农业政策、农户行为与农村区域经济的发展
摘要
从2004年至2012年中央政府连续9年发布以“三农”为主题的中央一号文件,表明现阶段“三农”问题在经济建设中具有重要地位。在一号文件纲领性和指导性作用下,各级政府实施了一整套的强农惠农政策体系促进农民增收,推动资源要素向农村配置、加大对农业基础设施尤其是水利设施的投入力度为农业增产提供条件,协调推进城乡改革增强农村经济发展活力,促进城乡区域经济协调发展。在这过程中,中央和地方两级政府采取了一系列的政策措施来促进农业增产、农村发展和农民增收,其中包括：实施退耕还林政策、全面取消农业税、建立新型农村合作医疗制度、推行农村养老保险政策、以及2011年中央一号文件计划今后十年水利投资翻番等政策措施。可以预计,在今后较长时问内,中央和地方政府会继续采取一系列农业政策措施来推动农村区域经济的发展。
现阶段研究农业政策对农村区域经济的影响具有重要的现实意义,然而,现存文献主要关注农业政策实施效果,鲜见研究农业政策如何影响农户行为,进而作用于农村区域经济的发展。研究农业政策如何影响农户行为,有助于了解农业政策影响农户行为的微观机制；研究因农业政策变化的农户行为对农村区域经济的影响,有助于了解农业政策通过农户行为影响农村区域经济的微观传导机制,这种微观传导机制会对农村区域经济产生深远影响。本研究目的在于通过研究三个农业政策如何影响农户经济行为,变化的农户行为又会怎样影响农村区域经济,以探索农业政策影响农村区域经济的微观传导机制。
本文选择新农合门诊补偿、“退耕还林”和农业补贴三个农业政策作为研究的对象,一方面是因为这些政策推行范围较广、涉及农户多、持续时间长,从而对农村区域经济其有深远影响；另一方面,也因为数据原因和笔者研究偏好,尤其是“退耕还林”政策和农业补贴政策是笔者在导师的支持和帮助下,不仅获得了宝贵的研究数据,而且还多次下乡调研,获得了难得的实地考察机会,从而对农户实际情况有更清晰的认识,激起了研究兴趣和爱好。
本文具体结构如下：第1章为绪论,阐述了本文研究背景、意义与目的,简要介绍了研究框架和调查数据的来源；第2章对国内外文献进行系统的梳理和描述,并作出相应的评述。先综述国内外农业政策文献,后针对本文研究的三个农业政策分别进行相应的文献综述,在此基础之上提出本文的贡献；第3章研究了新农合门诊补偿政策对于农户健康需求行为的影响。本章首先分析了农户健康需求行为因门诊补偿政策的改变,随后利用中国健康与营养调查数据估计了农户的医疗需求变化状况；第4章研究了“退耕还林农业政策对于农户生产决策行为的影响。本章首先建立了农户“退耕还林”和“退荒还林”的收益模型,在此基础之上比较两种决策行为的相对收益,以发现“退耕还林”政策如何影响农户的生产决策行为；第5章研究了农户如何配置农业补贴以获得更高的家庭净收益。本章首先实证检验了农户配置家庭资源的决策机制,随后分析了农业补贴政策如何影响农户家庭资源的配置；第6章研究农户因以上三个农业政策而变化的行为对农村区域经济的影响：最后一章为本文研究结论与评述。
本研究的主要发现为以下三个方面：首先,本文研究了新农合门诊补偿政策对于农户需求行为的影响。简要介绍了门诊补偿如何影响具有不同就医习惯的农户,这类农户又会导致两种可能的状态——农户患病后未采取治疗措施,但身体能自然康复即为状态一；农户患病后未采取任何措施,小病拖成大病,从而住院治疗即为状态二。研究发现新农合门诊补偿对农户医疗需求行为的影响表现在：一方面,门诊补偿促使农户状态一下及时进行门诊治疗。虽然这增加了医疗费用,但是能使农户迅速的恢复健康,减轻了因为患病而对家庭收入能力的冲击,而且还能避免农户患病后未采取任何措施而自然康复所经历的痛苦。另一方面,门诊补偿促使农户状态二下降低住院治疗的概率高达12.3%,这表明门诊补偿使农户及时进行门诊治疗避免拖成大病,有效地抵御了健康风险的冲击。新农合门诊补偿政策提高了农户健康存量,从而提高了农户健康消费的天数,这意味着农户从事生产的劳动供给增加。从短期上看,农户因新农合门诊补偿提高了劳动供给量,从而推动农村产量的增加,这意味看新农合门诊补偿政策推动了农村经济的增长；从长期上看,当农户根据新农合门诊补偿政策不断调整健康消费量和单位劳动物资资本存量,从而实现最优健康消费量和单位劳动最优资本存量,农户健康消费和生产决策最终处于新的均衡状态,这意味着新农合门诊补偿政策提高了最优健康消费量和最优单位劳动物质资本存量,但新农合门诊补偿政策不会继续推动农村经济的增长,因此,新农合门诊补偿政策不是长期推动农村区域经济增长的因素。
其次,研究了“退耕还林”政策对农户生产决策行为的影响。研究发现：就某村农户而言,绝大多数农户处于贫困或半贫困的状态,如果政府没有支付退耕补偿费的情况下,农户“退耕还林”导致的短期损失使得农户生计难以维持,农户选择“退耕还林”存在的风险较大,理性选择就是“退荒还林”。由此可知,政府惠农政策落实的快慢取决于政府公信度对农户生产行为的影响,当农户的政府公信度不高时,农户面临的主观风险较大,此时理性选择就是观察一段时间。这就是为什么政府出台的各种惠农政策总是要经过一段时问才能惠及每位农户。使用荒地“退荒还林”难以起到生态修复和保护的作用,同时,在荒地上种植经果林所得到的农业经济效益较低,“退荒还林”无法获得长期经济效益。也就是说,“退荒还林”既不能实现生态修复和保护,也不能起到反贫困的作用,农户只获得退耕补偿费。因此,农户选择“退荒还林”短期内获得退耕补偿费对于反贫困起到了一定的作用,但是对农户长期收益没有影响,不利于改善农户长期生产生活,不利于农村区域经济长期发展。
最后,研究了农业生产补贴如何影响农户家庭劳动力和物质资本的配置。研究得出兼业家庭会把农业生产补贴和劳动力投入到非农行业以获取更高的家庭净收益,从而降低了农业净收益,这不利于农业的生产经营。通过数据发现兼业家庭占农户家庭的比例高达74%,如果以此推算,那么就会有大量的农业补贴资金被农户投入到非农行,从而损害了农业补贴政策激励农户发展农业的积极性。农业净收益的下降对农村区域经济产生了正反两方面的作用。一方面,非农行业净收益高于农业净收益,这就会激励农户把物质资源和劳动力投入到非农行业,从而促进当地非农经济的发展,推动农村劳动力进一步的转移。另一方面,由于农业生产经营以家庭为单位,农户把家庭资源和劳动力更多地投入到非农行业,短期而言,这不利于农业的发展。在农村地区,或多或少存在耕地抛荒的现象,这表明农村非农行业的发展挤压了以家庭为单位的农业生产经营方式。为应对以家庭为单位的农业净收益不具备竞争力的局面,不少地区开始试行规模化农业生产经营方式。可以预计,未来农村区域经济的发展会因地制宜发展具有特色的非农经济,与此同时,以家庭为单位的农业生产经营方式会逐渐被以公司为单位、规模化和机械化的农业生产经营方式所替代。
From2004to2012, the Central Government of China announced Central No.1Document which is themed by agriculture, farmer and rural area every year, which proclaims that at the present stage, those issues play an important role in economic construction. Activated by those documents, governments at all levels have carried out a system of policies supporting and benefitting farmers, which increases their income, promotes resource elements allocation to rural areas, sets the stage for increasing agricultural output by increasing investment in agricultural infrastructure construction especially in hydraulic structure. They also promoted urban-rural reform in a coordinative way to enhance the impetus of agricultural and rural development which helps harmonious development of urban and rural region economy. During this process, both central and local governments took a series of measures to increase agricultural production and peasants'income and develop rural areas, which include carrying out the policy of grain for green, abolishing the Agricultural tax comprehensively, establishing new rural cooperative medical system, putting forward rural endowment insurance system and doubling investment in hydraulic structure in ten years planned by the Central No.1Document of2011. It can be predicted that central and local governments will continue to push forward development of urban and rural region economy.
At the present stage, it has important practical significance to study the effects that agriculture policies have on rural region economy. However, existing sources have paid most attention on the practical effects agriculture policies took, while few studied how they affected farm household behavior, and then influenced development of rural region economy. Studying how agriculture policies affected farm household behavior helps to understand microcosmic mechanism of how those policies influenced farm household behavior, which has far-reaching impacts of rural region economy. This study aims to research how the three agriculture policies influence farm household behavior, and how changed farm household behavior will influence rural region economy. By this way, we can explore microcosmic mechanism of how agriculture policies influence rural region economy.
This paper chooses new farming and outpatient service compensation, grain for green policy and agricultural subsidy as research objects, because on one hand, these policies have wide effects, refer to more peasant families and last for longer time, which make them take profound effects on rural region economy; on the other hand, the statistics and writer's preference matter a lot, for the writer has collected precious data about agricultural subsidy and grain for green policy by field investigation under the tutor's help, which also pall my interests in this field.
The structure of the paper is as follows:Chapter1is "Introduction", describing the background, meaning and purpose. It also refers to the studying structure and data resources; Chapter2is Literature review, including comments to them. Firstly, it reviews documents of agriculture policies both domestic and overseas, and then the three agriculture policies this paper studies. On this base, contributions of this paper are raised; Chapter3studies impacts new rural cooperative medical system has on peasants'health needs. This chapter firstly analyses changes of peasants demands of health driven by outpatient service compensation, and then estimates changes of medical treatment demands, supporting by data of China Health and Nutrition Survey; Chapter4studies how grain for green policy affects peasants'decision-making actions of producing. It firstly builds peasants'profit model of "grain for green" and "wasteland for green", on base of which to compare relative revenue of the two actions. By this way, to find out how grain for green policy affects peasants'decision-making actions of producing; Chapter5studies how peasants gain higher family net revenue by disposing agricultural subsidy. This chapter firstly demonstrates decision mechanism by which peasants dispose family resources, and then analyses how agricultural subsidy influence the disposition of peasants'family resources; Chapter6studies how peasants'actions changed by the three policies affect rural region economy; the last chapter is conclusion and comments.
The contribution of this study is divided into the following three aspects: firstly, this paper studies influences outpatient copayment have on peasants' demand actions, by simply introducing how outpatient copayment influences peasants with various medical service habits. There are two situations of these peasants, the first one is about peasants who will not see a doctor when getting sick, but after some time, they recovered by themselves, and the second one is about peasants who will not see a doctor when getting sick, by which reason their conditions become more terrible. Studies show that the impact of outpatient copayment on peasants'health demand as follow:on the one hand, outpatient copayment enable illness farmers see doctor as soon as possible; on the other hand, outpatient copayment reduce the probability of hospitalization up to12.3%, prevent the impact of the health shock on household income. Outpatient copayment not only enlarges the stock of farmer health, but also increasing the number of health days of farmer, this means that farmer can provide more time into work. From the short-term point of view, farmer can provide more time into work due to outpatient copayment, so increase the GDP of rural areas. This indicates that outpatient copayment can help rural economic growth. From long-term point of view, farmers get the optimal consumption of health stock in the new equilibrium. Economic growth can't be continues by outpatient copayment.
Secondly, this paper studies the impact of grain for green on behavior of farmer's agricultural production. Studies show that, on the one hand, the majority of farmers in our data are poor. If government does not pay money for farmers who have used land to grain for green, then farmers will don't have enough money to alive, so farmers don't use land to grain for green. However, in order to get money of compensation for grain for green, farmers use wasteland to grain for green. If farmers trust the government's promise that government must to pay money for farmers who use land to grain for green, then farmers should use land to grain for green replace use wasteland to grain for green. In terms of using wasteland to grain for green, this can't bring farmers the benefit in the long-term. From above analysis, we conclude that governments should improve their confidence in farmer's mind. Only to do this, fanners can do anything when government wants them to do anything.
Finally, this paper studies the impact of agricultural subsidy on configuration behavior of farmers who how to allocate their labor force and capital. Studies show that peasant households which both engage in agricultural production and non-agricultural job allocate the household resource into non-agricultural industry in order to get more net revenue. This doesn't help the development of agricultural output. The ratio of peasant household which both engage in agricultural production and non-agricultural job is more than74%in total household in our data. This means that a lot of agricultural subsidy to be allocated into non-agricultural industry. The effect of decrease agricultural net revenue on rural economy is double-edged sword. On the one hand, people engage in non-agricultural industry can get more net revenue than engage in agricultural production, this encourage peasant allocates more household resource into non-agricultural industry, so this promotes the development of non-agricultural economy in rural area. On the other hand, the unit of agricultural production is household, so agricultural net revenue is less than non-agricultural industry. In order to promote the development of agricultural production, government should reform the unit of agricultural production.
现阶段研究农业政策对农村区域经济的影响具有重要的现实意义,然而,现存文献主要关注农业政策实施效果,鲜见研究农业政策如何影响农户行为,进而作用于农村区域经济的发展。研究农业政策如何影响农户行为,有助于了解农业政策影响农户行为的微观机制；研究因农业政策变化的农户行为对农村区域经济的影响,有助于了解农业政策通过农户行为影响农村区域经济的微观传导机制,这种微观传导机制会对农村区域经济产生深远影响。本研究目的在于通过研究三个农业政策如何影响农户经济行为,变化的农户行为又会怎样影响农村区域经济,以探索农业政策影响农村区域经济的微观传导机制。
本文选择新农合门诊补偿、“退耕还林”和农业补贴三个农业政策作为研究的对象,一方面是因为这些政策推行范围较广、涉及农户多、持续时间长,从而对农村区域经济其有深远影响；另一方面,也因为数据原因和笔者研究偏好,尤其是“退耕还林”政策和农业补贴政策是笔者在导师的支持和帮助下,不仅获得了宝贵的研究数据,而且还多次下乡调研,获得了难得的实地考察机会,从而对农户实际情况有更清晰的认识,激起了研究兴趣和爱好。
本文具体结构如下：第1章为绪论,阐述了本文研究背景、意义与目的,简要介绍了研究框架和调查数据的来源；第2章对国内外文献进行系统的梳理和描述,并作出相应的评述。先综述国内外农业政策文献,后针对本文研究的三个农业政策分别进行相应的文献综述,在此基础之上提出本文的贡献；第3章研究了新农合门诊补偿政策对于农户健康需求行为的影响。本章首先分析了农户健康需求行为因门诊补偿政策的改变,随后利用中国健康与营养调查数据估计了农户的医疗需求变化状况；第4章研究了“退耕还林农业政策对于农户生产决策行为的影响。本章首先建立了农户“退耕还林”和“退荒还林”的收益模型,在此基础之上比较两种决策行为的相对收益,以发现“退耕还林”政策如何影响农户的生产决策行为；第5章研究了农户如何配置农业补贴以获得更高的家庭净收益。本章首先实证检验了农户配置家庭资源的决策机制,随后分析了农业补贴政策如何影响农户家庭资源的配置；第6章研究农户因以上三个农业政策而变化的行为对农村区域经济的影响：最后一章为本文研究结论与评述。
本研究的主要发现为以下三个方面：首先,本文研究了新农合门诊补偿政策对于农户需求行为的影响。简要介绍了门诊补偿如何影响具有不同就医习惯的农户,这类农户又会导致两种可能的状态——农户患病后未采取治疗措施,但身体能自然康复即为状态一；农户患病后未采取任何措施,小病拖成大病,从而住院治疗即为状态二。研究发现新农合门诊补偿对农户医疗需求行为的影响表现在：一方面,门诊补偿促使农户状态一下及时进行门诊治疗。虽然这增加了医疗费用,但是能使农户迅速的恢复健康,减轻了因为患病而对家庭收入能力的冲击,而且还能避免农户患病后未采取任何措施而自然康复所经历的痛苦。另一方面,门诊补偿促使农户状态二下降低住院治疗的概率高达12.3%,这表明门诊补偿使农户及时进行门诊治疗避免拖成大病,有效地抵御了健康风险的冲击。新农合门诊补偿政策提高了农户健康存量,从而提高了农户健康消费的天数,这意味着农户从事生产的劳动供给增加。从短期上看,农户因新农合门诊补偿提高了劳动供给量,从而推动农村产量的增加,这意味看新农合门诊补偿政策推动了农村经济的增长；从长期上看,当农户根据新农合门诊补偿政策不断调整健康消费量和单位劳动物资资本存量,从而实现最优健康消费量和单位劳动最优资本存量,农户健康消费和生产决策最终处于新的均衡状态,这意味着新农合门诊补偿政策提高了最优健康消费量和最优单位劳动物质资本存量,但新农合门诊补偿政策不会继续推动农村经济的增长,因此,新农合门诊补偿政策不是长期推动农村区域经济增长的因素。
其次,研究了“退耕还林”政策对农户生产决策行为的影响。研究发现：就某村农户而言,绝大多数农户处于贫困或半贫困的状态,如果政府没有支付退耕补偿费的情况下,农户“退耕还林”导致的短期损失使得农户生计难以维持,农户选择“退耕还林”存在的风险较大,理性选择就是“退荒还林”。由此可知,政府惠农政策落实的快慢取决于政府公信度对农户生产行为的影响,当农户的政府公信度不高时,农户面临的主观风险较大,此时理性选择就是观察一段时间。这就是为什么政府出台的各种惠农政策总是要经过一段时问才能惠及每位农户。使用荒地“退荒还林”难以起到生态修复和保护的作用,同时,在荒地上种植经果林所得到的农业经济效益较低,“退荒还林”无法获得长期经济效益。也就是说,“退荒还林”既不能实现生态修复和保护,也不能起到反贫困的作用,农户只获得退耕补偿费。因此,农户选择“退荒还林”短期内获得退耕补偿费对于反贫困起到了一定的作用,但是对农户长期收益没有影响,不利于改善农户长期生产生活,不利于农村区域经济长期发展。
最后,研究了农业生产补贴如何影响农户家庭劳动力和物质资本的配置。研究得出兼业家庭会把农业生产补贴和劳动力投入到非农行业以获取更高的家庭净收益,从而降低了农业净收益,这不利于农业的生产经营。通过数据发现兼业家庭占农户家庭的比例高达74%,如果以此推算,那么就会有大量的农业补贴资金被农户投入到非农行,从而损害了农业补贴政策激励农户发展农业的积极性。农业净收益的下降对农村区域经济产生了正反两方面的作用。一方面,非农行业净收益高于农业净收益,这就会激励农户把物质资源和劳动力投入到非农行业,从而促进当地非农经济的发展,推动农村劳动力进一步的转移。另一方面,由于农业生产经营以家庭为单位,农户把家庭资源和劳动力更多地投入到非农行业,短期而言,这不利于农业的发展。在农村地区,或多或少存在耕地抛荒的现象,这表明农村非农行业的发展挤压了以家庭为单位的农业生产经营方式。为应对以家庭为单位的农业净收益不具备竞争力的局面,不少地区开始试行规模化农业生产经营方式。可以预计,未来农村区域经济的发展会因地制宜发展具有特色的非农经济,与此同时,以家庭为单位的农业生产经营方式会逐渐被以公司为单位、规模化和机械化的农业生产经营方式所替代。
From2004to2012, the Central Government of China announced Central No.1Document which is themed by agriculture, farmer and rural area every year, which proclaims that at the present stage, those issues play an important role in economic construction. Activated by those documents, governments at all levels have carried out a system of policies supporting and benefitting farmers, which increases their income, promotes resource elements allocation to rural areas, sets the stage for increasing agricultural output by increasing investment in agricultural infrastructure construction especially in hydraulic structure. They also promoted urban-rural reform in a coordinative way to enhance the impetus of agricultural and rural development which helps harmonious development of urban and rural region economy. During this process, both central and local governments took a series of measures to increase agricultural production and peasants'income and develop rural areas, which include carrying out the policy of grain for green, abolishing the Agricultural tax comprehensively, establishing new rural cooperative medical system, putting forward rural endowment insurance system and doubling investment in hydraulic structure in ten years planned by the Central No.1Document of2011. It can be predicted that central and local governments will continue to push forward development of urban and rural region economy.
At the present stage, it has important practical significance to study the effects that agriculture policies have on rural region economy. However, existing sources have paid most attention on the practical effects agriculture policies took, while few studied how they affected farm household behavior, and then influenced development of rural region economy. Studying how agriculture policies affected farm household behavior helps to understand microcosmic mechanism of how those policies influenced farm household behavior, which has far-reaching impacts of rural region economy. This study aims to research how the three agriculture policies influence farm household behavior, and how changed farm household behavior will influence rural region economy. By this way, we can explore microcosmic mechanism of how agriculture policies influence rural region economy.
This paper chooses new farming and outpatient service compensation, grain for green policy and agricultural subsidy as research objects, because on one hand, these policies have wide effects, refer to more peasant families and last for longer time, which make them take profound effects on rural region economy; on the other hand, the statistics and writer's preference matter a lot, for the writer has collected precious data about agricultural subsidy and grain for green policy by field investigation under the tutor's help, which also pall my interests in this field.
The structure of the paper is as follows:Chapter1is "Introduction", describing the background, meaning and purpose. It also refers to the studying structure and data resources; Chapter2is Literature review, including comments to them. Firstly, it reviews documents of agriculture policies both domestic and overseas, and then the three agriculture policies this paper studies. On this base, contributions of this paper are raised; Chapter3studies impacts new rural cooperative medical system has on peasants'health needs. This chapter firstly analyses changes of peasants demands of health driven by outpatient service compensation, and then estimates changes of medical treatment demands, supporting by data of China Health and Nutrition Survey; Chapter4studies how grain for green policy affects peasants'decision-making actions of producing. It firstly builds peasants'profit model of "grain for green" and "wasteland for green", on base of which to compare relative revenue of the two actions. By this way, to find out how grain for green policy affects peasants'decision-making actions of producing; Chapter5studies how peasants gain higher family net revenue by disposing agricultural subsidy. This chapter firstly demonstrates decision mechanism by which peasants dispose family resources, and then analyses how agricultural subsidy influence the disposition of peasants'family resources; Chapter6studies how peasants'actions changed by the three policies affect rural region economy; the last chapter is conclusion and comments.
The contribution of this study is divided into the following three aspects: firstly, this paper studies influences outpatient copayment have on peasants' demand actions, by simply introducing how outpatient copayment influences peasants with various medical service habits. There are two situations of these peasants, the first one is about peasants who will not see a doctor when getting sick, but after some time, they recovered by themselves, and the second one is about peasants who will not see a doctor when getting sick, by which reason their conditions become more terrible. Studies show that the impact of outpatient copayment on peasants'health demand as follow:on the one hand, outpatient copayment enable illness farmers see doctor as soon as possible; on the other hand, outpatient copayment reduce the probability of hospitalization up to12.3%, prevent the impact of the health shock on household income. Outpatient copayment not only enlarges the stock of farmer health, but also increasing the number of health days of farmer, this means that farmer can provide more time into work. From the short-term point of view, farmer can provide more time into work due to outpatient copayment, so increase the GDP of rural areas. This indicates that outpatient copayment can help rural economic growth. From long-term point of view, farmers get the optimal consumption of health stock in the new equilibrium. Economic growth can't be continues by outpatient copayment.
Secondly, this paper studies the impact of grain for green on behavior of farmer's agricultural production. Studies show that, on the one hand, the majority of farmers in our data are poor. If government does not pay money for farmers who have used land to grain for green, then farmers will don't have enough money to alive, so farmers don't use land to grain for green. However, in order to get money of compensation for grain for green, farmers use wasteland to grain for green. If farmers trust the government's promise that government must to pay money for farmers who use land to grain for green, then farmers should use land to grain for green replace use wasteland to grain for green. In terms of using wasteland to grain for green, this can't bring farmers the benefit in the long-term. From above analysis, we conclude that governments should improve their confidence in farmer's mind. Only to do this, fanners can do anything when government wants them to do anything.
Finally, this paper studies the impact of agricultural subsidy on configuration behavior of farmers who how to allocate their labor force and capital. Studies show that peasant households which both engage in agricultural production and non-agricultural job allocate the household resource into non-agricultural industry in order to get more net revenue. This doesn't help the development of agricultural output. The ratio of peasant household which both engage in agricultural production and non-agricultural job is more than74%in total household in our data. This means that a lot of agricultural subsidy to be allocated into non-agricultural industry. The effect of decrease agricultural net revenue on rural economy is double-edged sword. On the one hand, people engage in non-agricultural industry can get more net revenue than engage in agricultural production, this encourage peasant allocates more household resource into non-agricultural industry, so this promotes the development of non-agricultural economy in rural area. On the other hand, the unit of agricultural production is household, so agricultural net revenue is less than non-agricultural industry. In order to promote the development of agricultural production, government should reform the unit of agricultural production.
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[54]帅传敏等,2008：《中国农村扶贫项目管理效率的定量分析》,《中国农村经济》第3期。
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[71]臧文如、傅新红和熊德平,2010：《财政直接补贴政策对粮食数量安全的效果评价》,《农业技术经济》第12期。
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[78]赵显洲,2010, 《关于“刘易斯转折点”的几个理论问题》, 《经济学家》第5期。
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[3]蔡昉,2010：《人口转变、人口红利和刘易斯转折点》,《经济研究》第4期。
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[46]彭克强、鹿新华,2010：《中国财政支农投入与粮食生产能力关系的实证分析》,《农业技术经济》第9期。
[47]冉圣宏、吕昌河和王茜,2010：《生态退耕对安塞县土地利用及其生态服务功能的影响》,《中国人口·资源与环境》第3期。
[48]邵传林,何磊,2010：《退耕还林：农户、地方政府与中央政府的博弈关系》,《中国人口·资源与环境》第2期。
[49]史耀波、李国平,2007：《劳动力移民对农村地区反贫困作用的评估》,《中国农村经济》专刊。
[50]施红,2010：《政策性农业保险中的保险公司激励机制研究》,《保险研究》第5期。
[51]司晓杰,2009：《粮食补贴政策的协同效应分析》,《经济与管理》第11期。
[52]宋璐和左冬梅,2010,《农村老年人医疗支出及其影响因素的性别差异：以巢湖地区为例》,《中国农村经济》第5期。
[53]宋长鸣,胡兴明,2011：《退耕还林背景下桑蚕茧技术效率及生产弹性分析》,《林业经济》第6期。
[54]帅传敏等,2008：《中国农村扶贫项目管理效率的定量分析》,《中国农村经济》第3期。
[55]田秀娟、侯建林、董竹敏,2010：《农户对新型农村合作医疗制度的综合评价》,《中国农村经济》第5期。
[56]汪小勤、姜涛,2009：《基于农业公共投资视角的中国农业技术效率分析》,《中国农村经济》第5期。
[57]王厚俊、李明桥和徐妍,2010：《政府公信度对农户退耕还林行为影响的实证研究》,《农业经济与管理》第3期。
[58]王姣,肖海峰,2006：《中国粮食直接补贴政策效果评价》,《中国农村经济》第12期。
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[60]吴仁寿,2007：《评论：政府公信度纳入绩效考核值得推崇》,《光明网》6月29日。
[61]肖国安,2005：《粮食直接补贴政策的经济学解析》,《中国农村经济》第3期。
[62]肖海峰,李瑞峰和王姣,2005：《农民对粮食直接补贴政策的评价与期望》,《中国农村经济》第3期。
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[66]谢旭轩,马训舟和张世秋,2011：《应用匹配倍差法评估退耕还林政策对农户收入的影响》,《北京大学学报》第4期。
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[71]臧文如、傅新红和熊德平,2010：《财政直接补贴政策对粮食数量安全的效果评价》,《农业技术经济》第12期。
[72]张广科和黄瑞芹,2010：《新型农村合作医疗制度目标及其实现路径》,《中国人口科学》第4期。
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[76]赵志刚和高启杰,2006,《农户医疗需求的约束因素分析——以京郊农民为例》,《中国农村观察》第3期。
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[78]赵显洲,2010, 《关于“刘易斯转折点”的几个理论问题》, 《经济学家》第5期。
[79]钊,钰和蓝海涛,2007《中国农村劳动力的变动及剩余状况分析》,《中国人口科学》第6期。
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