农田保护补偿政策异质效应提升的障碍因素诊断——以苏州市、成都市两个创新实践地区为实证

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英文篇名：Obstacle Factors Diagnoses of Affecting the Improvement of Farmland Protection Compensation Policy Effect——Take Two Innovative Practice Areas in Suzhou and Chengdu as Examples 作者：李海燕 ; 蔡银莺 英文作者：LI Haiyan;CAI Yinying;Harbin Institute of Technology,Shenzhen;Real Estate Assessment and Development Research Center,Shenzhen;College of Land Management, Huazhong Agricultural University; 关键词：补偿政策 ; 异质效应 ; 政策成效 ; 障碍因素 英文关键词：compensation policy;;heterogeneous effect;;policy effectiveness;;obstacle factor 中文刊名：STBY 英文刊名：Research of Soil and Water Conservation 机构：哈尔滨工业大学(深圳);深圳市房地产评估和发展研究中心;华中农业大学土地管理学院; 出版日期：2019-06-17 出版单位：水土保持研究 年：2019 期：v.26;No.135 基金：中国博士后科学基金面上项目“异质性农户参与农田保护补偿政策的分化效应研究”(2017M611379) 语种：中文; 页：STBY201904050 页数：8 CN：04 ISSN：61-1272/P 分类号：327-333+341

摘要

以苏州、成都两个创新实践地区2012年和2015年入户调研数据为基础,运用基于熵权改进的TOPSIS模型,从区域异质性视角分析了农田保护补偿政策成效提升的障碍因素。研究表明:影响农田保护补偿政策成效提升的障碍因素之间存在显著的区域差异。其中,影响苏州地区政策成效提升的关键障碍因素依次为:政策缺乏监督管理(C_8)、缺乏统一补偿标准(C_2)、补偿资金分配不合理(C_5)、补偿类型不一致(C_3)、缺乏明确补偿范围(C_1);影响成都地区补偿政策成效提升的关键障碍因素依次为:政策缺乏监督管理(C_8)、补偿类型不一致(C_3)、缺乏统一补偿标准(C_2)、补偿资金分配不合理(C_5)、资金发放形式不明确(C_4)。由于补偿信息不对称、政策监管体系不完善等制度弱化因素的存在,导致苏州、成都地区补偿政策在实施过程中存在道德风险和逆向选择等激励非兼容性问题。未来应规避农户参与补偿政策逆向选择的风险,降低信息不对称的发生,将丰富的基层创新实践做法提炼总结为具有普及性且兼顾公平和效率的补偿措施,为有效提升政策成效提供可操作化管理路径。
        Based on the survey data of farmers in Suzhou and Chengdu in 2012 and 2015, from the perspective of regional heterogeneity, we analyze the obstacles to the improvement of farmers′ participation in farmland protection compensation policies by TOPSIS model improved by entropy weight. The results showed that regional differences between the factors affecting the effectiveness of farmland protection compensation policies were significant, among which the key influencing factors of the improvement of the policy effectiveness of the Suzhou area were lack of policy supervision and management(C_8), inconsistent compensation standards(C_2), unreasonable allocation of compensation funds(C_5), inconsistent compensation type(C_3), inconsistent compensation range(C_1); the key influencing factors of the improvement of the policy effectiveness of the Chengdu area were: Lack of policy supervision and management(C_8), inconsistent compensation type(C_3), inconsistent compensation standards(C_2), unreasonable allocation of compensation funds(C_5), inconsistent form of payment(C_4). Institutional weakening factors such as imperfect supervision system and information asymmetry of compensation policy had led to problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection in the implementation of compensation policies in Suzhou and Chengdu. In the future, the government should reduce the risk of farmers′ participation in the adverse selection of compensation policies and avoid the occurrence of information asymmetry. At the same time, the diversified grassroots innovation practices were summarized as compensation measures with universality, fairness and efficiency, which provided the operational management path for effectively improving policy efficiency.

引文

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