get more firm-specific information. In contrast, when equity incentive induces managers to manipulate their firms' earnings and voluntary disclosure in order to maximize their own benefit, the firms' information transparency will be reduced because investors can not obtain real information about the company. Thus, the association between managerial equity incentives and firms' information transparency is expected to be positive(negative) under the alignment(rent-extraction) hypothesis. Which effect dominates is an unanswered, empirical question that we address.Using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies that implemented equity incentives during 2006-2016, our analyses yield the following main findings. First, we find that managerial equity incentives enhance the FERC, indicating that managerial equity incentives improve the firms' information transparency. This finding supports the incentive alignment hypothesis that disclosures by equity-incentivized managers can mitigate disclosure agency problems. Second, we find that managerial equity incentives does not enhance FERC for state-owned enterprises but enhance FERC for non-state-owned enterprises. Additional analyses show that equity incentives not only reduce accrual earnings management, but also increase the likelihood, frequency, precision and accuracy of voluntary management earnings forecasts, indicating that equity incentives primarily enhance FERC by prompting management to provide higher quality earnings or more and credible voluntary disclosure for investors. These results are robust to a set of sensitivity test, including Heckman two-stage regression and two-stage-least-squares(2 SLS) controlling for endogeneity bias.This paper makes several contributions. Firstly, this paper finds that managerial equity incentives improve firms' information transparency, which provide a new research perspective for the investigation of the effectiveness of China's equity incentive system. Secondly, by examining the relationship between managerial equity incentives and the FERC, this paper expands the existing literature examining the factors that affect FERC. Thirdly, the results in this paper are meaningful for the improvement of information transparency of Chinese listed firms, and provide theoretical reference for the market-oriented reform of executive equity incentives in state-owned enterprises.
On 31 st of December 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) released the "Regulation of Equity Incentive Plans(trial)", permitting firms to grant executive equity incentives. Since then, equity incentive plans have been rapidly implemented among Chinese listed firms. There are two conflicting views on the effects of managerial equity incentives: alignment and rent-extraction. The former suggests that managers' equity incentives better aligns their interest with the interests of shareholders, whereas the latter argues that equity incentives can induce managers to pursue their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. The existing literature provide mixed evidence on the association between managerial equity incentives and various aspects of financial reporting quality as well as voluntary disclosure. The incentive alignment hypothesis indicates that equity incentives can not only improve the firms' reported earnings quality, but also encourage managers to voluntarily provide additional information to the market. In contrast, the rent-extraction hypothesis suggests that equity incentives can induce managers to manipulate their firms' earnings and voluntary disclosure in order to maximize their own benefit. This paper aims to offer an analysis and discussion of whether the information provided by equity-compensated managers improves Chinese firms' information transparency. We particularly focus on how a managerial equity incentives affect the availability of firm-specific information to those market participants outside the publicly-traded firms, which measured by the future earnings response coefficient(i.e. FERC). When equity incentive motivates managers to provide higher quality earnings or voluntarily disclose more private information, it will improve firms' information transparency because investors can get more firm-specific information. In contrast, when equity incentive induces managers to manipulate their firms' earnings and voluntary disclosure in order to maximize their own benefit, the firms' information transparency will be reduced because investors can not obtain real information about the company. Thus, the association between managerial equity incentives and firms' information transparency is expected to be positive(negative) under the alignment(rent-extraction) hypothesis. Which effect dominates is an unanswered, empirical question that we address.Using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies that implemented equity incentives during 2006-2016, our analyses yield the following main findings. First, we find that managerial equity incentives enhance the FERC, indicating that managerial equity incentives improve the firms' information transparency. This finding supports the incentive alignment hypothesis that disclosures by equity-incentivized managers can mitigate disclosure agency problems. Second, we find that managerial equity incentives does not enhance FERC for state-owned enterprises but enhance FERC for non-state-owned enterprises. Additional analyses show that equity incentives not only reduce accrual earnings management, but also increase the likelihood, frequency, precision and accuracy of voluntary management earnings forecasts, indicating that equity incentives primarily enhance FERC by prompting management to provide higher quality earnings or more and credible voluntary disclosure for investors. These results are robust to a set of sensitivity test, including Heckman two-stage regression and two-stage-least-squares(2 SLS) controlling for endogeneity bias.This paper makes several contributions. Firstly, this paper finds that managerial equity incentives improve firms' information transparency, which provide a new research perspective for the investigation of the effectiveness of China's equity incentive system. Secondly, by examining the relationship between managerial equity incentives and the FERC, this paper expands the existing literature examining the factors that affect FERC. Thirdly, the results in this paper are meaningful for the improvement of information transparency of Chinese listed firms, and provide theoretical reference for the market-oriented reform of executive equity incentives in state-owned enterprises.
引文
[1]Piotroski,J.D.,and T.J.Wong.Institutions and Information Environment of Chinese Listed Firms[R].National Bureau of Economic Research,2011.
[2]李丹,王丹.供应链客户信息对公司信息环境的影响研究——基于股价同步性的分析[J].北京:金融研究,2016,(12):191-206.
[3]Healy,P.M.,and K.G.Palepu.Information Asymmetry,Corporate Disclosure,and the Capital Markets:A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31,(1-3):405-440.
[4]Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3,(4):305-360.
[5]Armstrong,C.S.,A.D.Jagolinzer,and D.F.Larcker.Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2010,48,(2):225-271.
[6]Nagara,V.,D.Nanda,and P.Wysocki.Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-based Incentives[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,34,(1-3):283-309.
[7]Kim,H.T.,B.Kwak,J.Lee,and I.Suk.CEO and Outside Director Equity Compensation:Substitutes or Complements for Management Earnings Forecasts?[J].European Accounting Review,2018,forthcoming.
[8]高敬忠,周晓苏.管理层持股能减轻自愿性披露中的代理冲突吗?——以我国A股上市公司业绩预告数据为例[J].上海:财经研究,2013,(11):123-133.
[9]Bebchuk,L.A.,and J.M.Fried.Executive Compensation as An Agency Problem[J].Journal of Economic Perspective,2003,17,(3):71-92.
[10]Bergstresser,D.,and T.Philippon.CEO Incentives and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80,(3):511-529.
[11]杨慧辉,赵媛,潘飞.股权分置改革后上市公司股权激励的有效性——基于盈余管理的视角[J].北京:经济管理,2012,(8):65-75.
[12]Brockman,P.,X.Martin,and A.Puckett.Voluntary Disclosures and the Exercise of CEO Stock Options[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2010,16,(1):120-136.
[13]Cheng,Q.,T.Luo.and H.Yue.Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision[J].The Accounting Review,2013,88,(5):1575-1602.
[14]盛明泉,蒋伟.我国上市公司股权激励对公司业绩的影响——基于2006—2008年度的面板数据[J].北京:经济管理,2011,(9):100-106.
[15]陈文强.股权激励、契约异质性与企业绩效的动态增长[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(5):175-192.
[16]吕长江,张海平.股权激励计划对公司投资行为的影响[J].北京:管理世界,2011,(11):118-126.
[17]陈效东,周嘉南,黄登仕.高管人员股权激励与公司非效率投资:抑制或者加剧?[J].北京:会计研究,2016,(7):42-49.
[18]肖淑芳,喻梦颖.股权激励与股利分配——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:会计研究,2012,(8):49-57.
[19]陈红,郭丹.股权激励计划:工具还是面具?——上市公司股权激励、工具选择与现金股利政策[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(2):85-99.
[20]姜英兵,于雅萍.谁是更直接的创新者?——核心员工股权激励与企业创新[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(3):109-127.
[21]李丹蒙,万华林.股权激励契约特征与企业创新[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(10):156-172.
[22]张兴亮.集体行动困境、高管持股差距与企业创新投入[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(8):172-193.
[23]袁东任,汪炜.异常审计收费可用来度量盈余质量吗——来自中国A股市场的经验证据[J].南昌:当代财经,2015,(7):118-129.
[24]钟凯,程小可,王化成,刘金钊.融资融券制度提高了股价信息含量吗?——基于未来盈余反应系数的实证分析[J].上海:会计与经济研究,2017,(2):3-25.
[25]Piotroski,J.D.,and D.T.Roulstone.The Influence of Analysts,Institutional Investors,and Insiders on the Incorporation of Market,Industry,and Firm-specific Information into Stock Prices[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79,(4):1119-1151.
[26]Muslu,V.,S.Radhakrishnan,K.R.Subramanyamet,and D.Lim.Forward-Looking MD&A Disclosures and the Information Environment[J].Management Science,2015,61,(5):931-1196.
[27]Choi,B.,and J.B.Kim.The Effect of CEO Stock-Based Compensation on the Pricing of Future Earnings[J].European Accounting Review,2017,26,(4):651-679.
[28]林忠国,韩立岩,李伟.股价波动非同步性——信息还是噪音?[J].天津:管理科学学报,2012,(6):68-81.
[29]Collins,D.W.,S.P.Kothari,J.Shanken,and R.G.Sloan.Lack of Timeliness and Noise As Explanations for the Low Contemporaneuos Return-earnings Association[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,18,(3):289-234.
[30]Kothari,S.P.,and R.G.Sloan.Information in Prices About Future Earnings:Implications for Earnings Response Coefficients[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1992,15,(2-3):143-171.
[31]Sloan,R.G.Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About Future Earnings?[J].The Accounting Review,1996,71,(3):289-315.
[32]Xie,H.The Mispricing of Abnormal Accruals[J].The Accounting Review,2001,76,(3):357-373.
[33]Haw,I.M.,B.B.Hu,J.J.Lee,and W.Wu.Investor Protection and Price Informativeness About Future Earnings:International Evidence[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2012,17,(2):389-419.
[34]Lundholm,R.,and L.A.Myers.Bringing the Future Forward:The Effect of Disclosure on the Returns-earnings Relation[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40,(3):809-839.
[35]Choi,J.H.,L.A.Myers,Y.Zang,and D.Ziebart.Do Management EPS Forecasts Allow Returns to Reflect Future Earnings? Implications for the Continuation of Management’s Quarterly Earnings Guidance[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2011,16,(1):143-182.
[36]刘宝华,罗宏,周微.股权激励行权限制与盈余管理优序选择[J].北京:管理世界,2016,(11):141-155.
[37]刘银国,孙慧倩,王烨,古柳.业绩型股权激励与盈余管理方式选择[J].北京:中国管理科学,2017,(3):49-58.
[38]辛宇,吕长江.激励、福利还是奖励:薪酬管制背景下国有企业股权激励的定位困境——基于泸州老窖的案例分析[J].北京:会计研究,2012,(6):67-75.
[39]Chen,Z.,Y.Y.Guan,and B.Ke.Are Stock Option Grants to Directors of State-Controlled Chinese Firms Listed in HongKong Genuine Compensation?[J].The Accounting Review,2013,88,(5):1547-1574.
[40]邵帅,周涛,吕长江.产权性质与股权激励设计动机——上海家化案例分析[J].北京:会计研究,2014,(10):43-50.
[41]Jiang,F.,and K.A.Kim.Corporate Governance in China:A Modern Perspective[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,(32):190-216.
[42]吴育辉,吴世农.股票减持过程中的大股东掏空行为研究[J].北京:中国工业经济,2010,(5):121-130.
[43]Gelb,D.S.,and P.Zarowin.Corporate Disclosure Policy and the Informativeness of Stock Prices[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2002,7,(1):33-52.
[44]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].北京:经济研究,2010,(11):88-100.
[45]Dechow,P.M.,R.G.Sloan,and A.P.Sweeney.Detecting Earnings Management[J].Accounting Review,1995,70,(2):193-225.
[46]Kothari,S.P.,A.J.Leone,and C.E.Wasley.Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39,(1):163-197.
[47]扈文秀,付强,吴婷婷.股票期权激励与管理层业绩预测披露的操控行为[J].哈尔滨:管理科学,2017,(6):142-158.
[48]袁振超,岳衡,谈文峰.代理成本、所有权性质与业绩预告精确度[J].天津:南开管理评论,2014,(3):49-61.
[49]吕长江,严明珠,郑慧莲,许静静.为什么上市公司选择股权激励计划?[J].北京:会计研究,2011,(1):68-75.
[50]Fang,H.,J.R.Nofsinger,and J.Quan.The Effects of Employee Stock Option Plans on Operating Performance in Chinese Firms[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2015,(54):141-159.
[51]Core,J.,and W.Guay.The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,28,(2):151-184.
[52]Drake,M.S.,J.N.Myers,L.A.Myers,and M.D.Stuart.Short Sellers and the Informativeness of Stock Prices with Respect to Future Earnings[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2015,20,(2):747-774.
[53]苏冬蔚,熊家财.股票流动性、股价信息含量与CEO薪酬契约[J].北京:经济研究,2013,(11):56-70.
[54]Chourou,L.,E.Abaoub,and S.Saadi.The Economic Determinants of CEO Stock Option Compensation[J].Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2008,18,(1):61-77.
[55]Larcker,D.F.,and T.O.Rusticus.On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,49,(3):186-205.
[56]Hsu,A.W.H.,and H.Pourjalali.The Impact of IAS No.27 on the Market’s Ability to Anticipate Future Earnings[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2015,32,(2):789-813.
[57]Burns,N.,and S.Kedia.The Impact of Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79,(1):35-67.
[58]李慧云,吕文超.上市公司自愿性信息披露现状及其监管研究[J].北京:统计研究,2012,(4):86-91.
(1)网络平台问答是指上市公司通过深交所的“互动易”和上交所的“上证e互动”网络平台以回答投资者提问的方式披露公司信息。
(2)本文中的“高管”和“管理层”的含义类似,均指上市公司的董事和高级管理人员,只是在名称上遵循了以往文献的习惯。
(3)这一比例在《关于规范国有控股上市公司实施股权激励制度有关问题的通知》(国资发分配[2008]171号)中被提高到40%。
(4)在以民营上市公司为主的非国有上市公司中,管理层和大股东身份常常重合(Jiang和Kim,2015)[41],而大股东的掏空动机也会影响上市公司的信息披露行为(吴育辉和吴世农,2010)[42],若采用管理层的持股数量,可能会对研究结果造成偏误。
(5)行业按照证监会《上市公司行业分类指引》(2012)进行划分。
(6)由于大部分研究FERC的文献都不加入行业和年份控制变量(Collins等,1994[29];Lundholm和Myers,2002[34];Chio等2011[35];Gelb和Zarowin,2002[43]),本文在正式的检验中也未对此进行控制。本文在后续的稳健性检验中加入行业和年份控制变量后,所得结论保持不变。
(7)在Bergstresser和Philippon(2006)[10]的研究中,美国上市公司仅CEO的股权激励薪酬水平就达到0.263。
(8)具体的计算公式及计算过程参见苏冬蔚和林大庞(2010)[44]的文章,在此不做赘述。
(9)上交所只对年度业绩预测进行了上述强制性披露条件的规定,而季度和半年度业绩预测无条件限制,都属于自愿性披露。
(10)Larcker和Rusticus(2010)[55]建议当工具变量个数为1、2、3、5和10时,对应的临界F值为8.96、11.59、12.83、15.09和20.88。
(11)事实上,这也是国资委等监管部门早已明确的改革方向。例如,国资委、财政部在2008年10月发布的《关于规范国有控股上市公司实施股权激励制度有关问题的通知》中明确指出:“随着资本市场的逐步完善以及上市公司市场化程度和竞争性的不断提高,将逐步取消股权励收益水平限制”。
[2]李丹,王丹.供应链客户信息对公司信息环境的影响研究——基于股价同步性的分析[J].北京:金融研究,2016,(12):191-206.
[3]Healy,P.M.,and K.G.Palepu.Information Asymmetry,Corporate Disclosure,and the Capital Markets:A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31,(1-3):405-440.
[4]Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3,(4):305-360.
[5]Armstrong,C.S.,A.D.Jagolinzer,and D.F.Larcker.Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2010,48,(2):225-271.
[6]Nagara,V.,D.Nanda,and P.Wysocki.Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-based Incentives[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,34,(1-3):283-309.
[7]Kim,H.T.,B.Kwak,J.Lee,and I.Suk.CEO and Outside Director Equity Compensation:Substitutes or Complements for Management Earnings Forecasts?[J].European Accounting Review,2018,forthcoming.
[8]高敬忠,周晓苏.管理层持股能减轻自愿性披露中的代理冲突吗?——以我国A股上市公司业绩预告数据为例[J].上海:财经研究,2013,(11):123-133.
[9]Bebchuk,L.A.,and J.M.Fried.Executive Compensation as An Agency Problem[J].Journal of Economic Perspective,2003,17,(3):71-92.
[10]Bergstresser,D.,and T.Philippon.CEO Incentives and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80,(3):511-529.
[11]杨慧辉,赵媛,潘飞.股权分置改革后上市公司股权激励的有效性——基于盈余管理的视角[J].北京:经济管理,2012,(8):65-75.
[12]Brockman,P.,X.Martin,and A.Puckett.Voluntary Disclosures and the Exercise of CEO Stock Options[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2010,16,(1):120-136.
[13]Cheng,Q.,T.Luo.and H.Yue.Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision[J].The Accounting Review,2013,88,(5):1575-1602.
[14]盛明泉,蒋伟.我国上市公司股权激励对公司业绩的影响——基于2006—2008年度的面板数据[J].北京:经济管理,2011,(9):100-106.
[15]陈文强.股权激励、契约异质性与企业绩效的动态增长[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(5):175-192.
[16]吕长江,张海平.股权激励计划对公司投资行为的影响[J].北京:管理世界,2011,(11):118-126.
[17]陈效东,周嘉南,黄登仕.高管人员股权激励与公司非效率投资:抑制或者加剧?[J].北京:会计研究,2016,(7):42-49.
[18]肖淑芳,喻梦颖.股权激励与股利分配——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:会计研究,2012,(8):49-57.
[19]陈红,郭丹.股权激励计划:工具还是面具?——上市公司股权激励、工具选择与现金股利政策[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(2):85-99.
[20]姜英兵,于雅萍.谁是更直接的创新者?——核心员工股权激励与企业创新[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(3):109-127.
[21]李丹蒙,万华林.股权激励契约特征与企业创新[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(10):156-172.
[22]张兴亮.集体行动困境、高管持股差距与企业创新投入[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(8):172-193.
[23]袁东任,汪炜.异常审计收费可用来度量盈余质量吗——来自中国A股市场的经验证据[J].南昌:当代财经,2015,(7):118-129.
[24]钟凯,程小可,王化成,刘金钊.融资融券制度提高了股价信息含量吗?——基于未来盈余反应系数的实证分析[J].上海:会计与经济研究,2017,(2):3-25.
[25]Piotroski,J.D.,and D.T.Roulstone.The Influence of Analysts,Institutional Investors,and Insiders on the Incorporation of Market,Industry,and Firm-specific Information into Stock Prices[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79,(4):1119-1151.
[26]Muslu,V.,S.Radhakrishnan,K.R.Subramanyamet,and D.Lim.Forward-Looking MD&A Disclosures and the Information Environment[J].Management Science,2015,61,(5):931-1196.
[27]Choi,B.,and J.B.Kim.The Effect of CEO Stock-Based Compensation on the Pricing of Future Earnings[J].European Accounting Review,2017,26,(4):651-679.
[28]林忠国,韩立岩,李伟.股价波动非同步性——信息还是噪音?[J].天津:管理科学学报,2012,(6):68-81.
[29]Collins,D.W.,S.P.Kothari,J.Shanken,and R.G.Sloan.Lack of Timeliness and Noise As Explanations for the Low Contemporaneuos Return-earnings Association[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,18,(3):289-234.
[30]Kothari,S.P.,and R.G.Sloan.Information in Prices About Future Earnings:Implications for Earnings Response Coefficients[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1992,15,(2-3):143-171.
[31]Sloan,R.G.Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About Future Earnings?[J].The Accounting Review,1996,71,(3):289-315.
[32]Xie,H.The Mispricing of Abnormal Accruals[J].The Accounting Review,2001,76,(3):357-373.
[33]Haw,I.M.,B.B.Hu,J.J.Lee,and W.Wu.Investor Protection and Price Informativeness About Future Earnings:International Evidence[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2012,17,(2):389-419.
[34]Lundholm,R.,and L.A.Myers.Bringing the Future Forward:The Effect of Disclosure on the Returns-earnings Relation[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40,(3):809-839.
[35]Choi,J.H.,L.A.Myers,Y.Zang,and D.Ziebart.Do Management EPS Forecasts Allow Returns to Reflect Future Earnings? Implications for the Continuation of Management’s Quarterly Earnings Guidance[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2011,16,(1):143-182.
[36]刘宝华,罗宏,周微.股权激励行权限制与盈余管理优序选择[J].北京:管理世界,2016,(11):141-155.
[37]刘银国,孙慧倩,王烨,古柳.业绩型股权激励与盈余管理方式选择[J].北京:中国管理科学,2017,(3):49-58.
[38]辛宇,吕长江.激励、福利还是奖励:薪酬管制背景下国有企业股权激励的定位困境——基于泸州老窖的案例分析[J].北京:会计研究,2012,(6):67-75.
[39]Chen,Z.,Y.Y.Guan,and B.Ke.Are Stock Option Grants to Directors of State-Controlled Chinese Firms Listed in HongKong Genuine Compensation?[J].The Accounting Review,2013,88,(5):1547-1574.
[40]邵帅,周涛,吕长江.产权性质与股权激励设计动机——上海家化案例分析[J].北京:会计研究,2014,(10):43-50.
[41]Jiang,F.,and K.A.Kim.Corporate Governance in China:A Modern Perspective[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,(32):190-216.
[42]吴育辉,吴世农.股票减持过程中的大股东掏空行为研究[J].北京:中国工业经济,2010,(5):121-130.
[43]Gelb,D.S.,and P.Zarowin.Corporate Disclosure Policy and the Informativeness of Stock Prices[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2002,7,(1):33-52.
[44]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].北京:经济研究,2010,(11):88-100.
[45]Dechow,P.M.,R.G.Sloan,and A.P.Sweeney.Detecting Earnings Management[J].Accounting Review,1995,70,(2):193-225.
[46]Kothari,S.P.,A.J.Leone,and C.E.Wasley.Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39,(1):163-197.
[47]扈文秀,付强,吴婷婷.股票期权激励与管理层业绩预测披露的操控行为[J].哈尔滨:管理科学,2017,(6):142-158.
[48]袁振超,岳衡,谈文峰.代理成本、所有权性质与业绩预告精确度[J].天津:南开管理评论,2014,(3):49-61.
[49]吕长江,严明珠,郑慧莲,许静静.为什么上市公司选择股权激励计划?[J].北京:会计研究,2011,(1):68-75.
[50]Fang,H.,J.R.Nofsinger,and J.Quan.The Effects of Employee Stock Option Plans on Operating Performance in Chinese Firms[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2015,(54):141-159.
[51]Core,J.,and W.Guay.The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,28,(2):151-184.
[52]Drake,M.S.,J.N.Myers,L.A.Myers,and M.D.Stuart.Short Sellers and the Informativeness of Stock Prices with Respect to Future Earnings[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2015,20,(2):747-774.
[53]苏冬蔚,熊家财.股票流动性、股价信息含量与CEO薪酬契约[J].北京:经济研究,2013,(11):56-70.
[54]Chourou,L.,E.Abaoub,and S.Saadi.The Economic Determinants of CEO Stock Option Compensation[J].Journal of Multinational Financial Management,2008,18,(1):61-77.
[55]Larcker,D.F.,and T.O.Rusticus.On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,49,(3):186-205.
[56]Hsu,A.W.H.,and H.Pourjalali.The Impact of IAS No.27 on the Market’s Ability to Anticipate Future Earnings[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2015,32,(2):789-813.
[57]Burns,N.,and S.Kedia.The Impact of Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79,(1):35-67.
[58]李慧云,吕文超.上市公司自愿性信息披露现状及其监管研究[J].北京:统计研究,2012,(4):86-91.
(1)网络平台问答是指上市公司通过深交所的“互动易”和上交所的“上证e互动”网络平台以回答投资者提问的方式披露公司信息。
(2)本文中的“高管”和“管理层”的含义类似,均指上市公司的董事和高级管理人员,只是在名称上遵循了以往文献的习惯。
(3)这一比例在《关于规范国有控股上市公司实施股权激励制度有关问题的通知》(国资发分配[2008]171号)中被提高到40%。
(4)在以民营上市公司为主的非国有上市公司中,管理层和大股东身份常常重合(Jiang和Kim,2015)[41],而大股东的掏空动机也会影响上市公司的信息披露行为(吴育辉和吴世农,2010)[42],若采用管理层的持股数量,可能会对研究结果造成偏误。
(5)行业按照证监会《上市公司行业分类指引》(2012)进行划分。
(6)由于大部分研究FERC的文献都不加入行业和年份控制变量(Collins等,1994[29];Lundholm和Myers,2002[34];Chio等2011[35];Gelb和Zarowin,2002[43]),本文在正式的检验中也未对此进行控制。本文在后续的稳健性检验中加入行业和年份控制变量后,所得结论保持不变。
(7)在Bergstresser和Philippon(2006)[10]的研究中,美国上市公司仅CEO的股权激励薪酬水平就达到0.263。
(8)具体的计算公式及计算过程参见苏冬蔚和林大庞(2010)[44]的文章,在此不做赘述。
(9)上交所只对年度业绩预测进行了上述强制性披露条件的规定,而季度和半年度业绩预测无条件限制,都属于自愿性披露。
(10)Larcker和Rusticus(2010)[55]建议当工具变量个数为1、2、3、5和10时,对应的临界F值为8.96、11.59、12.83、15.09和20.88。
(11)事实上,这也是国资委等监管部门早已明确的改革方向。例如,国资委、财政部在2008年10月发布的《关于规范国有控股上市公司实施股权激励制度有关问题的通知》中明确指出:“随着资本市场的逐步完善以及上市公司市场化程度和竞争性的不断提高,将逐步取消股权励收益水平限制”。
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |