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社会性规制扭曲的形成及其治理研究
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摘要
经济高速增长与社会性规制问题的不断恶化是当代中国社会的主要特征。煤矿安全、环境污染等属于社会性规制范畴,但却在中国的土壤中始终难以得到有效治理。本文认为,社会性规制失效的根本原因不在规制本身,而在于中国式的制度安排。具体的,行政体制与规制体制的不兼容,导致中国社会性规制扭曲,而中国式规制扭曲才是当前中国社会性规制的根本问题。如何纠正社会性规制扭曲,探寻造成中国社会性规制扭曲的原因是本文的主要研究内容。在中国,社会性规制体制经历了从无到有,由弱到强,由不健全到相对完善的发展道路。与这一发展过程并行的,中国的经济与政治体制也经历了由计划经济向市场经济,由政府独大到逐步放权的渐进过程,社会性规制实施与影响也受到制度环境方面改革的影响。
     社会性规制的实质是包含多个主体的契约,参与主体有:政府、企业、工人与普通民众等。最优契约的均衡结果应当是在完全信息、平等谈判势力的条件下,各参与人讨价还价的结果。社会性规制过程还受到市场经济与制度改革的深刻影响,其直接影响着完全信息与平等谈判势力等最优契约签订条件的实现。在当前中国制度环境下,社会性规制过程中也暴露了不少缺陷,如社会性规制契约中参与主体的非对称性;社会性规制机构的非独立性;社会性规制手段的非规范化等影响了规制机制的有效运行。
     在中国式分权的行政体制结构安排下,政府主导的市场经济运行方式在改善发展不足与极端落后局面时体现了重要的作用。但是,在具有政治、生产型复合特点的行政结构中,政府掌握了资源配置的主要权利,而市场的作用则处于边缘化境地。现行的体制安排与经济发展模式为政府干预提供了可能,也强化了激励。政府主导的经济发展,使地方政府有充足的理由参与生产经营与市场运行。以干部制度为基础的政绩考核体系,则要求地方政府逐级为上级负责,地方政府则有可能依靠其掌握的各种资源及弹性政策大搞形象与政绩工程,而忽视公共利益。中国式政绩考核体系则是行政体制与政府主导性经济发展模式的具体体现。在这一政绩考核体系下,地方政府将把精力偏重于经济增长目标。即便在当前经济发展更加突出要求发展质量时,地方政府对经济增长的偏好仍未改变。一方面,这与制度、行为惯性有关,另外一方面也是政治体制改革滞后于经济体制改革的结果。
     在中国式地方政府竞争作用下,社会性规制有可能同货币政策、财政政策、税收政策类似,进入地方政府的政策范围,成为其进行经济增长的工具手段。在地方政府为增长而进行的竞争中,社会性规制失效可能不是政府的“无为”所致,而是地方政府主导经济增长进行地区竞争的“有为”行为。行政体制约束下地方政府为上级负责,政治晋升方面则表现为地方政府间的激烈竞争,而投资成为竞争的主要标的物。
     本文将从中国规制现实出发,分析造成中国社会性规制扭曲的制度环境及运行机制,探求造成中国式规制扭曲的因素,以此为基础探寻纠正规制扭曲的治理路径。全文共分7章展开论述,系统分析中国社会性规制扭曲及其影响因素。具体的,本文首先从政府规制的效果出发,拷问政府规制的效果及其对市场的影响。然后,本文比较了规制分权与规制集权的均衡及其结论,并延伸指出规制分权中基本原则。最后,本文以“富士康内迁”为例揭示中国地方政府的角色定位,通过理论与实证,证明了中国式地方政府竞争将带来规制扭曲。
Rapid economic growth and deterioration of social regulation are main features of contemporary China. Social regulation including safety regulation,environmental pollution etc, is always difficult to get effective treatment in China.This paper argues that root cause for regulation failure is not the system of regulation, but Chinese-style institutional arrangements. Specifically, problem of compatible between the administrative system and the regulatory system can result in regulation distortion, and regulation distortion indeed is the real issue to be solved in current China. The main research content of the article is to explore the causes for social regulation distortionin China. Social regulation system has experienced scratch process. Parallel with this course, systems of economic and political has gone from a planned economy to a market economy through gradually decentralization by the government, while implementation and impacts of social regulation will be influenced by the system reform.
     Essence of social regulation is the contracts with the participants of government, business, workers, and ordinary people etc. Optimal balance of the contract should result in bargaining between participants in conditions of complete information, equal bargaining powers. Reforms of market economy and institution affect processes of social regulation, influencing on conditions of optimal contract. In current Chinese institution environment, many shortcomings, such as non-symmetry for bargaining powers, non-independence for regulation institutions and non-standardized for regulatory mechanisms, are exposed for social regulation.
     Under current administrative arrangements, the approach for government-led market economy embodied an important role in improving the situation of underdevelopment and extreme backwardness. However, the government has controled main rights of resources allocation; meanwhile the role of the market is marginalized. The Status quo of economic and institution provides the possibility for government intervention, but also to strengthen the incentives for economic intervention. And government-led economic development provides good excuse for government to participate in production and management.Based on the cadre system, performance evaluation system requires local governments to be responsible for the higher executive.Thus, it is possible local governments make full use of the resources todo something vigorously image and performance projects and neglect public interest. Performance evaluation system is an exemplification of economic development model and institution arrangements, with which, the local government will focus emphasis on economic growth targets. Even more prominent quality is requied in current economic development, the local government preferences on economic growth has not changed. This is partly for inertia of system and behavioral, in fact, mostly stemed from the lags of political reform behind economic reform.
     With the Chinese-style local government competition, social regulation may be the same as monetary policy, fiscal policy, tax policy etc, become a tool for economic growth. During the government competitionfor growth, social regulation failure may not due to the government's "inaction" Behavior, but the "aggressive" behavior for economic growth. Been Constrained by Administrative system, local government should be responsible for the higher executive,while political promotion display with fierce competition between local governments, and investment has become the main subject matter of competition.
     Based on the regulatory reality in China, it analys institutional environment and operation mechanism resulting in social regulation distortion, as a basis to explore the correct path to the governance of regulatory distortions. The paper is divided into seven chapters to systematic study social regulation distortion and d its influencing factors. Specifically, firstly this article considers the participating role in the regulatory process, reveals regulation mechanism from a theoretical perspective in order to deepen the understanding of the regulatory process and seek to find factors other than regulation to improve China's social regulation problems.Then, it compares equilibrium conclusion between the decentralized regulation and centralized regulation and extends acquied the basic principles of separation of regulation. Finally, make use of the case of Foxconn; it reveals the role of local governments in China. Theoretical and empirical analyses demonstrate that local government competition, being constraint with insititution arrangements and performance appraisal system, lead to regulatory distortion.
引文
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