我国地方政府融资平台问题研究
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摘要
地方政府融资平台从上个世纪80年代末就开始出现在神州大地上,不过真正引起国人高度关注还是在2008年末国家反经济周期的经济振兴计划出台之后。客观来说,地方政府融资平台在应对经济外生冲击力保国民经济平稳较快发展、加快投资建设步伐均衡基建成本成果的代际分布、助推城镇化建设优化投资环境增强发展后劲、保障和改善民生推进公共服务均等化、创新投融资体制加快地方经济建设发展等方面发挥了积极的作用。但是,国际金融危机后地方政府融资平台也暴露出今明两年偿债高峰兵临城下、偿债能力不强、公司治理规范化不够、中西部地区成为风险洼地等严峻问题,加之2008年起冰岛、迪拜、西班牙、意大利等亚欧国家一系列的主权债务危机连锁性爆发,引起了国家领导人对我国地方政府融资平台债务、国家经济安全的极大担忧。因此,研究地方政府融资平台问题对于国家经济安全、改革发展稳定的全局、“十二五”国民经济能否“稳中求进”、乃至中国能否抓住战略机遇期实现从“崛起”到“超越”的转变,都是意义重大、功在当下、利在未来、影响深远。
本文试图从地方政府融资平台的分类特征、历史演进、债务通道入手对地方政府融资平台基本面进行勾勒,然后运用宏观经济分析、微观财务异化行为等相关分析工具,从动力、动机、借口、机会、底气、途径六大方面对地方政府融资平台债务膨胀原因进行深入剖析。长期以来被西方主流理论批判的中国式经济管控,在国际金融危机中经受住考验,终于受到西方主流理论界和实务界的逐步认同和虚心借鉴。而地方政府融资平台问题就是一个典型的中国式问题,妥当的解决办法还是要靠中国式治理。因此,本文从政府的视角出发,贯彻多角度、多渠道、多方位的理念,多管齐下、多措并举探寻地方政府融资平台债务问题的解决之道；同时,考虑金融是现代经济的核心,银行业在我国金融体系又处于核心地位,而银行业平台贷款背后潜伏的金融风险状况同样深刻影响着国家经济安全,为此,本文还从银行业的视角出发,探讨平台贷款的风险管控之策。
本文的行文结构安排如下：
第一章,导论。在这个部分,本文对选题背景、研究意义、研究对象的界定、研究方法,以及行文结构和技术路线图进行总体的介绍。
第二章,地方政府融资平台概述。该章具体介绍地方政府融资平台的类型与特点、三大历史演进阶段、五大融资通道,为后面章节提供必要的背景交代。
第三章,地方政府融资平台的作用与问题。基于前述理论章节的叙述,本章对我国融资平台的积极作用和存在的问题进行细致的探讨,目的是找准融资平台问题所在,为后文探讨融资平台债台高筑的原因作铺垫。
第四章,地方政府融资平台债务膨胀的理论分析。在本章中,从动力、动机、借口、机会、底气、途径这六大要素作为切入点和突破口,深入挖掘平台债务膨胀的根源,梳理内在的机理,为后文平台债务治理和银行风险管控树立了靶子,力求做到对症下药、有的放矢。
第五章,政府部门与地方政府融资平台债务治理。本章立足政府部门的角度,从扭转政绩考核导向、推进财税体制改革、改进政府会计系统、扩容地方债券发行、加强平台规范管理等思路,摸索适合我国国情的以政府为主导的融资平台债务治理办法。
第六章,商业银行与地方政府融资平台风险管控。本章立足银行业的角度,对平台信贷资产的风险进行分析,从强化贷前审批、做实贷后管理、重启信贷资产证券化、延展平台贷款期限的思路探索银行业平台贷款的风险管控办法。
第七章,结论。本章作为全文的总结,在前述六章论述的基础上,归纳了全文研究的主要结论,明确了本文研究的主要创新点,展望了未来后续研究的方向。
本文的主要结论有如下几点：
1.平台债务疯狂膨胀是六大因素合力作用所导致。城市化提速是地方政府加快基础建设投资的外在动力；政绩考核的经济化是地方政府投融资冲动的内在动机;分税制下财权与事权不对称是地方政府举债建设投资的借口；松弛的财政货币政策是地方政府大举借债的绝好机会；财政联邦制下的预算软约束是地方政府大胆举债的底气；设立融资平台作为特殊目的载体,表外化或有化政府债务是地方政府规避现行法律障碍举债的有效途径。
2.此次平台债务问题,金融风险只是表象,财政风险才是实质。财力不足又追求经济政绩的地方政府,通过融资平台借入大量的中短期债务后,把相当部分投放到现金流回收周期较长或者不太理想的建设项目,结果债务和现金流的期限结构产生错配,债务到期缺乏足够的现金流偿还,进而引起银行业不良资产和坏账飙升的隐忧。
3.平台债务风险分布具有不均衡性、不对称性。平台债务风险在全国并不是均匀分布,而是在不同地区、不同的平台层级呈现出明显的差异。具体来说,从地区来看,风险集中主要集中在中西部地区的融资平台；从层级来看,风险集中在市县级融资平台,因此,平台债务风险的洼地就是这两个风险集中点的交汇之处——中西部地区市县级融资平台。这就更加精准定位了平台债务治理的目标,着眼点紧紧盯在中西部市县融资平台债务,施以“外科手术式管控”。
4.平台债务治理举措贯穿多角度、多主体、多维度的中国式管控理念。治理融资平台债务必须与时俱进、统筹兼顾、开拓创新,摈弃片面、孤立、静止的落后观念,既立足现在又放眼未来,既短期严防又长期谋划,既宏观着眼又微观着手,既扬汤止沸又釜底抽薪,做到远近结合、堵疏结合、发改结合,多管齐下、多措并举、多方联动,方能正本清源、标本兼治、长治久安。对于政府部门要有堵有疏,既要扭转政绩考核导向、改进政府会计系统,又要推进财税体制改革,扩容地方债券发行。对于融资平台,要做到改革与发展并举,要“边规范清理,边升级转型”,“在规范中谋转型,在转型中促规范”；对于银行业,既要“以时间换空间”,允许展期平台贷款,为后续风险管控腾出时间,又要“在风险管控促进结构调整,在稳重求进中消化信用风险”。
5.平台债务风险从短期来看形势严峻,但长期来看又总体可控。今明两年融资平台到期债务峰值兵临城下,融资平台现有的现金流难以抵御债务到期本息一波又一波的冲击,形势确实不容乐观,更不能掉以轻心。但是如果给予融资平台适当的展期延迟债务本金,那么风险又是总体可控,一方面,清理整顿后融资平台得到注资增信,资金实力得到增强,以及在到期债务的展期时间里,随着投资项目现金流逐渐走上正轨,融资平台对债务本息的偿付能力大大提高；另一方面,银行业调整业务结构寻找新的增长点,不断滚存增长的银行利润能够消化融资平台贷款转化的呆坏账。更让人宽心的是,政府手上还有有价值超百亿的国有股、自然资源等国有资产作为平台债务的靠山。因此,只要中国经济能够平稳增长,平台债务风险确实是可控的。
Local government financing platforms began to emerge from the late80s of last century in China. Until the end of2008, the public had been concerned greatly by LGFPs when the appearance of national counter-cyclical economic recovery plans by Chinese central government. Objectively, the local government financing platforms have played a positive role in some respects, such as in response to exogenous economy shocks to preserve the stable and rapid economic development, and accelerate the pace of infrastructure building investment, and balance inter-generational distribution of the costs and outcome, and boost urbanization, and optimize the hard and soft investment environment to enhance the development potential, and ensure promoting the equalization of public services and the livelihood, and innovate investment and financing system to speed up local economic construction and development.
However, the local government financing platform also exposed serious problems in the international financial crisis. For example, debt peak siege will emerge in next two years, corporate governance is not standard enough, risk accumulation in the midwest. In addition, in Iceland, Dubai, Spain, Italy and other Asian-European countries, the serial eruption of sovereign debt crisis cause a great concern of the national leaders to the debt of local government financing platform and national economic security from2008. Therefore, research for the local government financing platform to national economic security, and reform, development and stability, national economic growth sound and increasing, and seizing the strategic opportunity to achieve "from rise to transcend" for China is of great significance.
This paper attempts to describe the fundamentals of local government financing platforms from classification features, the historical evolution, and the debt channel. And then research tools as well macroeconomic analysis, as micro-financial alienation behavior were used to expose deeply the reasons of debt expansion of local government debt financing platform from motion, motivation, excuse, opportunity, boldness, and channel. At last, departure from the perspective of the government, the solutions of the debt problems of local government financing platforms were discussed in the basis of multi-angle, multi-channel, multi-orientation. On the other hand, considering banking industry is the core of China's market economy, and the banking sector's financial risk profile impacts on national economic security profoundly, this paper explores the measures of risk management and control to LGFPs'loans from the perspective of the banking industry.
The chapters of this paper are organized as follows:
The first chapter is introduction. In this section, a general introduction is given to the research background, research significance, definition of research objective, research methods, organizational structure, and the technology roadmap.
The second chapter gives an overview of local government financing platforms. This chapter describes the types, characteristics, historical evolution, and the financing channels, providing the necessary background to be accountable for the later chapters.
The third chapter reviews the roles and issues that local government financing platforms play. Based on the description of aforementioned section, this chapter discusses the positive role of China's financing platform and the problems in detail, in order to sort out the issues for the later analysis.
The fourth chapter offers the theoretical analysis of local government financing platforms of debt expansion. This chapter digs the root causes of platform of debt expansion from the six aspects of motion, motivation, excuse, opportunity, boldness, channel, and combs the inner mechanism, so as to set a target and propose a countermeasures for later chapters.
The fifth chapter discusses government departments and local government financing platforms for debt management. Based on the perspective of the government sectors, this chapter aims to explore governance approach to government-led debt financing platform for China's national conditions, from reversing the performance evaluation-oriented, promoting fiscal and taxation structural reform, improving government accounting system, expansing local bonds issue, and strengthening the platforms'standardize management.
The sixth chapter explores commercial banks and local government financing plat-form loans'risk management and control. Based on the angle of banking sector, this chapter analyzes the risk of credit assets of local government financing platform. And LGFPs'loan risk control approaches are explored from strengthening pre-credit approval, enforcing post-credit management, restarting the securitization of credit assets, extending the maturity of LGFPs'loans banking industry.
The seventh chapter is conclusion. On the basis of the foregoing chapters discussed, this chapter summarizes the main conclusions, innovations and contributions of the full text, and the possible direction of future follow-up study.
This paper obtained the following main conclusions:
1. Platform's debt expansion is caused by joint effect of the six factors. Speed-up of urbanization process makes infrastructure investment become a motion; GDP as the key promotion-evaluating criteria is the motivation of local government lead infrastructure investment; rights asymmetry under the tax system is an excuse for local government borrowing to finance investment; easing fiscal and monetary policy is an opportunity to huge-scale borrow for local government; soft budget constraint is the blodness of over-borrowing for local government; setting up a financing platform for the SPV, and making government debt off-balance-sheet, is an effective channel to circumvent the existing legal obstacles.
2. For platforms'debt problems, financial risk is only superficial, and the fiscal risk just be the reality. Local governments borrow a large number of medium-term debt financing platform, but considerable part debts is devoted to the construction project that cash flow payback period is too long or not so ideal. Thus the term structure is mis-matched, and the debt maturity due to inability to cause the anxiety about non-performing assets and bad debts are surging in banking sector.
3. The distribution of risk is unbalanced and asymmetry. Platform debt risk is not evenly distributed across the country, showing a significant difference in different regions and different platform levels. Specifically, from a regional perspective, the concentration of risk is mainly concentrated in the central and western regions of the financing platform; from a level perspective, the risk is concentrated in the city-county level of financing platform. Therefore, the platform debt risk of depression is located at the intersection of these two risk concentrations----the city-county level financing platform in central and western regions. The debt governance objectives of financing platform is even more accurate positioned, and the focus is firmly fixed on the debt of the financing platform in central and western cities and counties, so as to impose "surgical" risk management and control.
4. The platform debt management goes through the control concept of multi-angle, multi-agent, and multi-dimensional. Governing the financing platform debt must go ahead with the times, overall plans, innovations, and abandon the outdated concept of one-sided, isolated, and static. Both basing on present and looking to the future, both short-term strict pre-cause against another long-term planning, both macro focus and micro proceed, the root reasons will be found, and symptoms will be treated. Government departments need to reverse the performance evaluation-oriented, and improve government accounting system, and reform the existing taxation system, and expand the local government bonds issue. Local government financing platforms should be standarized and rectified, and be reformed, upgraded and transformed. The commercial banks should adjust business structure to promote risk management and control, and the maturity of platform loans should be allowed to extend.
5. The situation of platform debt risk is grim in the short term, but platform debt risk is controllable overall in the long run. The summit of due platform debts siege will emerge in the next two years, existing cash flow of the financing platform is difficult to resist waves of impacts of the maturity of principal and interest. Thus the situation is really not so optimistic; we can not be taken lightly. Given appropriate extension to the financing platform, then the financing platforms debt risk is overall controlled. On the one hand, after standardization, financing platforms will be injected capital and enhanced credit, and financial strength be increased. Moreover, with the investment projects of cash flow gradually go on the right track, the solvency to principal and interest of the platforms debt will be greatly improved; on the other hand, the banking industry restructure its business to find a new growth point, and bank profits that is snowballing growth can digest bad debts converse from financing platform loans. More reassuring, ten billion of state-owned shares and natural resources that handed in the government are a guarantee to platform debt. As long as the Chinese economy would growth steady, platform debt risk is exactly controlled in the long run.
本文试图从地方政府融资平台的分类特征、历史演进、债务通道入手对地方政府融资平台基本面进行勾勒,然后运用宏观经济分析、微观财务异化行为等相关分析工具,从动力、动机、借口、机会、底气、途径六大方面对地方政府融资平台债务膨胀原因进行深入剖析。长期以来被西方主流理论批判的中国式经济管控,在国际金融危机中经受住考验,终于受到西方主流理论界和实务界的逐步认同和虚心借鉴。而地方政府融资平台问题就是一个典型的中国式问题,妥当的解决办法还是要靠中国式治理。因此,本文从政府的视角出发,贯彻多角度、多渠道、多方位的理念,多管齐下、多措并举探寻地方政府融资平台债务问题的解决之道；同时,考虑金融是现代经济的核心,银行业在我国金融体系又处于核心地位,而银行业平台贷款背后潜伏的金融风险状况同样深刻影响着国家经济安全,为此,本文还从银行业的视角出发,探讨平台贷款的风险管控之策。
本文的行文结构安排如下：
第一章,导论。在这个部分,本文对选题背景、研究意义、研究对象的界定、研究方法,以及行文结构和技术路线图进行总体的介绍。
第二章,地方政府融资平台概述。该章具体介绍地方政府融资平台的类型与特点、三大历史演进阶段、五大融资通道,为后面章节提供必要的背景交代。
第三章,地方政府融资平台的作用与问题。基于前述理论章节的叙述,本章对我国融资平台的积极作用和存在的问题进行细致的探讨,目的是找准融资平台问题所在,为后文探讨融资平台债台高筑的原因作铺垫。
第四章,地方政府融资平台债务膨胀的理论分析。在本章中,从动力、动机、借口、机会、底气、途径这六大要素作为切入点和突破口,深入挖掘平台债务膨胀的根源,梳理内在的机理,为后文平台债务治理和银行风险管控树立了靶子,力求做到对症下药、有的放矢。
第五章,政府部门与地方政府融资平台债务治理。本章立足政府部门的角度,从扭转政绩考核导向、推进财税体制改革、改进政府会计系统、扩容地方债券发行、加强平台规范管理等思路,摸索适合我国国情的以政府为主导的融资平台债务治理办法。
第六章,商业银行与地方政府融资平台风险管控。本章立足银行业的角度,对平台信贷资产的风险进行分析,从强化贷前审批、做实贷后管理、重启信贷资产证券化、延展平台贷款期限的思路探索银行业平台贷款的风险管控办法。
第七章,结论。本章作为全文的总结,在前述六章论述的基础上,归纳了全文研究的主要结论,明确了本文研究的主要创新点,展望了未来后续研究的方向。
本文的主要结论有如下几点：
1.平台债务疯狂膨胀是六大因素合力作用所导致。城市化提速是地方政府加快基础建设投资的外在动力；政绩考核的经济化是地方政府投融资冲动的内在动机;分税制下财权与事权不对称是地方政府举债建设投资的借口；松弛的财政货币政策是地方政府大举借债的绝好机会；财政联邦制下的预算软约束是地方政府大胆举债的底气；设立融资平台作为特殊目的载体,表外化或有化政府债务是地方政府规避现行法律障碍举债的有效途径。
2.此次平台债务问题,金融风险只是表象,财政风险才是实质。财力不足又追求经济政绩的地方政府,通过融资平台借入大量的中短期债务后,把相当部分投放到现金流回收周期较长或者不太理想的建设项目,结果债务和现金流的期限结构产生错配,债务到期缺乏足够的现金流偿还,进而引起银行业不良资产和坏账飙升的隐忧。
3.平台债务风险分布具有不均衡性、不对称性。平台债务风险在全国并不是均匀分布,而是在不同地区、不同的平台层级呈现出明显的差异。具体来说,从地区来看,风险集中主要集中在中西部地区的融资平台；从层级来看,风险集中在市县级融资平台,因此,平台债务风险的洼地就是这两个风险集中点的交汇之处——中西部地区市县级融资平台。这就更加精准定位了平台债务治理的目标,着眼点紧紧盯在中西部市县融资平台债务,施以“外科手术式管控”。
4.平台债务治理举措贯穿多角度、多主体、多维度的中国式管控理念。治理融资平台债务必须与时俱进、统筹兼顾、开拓创新,摈弃片面、孤立、静止的落后观念,既立足现在又放眼未来,既短期严防又长期谋划,既宏观着眼又微观着手,既扬汤止沸又釜底抽薪,做到远近结合、堵疏结合、发改结合,多管齐下、多措并举、多方联动,方能正本清源、标本兼治、长治久安。对于政府部门要有堵有疏,既要扭转政绩考核导向、改进政府会计系统,又要推进财税体制改革,扩容地方债券发行。对于融资平台,要做到改革与发展并举,要“边规范清理,边升级转型”,“在规范中谋转型,在转型中促规范”；对于银行业,既要“以时间换空间”,允许展期平台贷款,为后续风险管控腾出时间,又要“在风险管控促进结构调整,在稳重求进中消化信用风险”。
5.平台债务风险从短期来看形势严峻,但长期来看又总体可控。今明两年融资平台到期债务峰值兵临城下,融资平台现有的现金流难以抵御债务到期本息一波又一波的冲击,形势确实不容乐观,更不能掉以轻心。但是如果给予融资平台适当的展期延迟债务本金,那么风险又是总体可控,一方面,清理整顿后融资平台得到注资增信,资金实力得到增强,以及在到期债务的展期时间里,随着投资项目现金流逐渐走上正轨,融资平台对债务本息的偿付能力大大提高；另一方面,银行业调整业务结构寻找新的增长点,不断滚存增长的银行利润能够消化融资平台贷款转化的呆坏账。更让人宽心的是,政府手上还有有价值超百亿的国有股、自然资源等国有资产作为平台债务的靠山。因此,只要中国经济能够平稳增长,平台债务风险确实是可控的。
Local government financing platforms began to emerge from the late80s of last century in China. Until the end of2008, the public had been concerned greatly by LGFPs when the appearance of national counter-cyclical economic recovery plans by Chinese central government. Objectively, the local government financing platforms have played a positive role in some respects, such as in response to exogenous economy shocks to preserve the stable and rapid economic development, and accelerate the pace of infrastructure building investment, and balance inter-generational distribution of the costs and outcome, and boost urbanization, and optimize the hard and soft investment environment to enhance the development potential, and ensure promoting the equalization of public services and the livelihood, and innovate investment and financing system to speed up local economic construction and development.
However, the local government financing platform also exposed serious problems in the international financial crisis. For example, debt peak siege will emerge in next two years, corporate governance is not standard enough, risk accumulation in the midwest. In addition, in Iceland, Dubai, Spain, Italy and other Asian-European countries, the serial eruption of sovereign debt crisis cause a great concern of the national leaders to the debt of local government financing platform and national economic security from2008. Therefore, research for the local government financing platform to national economic security, and reform, development and stability, national economic growth sound and increasing, and seizing the strategic opportunity to achieve "from rise to transcend" for China is of great significance.
This paper attempts to describe the fundamentals of local government financing platforms from classification features, the historical evolution, and the debt channel. And then research tools as well macroeconomic analysis, as micro-financial alienation behavior were used to expose deeply the reasons of debt expansion of local government debt financing platform from motion, motivation, excuse, opportunity, boldness, and channel. At last, departure from the perspective of the government, the solutions of the debt problems of local government financing platforms were discussed in the basis of multi-angle, multi-channel, multi-orientation. On the other hand, considering banking industry is the core of China's market economy, and the banking sector's financial risk profile impacts on national economic security profoundly, this paper explores the measures of risk management and control to LGFPs'loans from the perspective of the banking industry.
The chapters of this paper are organized as follows:
The first chapter is introduction. In this section, a general introduction is given to the research background, research significance, definition of research objective, research methods, organizational structure, and the technology roadmap.
The second chapter gives an overview of local government financing platforms. This chapter describes the types, characteristics, historical evolution, and the financing channels, providing the necessary background to be accountable for the later chapters.
The third chapter reviews the roles and issues that local government financing platforms play. Based on the description of aforementioned section, this chapter discusses the positive role of China's financing platform and the problems in detail, in order to sort out the issues for the later analysis.
The fourth chapter offers the theoretical analysis of local government financing platforms of debt expansion. This chapter digs the root causes of platform of debt expansion from the six aspects of motion, motivation, excuse, opportunity, boldness, channel, and combs the inner mechanism, so as to set a target and propose a countermeasures for later chapters.
The fifth chapter discusses government departments and local government financing platforms for debt management. Based on the perspective of the government sectors, this chapter aims to explore governance approach to government-led debt financing platform for China's national conditions, from reversing the performance evaluation-oriented, promoting fiscal and taxation structural reform, improving government accounting system, expansing local bonds issue, and strengthening the platforms'standardize management.
The sixth chapter explores commercial banks and local government financing plat-form loans'risk management and control. Based on the angle of banking sector, this chapter analyzes the risk of credit assets of local government financing platform. And LGFPs'loan risk control approaches are explored from strengthening pre-credit approval, enforcing post-credit management, restarting the securitization of credit assets, extending the maturity of LGFPs'loans banking industry.
The seventh chapter is conclusion. On the basis of the foregoing chapters discussed, this chapter summarizes the main conclusions, innovations and contributions of the full text, and the possible direction of future follow-up study.
This paper obtained the following main conclusions:
1. Platform's debt expansion is caused by joint effect of the six factors. Speed-up of urbanization process makes infrastructure investment become a motion; GDP as the key promotion-evaluating criteria is the motivation of local government lead infrastructure investment; rights asymmetry under the tax system is an excuse for local government borrowing to finance investment; easing fiscal and monetary policy is an opportunity to huge-scale borrow for local government; soft budget constraint is the blodness of over-borrowing for local government; setting up a financing platform for the SPV, and making government debt off-balance-sheet, is an effective channel to circumvent the existing legal obstacles.
2. For platforms'debt problems, financial risk is only superficial, and the fiscal risk just be the reality. Local governments borrow a large number of medium-term debt financing platform, but considerable part debts is devoted to the construction project that cash flow payback period is too long or not so ideal. Thus the term structure is mis-matched, and the debt maturity due to inability to cause the anxiety about non-performing assets and bad debts are surging in banking sector.
3. The distribution of risk is unbalanced and asymmetry. Platform debt risk is not evenly distributed across the country, showing a significant difference in different regions and different platform levels. Specifically, from a regional perspective, the concentration of risk is mainly concentrated in the central and western regions of the financing platform; from a level perspective, the risk is concentrated in the city-county level of financing platform. Therefore, the platform debt risk of depression is located at the intersection of these two risk concentrations----the city-county level financing platform in central and western regions. The debt governance objectives of financing platform is even more accurate positioned, and the focus is firmly fixed on the debt of the financing platform in central and western cities and counties, so as to impose "surgical" risk management and control.
4. The platform debt management goes through the control concept of multi-angle, multi-agent, and multi-dimensional. Governing the financing platform debt must go ahead with the times, overall plans, innovations, and abandon the outdated concept of one-sided, isolated, and static. Both basing on present and looking to the future, both short-term strict pre-cause against another long-term planning, both macro focus and micro proceed, the root reasons will be found, and symptoms will be treated. Government departments need to reverse the performance evaluation-oriented, and improve government accounting system, and reform the existing taxation system, and expand the local government bonds issue. Local government financing platforms should be standarized and rectified, and be reformed, upgraded and transformed. The commercial banks should adjust business structure to promote risk management and control, and the maturity of platform loans should be allowed to extend.
5. The situation of platform debt risk is grim in the short term, but platform debt risk is controllable overall in the long run. The summit of due platform debts siege will emerge in the next two years, existing cash flow of the financing platform is difficult to resist waves of impacts of the maturity of principal and interest. Thus the situation is really not so optimistic; we can not be taken lightly. Given appropriate extension to the financing platform, then the financing platforms debt risk is overall controlled. On the one hand, after standardization, financing platforms will be injected capital and enhanced credit, and financial strength be increased. Moreover, with the investment projects of cash flow gradually go on the right track, the solvency to principal and interest of the platforms debt will be greatly improved; on the other hand, the banking industry restructure its business to find a new growth point, and bank profits that is snowballing growth can digest bad debts converse from financing platform loans. More reassuring, ten billion of state-owned shares and natural resources that handed in the government are a guarantee to platform debt. As long as the Chinese economy would growth steady, platform debt risk is exactly controlled in the long run.
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