摘要
我国农村财政体系适从于国家的发展路径,支撑、映射并能约束各级政府在农村的行为,而呈现出独立性,分级治理结构作为其运行的框架,随着财政体系职能与价值取向的变化,在价值与效率的追逐中发生演变。城乡一体化及公共财政向农村覆盖,各级财政加大了对农投入,有力地推进了农村各项事业的发展,但分级治理结构的调整蹒跚推进,结构的固有缺陷不断放大,政府行为的有效性、责任性、回应性表现不充分,在理论上或依据外在的价值标准求解应有的治理模式或对某一问题求索治理方案,而忽略整个结构的演进规律及其微观基础,实践的不足和理论的滞后预设了本文的研究目标与主要内容：1.对治理结构演进的整个序列是否存在一个统一的解释,制约演进的基本规律是什么?分析演进的理论工具是什么?2.在结构的具体演进中,治理结构的选择受到哪些因素的影响,它们是如何影响的?即制约结构演进的结构逻辑与环境逻辑有何表现?3.以目前的治理环境和治理结构的绩效为基础,结构演进的趋势是什么?如何推进?
一.研究结论
本文以微观主体为研究视角,农村财政分级治理结构被界定为各级政府和农户及其组织在农村财政公共事务中的行为规则和行为关系,是“安装”在初始制度基础上的治理制度,具体体现为治理主体及主体间的行为规则。依据各主体间的基本关系即以财政收支的剩余控制权、决策权、管理权、执行权的配置为维度并结合演进的实际,分级治理结构被区分出完全控制型、有限控制型、技术治理型、有限参与型、完全参与型等型式,结合我国的政治社会制度,结构演进的装置设定为中央政府的结构选择和构建。以方法论的个人主义、结构的人工制品及结构的开放性为假设前提,以制度分析理论和博弈论为基础,以治理主体的行为为中心,认为农村财政分级治理结构的演变一方面受制于结构本身,另一方面受制于治理环境,表现出结构型式逻辑与外部环境逻辑,两种逻辑是相互嵌套在一起的,结构型式逻辑是外部环境逻辑实现的手段,外部环境逻辑制约着结构型式逻辑作用的发挥。以上述设定和分析框架为研究前提,获得了如下的研究结论：
1.分级治理结构的演进在“环境—目标—行为—结构—绩效”的循环作用中发生。治理环境内生出治理目标,包括体现价值取向的应然目标以及以现实为基础的实然目标,治理目标呼应相应行为,结构是规则集中表现,是影响主体行为的直接变量,结构的改进使主体行为选择发生改变,并受嵌入其间的社会关系影响,产生出实际的绩效,其可能与目标要求偏离、也可能使治理环境发生改变,当然其间环境也可能发生外生的或输入性的变化,由此滋生出新的治理目标,使结构发生进一步的改进。
2.分级治理结构演进的结构型式逻辑具体表现为：i.当地方政府的收入超过农户集团从财政获得的预期收益时,选择完全参与型与非农支出晋升为占优策略：ii.当地方政府收入低于农户集团从财政获得的预期收益且资本的增长与收入贡献超过其获得超额利润而引起的维稳成本时,选择技术治理型为弱占优策略：iii.当地方政府收入低于农户集团由财政获得的预期收益且资本的增长与收入贡献低于其获得超额利润而引起的维稳成本时,选择完全控制型与非农支出晋升为占优策略。以“环境—行为—结构”框架为分析演进的理论工具。结合实际把各主体的相互行为纳入序贯博弈中,设定了各主体为风险中性者时在农村财政收支中的行为模式与支付函数,结构参数作为行为的参数包含其中,中央政府行使结构选择权处在博弈的机会点。不同的结构表现出不同的结构参数,地方政府与公众在不同结构及不同的治理方式下有不同的支出行为选择,依据支付效用最大化,中央政府进行结构和治理方式的策略选择,以此实现序贯博弈均衡,使选择的策略能纳什实施。
3.随着生产组织型式由集中、集体生产型式向传统家庭生产型式、企业型生产型式转变,中央政府选择完全控制型与非农支出晋升的可能性减少,相应地选择技术治理型的可能性会增加,同时实施支农支出晋升策略的可能性也会增加,政府会偏向对农户集团的支出。这是分级治理结构演进外部逻辑的具体表现之一。为了分析的简洁把治理环境归结为产权结构和生产组织、经济与收入增长、初始收入差距、租金收益等四要素,分析这四要素对结构演进的影响,是以结构演进的结构型式逻辑为基础,把环境要素嵌套在各主体的支付函数中,来分析中央政府纳什选择的变化。随着农地产权配置及生产组织的变化,农户的生产与收益函数发生变化,引起各主体支付函数的改变,在财政支出安排的空间内,中央政府选择均衡治理策略的区间也会发生改变,与此相应能纳什实施的结构选择所对应的财政支出安排范围或增加或缩小,使得不同结构能纳什实施的可能性发生变化。
4.当中央政府偏好收入增长时,有：中央政府不具有实施支农支出激励策略的动机：当地方政府收入超过农户集团由财政获得的预期收益即时,选择完全参与型为占优策略：当地方政府收入低于农户集团由财政获得的预期收益时,选择技术治理型为占优策略。政府组织虽超越经济组织和社会组织,但其强制力由民所赋,提供私人组织和社会组织不能、不愿或供给不足但礼会成员又必需的物品、服务品,并在社会组织和私人组织的制衡中、调整中、融合中改进供给效率和效果,为此政府组织是以职能为依据,以支定收,不应具有追逐收入增长的目的,但私人组织与社会组织的发育与分化依赖于政府组织,同时政府行为的规则约束与公共约束不足,使政府的私人逐利性得以放大；政府组织与私人组织、社会组织的行为边界不明晰,政府组织介入微观资源配置,特别是竞争性领域,导致政府职能与支出不确定,有些行为具有经营性,使逐利性植根于政府组织的行为。政府的收入偏好改变了中央政府的支付函数,引起不同结构中激励策略实施边界的变化,结构选择能纳什实施的财政支出空间也随之变化。
5.中央政府偏好经济增长时,有：当非农支出的生产技术具有充分效率时,配置空间不存在实施支农支出激励策略的区间：当地方政府收入超过农户集团由财政获得的预期收益时,选择完全参与型与非农支出晋升为占优策略：当地方政府收入低于农户集团由财政获得的预期收益时,选择技术治理型为占优策略：追求经济增长的中央政府不具有实施完全控制型的动机。对增长的偏好表现为中央政府追求整个社会收入最大化,而不考虑收入分配的差异,即对收入分配持中性态度,在其效用函数中忽略了收入的社会差异,由此引起中央政府结构及治理策略选择所对应的财政支出区间发生变化。
6.当中央政府偏重社会发展时,收入差距的扩大使中央政府实施支农支出晋升、选择技术治理型策略的可能性增加,当地方政府的收入超过农户集团从财政获得的预期收益时中央政府选择完全参与型与非农支出晋升可纳什实施,当地方政府收入低于农户集团从财政获得的预期收益时,中央政府选择技术治理型为弱占优策略。在政府偏好不变时,租金收益的增加能增加中央政府实施支农支出晋升激励的可能性,并且与技术治理型选择相结合。经济的高速增长并不必然带来社会的全面进步及人的自由全面发展,这一应然目标取向在中央政府的效用函数中体现为支付收益是收入差距与租金收益的减函数,由此引起治理方式与结构的纳什选择在财政支出空间的变化。
7.“统收统支”作为完全控制型的实践型式,是中央政府在治理环境和目标制约下,均衡选择的结果,遵循选择的逻辑,它的调整在绩效及意识形态的约束中进行。新生政权脱臼于旧的政治与旧的经济,而旧的经济与旧的政治中缺乏“数目字管理”,政府的财政能力低下,已有的财政能力不支撑分配的主导权,新生政权缺乏治理私营经济的经验,而“统收统支”型能使中央政府通过财政渠道集中和分配社会的全部剩余,如意地实现社会经济中的主导作用。新生政权的执政能力及其集团成员私产的缺乏使完全控制型的构建有了强势的行动集团,意识形态的现实界定制约着结构的现实选择,私营经济的个体理性与国外的强权威胁也制约着结构的选择及建构的路径。“统收统支”虽使中央政府能集中全部的社会剩余,以此稳定政权、加快经济的恢复与发展,但支出重建设、轻消费,结构不合理,并且束缚了地方政府与微观组织利用自身信息配置资源的主动性,同时也滋生出体制内的机会主义行为,使资源配置难以优化,受意识形态及控制权的约束,调整仅在各级政府间进行,属于科层组织中不同层次间执行权的重新配置,调整未改变模式的集中统一性,经济增长的陷于“一放就乱、收就死”的怪圈,意识形态的刚性约束与政治性治理手段使怪圈得以强化与恶化。
8.“分级包干制”作为有限控制型的实践型式,渐进地突破了原有意识形态与体制的束缚,缓解了“统收统支”的固有缺陷,但又滋生出新的缺陷。在原有意识形态及体制的拮桎消解后,其不再是均衡选择。“分级包干制”不属于理论实证中中央政府的均衡选择集,但在中央政府的支付函数中加入结构变迁的社会成本,修正其支付函数,不同结构变迁成本的差异会使“分级包干制”成为均衡选择,其通过承包契约及政府间的行政性分权,把地方政府及农户塑造成相对独立的利益主体和生产主体,激活了生产组织及地方政府增产与增收的积极性,渐进地突破了原有意识形态与体制的束缚,但生产经营组织与地方政府的资源配置仍然缺乏有效的激励与约束,其短期行为使增长缺乏持续性,这种治理结构还未根除完全控制型的缺陷,宏观经济依然表现出大起大落的波动,地方政府的逐利行为也阻隔了资源配置的地区优化,加大了对农村税费式的汲取,承包契约中基数和分成比例核定不科学不规范,增加了治理结构运行中的交易成本,降低了结构的激励效应,最迫切的现实威胁是中央政府收入占比下降,对地方政府的激励与调控乏力。
9.“分税制”作为技术治理型的实践形式,提高了中央财政的收入占比,改变了地方政府的创收行为,实现了治理手段的多样化、技术化,但使县乡财力弱化,农户负担持续加重,治理中存在寻租与经营的空间。技术治理型中各级政府以税种组织收入,促进了微观主体的产权改革与统一市场的形成,转移支付也使中央政府获得了多样的调控手段,但地方政府作为利益主体的性质并未改变,增收压力的强化,使其以权力和所掌控的资源在市场中获取地方性收益,预算外收入与非预算收入膨胀,同时技术治理中的考核指标与程序规则受嵌入的社会关系的影响未能出现预期的约束作用。
10.分级治理结构演进的基本趋向是完全参与型。规范政府的收支形式、改进预算的管理与技术强化了过程的控制与能力的建设,提高了公共品供给效率；考核指标结构的改进与程序技术的规范、问责制的建立,改善了财政的支出安排,但满足公共需求的激励与约束机制的缺乏,治理成本的增加,使治理手段与技术的改进未能实现预期的目标,突出地表现在农村公共品的供给中总量不足与结构过剩相伴而生。依据演进的逻辑可推知分级治理结构演进的基本趋向是完全参与型,现实表现为：技术治理经营化根源于政府和政府部门的经营性、独立产权成为主体要求财政支出定位于公共需求、社会均衡发展及社会主义基本价值取向的要求,治理环境的这些表现与完全参与型相呼应；完全参与型自身能压缩“设租寻租”的空间、能消除政府的逐利性、能使政府受“公利”价值的激励与约束,使经营性财政收支植入公共属性。
二.政策建议
1.健全基层参与制,重塑基层政府的预算机制与模式。健全基层参与制实际上是推进有限参与型的建立,有限参与型不是中央政府的理性选择,但此策略符合实践理性,一方面能低成本地打破“仪式锁定”,消解路径依赖；另一方面可通过学习机制积累建立完全参与型的经验。除此外基层预算的公众参与有实施的便利条件和充分的参与激励,能实现当地居民公共需求的主权,提高基层财政支出的效率和效果,使财政分权有良好的微观基础。
2.改进分级治理中的权力配置。与完全参与型相匹配的责权利配置可通过演进来实现,但受既得权利集团的阻碍,时间长、成本高,以中央政府的选择主导权为基础可主动进行责权利配置。职责是政府存在的基础,更是其唯一目标,依据各级政府的信息结构及行为能力、按照效率原则划分各级政府的职责,以此划分为基础确定各级政府的支出责任；权力是履行职责的手段,与其对应的有事权、财权,权责要相对应,利益是政府官员履行职责高效实施支出的动力,其应与权责相统一。
3.完善分级治理中的治理方式。分级治理结构中的治理方式是中央政府激励各主体实现调控意图的手段,是通过改变各主体的行为约束和支付函数而发生作用的,对治理方式的完善主要表现在：转移支付、激励性约束与一般性约束。
三.主要创新点
1.财政分权研究的新视角：财政分权的已有研究主要集中于财政分权的有效性及有效的财政分权,缺乏财政分权的实现机理,本文从财政分级治理结构及演进的角度来探究财政分权,增强了财政分权的微观基础,并呈现出其过程性影响。
2.农村财政分级治理结构类型的归纳及演进分析框架的提出：本文以农村财政分级治理结构的界定为基础,结合我国财政分级治理结构演变的实际,对农村财政分级治理结构区分出五类型,即完全控制型、有限控制型、技术治理型、有限参与型、完全参与型；以方法论的个人主义、结构的人工制品及结构的开放性为假设前提,以制度分析理论和博弈论为基础,以治理主体的行为为中心,提出了“环境—行为—结构”分析框架。
3.揭示出我国农村财政分级治理结构演进的基本逻辑：我国农村财政分级治理结构的演进既是适从目标、追求效率的结果,又是初始结构安排与治理环境变化的结果。结合我国特有的政治结构,结构演进的内部逻辑即效率逻辑,以中央政府的选择行为表现出来,并以不同结构产生的结果为依据。结构演进的外部逻辑体现结构的演进还受到产权结构与生产组织、经济与收入增长、社会发展等外部环境因素的影响。
4.对我国农村财政分级治理结构演进趋势的论证：以现实的结构和环境特征为初始条件,利用已证实的演进规律揭示出结构演进的趋势,使趋势表现兼具科学基础和现实基础。
The rural fiscal system in China posesses independence when it serves the path of national development,and support,reflect,restrain the rural behavior of all levels of the Government. Decentralization-governanced structures,as its operative framework, evolve in pursuit of value and efficiency with functions and value trends of the fiscal system changing. With the city and countryside integrating and the public finance covering rural China, all levels of governments increased the input of the countryside,and apparantly propelled rural development. But the decentralization-governanced structure'adjustments stumble along and the structural inherent defects continue to enlarge.The effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness of the governmental conduct haven't performed fully. In the available literature,the governance model has been conceived on the basis of the external value standards,and the governance programs to some chaos are presented.The defects in the practice and the lag of the theory determine the expected goals of the dissertation:
1.May the whole structural evolution sequence be given one interpretation?What are the principles abided by in the structural evolutions?What are the theoretical tools to analysize the structural evolutions?
2.In the actual structural evolutions,what factors can influence and how do they influence?In a word,what's the internal and external logic restricting the structural evolutions?
3. Under the current situation what is the evolutional trend in the future and how is it propelled?
Rsearch conclutions:
In the papers, the analyses expand in perspective of the micro behavioral principals. The fiscal decentralization-governanced structure in rural China is defined the behavioal rules and relations among all levels of Government,farmers and their organizations practising rural public finance.It is the governance system including principals and their behavioral rules, based on the primary institutions. Based on the relations among principals and the evolutional prctice,it is distinguished into four patterns:the full control type, and the limited control type, and the technical governance type, and the limited participation type, and the full participation type. In line with the political and socical systems,the structural evolution equipment is defined for the central government to choose and construct. On basis of these propositins:the methodology individualism, the structure as artificial product, the structure in openness,by institution analysis theory and sequential game theory,in perspective of principals'behavior,it is infered that these evolutions are restrained by the structures themselves and the governance environment abiding by the structural logic and the outer logic,and both logic are conbined.The outer logic acts by the structural logic. On these premises,the conclutions below are reached.
1. Rural fiscal decentralization-governanced structures' evolutions ocurr in the cyclic actions of "environment—objection—conduct—structure—perfomance". The governance environment proposes governance objections including value goals and real goals. Governance objections demand suitable actions.The structure consist of the rules which is the independent variables of principals'behavior functions. With structural evolutions,the choices of principal'behavior change and are restricted by other social relations,which lead to real perfomance.The gap between the perfomance and the original objections,and new changes of the environment propose new objections which want new strctural evolutions.
2.The structural logic of the evolutions of the decentralization-governanced structure contains:i. When local Governments'revenue exceeds the farmer group'prospective return from the public finance, the full participation type and the promotion for non-agricultural expenditure belong to the dominant strategies;ii. When local Governments'revenue recedes from the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance with the growth and the income from capitals surpassing the cost of eliminating instability from their excess profit, the technical governance type is the weakly dominant strategy; iii. When local Governments' revenue recedes from the farmer group'prospective return from the public finance with the growth and the income from capitals lower than the cost of eliminating instability from their excess profit, the full control type and the promotion for non-agricultural expenditure are the dominant strategies.According to the "environment—conduct—structure" theory,principals(as risk neutrals)'behavioral functions are defined,including the structural parameters.Combined with the realities the mutual actions among all principals are explained by sequential game and the central government'choosing is the chance node of the game.The choosing of local governments and the public change with different struture and governance ways.The central government chooses governance structures and governance strategies to maximize its payoff,As a result the equilibrium comes true,the choices have Nash implementation.
3.With concentrative and collective production organization transforming into traditional family patterns, enterprise-based production patterns,the possibility is reduced that the central government chooses the dominant strategies:the full control type and the promotion for non-agricultural expenditure,while the possibility of implementing the promotion strategy for agricultural expenditure is increased.The conclusion belongs to the external logic.The enviornment is simplified four elements:the property arrangement of agricultural land and production orgnizations,the economic and income growth,the original income gap,rentals.These elements'influence on the structural evolutions is based on the internal logic.They change the payoff function of the central government and act on the balanced choice of governance structures. With the property arrangement of agricultural land and production orgnizations changing,the production and income function of farmers and the payoff functions of all principals have their own changes.In the space of fiscal expenditure,the areas move belonging to the balanced structural choice of the central government.The possibility of the structural Nash implementation is changed.
4. When the central government prefers the revenue growth,it hasn't the motive to implement the incentive strategy about agricultural expenditure;When local Governments'revenue exceeds the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance, the full participation type belongs to the dominant strategies,and when local Governments'revenue recedes from the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance, the technical governance type is the dominant strategy.Though goverments administer economic organizations and social organizations,their power is given by the people serving governments to supply public goods.The efficiency and effectiveness of the supplies are improved by the supervisions and balances, the adjustment, the integration from social and private organizations. Governmental organizations should obtain their revenue accoding to their responsibilities not for the sake of incomes. The dvelopment of private and social organizations relies on gveenment oganizations, government actions lack the restraints from regulations and the public,the occupation boundaries of government organizations,private and social organizations are not clear, government organizations involve in the micro-arragement of resources especially in competitive sectors resulting in the uncertainty of government functions and expenditure.Profit-driven behavior is rooted in the government organizations and is enlarged.The governmental preference to revenue changes the payoff function of the central government moving the boundary of the implementation of incentive strategies with the result that the space of expenditure changes in which the choice about structures has Nash implementation.
5. When the central government prefers the economic growth,it hasn't the motive to choose the full control style;and when the productivity with non-agricultural expenditure is sufficient,there is no the range of the incentive to agricultural expenditure in the expenditure space,and when local Governments'revenue exceeds the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance, the full participation type and the promotion for non-agricultural expenditure belong to the dominant strategies; and when local Governments'revenue recedes from the farmer group' prospective return from the public finance, the technical governance type is the dominant strategy.The preference to the growth drives from the central government to maximize the whole social incomes.Regardless of income distribution,it ignores the social differences of income in its utility function, the areas of expenditure are caused to change which correspond to the central government'choices of balanced structures and governance strategies.
6. When the central government lays emphasis on social development,the widening income gap renders the central government to choose the technical governance type and to motivate agricultural expenditure;When the central government's preferences are constant, the increment in rental income increases the possibility that the promotion incentive for agricultural expenditure is implemented,combined with the technical governance type. It is uncertain that the rapid economic growth lead to social progress, liberal and comprehensive development of every member.The value obliges the payoff of the central government to be decreased by the income gap and the rental,and lead to the choices of governance structures and means moving in the fiscal expenditure space.
7. "Revenue and expenditure unified", as the full control type,derived from the central government' rational choosing under the restraints of the reality and the goals.This choice was based on the evolutionay logic.Its adjustment took place under the restraints of the performance and the ideologies. The new regime is dislocated from the original politics and economy which lacked "the management of figure". The original government's fiscal capacity was low, the existing fiscal ability could't meet its domonance,and the new regime lacked the experienced governance of private sectors.But the "revenue and expenditure unified" type allows the central government to concentrate and distribute all the surplus of society helping it achieve social and economic domonances. The new regime having the ability to completely control and its members lacking private property became the strong action group.The realistic definition of the ideologies restrained the choice of the structure.The individual rationality of private economy and foreign threats also restricted the choice of the structure and the path of construction. Although by "revenue and expenditure unified" the central government can concentrate all of the social surplus to stabilize the regime and speed up economic recovery,the expenditure emphasized on building neglecting consumption.Local governments and production organizations lack the initiative to exploit their own information and resources spawing opportunistic behavior within the system.It is difficult to optimize resource arrgements. Under the restraints of ideology and domonance,the adjustment was limited to the inside of the government belonging to the re-arragement of executive power inside the hierarchical organization,it didn't reform the concentration and unity of the type.The economic growth was caught in the cycle of "decentralization and disorder, concentration and death". The rigid restraints of ideology and the politics of governance means strengthened and deteriorated the odd cycle.
8. "Grade revenue and expenditure contracted" system,as the limited control type, alleviated the inherent defects of "revenue and expenditure unified" system breeding new defects. The "grade revenue and expenditure contracted" system doesnot belong to the central government'equlibrium set,but possesses pratical rationality,which enabled the local governments and farmers to turn into relatively independent profit and production organizations by the contract and executive decentralization activating the production organizations and the local governments to increase production and income,graually breaking through the original ideology.But the local governments and farmers still lacked the effective incentives and restraints, their short -term behavior caused the growth to lack the endurance.The governance structure had not eradicated completely the defects of the full control type:The macro economy still displayed violent fluctuations.Deciding the cardinal sum and the allocation proportion little scientifically and regularly in the contracts increased transaction cost and reduced incentive effect. The most urgent realistic threat was that the central government had the diminished revenue not to control and incite the local governments.
9.The "tax-sharing" system,as the technical governance type,had increased the revenue of the central government and had changed the income-created behavior of the local governments and had realized diversifying and technologizing governance means.But it had caused the county-town public finance to attenuate and farmers'loads to aggravate continually,the opportunities of seeking rent and trsansacting existing in the governance.In the technical governance type,all governments obtained their revenue by shared taxes propelling the reform of micro-property and the formation of a unified market,the central government got a variety of governance means by transfer payments,but local governments didn't remove their seeking interests and obtained their incomes by the transaction of the control of power and resources in the markets under the pressure of increasing incomes,with the result that the extra-budgetary revenue and non-budgetary revenue expanded,at the same time the governance indicators and the regulations of procedure haven't given the expected restraints influenced by social relations embedded.
10. The trend of the evolutions of rural public finance decentralization-governanced structures is to the full participation type.To regulate the forms of governments' revenue and expenditure and to improve budget management and technology raised the efficiency of the supply of public goods.To improve the structure of the indicators, and to standardize the technologies and the procedures,and to establish accountability improve the public financial expenditures. However, for the lack of the incentives and restraints from public demands,and the increment of governance cost,the improvement of governance tools and technologies failed to achieve the desired goals.As a prominent example, the total lack coexists with the structural excess.According to the evolutionary logic,the governance structure trend to the full participation type.Profiting from technical governance derives from governments seeking interests,the dominance of independent property needs the public expenditures,the development of the society trends to benefit every member.These requirements from the environment ask for full participation. The full participation type itself can compress the "rent-setting and rent-seeking" space,and eliminate the government's profit-incentives enabling the governments to subject to the public interest,and embed the dominance of the public demands in the fiscal revenue and expenditure.
Policy suggestions:
1. The limited participation type should be established, while the mechanism and mode of local government budgets are remodeled. The limited participation type doesn't the rational choices of the central government,but the strategy is content with practical rationality, on the one hand which effectively breaks" the ceremony locked" and gradually removes the path dependence,on the other hand which acumulates experiences to establish the full participation type by the learning mechanism. Additionally, the limited participation type has the facilities for its implementation and affords enough participation incentives.It is helpful to the dominance of public demands to be realized,and can raise the efficiency and effectiveness of fiscal expenditures. The fiscal decentralization have a good micro-foundation.
2. The power configuration among all levels of governments should be improved.The responsibility-power-interest configuration matching the full participation type can be established by evolution,but the course is long and costly.The dominance of the central government can adjust the responsibility-power-interest configuration constructively. The existence of governments derives from their responsibilities which are their unique goals. Responsibilities are arranged among all levels of government according their information structures and their abilities,abiding by the principles of efficiency. Expenditures of all levels of government are determined on the basis of the divisions of responsibilities. Power is a means to perform their responsibilities including financial power and decision power, the interests incites government officials to perform their responsibilities efficiently, responsibility-power-interest is required harmonies.
3. The ways of governance should be perfected.The governance ways of decentralization-governanced structures serve intentions of the central government by motivating local governments and farmers, and changing their behavior functions and payoff functions. The improvement of governance ways should focus on transfer payments, incentive restraints and basic restraints.
Main innovations:
1.A new perspective in the fiscal decentralization researches:The available literature focuses on the efficiency of fiscal decentralizations and the effective decentralization neglecting its mechanism of realization. In the dissertation, to explore fiscal decentralizations in perspective of the fiscal decentralization-governanced structure and the evolution strengthens its micro bases and discovers tis process influence.
2.The distinction of the fiscal decentralization-governanced structure and the analytic framework on the structural evolutions:Based on the relations among principals and the evolutional prctice,it is distinguished into four patterns:the full control type, and the limited control type, and the technical governance type, and the limited participation type, and the full participation type. On basis of these propositins:the methodology individualism, the structure as artificial product, the structure in openness,by institution analysis theory and sequential game theory,in perspective of principals'behavior, the analytic framework:"environment—conduct—structure" is presented.
3. The basic logic of the evolutions of the decentralization-governanced structure is discovered. Its evolutions take place in pursuit of value and efficiency and on the basis of original institutions and environment changes.In line with the specical political structure,the internal logic(the efficiencey logic) is embodied by the central government'choosing based on the structural results.The external logic is discovered the influence of the property arrangement of agricultural land and production orgnizations,the economic and income growth,the original income gap,rentals on the structural evolutions.
4.The verification of the trend of the evolutions of rural public finance decentralization-governanced structures:Viewed the current structure and the environmental characteristics as the original conditions,the trend of the evolutions of structures is discovered by the evolution rules to be proved.The trend is obtained scientifically and realistically.
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