摘要
上市公司的盈余管理行为降低了会计信息披露的质量,使得企业的会计信息无法客观、公允地反映其经营状况,误导投资者以及其他相关部门的决策,并严重影响了社会资源的有效配置,因此如何制约企业的盈余管理行为就成为十分重要的问题。盈余管理的影响因素有很多种,本文主要基于管理者的风险偏好视角,研究管理者有限理性情况下盈余管理的变化规律,探寻管理者风险偏好水平对盈余管理的影响机理,并在此基础上依据双重委托代理关系,建立相应的盈余管理约束模型。
全文共包括7部分：第1章为绪论,介绍了文章的选题背景、选题意义、研究内容以及技术路线；第2章是相关的文献综述,对管理者的风险偏好、盈余管理以及二者关系的相关研究进行了梳理和总结；第3章在现有研究的基础上,构建了盈余管理程度的计量模型；第4章建立了管理者的风险偏好水平的综合评价体系,并对我国上市公司管理者的风险偏好水平进行了评价；第5章实证检验了管理者的风险偏好水平对上市公司盈余管理的影响；第6章从我国上市公司存在的双重委托代理关系入手,构建了管理者、控股股东与中小股东的最优收益模型以及相应的盈余管理约束模型,为约束盈余管理行为提供了理论依据；第7章是全文的研究结论和展望。本文取得的主要研究成果如下：
(1)构建了多维度的盈余管理程度评价模型,并对我国上市公司的盈余管理程度进行了评价。
企业资源流动与利润确认的不同步为盈余管理提供了空间。本文以财务报表各指标之间的勾稽关系为依据,从资产计价和费用确认两方面入手,构建了多维度的盈余管理程度评价模型,揭示了企业资源流动与利润确认的不同步性,实现了对我国上市公司在商业信用计价、存货计价、非流动资产计价、费用确认等四个维度的盈余管理评价,以及对上市公司盈余管理程度的综合评价,解决了以往在应计利润法下将盈余管理影响因素视为“黑箱”的问题,且计算更为简便。研究发现,2007—2009年我国进行正向盈余管理的企业明显多于进行负向盈余管理的企业,但从趋势看,正向盈余管理的公司样本数量均呈现出递减的趋势(费用确认维度除外)
(2)构建了管理者风险偏好水平的综合评价体系,实现了对我国上市公司管理者风险偏好水平的综合评价。
管理者的风险偏好特征很大程度上会体现在其个人的决策以及企业的决策中。根据管理者在日常生活和工作中的外在表现,从管理者决策对个人和公司的影响两个层面选取了管理者个人的资产结构以及企业的资产结构、资产来源、负债期限结构、融资与投资的匹配关系和盈利来源等6个方面的指标,构建了管理者风险偏好水平的综合评价体系。在此基础上,本文采用主成分分析法,构建了风险偏好水平综合评价模型,实现了对不同环境下我国上市公司管理者风险偏好水平的综合评价,弥补了预期效用函数理论在应用中的局限性。从评价结果看,2007—2009年的我国上市公司管理者的风险偏好水平在2008年最低,并出现了先递减后递增的趋势。
(3)实证检验了管理者的风险偏好水平对我国上市公司盈余管理程度的影响。
本文选取了2007年—2009年中国上市公司为研究样本,对我国上市公司盈余管理的程度以及管理者的风险偏好水平进行了评价,并进一步分析了管理者的风险偏好水平对公司盈余管理程度的影响。通过实证研究发现,管理者的风险偏好水平对上市公司盈余管理存在显著的影响,即管理者的风险偏好水平越高,公司盈余管理的程度越高。其中,与中小企业相比,大型企业管理者的风险偏好水平对公司盈余管理程度的影响更为显著；与国有企业相比,民营企业管理者的风险偏好水平对公司盈余管理绝对程度的影响更为显著。从盈余管理的不同维度看,管理者的风险偏好水平对公司存货计价维度、非流动资产计价维度以及公司费用确认维度的盈余管理程度均存在显著的jF向影响,即管理者的风险偏好水平越高,上述三个维度的盈余管理程度越大。
(4)构建了双重委托代理关系下,考虑管理者风险偏好因素的盈余管理约束模型。
依据管理者、控股股东与中小股东之间的双重委托代理关系,引入了管理者的风险偏好状况的代理变量,并在考虑各利益相关主体的行为成本与回报的基础上,根据管理者和股东的期望收益率函数,构建了管理者、控股股东与中小股东的收益优化模型,分析了各主体不同行为强度的影响因素,并在此基础上构建了相应的盈余管理约束模型,为防范和制约盈余管理行为提供了理论依据。根据模型可以看出,当实际查处风险较高时,风险偏好水平较高的管理者对盈余管理行为进行了抑制,控股股东的寻租分享行为强度也随着管理者的风险偏好水平的升高而有所降低。此外,企业管理者的风险偏好水平越高,则越需要中小股东进行较高强度的监管。
The earnings management causes the accounting information not to be objectively and fairly reported and investors to be misleaded. Finally earnings management seriously impacts the effective allocation of capital market resources. Therefore it's necessary to limite and constraint earnings management. There are lots of factors that have impacts on earnings management. This dissertation studies the methods to measure the level of earnings management in the context of managerial risk preference, and tries to find how managerial risk preference affects the degree of earnings management. Then based on the dual principal-agent relationships, this dissertation proposes earnings management constraint model.
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 gives an introduction on the research background, significance, contents and the technical route. Chapter 2 shows literature review, which summarizes the relative studies on managerial risk preference, earnings management, and the relationship between them. Based on existing researches, an evaluation model of earnings management is constructed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 establishes a comprehensive evaluation system of managerial risk preference, and measures Chinese listed companies'managerial risk preference. Chapter 5 empirically tests the influence of managerial risk preference on earnings management of listed companies. Starting with the dual principle-agent relationship which exists in Chinese listed companies, Chapter 6 constructs an optimization model for the income of managers, controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and then constructs earnings management constraint model in the perspective of managerial risk preference, which provides the theoretical foundation for constraining earnings management behaviors. Chapter 7 is conclusions and prospects of the dissertation. The main conclusions are as following:
(1)The evaluation model of earnings management is constructed to measure Chinese listed companies'earnings management level.
The desynchronized between company's resources flow and the confirming of profit provides chances for earnings management. The dissertation is based on the relationship of different account titles in financial statements, multidimensional evaluation model of earnings management degree is constructed from asset pricing and expenses confirmation. The model reveals the desynchronized between company's resources flow and confirming of profit, and realizes the valuation of earnings management on the dimension of business credit, inventory, non-current business assets, expenses and so on, and the comprehensive evaluation of earnings management level, thus solves the problem that view the factors of earnings management as "black box" in accruals model. The study finds that, the companies engaging in positive earnings management are more than those engaging in negative earnings management; however, companies engaging in positive earnings management show a trend of decreasing during 2007-2009(except the dimension of expenses).
(2)The comprehensive evaluation system of managerial risk preference is constructed, and the managerial risk preference of Chinese listed companies is measured.
The characteristic of managerial risk preference can be reflected by his decision-making in life and work. According to the manager's decision-making, the dissertation chooses indexes of six aspects to construct the comprehensive evaluation system of managerial risk preference, such as asset structure of the manager and the company, the source of the asset, the debt term structure, the matching relationship between financing and investment, the source of the profit and so on. Based on this, the dissertation constructs the risk preference comprehensive evaluation model and employs principal component analysis to assess the degree of listed companies'managerial risk preference in different environment, which makes up the limitation of expected utility function theory in application. The study shows that, the managerial risk preference of Chinese listed companies is lowest in 2008 and appeares to have an initial ascent after a decline trend.
(3) Managerial risk preference's influence over earnings management is empirically tested.
This dissertation measures Chinese listed companies' earnings management and managerial risk preference in 2007-2009, and makes further analysis of managerial risk preference's influence over earnings management. The empirical research reveals that managerial risk preference has a significant effect on earnings management, namely, the higher managerial risk preference is, the higher degree of earnings management is. Compared with small and medium enterprises, managerial risk preference has more significant effect on the degree of earnings management in large enterprises. Compared with state-owned enterprises, managerial risk preference has more significant effect on the degree of earnings management in private-owned enterprises. Based on different dimensions of earnings management, managerial risk preference has a significant positive effect on earnings management in corporate inventory dimension, non-current assets dimension, and orporate expense dimension respectively, that is to say, the higher managerial risk preference is, the higher degrees of earnings management in above three dimensions are.
(4) Based on the dual principal-agent relationships, the earnings management constraint model is constructed from the perspective of managerial risk preference.
On the basis of the dual principal-agent relation between managers and shareholders, this dissertation reveals the cost and reward of all the stakeholders'behaviors in the context of managerial risk preference. According to the expectations yield function of shareholders and managers, we creats the revenue optimization model of stakeholders and discusses the influencing factors on their degree of behaviors. Thus this dissertation proposes earnings management constraint model from the perspective of managerial risk preference and offers the theoretical foundation for restraining corporate earnings management behaviors. The models show that, when the risk of being investigated and dealed with is high, managers with high level of risk preference will restrain the earnings management degree by themselves while the rent-seeking and sharing degree of controlling shareholders is decreased with the level of managerial risk preference ascending. And the higher managerial risk preference is, the minority shareholders need to go ahead with stronger supervision.
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