摘要
我国资本市场退市制度在短短的10年间经历了一个从无到有,逐步发展和完善的过程。与国外退出机制相比,我国退市制度发展时间短、速度快。其中,以特别处理(Special Treatment)机制为核心的过渡式退市制度设计,是我国制度背景下的资本市场重要制度创新之一。退市制度作为市场监管体系的一部分,其运行是建立在资本市场健康、持续发展的目标上,投资者保护作为资本市场健康发展的基石,是度量一切制度设计好坏的准绳之一。本文从投资者保护出发,对我国资本市场退出机制的有效性进行了系统的研究。
本文的研究充分考虑了现有制度研究的成果和视角,我们认为退市制度作为市场交易机制的一个重要环节,研究制度运行收益与制度运行成本同样重要,仅着眼于制度运行成本就否定现有的机制存在价值的做法是有失偏颇的,一些研究看到国外退出机制的优势就呼吁全盘引入西方成熟资本市场的退市制度设计,这样的论断和视角都是不完整的,其研究结论的价值和稳健性都受到质疑。有基于此,本研究通过对我国现行退市制度的运行现状、效率、困难、优势的分析,以投资者保护为研究切入点,通过理论演绎、经验归纳和实验模拟等手段,对我国资本市场现行退市制度的有效性进行了系统的研究。具体来说,本文从以下三个方面对我国资本市场退市制度的有效性进行研究：
1.我国上市公司退市制度运行效率与投资者保护分析的研究。在这个部分,本文从投资者保护的视角切入,研究退市制度设计的有效性。本文将我国上市公司退市机制的设计目标定位为“汰弱、激励和保护”。其中投资者保护是基点,淘汰劣质上市公司是手段,实现对上市公司管理层的激励是这一机制的外在化效应。这三大目标的实现程度,有效的考察了我国退市制度的运行效率；
2.我国证券市场退市设计下的披露改进。在这个部分,本章研究了退出设计下的过渡退市群体(ST处理公司)自愿披露的动机及其对信息不对称的改善。事实上,我国现行的退市机制的相关条例中,明确要求受到特别处理(ST)的公司应该加强披露,降低信息不对称,从而保护投资者利益。因此,本文通过对过渡退市群体的自愿披露状况及其动机分析,研究我国资本市场退市设计下的目标实现效率；
3.我国证券市场退出机制设计与投资者歧视的研究。在这个部分,我们从制度变更下来带够元机制交互影响出发,基于一个崭新的视角认识渐进式变革下的中国资本市场发展与矛盾,从当前资本市场引入公允价值计价与我国现行退市机制的交互影响和冲击出发,研究了在资本市场变革过程下的新旧机制的碰撞及其带来的制度效率的损失。该章的研究显示出我国资本市场的国际化进程与现行监管机制设计的冲突,从而为市场监管单位理解转轨经济下的制度设计与变革提供了更多实证研究证据。
全文的论述章节安排如下：
1.绪论。在这个部分,我们对全文研究背景、研究问题、研究目标和研究意义、研究内容和研究方法,以及组织结构和技术路线进行了总体的介绍；
2.我国资本市场退市制度设计有效性研究的理论和现实探索。该章从市场退市机制设计的必要性出发,在理论和实践上对我国上市公司退市机制的诞生和发展进行了诠释。同时,基于国内外文献基础和市场评价,对资本市场退市机制设计及其发展历程中的质疑进行逻辑性的解答和推衍,在理论上探索了我国上市公司退市机制存在的问题和未来发展的方向；
3.我国资本市场退市制度与投资者保护的实证研究。基于前述理论章节的叙述,本章对我国资本市场退市机制的诸多设计目标和效率标准进行验证。一方面验证了对我国上市公司在淘汰劣质上市公司,警示投资风险以及激活上市公司治理效能等方面的积极作用；另一方面,也实证检验我国现行退市机制在诱导市场机会主义行为,扭曲资源配置的方向等方面的消极作用。这是从制度运行成本与收益的整体视角出发,综合评价我国现有退出机制的效率水平；
4.我国资本市场退市制度下的披露改进—基于MD&A自愿披露的动因分析。在本章中,通过对我国特别处理(ST)上市公司从发生经营亏损到ST处理,再到ST摘帽过程中,年报MD&A披露内容的质量和动因分析,向我们展示了我国退市制度设计在改善披露状况,削弱市场信息不对称水平方面的积极作用；
5.我国资本市场退市制度设计与投资者歧视的制度效率研究。本章从资本市场引入新会计准则公允价值计量模式出发,研究其与我国资本市场退市制度的契合效用,引入行为财务理论中对于投资者认知局限的理论基础,利用情景实验的研究方式,对公允价值机制引入受到退市机制的影响。从而对信息质量、投资者决策及其既有市场规则的冲击做一个系统的研究。本章的研究结论为资本市场监管当局摸索适合我国国情的资本市场监管体系提供了一种崭新的研究范式。
6.研究结论和政策建议。本章作为全文的总结,在前述五章论述的基础上,归纳得到全文研究的结论和启示,明确了本研究的创新价值和贡献,并为市场监管提供了诸多政策建议。此外,该部分也对本文研究的局限和未来发展的展望进行了探讨。
本文研究的创新在于,从制度运行成本和收益的系统视角,对当前我国资本市场退出机制的有效性进行了研究。不同于以往研究将视角仅仅定位在退市机制设计的负面市场效应上,本研究从投资者保护出发,对资本市场退出机制“淘汰劣质上市公司,保护投资者利益,削弱信息不对称、推动市场变革”等方面的效用进行了系统、全面的探索,具体包括：
1.不仅仅关注于资本市场退出机制的低效运行的现状,而是从制度设计的背景和目标着手,基于制度运行成本和制度运行收益的整体效能出发,对退市制度设计的有效性进行了考量。这就避免了将市场发展阶段的低效等同于市场制度设计的低效,前者是经济发展阶段的效率水平,后者是运行于这一发展阶段的制度设计的合理性。因此,本文的研究框架从制度运行的成本和收益来考虑制度设计的合理性,从而将两个概念的差异分离开来。本文的研究为理解我国过度式退市机制的有效性提供了大量理论和实证的证据,这在研究框架的设计上是有创新和突破的。
2.本文的研究内容触摸了大量现有资本市场的空白,如管理层讨论与分析的披露动机及其有效性的研究,资本市场多元机制交互的影响等。特别是渐进式退出机制设计下,从企业自愿的披露意愿和质量研究我国渐进式退出机制的设计是具有合理性的,这一视角和结论在现有的研究中是创新的。
3.在研究方法上,本文引入了行为财务的实验研究工具,通过情景设计和实验手段来探索制度运行的效率和评价,这在财务领域是不多见的。实验研究的优势是具有一定的先验研究的能力,因此,本文的研究为资本市场管理当局摸索我国资本市场退出机制的未来与变革,提供了一个良好的研究工具。
The withdrawal mechanism of China's capital market has gone through a scratch, and gradually perfecting the process of development. Compared with the foreign withdrawal mechanism, it develops time short and fast in China. Keeping special treatment (ST) mechanism as a core, the transition withdrawal mechanism is one of the most important designs in capital market under the China institutional background. Withdrawal mechanism as part of the market supervision system, its operation is based on the long-term health and sustainable development objectives, and investor protection, as the cornerstone of health development of financial market, is one of the criterions of measuring the all systems design. Therefore, this paper, from the perspective of investor protection, researches systematically the efficiency of withdrawal mechanism of listed company.
This study full considers the research results and perspective of existing system, we believe that the withdrawal mechanism is a key links of market transaction system, and studying the benefits of system operation is as important as the costs. So it is biased that we negative the value of existing system only based on its cost. Meanwhile, it is also incomplete if we introduce totally the western mature capital market withdrawal mechanism according to its advantages, and the value and robustness of its research conclusions are questioned. In regard to these, this paper, from the current situation, problems, advantages of the existing withdrawal mechanism in China and the investor protection, studies systematically its efficiency through the ways of theoretical derivation, experiences deduction and experiment simulation. Specifically, this paper has three parts:
First, it analyzes the efficiency of withdrawal mechanism of listed company in China and the investor protection. In this part, from the perspective of investor protection, we analyze the efficiency of the withdrawal mechanism. We will locate the withdrawal mechanism of listed company in China as "weak, motivation and protection". Investor protection is the starting point, cleaning out the poor listed company is the way, and motivating the managers of listed company is the external expression of the mechanism. The level of achievements of these three objectives could effectively exam the efficiency of withdrawal mechanism operation in China.
Second, the disclosure improvement of stock market withdrawal mechanism in China. We analyze the motivation of the quit-market groups on the transitional stage (ST treatment company) disclosure voluntary under the withdrawal mechanism and the improvement of information asymmetry. In fact, the relevant regulations of the existing withdrawal mechanism clearly require the ST company should strengthen the disclosure, reduce the information asymmetry, thereby protect the benefits of investors.
Third, it analyzes the design of stock market withdrawal mechanism in China and investors discrimination. We start from a new perspective which is the interaction of the multiple mechanisms under the system changes, and then understand the development and contradiction of China capital market. This paper, based on the interaction and impact between the introduction of the fair value measurement of current capital market and the withdrawal mechanism in China, studies the conflict between the new and old system during the process of capital market transformation and the loss of efficiency accompany with the system. These findings show that the conflict between the international process of capital market in China and the existing supervision mechanism, and provide the more empirical research evidences for the design and transformation of mechanism under the transition economics according to the understandings of the market supervision department.
The chapters of this paper as follows:
Chapter 1:Introduction. In this section, we give a general introduction to the research background, questions, objectives, significance, contents and methods, and also introduce the organizational structure and technology roadmap.
Chapter 2:the theoretical and practical exploration of researching the efficiency of the design of capital market withdrawal mechanism in China. This chapter interprets the birth and development of withdrawal mechanism of China listed company from theory and practice based on the necessity of the market withdrawal mechanism. Meanwhile, according to the evaluation of literature of domestic and overseas and market, it explains and deducts logistically the doubts about the design and development process of capital market withdrawal mechanism, and explores in theory the problems of withdrawal mechanism of listed company and its development direction in the future.
Chapter 3:the empirical research of China capital market withdrawal mechanism and investor protection. Based on the mentioned above, this chapter authenticates the many design goals and efficiency criterions of the capital market withdrawal mechanism in China. On the one hand, it authenticates the positive effect of cleaning out the poor listed company, warning the investment risk and activating the governance performance of listed company; on the other hand, it empirical exams the negative effect of the withdrawal mechanism to induce the g the market opportunity behaviors and distort the direction of resources distribution. This starts from the perspective of mechanism operation cost'and benefits, and evaluates comprehensively the level of efficiency of existing withdrawal mechanism in China.
Chapter 4:the disclosure improvement of China's capital market withdrawal mechanism—the motivation of voluntary disclosure based on the MD&A. Analyzing the special treatment (ST) listed company from operation deficit to ST, ST to uncap, and the quality and motivation of the content that the annual MD&A disclosure, it shows the positive effect of the withdrawal mechanism on improving the disclosure and slaking down the level of information asymmetry of market.
Chapter 5:the analysis of the design of China's capital market withdrawal mechanism and the system efficiency of investor discrimination. This part introduces the measurement method of fair value of the New Accounting Criteria of capital market, and analyzes its agreement with the China's capital market withdrawal mechanism. Also it introduces that the behavior theory is limited to cognition for investors, and through the way of situational simulated methods, and then concludes that how the withdrawal mechanism affected by the introduction of fair value. Thus it could systematically research the information quality, investors decision-making and the impact on the existing market. The conclusion of this chapter provide a new research way for government to develop the capital market supervision mechanism which are suitable for China's own situation.
Chapter 6:the conclusion and the recommendations of policy. As a summary of the whole paper, this part, based on the full findings mentioned in the previous five chapters, inducts the research results and enlightens, clears the creativity values and contributions, and as well gives the many recommendations of policy for market supervision. In addition, the limitations of research and the future development prospects are discussed in this part.
The innovation of this paper is, from the mechanism perspective of the benefits and costs of system operation, studying the efficiency of the existing China's capital market withdrawal mechanism. Unlike the previous research which only concentrate on the negative effects of the withdrawal mechanism, this paper, starting from the investor protection, systematically and comprehensively explores the aspects of capital market withdrawal mechanism, which are cleaning out the poor listed company, protecting the benefits of investors, diminishing the information asymmetry, and promoting the market change. Specifically including:
1. It not only focuses on the current situation of low efficiency of capital market, but also considers the efficiency of withdrawal mechanism from its background, objectives, based on the cost and benefit of the whole performance of system operation. This avoids the low inefficiency of market development process equal to the design of market system. The former is the level of efficiency on the stage of economic development, and the later is the reasonable of the system design which running in the stage. Therefore, the framework of the research considers the reasonable of system design from the cost and benefits of system operation and thus different these two concepts. This study provides a large number of theoretical and empirical evidences for understanding the efficiency of the progressive withdrawal mechanism in China. The design of research framework is an innovation and breakghrough.
2. The research contents touch a lot of gaps in the existing capital market, such as management discussion, analysis of disclosure motivate and its efficiency and the interaction of multiple mechanisms of capital market. Especially, it is reasonable that we research the progressive withdrawal mechanism from the intention and quality that enterprises disclosure voluntarily. This perspective and conclusion is creative in the existing research result.
3. With regard to the research methodology, this paper introduces the experimental research tools of behavioral finance, and it explores and evaluates the efficiency of mechanism operation through scenario design and experimental method. This is so rare in the financial field. The advantage of experimental research is capable of prior research. Therefore, the study of this paper provides a good research tool for the management to explore the future and change of capital market withdrawal mechanism in China.
引文
1.白重恩、路江涌、陶志刚：“投资环境对外资企业效益的影响——来自企业层面的证据”,《经济研究》,2004年第9期；
2.边泓,曲兴华：“会计信息在投资决策中长期锚定效应研究——对计量观实证方法的改进”,《财经研究》,2009年11期；
3.边燕杰、丘海雄：“企业的社会资本及其功效”,《中国社会科学》,2000年第2期；
4.曾颖、陆正飞,2006：“信息披露质量与股权融资成本”,《经济研究》,第2期；
5.陈冬华、陈信远、万华林：“国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费”,《经济研究》,2005年第2期；
6.陈胜蓝、魏明海,2006：“投资者保护与财务会计信息质量”,《会计研究》,2006年10期；
7.邓传洲,2005：“公允价值的价值相关性：B股公司的证据”,《会计研究》,2005年10期；
8.樊纲、王小鲁、朱恒鹏：“中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2006年报告”,经济科学出版社,2007年；
9.樊潇彦、袁志刚：“我国宏观投资效率的定义与衡量：一个文献综述”,《南开经济研究》,2006年第1期；
10.方军雄,2006：“市场化进程与资本配置效率的改善”,《经济研究》,第5期：
11.葛家澍,2007：“关于在财务会计中采用公允价值的探讨”,《会计研究》,2007年第11期；
12.龚六堂,谢丹阳：“我国省份之间的要素流动和边际生产率的差异分析”,《经济研究》,2004年第1期；
13.韩立岩,蔡红艳：”我国资本配置效率及其与金融市场关系评价研究”,《管理世界》,2002年第1期；
14.黄瑶、凌志雄：”中国会计发展与创新：回顾、评述与展望——“改革开放三十年会计发展与创新研讨会”综述”,《管理世界》,2008年第10期；
15.姜国华：“基于会计信息的证券投资策略研究：分析及展望”,《会计研究》,2005年第11期；
16.姜国华、张然：“稳健性与公允价值：基于股票价格反应的规范性分析“,《会计研究》,2007年6期；
17.李青原：会计信息质量与公司资本配置效率——来自我国上市公司的经验证据,《南开管理评论》,2009年第8期；
18.李心丹、王冀宁、傅浩：“中国个体证券投资者交易行为的实证研究”,《经济研究》,2002年11期；
19.刘昌胜、汤湘希：“会计信息产权配置理论：财富最大化假说”,《管理世界》,2010年第1期；
20.刘浩、孙铮：“公允价值的实证理论分析与中国的研究机遇“,《财经研究》,2008年1期；
21.刘泉军、张政伟：“新会计准则引发的思考”,《会计研究》,2006年3期；
22.卢锐、魏明海、黎文靖：《管理层权利、在职消费与产权效率》,《南开管理评论》,2008年第5期；
23.陆宇建、张继袖、刘国艳：“基于不确定性的公允价值计量与披露问题研究”,《会计研究》,2007年2期；
24.陆正飞、刘桂进：“中国公众投资者信息需求之探索性研究”,《经济研究》,2002年第4期；
25.罗宏、黄文化：“国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩”,《管理世界》,2008年第9期；
26.潘文卿,张伟：“中国资本配置效率与金融发展相差性研究”,《管理世界》,2003年第8期；
27.潘琰、辛清泉,：“解读企业信息需求——基于机构投资者的信息需求 探索”,《会计研究》,2004年第12期；
28.彭桃英,李良师,李岚：“审计判断中的时近效应和肯定性倾向——基于持续经营能力判断的实验研究”,会计研究,2009年第11期；
29.彭星辉、汪晓红,1995：“上海股民的投资行为与个性特征研究”,《心理科学》,1995年02期
30.綦好东、黄跃群：“我国非上市国有企业信息公开披露：现状分析与制度设计”,《管理世界》,2009年第2期。
31.沈艺峰、吴世农：“我国证券市场过度反应了吗?”《经济研究》,1999年第02期
32.史永东、齐鹰飞：“中国经济的动态效率”,《世界经济》,2002年第8期
33.世界银行：”政府治理、投资环境与和谐社会：中国120个城市竞争力的提高”,报告编号No.37759-CN.,2006年。
34.谭洪涛、蔡春：“新准则实施会计质量实证研究——来自A股上市公司的经验证据”,《中国会计评论》,2009年6期
35.王建成、胡振国：“公允价值会计与利益相关者行为”,《管理世界》,2006年第4期
36.王建成、胡振国：“我国公允价值计量研究的现状及相关问题探析”,《会计研究》,2007年05期
37.王乐锦：“我国新会计准则中公允价值的运用：意义与特征”,《会计研究》,2006年05期
38.魏明海：“盈余的预期管理与盈余管理”,《审计研究》,2005年第3期；
39.吴联生：“会计域秩序与会计信息规则性失真”,《经济研究》,2002年第4期。
40.谢德仁：“会计信息的真实性与会计规则制定权合约安排”,《经济研究》,2000年第5期。
41.辛清泉、林斌、杨德明：“中国资本投资回报率的估算和影响因素分析”,《经济学季刊》,2007年第3期
42.许年行、吴世农：“我国上市公司股权分置改革中的锚定效应研究”, 《经济研究》,2007年01期
43.薛爽、徐浩萍、施海娜：“公允价值的运用与应计利润功能——基于中国新旧会计准则比较的研究”,《南开管理评论》,2009年第5期
44.薛爽、赵立新、肖泽忠、程绪兰,2008：“会计准则国际趋同是否提高了会计信息的价值相关性?——基于新老会计准则的比较研究”,《财贸经济》,2008年09期
45.杨丹、陈旭东、逯东、叶建明,2009：中国会计改革30年——经济和会计互动的中国路径,《会计研究》,第1期。
46.杨明增,张继勋：“审计判断中的锚定效应研究”,《审计研究》,2007年第4期；
47.杨明增：“经验对审计判断中锚定效应的影响”,《审计研究》,2009年第2期；
48.袁志刚、何樟勇：“20世纪90年代以来中国经济的动态效率”,《经济研究》,2003年第7期；
49.周中胜、陈汉文：会计信息透明度与资源配置效率,《会计研究》,2008年第12期；
50.朱凯、李琴、潘金凤：“信息环境与公允价值的股价相关性——来自中国证券市场的经验证据”,《财经研究》,2008年7期；
51.朱凯、赵旭颖、孙红：“会计准则改革、信息准确度与价值相关性——基于中国会计准则改革的经验证据”,《管理世界》,2009年第4期；
52. Ahn Kookshin,2003, "Are East Asian Economies Dynamically Efficient?" Journal of Economic Development,28(1), pp.101-110
53. Allen, F, and E. Carletti.2008. Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45 (2-3):pp.358-378.
54. Allen, F., J. Qian and M. J. Qian,2005, "Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China", Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.77, pp.57-116.
55. Allen, F., R. Chakrabarti, S. De, J. Qian, and M.J. Qian,2006, "Financing Firms in India", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3975.
56. Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson,1986. Asset Pricing and The Bid Ask Spread. Journal of Financial Economics 17 (2):pp.223-249.
57. Armstrong, C. S., W. R. Guay, and J. P. Weber.2010. The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (2-3):pp.179-234.
58. Ball, R.2001.Infrastructure Requirements for an Economically Efficient System of Public Financial Reporting and Disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 2001 (1):pp.127-169.
59. Ball, R. A.Y., G. I. L. Sadka, and R. Sadka.2009. Aggregate Earnings and Asset Prices. Journal of Accounting Research 47 (5):pp.1097-1133.
60. Ball, R., and P. Brown.1968. An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2):pp.159-178.
61. Ball,r., A. Robin, and s.j. Wu.2000. Accounting standards, the institutional environment and issuer incentives:effect on timely loss recognition in china Asia-pacific journal of accounting and economics 7:pp.71-96.
62. Barbara M Fraumeni and Dale W Jorgenson,1980, "Rates of Return by Industrial Sector in the United States,1948-76", American Economic Review, 70(2), pp.326-330
63. Barberis, Nicholas, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny.1997."A model of investor sentiment,"3:pp.241-258
64. Barth, Beaver, W. H., and Landsman.1996. Value-relevance of bank's fair value diselosures under SFAS No.107. [J].The Accounting Review 71(4):pp. 513-537
65. Barth, M. E., Beaver, W. H. and Landsman, W. R.2001. The relevance of the value relevance literature for accounting standard setting:another view.[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31:pp.77-104
66. Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R., and Wahlen, J. M.,1995. Fair value accounting:effects on banks'earnings volatility, regulatory capital, and value of contractual cash flows. [J]. Journal of Banking& Finance 19(6):pp.577-605
67. Baumol, W., P. Heim, B. Malkiel, and R. Quandt,1970, "Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growt h of t he Firm", Review of Economics and S tatistics,52 (4), pp.345-355.
68. Beaver W. H., C. Eger, S. Ryan, and M. Wolfson.1989. Financial Reporting, Supplemental Disclosures, and Bank Share Prices. [J]. Journal of Accounting Research27:pp.151-178
69. bel A.et al.,1989 "Assessing Dynamic Efficiency:Theory and Evidence", Review of Economic Studies,56(1), pp.1-19
70. Bernanke, B., and M. Gertler.1989. Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations. American Economic Review 79 (1):pp.14-31.
71. Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and G. Simon.1996. The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality. The Review of Economics and Statistics 78 (1):pp.1-15.
72. Brealey. R., S. Hodges, and D. Capron,"The Ret urn on Alternative Sources of Finance", Review of Economics and S tatistics,1976,58 (4), pp.469-477.
73. Brian W. Mayhew, Jeffrey W. Schatzberg, Galen R. Sevcik.2004. Examining the Role of Auditor Quality and Retained Ownership in IPO Markets: Experimental Evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research,21(1):89
74. Brunnermeier, M. K.2009. Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (1):pp.77-100.
75. Bushman, R. M., and A. J. Smith.2001. Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal Of Accounting & Economics 32 (1-3):pp.237-333.
76. Camerer, C.,1995. Individual decision-making, in John H. Kagel, and Alvin E. Roth, ed.:The Handbook of Ex-perimental Economics.[J]. Princeton University Press, Prince-ton NJ
77. Cass David.,1965, "Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation", Review of Economic Studies,32(3), pp.233-240.
78. Cull, R., and L. Xu,2005, "Institutions, Ownership, and Finance:The Determinant s of Profit Reinvestment among Chinese Firms", Journal of Financial Economics,77(1), pp.117—146.
79. D. Eric Hirst, Lisa Koonce, Jeffrey Miller.1999. The Joint Effect of Management's Prior Forecast Accuracy and the Form of Its Financial Forecasts on Investor Judgment. Journal of Accounting Research,37:101～124
80. D. Eric Hirst, Lisa Koonce, Paul J. Simko.1995. Investor Reactions to Financial Analysts'Research Reports. Journal of Accounting Research, 33(2):335～351
81. Daniel, Kent, D. Hirshleifer and A. Subrahmanyam.1998. Investor psychology and security market under-and overreactions. [J]. Journal of Finance 53:pp.1839-1886
82. De Bondt W. F. M.,1993. Betting on trends:Intuitive forecasts of financial risk and return, International Journal of Forecasting 9:pp.355-371
83. De Bondt, Werner Thaler.1985. Does the Stock Market Overreact [J]. Journal of Finance 40:pp.793-808
84. Dechow, P., W. Ge, and C. Schrand.2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (2-3):pp.344-401.
85. Dollar, D., M. Hallward Driemeier, and T. Mengistae,2003, "Investment Climate and Firm Performance in Developing Economies", World Bank Working Paper
86. Easley, D., and M. O'Hara.2004. Information and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance 59 (4):pp.1553-1583.
87. Fama, E.,1980. "Agency problems and the theory of the firm". Journal of Political Economy 88,288-307.
88. Fama, E., and K. French,1999, "The Corporate Cost of Capital and t he Return on Corporate Investment", Journal of Finance,54 (6), pp.1939—1967.
89. Francis, J. R., S. Huang, I. K. Khurana, and R. Pereira.2009. Does Corporate Transparency Contribute to Efficient Resource Allocation? Journal of Accounting Research 47 (4):pp.943-989.
90. Fred Phillips.1999. Auditor Attention to and Judgments of Aggressive Financial Reporting. Journal of Accounting Research,37:167～189
91. Friedman, E., S. Johnson, D. Kaufmann, and P. ZoidoLobaton,2000, "Dodging the Grabbing Hand:the Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries", Journal of Public Economics,Vol.76, pp.459-493.
92. Friend, I., and F. Husic,1973, "Efficiency of Corporate Investment", Review of Economics and Statistics,55 (1), pp.122-127.
93. Frye, T. and E. Zhuravskaya,2000, "Rackets, Regulations and the Rule of Law", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,Vol.16, pp.478～502.
94. George, T. J. and Chuan-yang Hwang,2004. The 52-week High and Momentum Investing. [J]. Journal of Finance 59:pp.2145—2175.
95. Gugler K., D. Mueller, and B. Yurtoglu,2003, "The Impact of Corporate Governance on Investment Returns In Developed and Developing Count ries", Economic Journal,113 (491), pp.511—539.
96. Gugler K., D. Mueller, and B. Yurtoglu,2004, "Corporate Governance and t he Returns on Investment", Journal of Law and Economics,47(2), pp.589 —633.
97. Hay, J. and A. Shleifer,1998, "Private Enforcement of Public Laws:a Theory of Legal Reform", American Economic Review, Vol.88, pp.398～403.
98. Healy, P. M., and K. G. Palepu.2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal Of Accounting & Economics 31 (1-3):pp.405-440.
99. Hirshleifer D.,2001. Investor psychology and asset pricing, Journal of Finance 56:pp.1533-1597
100.Hirshleifer D., Siew Hong Teoh,2009. Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets Handbook of Financial Markets:Dynamics and Evolution. pp. 1-56
101.Hughes, J. S., L. Jing, and J. Liu.2007. Information Asymmetry, Diversification, and Cost of Capital. Accounting Review 82 (3):pp.705-729.
102.Hun-Tong Tan, Robert Libby, James E. Hunton.2002. Analysts'Reactions to Earnings Preannouncement Strategies. Journal of Accounting Research,40(1): 223～246
103.Hun-Tong Tan, Robert Libby, James E. Hunton.2009. When Do Analysts Adjust for Biases in Management Guidance? Effects of Guidance Track Record and Analysts'Incentives. Contemporary Accounting Research,47(1):
104.Jamal. K, H. T. Tan.2010. Joint Effects of Principles-Based versus Rules-Based Standards and Auditor Type in Constraining Financial Managers'Aggressive Reporting. The Accounting Review,85:1325～1346
105.James R. Frederickson, Jeffrey S. Miller.2004. The Effects of Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures on Analysts'and Nonprofessional Investors'Equity Valuation Judgments. The Accounting Review,79(3):667～686
106. Jane Kennedy.1999. Discussion of the Joint Effect of Management's Prior Forecast Accuracy and the Form of Its Financial Forecasts on Investor Judgment. Journal of Accounting Research,37:125～134
107.Jensen, M., and Meckling, W.,1976, "Thoery of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure", Journal of Financial Economics,3, pp.30-360.
108.Johnson, S., D. Kaufmann, and A. Shleifer,1997, "The Unofficial Economy in Transition", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.2, pp.159～239.
109 Johnson, S., D. Kaufmann, J. McMillan, and C.Woodruff,2000, "Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism", Journal of Public Economics, Vol.76,pp.495-520.
110.Jun Han, Hun-Tong Tan.2010. Investors'Reactions to Management Earnings Guidance:The Joint Effect of Investment Position, News Valence, and Guidance Form. Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting Research, 48(1):81～104
111.Kahneman D, Tversky A.1979. Prospect Theory:An analysis of decision under risk. [J].Econometrical 47:pp.263-291
112.Kahneman D, Tversky A.1982. Judgment under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases [M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press
113.Kahneman D., Tversky A.1973. On the psychology of prediction. [J]. Psychological Review 80:pp.237-251.
114.Kahneman, P. Slovic, A. Tversky.1980. Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. UK:Cambridge University Press, pp.306-334
115.Karl Hackenbrack, Mark W. Nelson.1996. Auditors'Incentives and Their Application of Financial Accounting Standards. The Accounting Review,71:43-59
116.Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore.1997. Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105 (2):pp.211-248.
117.Koopmans Tjalling C.,1965, "On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth", The Econometric Approach to Development Planning, Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Scripta Varia,28(1965), pp.225-300
118.Kothari, S. P.2001. Capital markets research in accounting. Journal Of Accounting & Economics 31 (1-3):pp.105-231.
119.La Porta R.,1996. Expectations and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. Journal of Finance 51:pp.1715-1742
120.Lambert, R., C. Leuz, and R. E. Verrecchia.2007. Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research 45 (2):pp.385-420.
121.Levine, R.1997. Financial Development and Economic Growth:Views and Agenda. Journal of Economic Literature 35 (2):pp.688-726.
122.Libby R., M.W.Nelson, J.E.Hunton.2006. Recognition.v. Disclosure, Auditor Tolerance for Misstatement, and the Reliability of Stock-Copensation and Lease Information. Journal of Accounting Research,44:533～560
123.long:Theory and evidence. [J]. Journal of Finance 40:pp.777-790
124.Mark W.Nelson, John A.Elliott, Robin L.Tarpley.2002. Evidence from Auditors about Managers'and Auditors'Earnings Management Decisions. The Accounting Review,77Supplement:175-202
125.Mary.E.Barth, Wayne.R.L., Mark..H.Lang.2008. International Accounting Standards and Accounting Quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 46:467～498
126.McFetridge, D.,1978, "The Efficiency Implications of Earnings Retentions", Review of Economics and Statistics,60 (2), pp.218—224.
127.McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff,1999a, "Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.114, pp.1285～1320.
128.McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff,1999b, "Disputes Prevention without Courts in Vietnam", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol.15, pp.637～658.
129.McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff,2002, "The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.16, pp.153-170.
130.McMillan, J.,1997, "Markets in Transition", Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Volume II, edited by David M.Kreps and Kenneth F. Wallis, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp.210～239.
131.Molly Mercer,2005. The Fleeting Effects of Disclosure Forthcomingness on Management's Reporting Credibility. [J]. THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW 80: pp.723-744
132.Mueller, D., and B. Yurtoglu,2000, "Count ry Legal Environment s and Corporate Investment Performance", German Economic Review,1(2), pp.187-220
133.Mueller, D., and E. Reardon,1993, "Rates of Return on Corporate Investment", Southern Economic Journal,60 (2), pp.430-453
134.Nofsinger J.,2001. The impact of Public infonnation on investors.[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance 25:pp.1339-1366.
135.Northcraft, Neale.1987. Experts, Amateurs and Real Estate:An Anchoring and Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions.[J]. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (39),pp.214-229
136.Padma Desai and Ricardo Martin,1983, "Efficiency Loss From Resource Misallocation in Soviet Industry", The Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(3), pp.441-456
137.Petersen, M. A., and R. G. Rajan.2002. Does distance still matter? The information revolution in small business lending. Journal of Finance 57 (6):pp.2533-2570.
138.Phelps E,1961, " The Golden Rule of Accumulation:A Fable For Growthmen", The American Economic Review,51(4),638-643
139.Plantin, G, H. Sapra, and H. S. Shin.2008. Marking-to-Market:Panacea or Pandora's Box? Journal of Accounting Research 46 (2):pp.435-460.
140.Rajan, R., Wulf, J.,2006, "Are perks purely managerial excess?", Journal of Financial Economics 79,1-33.
141.Ramsey F. P.,1928, "A Mathematical Theory of Saving", Economic Journal,38(152), pp.543-559.
142.Reproduced, University of Chicago, Presented at the NBER-Sage workshop on Behvaioral Economics
143.Richard C. Hatfield, Christopher P. Agoglia, Maria H. Sanchez.2008. Client Characteristics and the Negotiation Tactics of Auditors:Implications for Financial Reporting. Journal of Accounting Research,46:1183～1207
144.Richard Dietrich, Mary S. Harris, Karl A Muller,2000. the Reliability of Investment Property Fair Value Estimates 30(2):pp.125-145.
145.Robert Libby, Hun-Tong Tan, James E. Hunton.2006. Does the Form of Managements'Earnings Guidance Affect Analysts'Earnings Forecasts?. The Accounting Review,81:251～270
146.Robert Libby, James E. Hunton, Hun-Tong Tan, N. Seybert.2008. Relationship Incentives and the Optimistic/Pessimistic Pattern in Analysts' Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research,46:173～198
147.Robert Libby, Mark W. Nelson, James E. Hunton.2006. Recognition vs. Disclosure, Auditor Tolerance for Misstatement, and the Reliability of Stock-Compensation and Lease Information. Journal of Accounting Research, 44:533～560
148.Robert Libby, Robert Bloomfield, Mark W. Nelson.2002. Experimental Research in Financial Accounting. Accounting, Organization and Society, 27:775～810
149.Ron Kasznik, Baruch Lev.1995. To Warn or Not to Warn:Management Disclosures in the Face of an Earnings Surprise. The Accounting Review, 70(1):113～134
150.Sarah E. Bonner, Artur Hugon, Beverly R. Walther.2007. Investor Reaction to Celebrity Analysts:The Case of Earnings Forecast Revisions. Journal of Accounting Research,45(3):481～513
151.Shana Clor-Proell, Mark W. Nelson.2007. Accounting Standards, Implementation Guidance, and Example-Based Reasoning. Journal of Accounting Research,45:699～730
152.Shefrin H. Beyond Greed and Fear.2000. [M]. Boston:Havard Business School Press
153.Shefrin H.and Meir Statman.2000. Behavioral portfolio theory. [J].Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis 35:pp.127-151
154.Solow Robert M.,1956, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth", Quarterly Journal of Economics,70(1), pp.65-94.
155.Swan Trevor W.,1956, "Economic growth and Capital Accumulation", Economic Record,32(63), pp.334-61.
156.Tversky A, Kaheman D.1974. Judgment under Uneertainiy. [J]. Heuristies and Biase S. Science 185:pp.1124—1131
157.Whittington, G.,1972, "The Profitability of Retained Earnings", Review of Economics and S tatistics,54 (2), pp.152-160.
158.Wurgler, Jeffrey,2000, "Financial markets and the allocation of capita", Journal of Financial Economics,58(1-2), pp.187-214