规范阻滞及其策略——以中俄等在“保护的责任”演进中的实践为例
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摘要
在国际规范演进的过程中,有一些行为体并不反对新规范的生成与扩散,但由于各种原因对其发展速度与适用范围存有疑虑或不满。于是,通过采取各种说辞及程序性手段,试图对规范化进程的"过度"及"过快"发展加以限制或延缓,同时又不寻求修正或逆转那些正在生成和扩散中的规范理念。它们既不是规范创新与扩散的推动者,也不能被视为破坏者。对于规范的生成与扩散,它们采取的是限制或拖延的策略,而非抗拒、破坏或修正,这是以往研究所忽略的。在近年来兴起的"竞争性规范演进"研究议程基础上,"规范阻滞"这一新概念及其应用聚焦限制某一规范"过快"及"过分"发展的行为,揭示其不同于其他行为的实践特征,探讨其出现的原因、运作的背景与说辞策略技巧,有助于丰富学界对规范演进中行为体角色与行为多样性的理解。梳理中俄两国在"保护的责任"理念兴起过程中的相关实践经验可以有力展示这一概念的应用价值。
In the process of the evolution of international norms,some actors do not oppose the generation and diffusion of new norms,but for various reasons,they show doubts or dissatisfaction with those norm's development speed and application scope,and therefore try to adopt various rhetoric and procedural means to limit or delay the excessive and "too fast" advancement of those norms,while not seeking to reverse or amend them. They are neither supporters of normative innovation and proliferation,nor are they destroyers of innovation and proliferation. For the development of those new norms,these actors adopt a strategy of limiting or delaying,rather than resisting and obstructing. This phenomenon is largely ignored by previous research. Based on the research agenda of "contested normative evolution" which has emerged in recent years,this paper makes a conceptual investigation into this "norm containment" strategy of restricting the new norms' "too fast" developments and "excessive" applications by exploring this strategy's causes of emergence,backgrounds of operations and rhetoric tactics in practices,and examining China and Russia's practices during the rise of the concept of "responsibility to protect" as empirical evidence. This research can enrich our understanding of the diversity of actors' roles and behaviors in the evolution of international norms,while laying foundations for further systematic inquiry.
In the process of the evolution of international norms,some actors do not oppose the generation and diffusion of new norms,but for various reasons,they show doubts or dissatisfaction with those norm's development speed and application scope,and therefore try to adopt various rhetoric and procedural means to limit or delay the excessive and "too fast" advancement of those norms,while not seeking to reverse or amend them. They are neither supporters of normative innovation and proliferation,nor are they destroyers of innovation and proliferation. For the development of those new norms,these actors adopt a strategy of limiting or delaying,rather than resisting and obstructing. This phenomenon is largely ignored by previous research. Based on the research agenda of "contested normative evolution" which has emerged in recent years,this paper makes a conceptual investigation into this "norm containment" strategy of restricting the new norms' "too fast" developments and "excessive" applications by exploring this strategy's causes of emergence,backgrounds of operations and rhetoric tactics in practices,and examining China and Russia's practices during the rise of the concept of "responsibility to protect" as empirical evidence. This research can enrich our understanding of the diversity of actors' roles and behaviors in the evolution of international norms,while laying foundations for further systematic inquiry.
引文
(1)Ryder Mckeown,“Norm Regress:Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm,” International Relations,Vol.23,No.1,2009,pp.14-18; Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn,“Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes,” European Journal of International Relations,Vol.18,No.4,2012,pp.719-742.
(2)Antje Wiener,“The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance Beyond the State:Sociological and Normative Approaches to Interaction,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,Vol.10,No.1,2007,pp.47-69.
(3)有学者的早先研究使用了这一英文概念,但并没有对之进行更多的界定和阐释。参见Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Responsibility to Protect Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia:How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect,” International Relations,Vol.25,No.2,2011,pp.204-223。
(1)Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization,Vol.52,No.4,1998,pp.887-917; Margaret Keck and Karthryn Sikkink,Activists Beyond Borders:Advocacy Networks in International Politics,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1998; Audie Klotz,Norms in International Relations:The Struggles Against Apartheid, Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1995; Martha Finnemore,National Interests in International Society,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1996.
(2)Charlotte Epstein,“Stop Telling Us How to Behave:Socialization or Infantilization?” International Studies Perspectives,Vol.13,No.2,2012,pp.135-145; Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2016, pp. 310-333; Matthew J. Hoffman,“Norms and Social Constructivism in International Relations,”in Robert A. Denemark,ed.,The International Studies Encyclopedia, Blackwell Reference Online, 2010, http://www. oxfordreference. com/view/10. 1093/acref/9780191842665.001.0001/acref-9780191842665-e-0287? rskey=IOlT s1&result=325,访问时间:2019年2月15日。
(1)维纳进而主张规范形成与扩散以及全球治理进程应该更具包容性,参见Antje Wiener,“Contested Compliance:Interventions on the Normative Structure of World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations,Vol.10,No.2,2004,pp.189-234; Antje Wiener,The Invisible Constitution of Politics:Contested Norms and International Encounters,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008; Antje Wiener,A Theory of Contestation,Heidelberg:Springer, 2014; Antje Wiener,“The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance Beyond the State,”pp.47-69; Antje Wiener, Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018。
(2)Wayne Sandholtz,Prohibiting Plunder:How Norms Change,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007; Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek,“The Politics of International Norms:Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.13,No.2,2007,pp.217-238; Mona Krook and Jacquie True,“Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms:The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1 2010,pp.103-127.
(3)参见Matthew J. Hoffman,“Norms and Social Constructivism in International Relationship,”2010。
(4)Matthew A. Evangelista,“The Power of Precedent:Will American Practice Change the Norms of International Humanitarian Law?” Crossroads,Vol. 6, No. 1,2006, pp. 7-19; Regina Heller, Martin Kahl and Daniela Pisoiu,“The ‘Dark’Side of Normative Argumentation:The Case of Counterterrorism Policy,”Global Constitutionalism,Vo1.1,No.2,2012,pp.278-312。中国学者的讨论参见秦亚青:《国际关系理论:反思与重构》,北京:北京大学出版社2012年版,第282—284页;柳思思:《从规范进化到规范退化》,载《当代亚太》,2010年第3期,第145—160页;谢婷婷:《行为体策略与规范传播:以美国退出〈京都议定书〉为例》,载《当代亚太》,2011年第5期,第100—119页。
(5)Ryder Mckeown,“Norm Regress:Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm,” International Relations,Vol.23,No.1,2009,pp.14-18.
(1)Clifford Bob,The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics,New York:Cambridge University Press,2012.
(2)Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,”pp.310-333; Alan Bloomfield and Shirley V. Scott, eds., Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change,New York:Routledge,2017.
(3)如近期有研究指出,实际上规范倡导者也存在多种类型,有些更积极地提出和推广新思想,而有些行为体更倾向于刺激讨论、设置议程、勾连议题和行为体。参见Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos,“Communicative Entrepreneurs:The Case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Dialogue with National Judges,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol.62,No.4,2018,pp.737-750。
(4)Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn,“Additional Categories of Agency:‘Creative Resistors’ to Normative Change in Post-Crisis Global Financial Governance,” in Bloomfield and Scott,eds.,Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change,pp.140-158.
(5)Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,” pp.329-331.
(1)Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,”pp.323-324.
(1)朱立群、聂文娟:《社会结构的实践演变模式:理解中国与国际体系互动的另一种思路》,载《世界经济与政治》,2012年第1期,第13—18页。
(2)Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall W. Stiles,“Explaining International Norm Change,” in Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall W. Stiles,eds,International Norms and Cycles of Change,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2009,p.4.
(1)Joshua William Busby,“Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry:Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol.51,No.2,2007,pp.247-275; Joshua W. Busby,Moral Movements and Foreign Policy,New York:Cambridge University Press,2010; George Tsebelis,Veto Players:How Political Institutions Work,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2002.
(2)参见赵晨:《协商还是博弈?——对“欧洲制宪会议”的考察》,载《欧洲研究》,2007年第5期,第41—55页;袁正清、李志永、主父笑飞:《中国与国际人权规范重塑》,载《中国社会科学》,2016年第7期,第189—203页。
(3)Thomas Risse,“‘Let’s Argue!’:Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization,Vol.54,No.1,2000,pp.1-39; Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller,“Theoretical Paradise-Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas,” Review of International Studies,Vol.31,No.1,2005,pp.167-179.
(4)相关批评可参见Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson,“Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms:The Power of Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Relations,Vol.13,No.1,2007,pp.39-42。
(5)对于说辞行为较为深入的讨论,参见Frank Schimmelfennig,The EU,NATO,and the Integration of Europe,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2003,pp.195-199,p.208。
(6)Harald Muller,“Arguing, Bargaining and All That:Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations,Vol. 10,No. 3,2004,pp.395-435.
(1)Frank Schimmelfennig,“The Community Trap:Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Actions and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization,Vol.55,No.1,2001,p.63; Tine Hanrieder,“The False Promise of the Better Argument,” International Theory,Vol.3,No.3,2011,pp.390-415.
(2)Benjamin R. Banta,“Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.19,No.3,2013,p.390.
(3)Frank Schimmelfennig,“The Community Trap:Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Actions and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” pp. 62-65; Ronald Krebs and Patrick T. Jackson,“Twisting Arms/Twisting Tongues,” European Journal of International Relations,Vol. 13,No. 1,2007,pp. 40-66; Adam Bour,“Arguing with Law:Strategic Legal Argumentation,US Diplomacy,and Debates Over the International Criminal Court,”Review of International Studies,Vol.41,No.2,pp.337-360.在现实中,论辩除了诉诸理性,还可能诉诸情感。修辞成效不仅取决于其逻辑上的一致严密,有时还在于情感上的打动人心,取决于在特定情境下对听众情感的调动。说辞也不仅通过文字和言语,它还经常借助于其他非言语的表达方式例如服饰道具、表情姿态、口气语调等来影响听众,提升说服力、感染力乃至煽动性。参见Christopher W. Tindale,Acts of Arguing:A Rhetorical Model of Argument,Albany:SUNY Press, pp. 3-13; Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos,“Politics, Speech, and the Art of Persuasion:Toward an Aristotelian Conception of the Public Sphere,” Journal of Politics,Vol.61,No.3,1999,p.745,p.749。
(4)参见Frank Schimmelfennig,The EU,NATO,and the Integration of Europe,p.210。
(1)参见Frank Schimmelfennig,The EU,NATO,and the Integration of Europe,p.210。
(2)Edward Newman,“R2P:Implications for World Order,” Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.5,No. 3,2013,pp.235-259.
(3)International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protec,t“General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect and Informal Interactive Dialogue,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/2493-general-assembly-debate-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-and-informal-interactive-dialogue-,访问时间:2019年5月20日; Patrick Quinton-Brown,“Mapping Dissent:The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics,”Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.5,No.3,2013,pp.260-282; Edward Newman,“R2P:Implications for World Order,” pp.245-246。
(4)Patrick Quinton-Brown,“Mapping Dissent:The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics,” pp.271-272; Noam Chomsky,“The Skeleton in the Closet:The Responsibility to Protect in History,” in Philip Cunliffe,ed.,Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect:Interrogating Theory and Practice,New York:Routledge,2011,pp.11-18.
(1)Alan J. Kuperman,“A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” International Security,Vol.38,No.1,pp.105-136; Ramesh Thakur,The Responsibility to Protect:Norms,Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics,New York:Routledge,pp.189-190.
(2)Kudrat Virk,“India and the Responsibility to Protect:A Tale of Ambiguity,” Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.5,No.1,2013,pp.56-83.
(3)Alan J. Kuperman,“NATO’s Intervention in Libya:Humanitarian Success?” in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray,eds.,Libya:The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,New York:Palgrave Macmillan,2013,p.214.
(4)Alan J. Kuperman,“A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” p.115.
(5)有学者在2013年的研究中认为,有近30个国家将“保护的责任”作为自身的掩饰工具,参见Patrick Quinton-Brown,“Mapping Dissent:The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics,” pp.265-267。
(6)Jonas Claes,“Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities:Meeting the Challenge of R2P Rejectionism,”Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.4,No.1,2012,pp.67-97.
(7)“Vital and Enduring Commitment:Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” UN Doc.A/69/981-S/2015/500,para.8; Roland Paris,“The ‘Responsibility to Protect’and the Structural Problems of Preventative Humanitarian Intervention,” International Peacekeeping,Vol.21,No.5. 2014,pp.569-603.
(1)Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann,“Things We Lost in the Fire:How Different Types of Contestation Affect the Validity of International Norms,”https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy080,访问时间:2019年5月4日。类似的研究还有Anette Stimmer,“Beyond Internalization:Alternate Endings of the Norm Life Cycle,”International Studies Quarterly,访问时间:2019年5月4日。笔者将另撰专文对此问题展开论述。
(2)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,“The New Politics of Protection? C8te d’Ivoire,Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,”International Affairs,Vol.87,No.4,2011,pp.825-850; David Rief,f“R2P,R.I.P.,”The New York Times,http://www. nytimes. com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip. html,访问时间:2018年2月15日;Justin Morris,“Libya and Syria:R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum,” International Affairs,Vol.89,No.5,2013,pp.1265-1283; Robert W. Murray and Aidan Hehir,“Intervention in the Emerging Multipolar System:Why R2P Will Miss the Unipolar Moment,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,Vol.6,No.4,2012,pp.387-406; Alex J. Bellamy,“The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten,”Ethics&International Affairs,Vol.29,No.2,2015,pp.161-185。
(3)Jonas Claes,“Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities:Meeting the Challenge of R2P Rejectionism,”Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.4,No.1,2012,pp.67-97.
(4)Alan Bloomfield,“Resisting the Responsibility to Protect,” in Alan Bloomfield and Shirleg V. Scott,eds.,Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change,pp. 20-38; Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,”pp.310-333.
(1)ICISS,The Responsibility to Protect:Report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,December 2011,p.VIII,http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)Robert A. Pape,“When Duty Calls:A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention,” International Security,Vol.37,No.1,2012,pp.41-80.
(3)《2005年世界首脑会议成果》,http://www.un.org/zh/ga/60/docs/ares60_1.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)2006年4月,安理会在第1674号决议中首次采用这一概念,并于当年8月通过第1706号决议,批准向苏丹达尔富尔地区部署维和部队。但这一过程遭遇来自苏丹方面的外交阻力,其实也并不顺利。参见Alex J.Bellamy,“From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson Learning and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect,”International Politics,Vol.51,No.1,2014,p.38。
(5)潘基文:《履行保护的责任》,UN Doc. A/63/677,2009年,http://undocs. org/zh/A/63/677,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(6)Patrick Quinton-Brown,“Mapping Dissent:The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics,” p.269.
(1)Human Rights Center,“The Responsibility to Protect. Moving the Campaign Forward,” 2007, p. 1,pp.58-65,https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/The-Responsibility-to-Protect-R2P-October-2007.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)Alex Bellamy,“R2P-Dead or Alive?” in Malte Brosig,ed.,The Responsibility to Protect-From Evasive to Reluctant Action? The Role of Global Middle Powers,Pretoria:Institute for Security Studies,2012,p.11.
(3)Jennifer M. Welsh,“Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect,”Global Responsibility to Protect Vol.5,No.1. 2013,pp.365-396; Jennifer M. Welsh,“Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’,”in Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard,eds.,Implementation in World Politics:How International Norms Change Practice,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2014,p.129.
(4)United Nations General Assembly(UNGA),“Summary Record of the 23rd Meeting,” UN Doc. A/C. 5/62/SR.23,17 December,2007,p.10,https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/568950/files/A_C.6_60_SR.23-EN.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)Hugh Sreakey,“The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict:Overlap and Contrast,”in Angus Francis,Vesselin Popovski and Charles Sampford,eds.,Norms of Protection:Responsibility to Protect,Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction,Tokyo:United Nations University Press,2012,pp.74-75.
(2)Angus Francis and Vesselin Popovsk,i“The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians:The View from the United Nations,” in Angus Francis,Vesselin Popovski and Charles Sampford,eds.,Norms of Protection:Responsibility to Protect,Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction,pp.82-97.
(3)“Statement by H. E. Dilma Rousseff,President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the Opening of the General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,”http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/BR_en_0.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)《2011年11月9日巴西常驻联合国代表给秘书长的信的附件:〈保护过程中的责任:制定和推广一个概念的各项要素〉》,UN Doc.A/66/551-S/2011/701,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/66/551,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)潘基文在他的2012年“保护的责任”专门报告中对之表示欢迎,参见潘基文:《保护责任:及时果断的反应》,UN Doc.A/66/874-S/2012/578,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/66/874,访问时间:2019年5月20日; Oliver Stuenke,l“Brazil and the Responsibility While Protecting,”Post Western World,http://www.postwesternworld.com/2011/11/28/brazil-and-the-responsibilitywhen-protecting,访问时间:2019年2月5日。
(6)Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho,“Regulating Intervention:Brazil and the Responsibility to Protect,”Conflict,Security&Development,Vol.14,No.4,2014,pp.394-395.
(1)Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho,“Regulating Intervention:Brazil and the Responsibility to Protect,”pp.395-396.
(2)相关研究很多,难以一一列举,除了中国学界已比较熟悉的中文文献,值得注意的英文文献有Sarah Teitt,“Assessing Polemics,Principles and Practices:China and the Responsibility to Protect,”Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.1,No.2,2009,pp.208-236; Rosemary Foo,t“The Responsibility to Protect(R2P)and Its Evolution:Beijing’s Inuence on Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas,” St Antony’s International Review,Vol.6,No.2,2011,pp.47-66; Liu Tiewa,“China and Responsibility to Protect:Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for Intervention,” The Pacific Review,Vol.25,No.1,2012,pp.153-173; Andrew Garwood-Gowers,“China and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’:The Implications of the Libyan Intervention,” Asian Journal of International Law,Vol.1,No.1,2013,pp.375-393; Ekatarina Stepanova,“Russia,” in Alex J. Bellamy and Timothy Dunne,eds.,The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2016; Gareth Evans,“Russia,Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect,”Amsterdam Law Forum,Vol.1,No.2,2009,pp.25-28; Roy Allison,“The Russian Case for Military Intervention in Georgia:International Law,Norms and Political Calculation,”European Security,Vol.18,No.2,2009,pp.173-200; Nicholai N. Petro,“The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia,” Fordham International Law Journal,Vol.32,No.5,2008,pp.15-24。
(1)Bobo Lo,Axis of Convenience:Moscow,Beijing,and the New Geopolitics,Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution Press,2008; Tony Brenton,“Russia and China:An Axis of Insecurity,” Asian Affairs,Vol.44,No.22013,pp.231-249.
(2)中国前国务院副总理钱其琛应邀参加了安南秘书长所推动的名人小组的工作。中国政府对名人小组表达了欢迎,对“保护的责任”则未提及。参见《2004年4月19日中国驻联合国代表团谢波华参赞在秘书长改革报告〈法治、人权与民主〉部分非正式磋商中的发言》,http://www. china-un. org/chn/lhghywj/fyywj/wn/fy2005/t192894.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《中国关于联合国改革问题的立场文件》,http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/ziliao/tytj/t199083.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)《2005年7月28日中国驻联合国代表团张义山大使在联大磋商9月首脑会议成果文件草案时的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/zt/gg/t206050.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《王光亚大使在联大磋商9月首脑会成果文件草案时的发言》,http://www. fmprc. gov. cn/chn//pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg/zyjh/t200843.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)《张义山大使在联大磋商9月首脑会成果文件草案时的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/zgylhg/lhgzyygg/t206050.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)有关中国在“保护的责任”问题上立场,参见罗艳华:《“保护的责任”的发展历程与中国的立场》,载《国际政治研究》,2014年第3期,第11—26页;刘铁娃:《联合国与“保护的责任”》,载张贵洪主编:《联合国发展报告2012》,北京:时事出版社2013年版,第160—192页。
(2)《刘振民大使在联大关于“保护的责任”问题全会上的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/lhghywj/ldhy/63rd_ga/t575179.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《中国关于联合国改革问题的立场文件》,http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/ziliao/tytj/t199083.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)《刘振民大使在“武装冲突中保护平民问题”公开辩论会上的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/zgylhg/jjalh/alhzh/wzctpm/t260631.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《刘振民大使在联大关于“保护的责任”问题全会上的发言》,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/chn/lhghywj/ldhy/63rd_ga/t575179.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。另参见《刘振民大使在安理会“武装冲突中保护平民问题”公开辩论上的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/lhghywj/fyywj/2008/t459182.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)ICISS,“The Responsibility to Protect:Research,Bibliography,Background-Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,” International Development Research Centre 2001; ICR2P,“State-by-State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect,” http://www. responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Chart_R2P_11August.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。俄罗斯前总理和外长,著名学者普里马科夫参与了安南发起的“高级别小组”。
(3)与中国不同,俄罗斯认为“保护的责任”所提供的保护不应仅局限于严重危害人权的罪行,还应该考虑一些软性的威胁,如环境恶化、危险疾病的扩散、饥饿对公民造成的伤害。参见顾玮:《保护的责任:俄罗斯的立场》,载《国际政治研究》,2014年第3期,第50—60页。
(4)《联合国大会第五十九届会议第八十七次全体会议》,UN Doc.A/59/PV.87,2005年4月7日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/59/PV.87,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)《联合国大会第六十七届会议第十六次全体会议》,UN Doc.A/67/PV.16,2012年9月28日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/67/PV.16,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,“The New Politics of Protection? C8te d’Ivoire,Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” pp.838-839.
(2)《联合国安理会第1970号决议》,UN Doc.S/RES/1970,2011年2月26日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/RES/1970(2011),访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《联合国安理会第1973号决议》,UN Doc.S/RES/1973,2011年3月17日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/RES/1973(2011),访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,“The New Politics of Protection? C8te d’Ivoire,Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” pp. 825-850; Edward C. Luck,“The Responsibility to Protect:The First Decade,”Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2011, pp. 387-399; Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis,“NATO’s Victory in Libya:The Right Way to Run an Intervention,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.91,No.3,2012,pp.2-7.
(5)Tim Dunne and Jess Gifkins,“Libya and R2P:Norm Consolidation or Perfect Storm?” The Interpreter,14 April,2011,https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/libya-r2p-norm-consolidation-or-perfect-storm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(6)《联合国安理会第6491次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6491,2011年2月26日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6491,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)《联合国安理会第6491次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6491,2011年2月26日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6491,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)《李保东大使在安理会通过利比亚局势决议后的解释性发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/gdxw/t807542.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《2011年3月3日外交部发言人姜瑜举行例行记者会》,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceae/chn/wjbfyrth/t803799.htm,访问时间:2019年2月15日。
(4)《联合国安理会第6498次会议记录》,UN. Doc.S/PV.6498 http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6498,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,“The New Politics of Protection? C8te d’Ivoire,Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” pp.825-850.
(6)Simon Adams,“Emergent Powers:India,Brazil,South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect,”http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-adams/un-india-brazil-south-africa_b_1896975.html,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)杨永红:《从利比亚到叙利亚:保护责任走到尽头了?》,载《世界经济与政治论坛》,2012年第3期,第75—76页。
(2)Gareth Evans,“When Intervening in a Conflict, Stick to UN Script,” The Sydney Morning Herald,March 24,2011,http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/when-intervening-in-a-conflict-stickto-un-script-20110323-1c6kz.html,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)钱文荣:《不干涉内政原则的内涵及其现实意义》,载张贵洪主编:《联合国发展报告2012》,北京:时事出版社2013年版,第150页。
(4)Emily O’Brien and Andrew Sinclair,“The Libyan War:A Diplomatic History:February-August 2011,”Center on International Cooperation,New York University,http://cic. es. its. nyu. edu/sites/default/files/libya_diplomatic_history.pdf,p.5,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)有关中国在利比亚问题上的对策,参见Liu Tiewa,“China and Responsibility to Protect:Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for Intervention,” pp.153-173。
(6)《胡锦涛会见法国总统萨科齐》,http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/14280249.html,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(7)《常驻联合国代表李保东大使在安理会审议武装冲突中保护平民问题上的发言》,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/chn/gdxw/t945106.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《常驻联合国代表李保东大使在安理会武装冲突中保护平民问题公开辩论会上的发言》,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/chn/gdxw/t821505.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6627,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)Philippe Bolopion,“After Libya,the Question:to Protect or Depose?” Los Angeles Times,25 August,2011,http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/190-crisis-in-libya/3631-hrw-un-director-philippebolopion-after-libya-the-question-to-protect-or-depose,访问时间:2018年11月23日; Ian Hal,l“Tilting at Windmills? The Indian Debate over the Responsibility to Protect After UNSC Resolution 1973,” Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.5,No.1,2013,pp.84-108.
(3)Emily O’Brien and Andrew Sinclair,“The Libyan War:A Diplomatic History:February-August 2011,”Center on International Cooperation,New York University,http://cic. es. its. nyu. edu/sites/default/files/libya_diplomatic_history.pdf,p.15,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)《潘基文呼吁采取行动落实“保护责任”》,http://www.un.org/chinese/News/story.asp? newsID=17052,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)Jess Gifkins,“Briefing-The UN Security Council Divided:Syria in Crisis,” Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.4,No.3,2012,pp.377-393.
(6)其中最具代表性的是中俄前四次联手否决后两国代表的发言,参见《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《联合国安理会第6711次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6711,2012年2月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《联合国安理会第6810次会议记录》,2012年7月19日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6810,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《联合国安理会第7180次会议记录》,2014年5月22日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.7180,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)《安理会决议草案》,UN Doc.S/2011/612,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/2011/612,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)钟声:《不能任由外部干涉实现政权更迭》,载《人民日报》,2012年7月17日。
(1)Global Center for the Responsibility to Protec,t“UN Security Council Resolutions Referencing R2P,”22January,2018,http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/335,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)刘铁娃:《保护的责任与中国的视角——以中国对利比亚问题的态度为例》,http://www.unachina.org/webrms/wwwroot/wnachina/upload/Attach/default/274269.pdf,访问时间:2019年2月15日。
(3)Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Responsibility to Protect Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia:How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect,”pp.204-223; Andrew Garwood-Gowers,“China and the‘Responsibility to Protect’:The Implications of the Libyan Intervention,” Asian Journal of International Law,Vol.2,No.2,2012,pp.375-393.毫无疑问,俄罗斯在叙利亚问题上的考虑要比中国复杂得多,牵涉到诸多现实的战略利益考量。
(2)Antje Wiener,“The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance Beyond the State:Sociological and Normative Approaches to Interaction,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,Vol.10,No.1,2007,pp.47-69.
(3)有学者的早先研究使用了这一英文概念,但并没有对之进行更多的界定和阐释。参见Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Responsibility to Protect Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia:How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect,” International Relations,Vol.25,No.2,2011,pp.204-223。
(1)Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization,Vol.52,No.4,1998,pp.887-917; Margaret Keck and Karthryn Sikkink,Activists Beyond Borders:Advocacy Networks in International Politics,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1998; Audie Klotz,Norms in International Relations:The Struggles Against Apartheid, Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1995; Martha Finnemore,National Interests in International Society,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1996.
(2)Charlotte Epstein,“Stop Telling Us How to Behave:Socialization or Infantilization?” International Studies Perspectives,Vol.13,No.2,2012,pp.135-145; Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2016, pp. 310-333; Matthew J. Hoffman,“Norms and Social Constructivism in International Relations,”in Robert A. Denemark,ed.,The International Studies Encyclopedia, Blackwell Reference Online, 2010, http://www. oxfordreference. com/view/10. 1093/acref/9780191842665.001.0001/acref-9780191842665-e-0287? rskey=IOlT s1&result=325,访问时间:2019年2月15日。
(1)维纳进而主张规范形成与扩散以及全球治理进程应该更具包容性,参见Antje Wiener,“Contested Compliance:Interventions on the Normative Structure of World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations,Vol.10,No.2,2004,pp.189-234; Antje Wiener,The Invisible Constitution of Politics:Contested Norms and International Encounters,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008; Antje Wiener,A Theory of Contestation,Heidelberg:Springer, 2014; Antje Wiener,“The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance Beyond the State,”pp.47-69; Antje Wiener, Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018。
(2)Wayne Sandholtz,Prohibiting Plunder:How Norms Change,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007; Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek,“The Politics of International Norms:Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.13,No.2,2007,pp.217-238; Mona Krook and Jacquie True,“Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms:The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1 2010,pp.103-127.
(3)参见Matthew J. Hoffman,“Norms and Social Constructivism in International Relationship,”2010。
(4)Matthew A. Evangelista,“The Power of Precedent:Will American Practice Change the Norms of International Humanitarian Law?” Crossroads,Vol. 6, No. 1,2006, pp. 7-19; Regina Heller, Martin Kahl and Daniela Pisoiu,“The ‘Dark’Side of Normative Argumentation:The Case of Counterterrorism Policy,”Global Constitutionalism,Vo1.1,No.2,2012,pp.278-312。中国学者的讨论参见秦亚青:《国际关系理论:反思与重构》,北京:北京大学出版社2012年版,第282—284页;柳思思:《从规范进化到规范退化》,载《当代亚太》,2010年第3期,第145—160页;谢婷婷:《行为体策略与规范传播:以美国退出〈京都议定书〉为例》,载《当代亚太》,2011年第5期,第100—119页。
(5)Ryder Mckeown,“Norm Regress:Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm,” International Relations,Vol.23,No.1,2009,pp.14-18.
(1)Clifford Bob,The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics,New York:Cambridge University Press,2012.
(2)Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,”pp.310-333; Alan Bloomfield and Shirley V. Scott, eds., Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change,New York:Routledge,2017.
(3)如近期有研究指出,实际上规范倡导者也存在多种类型,有些更积极地提出和推广新思想,而有些行为体更倾向于刺激讨论、设置议程、勾连议题和行为体。参见Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos,“Communicative Entrepreneurs:The Case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Dialogue with National Judges,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol.62,No.4,2018,pp.737-750。
(4)Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn,“Additional Categories of Agency:‘Creative Resistors’ to Normative Change in Post-Crisis Global Financial Governance,” in Bloomfield and Scott,eds.,Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change,pp.140-158.
(5)Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,” pp.329-331.
(1)Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,”pp.323-324.
(1)朱立群、聂文娟:《社会结构的实践演变模式:理解中国与国际体系互动的另一种思路》,载《世界经济与政治》,2012年第1期,第13—18页。
(2)Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall W. Stiles,“Explaining International Norm Change,” in Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall W. Stiles,eds,International Norms and Cycles of Change,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2009,p.4.
(1)Joshua William Busby,“Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry:Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol.51,No.2,2007,pp.247-275; Joshua W. Busby,Moral Movements and Foreign Policy,New York:Cambridge University Press,2010; George Tsebelis,Veto Players:How Political Institutions Work,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2002.
(2)参见赵晨:《协商还是博弈?——对“欧洲制宪会议”的考察》,载《欧洲研究》,2007年第5期,第41—55页;袁正清、李志永、主父笑飞:《中国与国际人权规范重塑》,载《中国社会科学》,2016年第7期,第189—203页。
(3)Thomas Risse,“‘Let’s Argue!’:Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization,Vol.54,No.1,2000,pp.1-39; Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller,“Theoretical Paradise-Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas,” Review of International Studies,Vol.31,No.1,2005,pp.167-179.
(4)相关批评可参见Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson,“Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms:The Power of Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Relations,Vol.13,No.1,2007,pp.39-42。
(5)对于说辞行为较为深入的讨论,参见Frank Schimmelfennig,The EU,NATO,and the Integration of Europe,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2003,pp.195-199,p.208。
(6)Harald Muller,“Arguing, Bargaining and All That:Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations,Vol. 10,No. 3,2004,pp.395-435.
(1)Frank Schimmelfennig,“The Community Trap:Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Actions and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization,Vol.55,No.1,2001,p.63; Tine Hanrieder,“The False Promise of the Better Argument,” International Theory,Vol.3,No.3,2011,pp.390-415.
(2)Benjamin R. Banta,“Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.19,No.3,2013,p.390.
(3)Frank Schimmelfennig,“The Community Trap:Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Actions and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” pp. 62-65; Ronald Krebs and Patrick T. Jackson,“Twisting Arms/Twisting Tongues,” European Journal of International Relations,Vol. 13,No. 1,2007,pp. 40-66; Adam Bour,“Arguing with Law:Strategic Legal Argumentation,US Diplomacy,and Debates Over the International Criminal Court,”Review of International Studies,Vol.41,No.2,pp.337-360.在现实中,论辩除了诉诸理性,还可能诉诸情感。修辞成效不仅取决于其逻辑上的一致严密,有时还在于情感上的打动人心,取决于在特定情境下对听众情感的调动。说辞也不仅通过文字和言语,它还经常借助于其他非言语的表达方式例如服饰道具、表情姿态、口气语调等来影响听众,提升说服力、感染力乃至煽动性。参见Christopher W. Tindale,Acts of Arguing:A Rhetorical Model of Argument,Albany:SUNY Press, pp. 3-13; Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos,“Politics, Speech, and the Art of Persuasion:Toward an Aristotelian Conception of the Public Sphere,” Journal of Politics,Vol.61,No.3,1999,p.745,p.749。
(4)参见Frank Schimmelfennig,The EU,NATO,and the Integration of Europe,p.210。
(1)参见Frank Schimmelfennig,The EU,NATO,and the Integration of Europe,p.210。
(2)Edward Newman,“R2P:Implications for World Order,” Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.5,No. 3,2013,pp.235-259.
(3)International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protec,t“General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect and Informal Interactive Dialogue,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/2493-general-assembly-debate-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-and-informal-interactive-dialogue-,访问时间:2019年5月20日; Patrick Quinton-Brown,“Mapping Dissent:The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics,”Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.5,No.3,2013,pp.260-282; Edward Newman,“R2P:Implications for World Order,” pp.245-246。
(4)Patrick Quinton-Brown,“Mapping Dissent:The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics,” pp.271-272; Noam Chomsky,“The Skeleton in the Closet:The Responsibility to Protect in History,” in Philip Cunliffe,ed.,Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect:Interrogating Theory and Practice,New York:Routledge,2011,pp.11-18.
(1)Alan J. Kuperman,“A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” International Security,Vol.38,No.1,pp.105-136; Ramesh Thakur,The Responsibility to Protect:Norms,Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics,New York:Routledge,pp.189-190.
(2)Kudrat Virk,“India and the Responsibility to Protect:A Tale of Ambiguity,” Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.5,No.1,2013,pp.56-83.
(3)Alan J. Kuperman,“NATO’s Intervention in Libya:Humanitarian Success?” in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray,eds.,Libya:The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,New York:Palgrave Macmillan,2013,p.214.
(4)Alan J. Kuperman,“A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” p.115.
(5)有学者在2013年的研究中认为,有近30个国家将“保护的责任”作为自身的掩饰工具,参见Patrick Quinton-Brown,“Mapping Dissent:The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics,” pp.265-267。
(6)Jonas Claes,“Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities:Meeting the Challenge of R2P Rejectionism,”Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.4,No.1,2012,pp.67-97.
(7)“Vital and Enduring Commitment:Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” UN Doc.A/69/981-S/2015/500,para.8; Roland Paris,“The ‘Responsibility to Protect’and the Structural Problems of Preventative Humanitarian Intervention,” International Peacekeeping,Vol.21,No.5. 2014,pp.569-603.
(1)Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann,“Things We Lost in the Fire:How Different Types of Contestation Affect the Validity of International Norms,”https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy080,访问时间:2019年5月4日。类似的研究还有Anette Stimmer,“Beyond Internalization:Alternate Endings of the Norm Life Cycle,”International Studies Quarterly,访问时间:2019年5月4日。笔者将另撰专文对此问题展开论述。
(2)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,“The New Politics of Protection? C8te d’Ivoire,Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,”International Affairs,Vol.87,No.4,2011,pp.825-850; David Rief,f“R2P,R.I.P.,”The New York Times,http://www. nytimes. com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip. html,访问时间:2018年2月15日;Justin Morris,“Libya and Syria:R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum,” International Affairs,Vol.89,No.5,2013,pp.1265-1283; Robert W. Murray and Aidan Hehir,“Intervention in the Emerging Multipolar System:Why R2P Will Miss the Unipolar Moment,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,Vol.6,No.4,2012,pp.387-406; Alex J. Bellamy,“The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten,”Ethics&International Affairs,Vol.29,No.2,2015,pp.161-185。
(3)Jonas Claes,“Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities:Meeting the Challenge of R2P Rejectionism,”Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.4,No.1,2012,pp.67-97.
(4)Alan Bloomfield,“Resisting the Responsibility to Protect,” in Alan Bloomfield and Shirleg V. Scott,eds.,Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change,pp. 20-38; Alan Bloomfield,“Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change,”pp.310-333.
(1)ICISS,The Responsibility to Protect:Report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,December 2011,p.VIII,http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)Robert A. Pape,“When Duty Calls:A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention,” International Security,Vol.37,No.1,2012,pp.41-80.
(3)《2005年世界首脑会议成果》,http://www.un.org/zh/ga/60/docs/ares60_1.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)2006年4月,安理会在第1674号决议中首次采用这一概念,并于当年8月通过第1706号决议,批准向苏丹达尔富尔地区部署维和部队。但这一过程遭遇来自苏丹方面的外交阻力,其实也并不顺利。参见Alex J.Bellamy,“From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson Learning and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect,”International Politics,Vol.51,No.1,2014,p.38。
(5)潘基文:《履行保护的责任》,UN Doc. A/63/677,2009年,http://undocs. org/zh/A/63/677,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(6)Patrick Quinton-Brown,“Mapping Dissent:The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics,” p.269.
(1)Human Rights Center,“The Responsibility to Protect. Moving the Campaign Forward,” 2007, p. 1,pp.58-65,https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/The-Responsibility-to-Protect-R2P-October-2007.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)Alex Bellamy,“R2P-Dead or Alive?” in Malte Brosig,ed.,The Responsibility to Protect-From Evasive to Reluctant Action? The Role of Global Middle Powers,Pretoria:Institute for Security Studies,2012,p.11.
(3)Jennifer M. Welsh,“Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect,”Global Responsibility to Protect Vol.5,No.1. 2013,pp.365-396; Jennifer M. Welsh,“Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’,”in Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard,eds.,Implementation in World Politics:How International Norms Change Practice,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2014,p.129.
(4)United Nations General Assembly(UNGA),“Summary Record of the 23rd Meeting,” UN Doc. A/C. 5/62/SR.23,17 December,2007,p.10,https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/568950/files/A_C.6_60_SR.23-EN.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)Hugh Sreakey,“The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict:Overlap and Contrast,”in Angus Francis,Vesselin Popovski and Charles Sampford,eds.,Norms of Protection:Responsibility to Protect,Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction,Tokyo:United Nations University Press,2012,pp.74-75.
(2)Angus Francis and Vesselin Popovsk,i“The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians:The View from the United Nations,” in Angus Francis,Vesselin Popovski and Charles Sampford,eds.,Norms of Protection:Responsibility to Protect,Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction,pp.82-97.
(3)“Statement by H. E. Dilma Rousseff,President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the Opening of the General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,”http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/BR_en_0.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)《2011年11月9日巴西常驻联合国代表给秘书长的信的附件:〈保护过程中的责任:制定和推广一个概念的各项要素〉》,UN Doc.A/66/551-S/2011/701,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/66/551,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)潘基文在他的2012年“保护的责任”专门报告中对之表示欢迎,参见潘基文:《保护责任:及时果断的反应》,UN Doc.A/66/874-S/2012/578,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/66/874,访问时间:2019年5月20日; Oliver Stuenke,l“Brazil and the Responsibility While Protecting,”Post Western World,http://www.postwesternworld.com/2011/11/28/brazil-and-the-responsibilitywhen-protecting,访问时间:2019年2月5日。
(6)Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho,“Regulating Intervention:Brazil and the Responsibility to Protect,”Conflict,Security&Development,Vol.14,No.4,2014,pp.394-395.
(1)Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho,“Regulating Intervention:Brazil and the Responsibility to Protect,”pp.395-396.
(2)相关研究很多,难以一一列举,除了中国学界已比较熟悉的中文文献,值得注意的英文文献有Sarah Teitt,“Assessing Polemics,Principles and Practices:China and the Responsibility to Protect,”Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.1,No.2,2009,pp.208-236; Rosemary Foo,t“The Responsibility to Protect(R2P)and Its Evolution:Beijing’s Inuence on Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas,” St Antony’s International Review,Vol.6,No.2,2011,pp.47-66; Liu Tiewa,“China and Responsibility to Protect:Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for Intervention,” The Pacific Review,Vol.25,No.1,2012,pp.153-173; Andrew Garwood-Gowers,“China and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’:The Implications of the Libyan Intervention,” Asian Journal of International Law,Vol.1,No.1,2013,pp.375-393; Ekatarina Stepanova,“Russia,” in Alex J. Bellamy and Timothy Dunne,eds.,The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2016; Gareth Evans,“Russia,Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect,”Amsterdam Law Forum,Vol.1,No.2,2009,pp.25-28; Roy Allison,“The Russian Case for Military Intervention in Georgia:International Law,Norms and Political Calculation,”European Security,Vol.18,No.2,2009,pp.173-200; Nicholai N. Petro,“The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia,” Fordham International Law Journal,Vol.32,No.5,2008,pp.15-24。
(1)Bobo Lo,Axis of Convenience:Moscow,Beijing,and the New Geopolitics,Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution Press,2008; Tony Brenton,“Russia and China:An Axis of Insecurity,” Asian Affairs,Vol.44,No.22013,pp.231-249.
(2)中国前国务院副总理钱其琛应邀参加了安南秘书长所推动的名人小组的工作。中国政府对名人小组表达了欢迎,对“保护的责任”则未提及。参见《2004年4月19日中国驻联合国代表团谢波华参赞在秘书长改革报告〈法治、人权与民主〉部分非正式磋商中的发言》,http://www. china-un. org/chn/lhghywj/fyywj/wn/fy2005/t192894.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《中国关于联合国改革问题的立场文件》,http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/ziliao/tytj/t199083.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)《2005年7月28日中国驻联合国代表团张义山大使在联大磋商9月首脑会议成果文件草案时的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/zt/gg/t206050.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《王光亚大使在联大磋商9月首脑会成果文件草案时的发言》,http://www. fmprc. gov. cn/chn//pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg/zyjh/t200843.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)《张义山大使在联大磋商9月首脑会成果文件草案时的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/zgylhg/lhgzyygg/t206050.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)有关中国在“保护的责任”问题上立场,参见罗艳华:《“保护的责任”的发展历程与中国的立场》,载《国际政治研究》,2014年第3期,第11—26页;刘铁娃:《联合国与“保护的责任”》,载张贵洪主编:《联合国发展报告2012》,北京:时事出版社2013年版,第160—192页。
(2)《刘振民大使在联大关于“保护的责任”问题全会上的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/lhghywj/ldhy/63rd_ga/t575179.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《中国关于联合国改革问题的立场文件》,http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/ziliao/tytj/t199083.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)《刘振民大使在“武装冲突中保护平民问题”公开辩论会上的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/zgylhg/jjalh/alhzh/wzctpm/t260631.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《刘振民大使在联大关于“保护的责任”问题全会上的发言》,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/chn/lhghywj/ldhy/63rd_ga/t575179.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。另参见《刘振民大使在安理会“武装冲突中保护平民问题”公开辩论上的发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/lhghywj/fyywj/2008/t459182.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)ICISS,“The Responsibility to Protect:Research,Bibliography,Background-Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,” International Development Research Centre 2001; ICR2P,“State-by-State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect,” http://www. responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Chart_R2P_11August.pdf,访问时间:2019年5月20日。俄罗斯前总理和外长,著名学者普里马科夫参与了安南发起的“高级别小组”。
(3)与中国不同,俄罗斯认为“保护的责任”所提供的保护不应仅局限于严重危害人权的罪行,还应该考虑一些软性的威胁,如环境恶化、危险疾病的扩散、饥饿对公民造成的伤害。参见顾玮:《保护的责任:俄罗斯的立场》,载《国际政治研究》,2014年第3期,第50—60页。
(4)《联合国大会第五十九届会议第八十七次全体会议》,UN Doc.A/59/PV.87,2005年4月7日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/59/PV.87,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)《联合国大会第六十七届会议第十六次全体会议》,UN Doc.A/67/PV.16,2012年9月28日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/67/PV.16,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,“The New Politics of Protection? C8te d’Ivoire,Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” pp.838-839.
(2)《联合国安理会第1970号决议》,UN Doc.S/RES/1970,2011年2月26日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/RES/1970(2011),访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《联合国安理会第1973号决议》,UN Doc.S/RES/1973,2011年3月17日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/RES/1973(2011),访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,“The New Politics of Protection? C8te d’Ivoire,Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” pp. 825-850; Edward C. Luck,“The Responsibility to Protect:The First Decade,”Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2011, pp. 387-399; Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis,“NATO’s Victory in Libya:The Right Way to Run an Intervention,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.91,No.3,2012,pp.2-7.
(5)Tim Dunne and Jess Gifkins,“Libya and R2P:Norm Consolidation or Perfect Storm?” The Interpreter,14 April,2011,https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/libya-r2p-norm-consolidation-or-perfect-storm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(6)《联合国安理会第6491次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6491,2011年2月26日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6491,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)《联合国安理会第6491次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6491,2011年2月26日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6491,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)《李保东大使在安理会通过利比亚局势决议后的解释性发言》,http://www.china-un.org/chn/gdxw/t807542.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《2011年3月3日外交部发言人姜瑜举行例行记者会》,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceae/chn/wjbfyrth/t803799.htm,访问时间:2019年2月15日。
(4)《联合国安理会第6498次会议记录》,UN. Doc.S/PV.6498 http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6498,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,“The New Politics of Protection? C8te d’Ivoire,Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” pp.825-850.
(6)Simon Adams,“Emergent Powers:India,Brazil,South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect,”http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-adams/un-india-brazil-south-africa_b_1896975.html,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)杨永红:《从利比亚到叙利亚:保护责任走到尽头了?》,载《世界经济与政治论坛》,2012年第3期,第75—76页。
(2)Gareth Evans,“When Intervening in a Conflict, Stick to UN Script,” The Sydney Morning Herald,March 24,2011,http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/when-intervening-in-a-conflict-stickto-un-script-20110323-1c6kz.html,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)钱文荣:《不干涉内政原则的内涵及其现实意义》,载张贵洪主编:《联合国发展报告2012》,北京:时事出版社2013年版,第150页。
(4)Emily O’Brien and Andrew Sinclair,“The Libyan War:A Diplomatic History:February-August 2011,”Center on International Cooperation,New York University,http://cic. es. its. nyu. edu/sites/default/files/libya_diplomatic_history.pdf,p.5,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)有关中国在利比亚问题上的对策,参见Liu Tiewa,“China and Responsibility to Protect:Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for Intervention,” pp.153-173。
(6)《胡锦涛会见法国总统萨科齐》,http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/14280249.html,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(7)《常驻联合国代表李保东大使在安理会审议武装冲突中保护平民问题上的发言》,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/chn/gdxw/t945106.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《常驻联合国代表李保东大使在安理会武装冲突中保护平民问题公开辩论会上的发言》,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/chn/gdxw/t821505.htm,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6627,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)Philippe Bolopion,“After Libya,the Question:to Protect or Depose?” Los Angeles Times,25 August,2011,http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/190-crisis-in-libya/3631-hrw-un-director-philippebolopion-after-libya-the-question-to-protect-or-depose,访问时间:2018年11月23日; Ian Hal,l“Tilting at Windmills? The Indian Debate over the Responsibility to Protect After UNSC Resolution 1973,” Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.5,No.1,2013,pp.84-108.
(3)Emily O’Brien and Andrew Sinclair,“The Libyan War:A Diplomatic History:February-August 2011,”Center on International Cooperation,New York University,http://cic. es. its. nyu. edu/sites/default/files/libya_diplomatic_history.pdf,p.15,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)《潘基文呼吁采取行动落实“保护责任”》,http://www.un.org/chinese/News/story.asp? newsID=17052,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)Jess Gifkins,“Briefing-The UN Security Council Divided:Syria in Crisis,” Global Responsibility to Protect,Vol.4,No.3,2012,pp.377-393.
(6)其中最具代表性的是中俄前四次联手否决后两国代表的发言,参见《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《联合国安理会第6711次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6711,2012年2月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《联合国安理会第6810次会议记录》,2012年7月19日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6810,访问时间:2019年5月20日;《联合国安理会第7180次会议记录》,2014年5月22日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.7180,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(1)《安理会决议草案》,UN Doc.S/2011/612,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/2011/612,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(3)《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(4)《联合国安理会第6627次会议记录》,UN Doc.S/PV.6627,2011年10月4日,http://www.un.org/zh/documents/view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PV.6711,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(5)钟声:《不能任由外部干涉实现政权更迭》,载《人民日报》,2012年7月17日。
(1)Global Center for the Responsibility to Protec,t“UN Security Council Resolutions Referencing R2P,”22January,2018,http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/335,访问时间:2019年5月20日。
(2)刘铁娃:《保护的责任与中国的视角——以中国对利比亚问题的态度为例》,http://www.unachina.org/webrms/wwwroot/wnachina/upload/Attach/default/274269.pdf,访问时间:2019年2月15日。
(3)Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano,“Responsibility to Protect Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia:How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect,”pp.204-223; Andrew Garwood-Gowers,“China and the‘Responsibility to Protect’:The Implications of the Libyan Intervention,” Asian Journal of International Law,Vol.2,No.2,2012,pp.375-393.毫无疑问,俄罗斯在叙利亚问题上的考虑要比中国复杂得多,牵涉到诸多现实的战略利益考量。
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